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This study tracks magic as a recurring and ambivalent figure in early-twentieth-
century Cuban intellectual discourse. In the wake of Cuba’s formal political independence in 
1902, magic surfaced as a major practical concern. Public debates swirled around questions 
about the place of ‘primitive’ magical practices in Cuban society. In these collective 
discussions, African-inflected traditions in Cuba commonly stood as the embodiment of the 
primitive propensity to magic. The notion of “Afro-Cuban culture” emerged during the first 
years of independence and, in turn, the notion of “Afro-Cuban studies” as a field of social 
science also took shape. Thus, the title of the dissertation refers most immediately to the 
widespread call for the elimination, or displacement, of magic in general and of Afro-Cuban 
“witchcraft” [brujería] in particular as means to Cuba’s realization as a truly independent and 
modern society.
At the same time, magic also appeared in other ways in the public discussions on 
Cuba’s future. To many Cubans, modernity seemed to depend upon its own form of magic, 
namely, a process of commodification that transformed everything and everyone into 
inanimate entities for capitalist exchange. Cuban intellectuals responded by searching for 
critical strategies that would displace not only the magical endeavors of primitives but also 
what one critic identified as “the magic power of money” in modern life. The intellectuals 
iv
typically framed the critical effort to displace different forms of magic as magical in its own 
right. 
In examining this repeated ironic gesture, the dissertation focuses especially on 
intellectual activity in the years after the 1933 fall of Gerardo Machado’s regime, a period of 
profound socio-political transition for Cubans. The study considers the intellectual 
production of the Afro-Cuban tradition “Santería” as an enduring and emblematic 
development of the times, when the island’s most prominent public figures formally 
inaugurated Afro-Cuban studies as field of inquiry and as an alternate forum for political 
action. Fernando Ortiz stands at the center of these events. The dissertation closely considers 
his efforts to pioneer Afro-Cuban studies as well as engagements with Ortiz’s work—both 
direct and indirect—by Alejo Carpentier, Nicolás Guillén, and Rómulo Lachatañeré.
vPROLOGUE
 “To win the energies of intoxication for the revolution . . . “
1.
In the following study, I consider the activities of Cuban intellectuals during the early 
twentieth century as they tried to define the new scholarly field of “Afro-Cuban studies.” The 
group involved in these efforts included many—if not most—of Cuba’s intelligentsia and 
undoubtedly revolved around the scholarship and personage of Fernando Ortiz. He was 
credited with pioneering Afro-Cuban studies during the early 1900s, and in the ensuing 
decades many writers, artists, historians, policy makers and others made use of and built on 
Ortiz’s ongoing efforts. In my discussion, I examine some of Ortiz’s forays into Afro-Cuban 
studies as well as contributions to the field by Alejo Carpentier, Nicolás Guillén, and Rómulo 
Lachatañeré. The latter three all drew on and engaged Ortiz’s work. Arguably, Ortiz, 
Carpentier, and Guillén stand as Cuba’s three most visible twentieth-century intellectuals. 
Lachatañeré, though little-known outside of circles of Cubanist scholarship, frequently earns 
critical recognition as one of the most important figures in the development of Afro-Cuban 
studies. The examples that I investigate by these four writers date from different moments 
between the mid-1930s and mid-1950s, but they continually refer back to the formation of 
Afro-Cuban studies around Ortiz at the beginning of the century. 
Curiously, in the course of trying to make sense of this material, the epigraph above 
continually resurfaced. I did not plan on the recurrence, but at a certain point I realized that 
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the phrase related to the history of Afro-Cuban studies in a fundamental, even if unexpected, 
way. The remark appears in an article by the German philosopher Walter Benjamin about the 
Paris-based Surrealist activities of the late 1920s. Benjamin presents his essay—written in 
1929—as “the last snapshot of the European intelligentsia,” and his comment functions as a 
summary of “the project about which Surrealism circles in all of its books and enterprises.” 
As I moved deeper into my research, I increasingly recognized the relation of 
Benjamin’s characterization of Surrealist “enterprises” to the group of Cuban intellectuals I 
was considering. Most immediately, Ortiz and his partners in Afro-Cuban studies were direct 
contemporaries of “the European intelligentsia” that Benjamin discussed. But, more than 
mere contemporaneity, what especially struck me was how the Cubans also looked for ways 
“to win the energies of intoxication for the revolution.” Like the Surrealists, a self-constituted 
cluster of Cuban intellectuals endeavored to transform contemporary societies, beginning 
with Cuba itself. In pursuing social revolution, the Cubans frequently talked about—and 
searched for ways to generate—exuberant collective experiences. The intellectuals imagined 
such events, coursing with enthusiastic or “intoxicating energies,” as the means to revitalize 
social orders that had lost most of their vitality under the mechanizations of modern life. The 
oft-repeated idea was that if people ‘lost’ themselves during some shared event then they 
would find new, stronger social bonds in place of the rampant individualism and alienation 
that seemed to define the modern experience. 
From that standpoint, the members of the Cuban intelligentsia about whom I was 
learning paralleled their European contemporaries in developing modernist critiques of 
modernity. Both groups drew on ideas and techniques of the self-proclaimed “modernism” 
unfolding in the literary and plastic arts as well as in philosophy and social science. As an 
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historian of discourses on religion and magic, I was particularly interested in how both the 
Surrealists and Cubans looked toward ritual in searching for socially transformative 
experiences. As each group saw it, the ceremonies of so-called ‘primitives’ created an 
enviable social interdependence, one that connected members of a community and made their 
lives richer and more meaningful. Not surprisingly, a problem remained for these self-
identified “moderns”: how to recover the revitalizing energy of ‘primitive’ rituals without 
falling prey to the ignorance that defined ‘primitives’ as primitive and apparently drove them 
to ceremonial undertakings in the first place.
For the Surrealists and Cubans alike nothing symbolized more than magic the 
paradoxes surrounding ritual. From their perspective, magic involved systematic efforts to 
intervene in the world through the establishment of material correspondences: an individual 
magician or a magically inclined group would create representations—images, effigies, 
chants, material composites, and the like—in order to generate effects related to, or literally 
embodied by, the propitiatory figures. The Cuban intellectuals admired the bombastic spirit 
of magic but decried its fallacious pretenses; they identified with the impulse underlying 
magic—to transform lived conditions—but disparaged practitioners’ misguided convictions 
about the power to engender such change. 
The title of the dissertation—Displacing Magic—encapsulates this ambivalence. On 
one hand, the intellectuals targeted magical practices, with their roots in false notions of 
causality and power, as an impediment to the proper development of contemporary societies. 
On the other hand, modern intelligentsia also wanted to channel the revolutionary impulses 
behind magical endeavors into new forms of social transformation. My main argument 
follows from these points: according to their own terms, the intellectuals figured their 
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enterprises, including efforts to displace ‘primitive’ magic, as magical. They developed their 
own, paradoxical form of displacing magic. And as modernist critique of modernity, that 
endeavor also pointed at a certain “magic” endemic to modern life, namely, 
commodification. 
2.
Still, my study—and its title—ultimately addresses Cuban intellectuals more than 
European Surrealists. So how does “displacing magic” separate from Surrealism and attach 
more exclusively to early-twentieth-century intellectuals engaged in Afro-Cuban studies? I 
discovered that, in this regard too, Benjamin served as an illuminating point of contact. As 
my research developed, I found that the contemporaneity of the revolutionary “enterprises” 
among the European and Cuban intelligentsia cut deeper. Benjamin had not simply exposed 
parallel endeavors. Rather, the two fields of activity bled together in particular, geographic 
places, such as Paris. In some cases, Cubans participated in Surrealist activities; in every 
case, they were aware of their European counterparts. And in a number of situations, the 
Surrealists made their way to Latin America and Cuba, particularly with the rising tide of 
fascism during the 1930s. 
However, the more intimate that the Cubans became with the European and North 
American intelligentsia, the more they tried to distinguish themselves as unique, as 
something other than copycats. As I proceed, I show how the early-twentieth-century Cuban 
discourse of displacing magic—and, in a related way, an emerging field of “Afro-Cuban 
studies”—developed largely out of experiences of displacement—as much literal as 
figurative—when Cubans found themselves by choice and by circumstance off the island and 
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in places like Madrid, Paris, and New York. In those contexts, Afro-Cuban studies and the 
discourse on magic served as means to differentiate Cuba and Cubans. As my account 
unfolds Benjamin surfaces regularly, not only as a commentator. As a continually displaced 
member of the European intelligentsia, he appears as an important character in the story I 
tell. For, like the Surrealists about whom he wrote, Benjamin also searched for ways “to win 
the energies of intoxication for the revolution.” That quest led him to his own particular, 
powerful modernist critique of modernity. At points, my discussion juxtaposes, even if in a 
limited way, Benjamin’s undertakings with those of his Cuban contemporaries in order to 
illuminate similarities among and distinctions between efforts that arose in what I insist is a 
common “discourse circuit.”
3.
If Benjamin’s remark about the Surrealist “enterprises” repeatedly surfaced in the 
course of my work on the present study—first, as an illuminating commentary on 
developments parallel to my main subject; second, as a commentary within the contemporary 
history I outline—then the phrase continues to have further, immediate, and more personal 
relevance to my project. Undoubtedly, Benjamin’s observation is historically specific. He 
clearly referred to a Surrealist “project” based in Paris during the late 1920s. While I insist 
that 1920s Paris—a scene seemingly on the margins of my central narrative—is still part of 
the history I recount, my conviction about the significance of that tangential field of activity 
derives in part from my unwavering sense that Benjamin’s comment not only relates to 
Cuban intellectual life at that time but also, on some level, to my own attempt to account for 
those endeavors. Benjamin’s comment identifies an underlying tension in the Surrealists’ 
xefforts: they were intellectuals who struggled to find ways to overcome what they perceived 
as the limits of intellectualism. After all, intellectual pursuits—especially when held to the 
standard of objective detachment—are not necessarily associated with intoxicating, 
revolutionary energies. 
As Benjamin underscored, the Surrealists hoped to explode the rationalist myth of 
objectivity as a key component of the deadening weight of modern life. The Cuban 
intellectuals I discuss felt a similar disenchantment with the familiar scholarly appeals to 
‘purely’ detached knowledge that seemed to define a disenchanted modern world. Like the 
Surrealists, the Cubans also searched for forms of knowledge that were deliberately engaged 
and directed toward reenchanting contemporary life. They too felt caught between the 
rational pursuit of knowledge and a sense of hollowness associated with excessive 
rationalism. As I note in the course of my discussion, this tension surrounding intellectual 
undertakings continually resurfaces as endemic to what Michel Foucault identifies as a 
“modern order” formalized by Immanuel Kant in the late eighteenth century.
Perhaps, then, it comes as little surprise that I experienced a certain measure of that 
ambivalence in the course of my work on this project. The completion of a dissertation—an 
entrenched mechanism of modern knowledge-production—necessarily requires large 
stretches of isolation, so it is a curious process to retreat to solitary places as well as into the 
privacy of thought in order to learn and write about early-twentieth-century intellectuals on 
both sides of the Atlantic who hoped to overcome what they considered a dangerous, 
disillusioning, and prevalent sense of solitude. There was—and still is—a palpable desire “to 
win the energies of intoxication for the revolution” propelling my efforts with this 
dissertation. I remain uncertain about the precise contours of “the revolution” I have in mind, 
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but I too am certain that it depends upon the creation of vital social connections. Therefore, 
this dissertation—like the intellectual pursuits of the subjects of my study— necessarily 
remains a paradoxical entity: it bears an individual name as the mark of a solitary effort even 
as the project aspires toward some collective end.
4.
I make no claims about my project as victorious in pursuit of socially revolutionary 
“energies.” Nevertheless, I can claim some real success in the battle by insisting—all the 
more strongly from the perspective at the end of the process—that, after all, this individual 
project has been anything but solitary. As I prepare to put this study into circulation for wider 
consideration, I must express my profound gratitude to and deep appreciation of some of 
those who made the undertaking a collective affair all along. They deserve credit for any 
contribution this project might make. Of course, all shortcomings are my responsibility 
alone.
First and foremost, I thank my advisor, Professor Ruel Tyson, for his unwavering 
support, constructive advice, and generosity of time and spirit, even as we worked from a 
distance during the entire dissertation process. Professor Tyson has been a tremendous 
colleague, reader, collaborator, and mentor since the beginning of my graduate studies, years 
before this dissertation even took shape. I am also extremely grateful to the other members of 
my committee: Randall Styers, Alberto Moreiras, Tom Tweed, and Jim Peacock. Each made 
significant sacrifices to ensure that I was able to complete this project. I met Professor Styers 
before I began graduate school, and we have remained friends and intellectual companions 
ever since. Along with his encouragement, Professor Styers’s historical and critical work on 
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the modern theory of magic and religion has been invaluable to me, as indicated by my direct 
engagement with his work in the following discussion. Similarly, I cannot overstate Professor 
Moreiras’s personal and intellectual impact on me. Through his writings, in working groups, 
and in his classes, he has opened up new critical perspectives for me (and, I know, for many 
others) on the wider significance of Latin American intellectual and cultural history. He too 
has been a good friend as well as tireless champion of my research and writing. I also have 
learned much from Professor Tweed’s scholarship over the years. I am especially 
appreciative of his much-needed encouragement during the final stages of writing and of his 
feedback on the manuscript. His insightful commentaries will be invaluable in developing 
this project further, as will the remarks of Professor Peacock. He helped me out by joining 
the committee at a late stage, yet his fresh reading of the manuscript—along with his pointed 
but enthusiastic responses to it—have helped me find the greater clarity with which to carry 
this work forward.
The friends, fellow students, co-workers and staff who helped me along the way are 
too numerous to mention all by name. Among them are: 
• My colleagues in the Department of Religious Studies at Manhattan College who, in 
addition to their continued moral support, picked up the slack I left in professional 
responsibilities during the semesters I worked to complete this dissertation.
• Cohorts in and wonderful companions from the programs in Latin American Studies, 
Cultural Studies, and Religion and Culture at UNC and Duke who responded to 
portions of this work and with whom I have maintained invigorating intellectual 
exchange over the years: Chris Frilingos and Oscar Chamosa (with whom I shared 
lodgings as well as ideas); Esther Poveda, William Villalba, Javier Krauel, Virginia 
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Tuma, and David Sartorius; Barry Saunders, Tom Pearson, Ward Blanton, Jill 
DeTemple, Katie Lofton, Chris Roberts, and Maryellen Davis.
• Stephanie Cobb remains a singular friend and consultant who bridges my lives in 
North Carolina and New York. 
And, of course, I need to express my deepest gratitude to my family. My mother, Ileen 
Shefferman, has always been a well of strength and encouragement, and I know that more 
than anyone else she is excited about and proud of this achievement.  My sister and brother, 
Kim and Scott, have never given up on me and aid me—as they always have—in ways that 
only siblings can. My brother-in-law, Roger Leibowitz, and nephews, Matthew and Evan, 
and my sister-in-law, Ilissa Kabak Shefferman, are true family and as essential to the 
completion of this dissertation as anyone. The forms of help provided by my in-laws from 
Spain—my suegros, Amparín Rico Pérez and Matías Segura Navarro, and my cuñados José 
Manuel, Sergio, Daniel, Pilar, and Juan—are myriad, and their importance to me is 
unquantifiable. Without help at home from Amparín and Daniel during extended visits, the 
final stages of writing would have been impossible. 
Most of all, I gratefully and humbly celebrate the influence here of my daughters, Nora 
and Leah, and of my wife, Dr. Nereida Segura-Rico. They are my main source of 
“intoxicating energies.” The girls were born during my work on this dissertation, and they 
inhabit every word (even if they do not yet understand very many of them). At the same time, 
I could not be luckier than to have in Nereida a life-partner who also shares professional 
pursuits and intellectual interests. Among her countless other contributions, Nereida has 
always offered continual reassurance, remarkable patience, and an inimitable ability to listen, 
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to understand and to respond appropriately and constructively. She has lived with this project 
through its extended course, and it belongs to her as much as to me. 
Finally, I would like to dedicate this dissertation to the memory of my father, Dr. 
Michael Shefferman. Even in his physical absence, he remains one of my greatest teachers, 
an ongoing conversation partner, and a continual inspiration. My best hope is that this 
enterprise effectively carries forth something of his enduring spirit.
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INTRODUCTION: MAGIC AND MODERN CUBA
1.
On the evening of December 12, 1942, Dr. Fernando Ortiz delivered a talk to the 
Club Atenas of Havana, an old and venerable social organization comprised of Cubans proud 
of their “Negro ancestry and blood.” The occasion for Ortiz’s speech was his acceptance as 
an honorary member. Although Ortiz made no claim to any apparent “Negro ancestry,” he 
stood as one of Cuba’s—if not Latin America’s—towering public figures. Between 1902 and 
1926—the first decades of the Cuban Republic—he had served the island’s political interests, 
initially as a diplomat in Spain, France and Italy and later as Liberal Party member of the 
Cuban Congress. However, Ortiz had earned special, international recognition as a scholar. 
With a doctorate in penal law, Ortiz had turned to the study of Cuba’s black population as a 
means of understanding—and potentially solving—a perceived crime problem in the fledging 
republic. Inside and outside of Cuba, he was widely credited with opening up and developing 
social scientific investigation into the island’s “African legacy.” By the time of his December 
1942 speech, he had even earned the title of “el Tercer Descubrador,” the Third Discoverer 
of the Americas. The logic held that Columbus—the First Discoverer—had uncovered the 
route to and geographic location of the Americas and the Second Discover—Alexander von 
Humboldt—had exposed the full natural bounty of the continents. But Ortiz had revealed the 
general structure of American life. He had shown that the Americas, past and present, took 
shape through unique interactions among cultural and natural forms brought by the various 
2peoples who converged on the region over time. In contrast to popular thinking, he 
repeatedly had emphasized and documented the profound influence of African elements in 
the Americas in general and in Cuba in particular. 
In this context of admiration for Ortiz’s achievements, Club Atenas enthusiastically 
tapped him for honorary membership. Ortiz gratefully accepted and chose to address the 
underlying theme that had led him there: racial segregation and its negative consequences. 
He delivered a speech, “Por la integración cubana de blancos y negros” [For the Cuban 
integration of whites and blacks] that, aided by subsequent publications in Spanish and in 
English translation, drew international attention as a profound statement on race relations and 
as confirmation of Ortiz’s tremendous intellectual stature.1 In light of the enduring fame of 
Ortiz’s mediations upon race relations, it is significant that Ortiz spent much of his speech 
talking about himself. More specifically, he considered his central role in the field of Afro-
Cuban studies:
For forty years, I have been an explorer engaged in classification and analysis, 
working with this intricate jungle of African cultural roots that have sprouted 
anew in Cuba, and from time to time I have published some of the results of 
this work as samples of what can be done and as an indication of the great deal 
that still remains to be done in this field of research. (Ortiz 1998: 20)
But while Ortiz suggested with this statement that Afro-Cuban studies was an established but 
open “field of research,” his next set of reflections reminded his audience that the current 
state of scholarship had emerged against all odds:
1The transcript of Ortiz’s speech appeared weeks later in the popular Cuban press (Ortiz 1943a) and 
again, a few months later, in a scholarly review (Ortiz 1943b). The English translation first appeared in October 
1943 as a special publication of the Pan American Union’s Points of View (Ortiz 1943c). This original English 
version includes an introduction by Concha Romero James that offers some background on the speech and 
declares its global significance. That notion is reinforced by the Pan American Union’s alteration of the title 
from “On the Cuban Integration of Whites and Blacks” to the universalized “On the Relations Between Blacks 
and Whites.” Many other editions of the speech followed in Spanish and beyond, including new, excerpted 
English translations in Pérez Sarduy and Stubbs 1993 and InterAmericas 1998. I refer to both those latter 
translations below.
3I published my first volume in 1906. This was a brief tentative study of the 
religious and magical survivals of African cultures in Cuba. I revealed them as 
they were and not as they were thought to be: an extravagant variation of the 
white man’s witchcraft, i.e. the thousand-year-old dealings with demons or evil 
spirits whose classic examples are the horrible practices of European witches 
who sucked children’s blood and soared to their haunts on brooms.[…] In this 
book I introduced the expression “Afro-Cuban,” thereby avoiding the risk of 
using designations tainted with prejudice and moreover exactly defining the 
dual origin of the social phenomena I had set out to study. This word had 
already been used in Cuba in 1847 by Antonio de Veitía(, a fact I learned due 
to the courtesy and great erudition of Francisco González del Valle),2 but it had 
not been incorporated into common parlance as is the case today. My first book 
was generally received by whites with benevolence, accompanied by the same 
condescending or disdainful smile which is often the reaction to Bertoldo’s 
anecdotes, bar-room stories and off-color jokes, while among the colored 
people the only reaction was ominous silence broken only by expressions of 
restrained hostility.[…] The years went by and I continued to work, constantly 
writing on kindred themes.[…] ‘What’s up this little white fellow’s sleeve?’ I 
heard this many times behind my back. Often they asked me to my face, ‘Why 
do you butt in on this Negro business? What is it to you? Wouldn’t it be better 
not to bother with it?’[…]. Today confidence in ethnographic research is 
growing in Cuba and we already have a select, conscientious, capable and 
farsighted minority which understands that the only sure path to complete 
freedom from prejudices is an acquaintance with reality based on scientific 
investigation and on the just appreciation of facts and circumstances. (20-21)
Ortiz’s reminiscence hits upon a few key, interrelated points. The first is that his 
efforts “for forty years” sprang from the specific intention of confronting society’s 
shortcomings. Thus, his 1906 book presented African “survivals” in Cuba “as they were and 
not as they were thought to be.” Similarly, “a select, conscientious, capable and farsighted 
minority” is working “today” for “complete freedom from prejudices.” The second key point 
followed: the way to achieve these goals is through “classification and analysis” or, more 
specifically, the kind of “ethnographic research” that presents a “reality based on scientific 
investigation and on the just appreciation of facts and circumstances.” Ortiz’s third point of 
emphasis goes back to his earlier statement: Afro-Cuban studies—that viable, open “field of 
2The text in parentheses is part of Ortiz’s original transcript but was excised from the published 
translation I cite here. I am restoring the text for reasons that should become more apparent in the course of my 
discussion.
4research” he pioneered—had materialized despite enormous skepticism. The “farsighted 
minority” labored in an underappreciated area but “confidence [was] growing.” 
When taken together, these three points might appear to add up to a fairly 
straightforward account of moral conviction, hard work, and persistence as the principle 
factors behind the viability of Afro-Cubans studies. However, at the center of Ortiz’s 
narrative is a reminder that his “field of research” has a tricky history. The whole business 
pivoted around a particular trick, namely, his introduction of “the expression ‘Afro-Cuban.’” 
Ortiz acknowledged that, by 1942, the term had “been incorporated into common parlance” 
despite the fact that in 1906 he had conjured it into existence or, more precisely, had 
resurrected it from a dead past with another purpose and new life. He had revived ‘Afro-
Cuban’ to bypass “designations tainted with prejudice and more exactly defining the dual 
origin of the social phenomena I had set out to study.”
And what were “the social phenomena” Ortiz endeavored to investigate? As he noted, 
the focus of his “brief tentative study” had been “the religious and magical survivals of 
African cultures in Cuba.” In the speech, Ortiz suggested that how he understood “magic” in 
1942 had not fundamentally changed since 1906. While it was not “an extravagant variation 
of the white man’s witchcraft, i.e. the thousand-year-old dealings with demons or evil 
spirits,” magic was still a materialistic and volitional practice. It hinged upon an act of will in 
which practitioners used ritual propitiations to generate corresponding effects in the world. In 
this regard, a curious link surfaces in Ortiz history between the methods and topic of his 1906 
book. According to his own characterization, his initial study of magic depended upon it own 
trick! Had not he given life to ‘Afro-Cuban’ by introducing it in an original way within the 
ritualistic confines of ethnographic scholarship? Had not he turned to ‘Afro-Cuban’ as 
5something of a magical formula that would circulate how he intended? And had his trick not 
worked? By his own description, his original formulation had since 1906 “been incorporated 
into common parlance.” 
2.
Whether or not Ortiz’s 1906 book introduced the term “Afro-Cuban” into popular 
circulation, his 1942 speech reflects certain truths about the world today. The word “Afro-
Cuban” is part of “common parlance” today as in 1942.3 So too is “Afro-Cuban studies,” the 
corollary designation for that “field of research” that Ortiz labored so tirelessly to establish. 
My own account rests on the discursive reality of those terms. To a certain degree, I mimic 
Ortiz’s 1942 move by tracking the histories of certain terms, beginning with “Afro-Cuban.” 
My endeavor here could be described as genealogical, but I make no pretense to identify any 
absolute linguistic origins. I am more concerned with a dynamic of discourse that surfaces in 
Ortiz’s 1942 reflections. In that regard, the accuracy of his history does not really matter. 
What concerns me most is Ortiz’s effort to call attention to ‘Afro-Cuban’ as an original 
“expression.” His historiography turns on the history of his 1906 move and, in that way, is 
deliberately tricky. 
Accordingly, Ortiz’s linguistic innovation moves my discussion from the introduction 
of the term “Afro-Cuban” to the inauguration of “Afro-Cuban studies.” As it happened, it 
took three decades for a group of scholars to adopt that designation openly. As Ortiz hinted 
3With regard to the contemporary reality of the designations, Tomás Fernández Robaina (2005) offers 
an important and ironic history in a short essay “The Term Afro-Cuban: A Forgotten Contribution.” He points 
out that “Afro-Cuban” remains common despite the official rejection of the term in Cuba since the 1960s. As 
Fernández Robaina points out, the revolutionary ideal of equality among and solidarity between all Cubans 
theoretically precludes qualifying classifications like “Afro-.”
6in his 1942 talk, a “field of research” dedicated to “classification and analysis [of the] 
intricate jungle of African cultural roots that have sprouted anew in Cuba” had developed 
sporadically. Only recently had the task coalesced among the “select, conscientious, capable 
and farsighted minority” that had inspired “growing confidence” in Cuba about 
“ethnographic research.” Ortiz’s comments referred most directly to the Society for Afro-
Cuban Studies. In early 1936 Ortiz proposed the creation of a formal institution for Afro-
Cuban studies and finally found a number of his peers—including many of Cuba’s most 
prominent intellectuals—open to the idea. On June 1, a group gathered in Havana to draw up 
statutes for a new “Sociedad de Estudios Afrocubanos”—“Society for Afro-Cuban 
Studies”—and enthusiastically elected Ortiz as the obvious choice for the Society’s first 
President. In a formal statement released to the public on December 26 of that same year, the 
Society—with a membership of about forty-eight—announced its purpose and design. Less 
than a month later, on January 16 of 1937, “SEAC”—the acronym (Sociedad de Estudios 
Afrocubanos) members took to using—held its first official session. Fittingly, the activities 
revolved around a lecture, or “inaugural address,” by President Ortiz. The events took place 
at Club Atenas.
So the move from reflection on the introduction of “Afro-Cuban” to the inauguration 
of “Afro-Cuban studies” creates a striking cut. The scene jumps back nearly six years in time 
from 1942 to 1937 but hardly changes otherwise. In each case, Fernando Ortiz stands on a 
tropical winter’s night at a podium in Havana’s Club Atenas. Ortiz’s remarks from the 1937 
occasion stand, structurally and thematically, at the center of my account. I come to them at 
the midpoint of my discussion. But, more fundamentally, his words from that night embody 
the critical dynamics I hope to illuminate with my study. 
7What did Ortiz say? The explicit theme of his remarks was “religión en ‘poesía 
mulata’” [religion in ‘mulatto poetry’]. In introducing the talk, he noted his intention to offer 
an example of social science that the new Society for Afro-Cuban Studies might use as a 
model. Therefore, he wanted to show the religious dimensions of—and especially the African 
religious elements in—a seemingly secular and modernist body of contemporary Caribbean 
literature known as poesía mulata (‘mulatto poetry’).4
Ortiz’s lecture circled around magic. In order to illuminate the dimensions of African 
religion in the poems, Ortiz spent much of his talk laying out a characterization of religion in 
general. This task enabled him to identify the particular “African” religious forms reflected in 
poesía mulata. He focused especially on “primitive magic,” a particular species within the 
larger genus of “religion.” In making this point, Ortiz relied on his familiar characterization 
of magic as a matter of trying to use material means, such as repetition of efficacious words, 
to generate corresponding effects in the world in a quest to satisfy personal desires. 
In assessing “primitive magic,” Ortiz made the moves I have already outlined. He 
considered magical endeavors dangerously misguided by false notions of cause and effect. 
However, Ortiz pointed out the critical lesson of poesía mulata. He emphasized that, despite 
the irrationality of the “primitive” forms of African magic drawn into poesía mulata, the 
poems forcefully revealed that magical practices should be taken very seriously as 
expressions of a desire for “liberation” and, more immediately, for intense, liberating 
collective experiences that created bonds among participants and thus transformed the 
communities. In this regard, primitive magic forcefully expressed an underlying human 
4As Ortiz emphasized in his talk, the poems themselves—and not necessarily the poets—were 
“mulatto.” I return to this idea at a later point in my discussion. Moreover, I will continue to use the 
untranslated term ‘poesía mulata’ instead of ‘mulatto poetry’ in order to preserve Ortiz’s critical notion that 
these poems formed a unique body of early-twentieth-century modernist Spanish Caribbean literature.
8impulse—“religiosity,” as he called it—that served as the essence of “religion.” In other 
words, Ortiz highlighted the ‘intoxicating energies’ tied up in magical pursuits.
And in identifying those energies, Ortiz fully intended—to put the matters in 
Benjamin’s terms—to “win” them for a social revolution. In the last portion of his talk, Ortiz 
took an openly political turn. He presented his audience with a prophetic vision in which 
publicly produced and performed “aesthetic theatricalizations” of rites of magic would 
transform Cuban society—and even the whole of humanity—by generating exhilarating 
collective experiences that mimicked the original ceremonies. The terms ‘sacred’ and 
‘profane’ derive, at their roots, around considerations of position in relation to a particular 
place: “the temple.” Profanum—literally, ‘outside (pro) the temple (fanum)’—contrasts with
sacrare—the ‘seat’ of the deities. Ortiz was fully aware of these etymologies, and he 
envisioned deliberate, and literal, acts of profanation. He dramatized the point by insisting 
that “sacred rites, Dionysian in nature,” would “emerge into the light of day” from “their 
crypts,” and he figured this emergence from the temples as a matter of “liberation.” 
My entire study builds around that portrayal of profanation at the end of Ortiz’s 
January 1937 inaugural address. With that image, Ortiz vividly portrayed his quest to 
produce socially revitalizing ritualistic experiences for Cuba and beyond. He also made clear 
that he saw the whole affair as a confrontation of magic. The presence of “primitive magic” 
in the scenario may have been obvious, but Ortiz identified another factor in his equation: 
“the magic power of money.” Ortiz saw in poesía mulata how “primitive magic” would turn 
money’s spell against itself, but the intervention would require a third form of magic: the 
public “theatricalizations,” undertaken knowingly and with revolutionary intentions, that 
produced desired effects. 
93.
In building my discussion around Ortiz’s January 1937 inaugural address, I illuminate 
the broader relevance of the profane vision that concludes the speech. The movements 
around magic in the talk reflect the dynamics of a more general Cuban intellectual discourse 
of displacing magic running across the first half of the twentieth century. I follow the figure 
of magic as it surfaces at points between the early 1900s and 1956 in Ortiz’s activities and in 
some of the intellectual production that drew upon, responded to, and influenced them. My 
point of emphasis is that, as in Ortiz’s speech, the participants in this discourse figure their 
enterprises as magical practices. 
I situate the Society for Afro-Cuban Studies within this frame. The development of 
Afro-Cuban studies provides a window through which to see how, in its play on magic, the 
Cuban intellectual discourse in which SEAC arises and participates is a direct reflection of
and on modernity. The period of this development encompasses the first decades of a 
politically independent Cuba. Freed of Spanish colonial control during the War of 1898, the 
island fell under the official protection of the United States government until 1902. In that 
year the U.S. transferred the powers of governance to an independently elected 
administration, and the Cuban Republic suddenly came into official existence. From this 
standpoint, questions about the nature of Cuban society—what it was, what it should be, how 
those objectives could be achieved, and so on—assumed practical urgency. In discussing 
these issues publicly amongst themselves and with outsiders, virtually all Cubans appeared to 
agree on one point: the legacy of colonialism had hindered Cuba’s development as a 
“modern” society. Cuba had to modernize. 
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In the extensive and often contentious public debates over what exactly it meant to 
“modernize” and how that commonly held objective could be achieved, at least one other 
apparent point of agreement developed: one of the principal roadblocks to the modernization 
of Cuban society was the island’s large “colored” population, which consisted largely of 
former slaves and descendants of slaves. Defined by an overwhelming poverty of material 
wealth and of formal education within this major sector of Cuba’s population, the so-called 
“colored” masses figured in the public imagination as the antithesis of the “modern.” What 
should be done with these people? Could they be educated? Could they be eliminated? Could 
they be sent somewhere else? Nothing symbolized the group’s threat to modernization more 
than the perceived propensity among the colored toward magical practices introduced to the 
island during the centuries of plantation-driven migration by European peasants, African 
slaves, and Chinese contract-laborers. The need to displace primitive magic surfaced in this 
context as a common theme in Cuban public discourse. In this regard, Ortiz’s obvious 
ambivalence in January 1937 toward magic reflected a wider and enduring sentiment about 
the challenges to modernization. 
So too did his invocation of “the magic power of money.” His attack on 
commodification echoed another familiar refrain in Cuban public discussion during over the 
first half of the twentieth century. This position revealed the varied but prevalent influence 
among Cubans of Marxism.5 Marx’s analysis of the mystifying process of commodification 
reverberated far and wide on the island. As Ortiz implied in the conclusion of his January 
5The abiding influence of Marxism in Cuba throughout the early twentieth century should be fairly 
obvious in light of the subsequent triumph at the end of this period of the Castro-led Revolutionary Forces. 
However, as reflected throughout my discussion, claims to and interpretations of Marxism varied widely. For an 
illuminating consideration of diverse reactions to Marxism in Cuba leading into the 1930s, see Luis Aguilar’s 
Cuba 1933: Prologue to Revolution (1972), which traces the development of the 1933 overthrow of Machado. I 
discuss this history more fully in Chapter 2.
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1937 talk, modernity’s magic played out as money, which converts everything into an 
abstract value of exchange. Even though humans to facilitate social interaction had created 
money, that tool of exchange somehow usurped control and came to govern relations. Vital 
human contact had been lost in contemporary societies because capitalism—a particular and 
peculiar version of modernity—had won the day. Under capitalism, all social exchange took 
place through the mediation of objectified commodities. People and places—including 
Cubans and Cuba—had turned into commodities and suffered terribly for it. Therefore, 
modernizing Cuban society meant displacing magic in all of its forms, especially in its 
desocializing modern guises under the rule of capitalist commodification. This modern magic 
had to be dislodged in order to fulfill modernity’s liberating potential and to achieve a real, 
more complete modernization.
But in openly asserting a displacing magic of its own, Ortiz’s January 1937 prophecy 
reveals that Cuban reflections on modernity and modernization played out according to a 
thoroughly modern dynamic. By calling attention to its own displacing power, Ortiz and his 
cohorts participated in a broad modern intellectual tradition that I call “post-Kantian.” With 
that term, I follow Michel Foucault and many others who invoke Kant as a marker of a 
profound shift in conceptions of knowledge. As Foucault explains in The Order of Things, at 
the end of the eighteenth century Kant formally worked out the philosophical framework of a 
“modern order” in which knowledge reaches its ‘end’ with reason’s reflexive return to its 
own workings.6 When Kant came to the conclusion through his three Critiques that rational 
6See especially Chapter 7 (“The Limits of Representation”) in The Order of Things. With the following 
statement, Foucault summarizes a key point in his “archaeology of the human sciences”: 
Confronting ideology, the Kantian critique marks the threshold of our modernity; it questions 
representation, not in accordance with the endless movement that proceeds from the simple 
element to all its possible combinations, but on the basis of its rightful limits. Thus it sanctions 
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pursuits could not make any definitive truth-claims about the external world but only about 
the mechanisms of reason itself, he paved the way for the quintessentially “modern” notion 
that humans therefore were capable of rationally constituting their own worlds. Since reason 
included an “aesthetic” function—that is, the ability to imagine new life forms and to 
recognize these imaginings as such—humans potentially could change the worlds they 
inhabit through the power of their own rational productions. 
Ever since Kant began to work out his critical system more than two centuries ago, 
readers have pushed the implications of his claims in myriad directions with competing 
implications. Frederick C. Beiser summarizes how related yet distinct critical possibilities 
emerged among Kant’s immediate intellectual successors. In a short, illustrative essay on 
“Early Romanticism and the Aufklärung,” Beiser traces two of the primary and most 
influential legacies of post-Kantian thought: Romanticism and Idealism. He shows how these 
traditions developed among a singular group of friends: the famous “Jena Group, ” or self-
identified “new sect,” that directly engaged Kant’s critical system in searching for ways to 
use philosophy and aesthetics—and especially the philosophy of aesthetics—to restore a 
social fabric that they considered seriously frayed. The group—including Ludwig Tieck, 
F.W.J. Schelling, Ernst Schleiermacher, Novalis, Friedrich Hölderin (at times), Friedrich 
Schlegel, and others—regularly met at the house of Schlegel’s brother, August Wilhelm 
(Beiser 1996: 319). For purposes of illustration and explication, Beiser aligns “Romanticism” 
with A.W. Schlegel, as ringleader, and identifies its intimate relation to the “Idealist” system 
represented by G.W.F Hegel, who participated in “the new sect” during its early years at the 
for the first time that event in European culture which coincides with the end of the eighteenth 
century: the withdrawal of knowledge and thought outside the space of representation. That 
space is brought into question in its foundation, its origins, and its limits: and by this very fact 
[…] now appears as a metaphysics. (Foucault 1970: 242-43)
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very end of the eighteenth century. Beiser emphasizes the important differences between 
these two post-Kantian trajectories of thought, but he also highlights their common 
grounding in Kant’s notion of aesthetic self-constitution through human reason that 
imaginatively recreates the world in reflecting on its own operations.
As I demonstrate throughout my study, Ortiz and the other Cuban intellectuals that I 
discuss operate within that same post-Kantian tradition. Ortiz’s intellectual training occurred 
within a tradition of “Krauspositivist” social science descended directly from Kantian 
thought, and the Marxian critique so influential in Cuba also emerged squarely in the post-
Kantian tradition.7 Accordingly, the Cubans often refer directly to earlier thinkers like Hegel 
and, more fundamentally, struggle with many of the same issues as Kant’s immediate 
successors. The tensions between the different post-Kantian trajectories play out in the 
Cubans’ work without necessarily finding resolution. To put it another way, the intellectuals 
move back and forth between “Romantic” and “Idealist” sensibilities. 
4.
The emblem adopted by the Society for Afro-Cuban Studies encapsulates both the 
post-Kantian and the magical parameters of the organization’s modernist engagements with 
modernity. In a lengthy explanation published in 1937 in the first volume of the group’s 
7Many studies, building on Ortiz’s own characterizations of his intellectual formation, highlight his 
associations with positivism, especially with the Italian criminological positivism of Enrico Ferri and Cesare 
Lombroso. However, very few sources consider the more fundamental influence of the Krausism—rearticulated 
as “Krauspositivism”—within the Spanish intellectual circles of Ortiz’s education. A notable exception is 
Consuelo Naranjo Orovio and Miguel Angel-Puig Samper Mulero’s “Spanish Intellectuals and Fernando Ortiz 
(1900-1941)” (2005). German philosopher Frederic Christian Krause (1781-1832) studied in Jena under Hegel 
and Fichte. His direct engagement with Kant’s work led him to a ‘philosophy of identity’ in which reason 
unveils all parts of the universe amounting to a divine organism (God). Krause’s ideas gained widespread 
attention in Spain during the latter half of the nineteenth century through Julian Sanz del Rio, who translated 
Krause’s The Ideal of the Humanity of Life, and through Francisco Giner de los Ríos, founder and director of 
the influential Instituto Libre de Enseñanza (“Free School of Teaching”).
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journal, Ortiz explained the Society’s choice to represent itself through a janus-image taken 
from “the historic, sixth-century B.C. janiform vase made by the potter Charinus” (Sociedad 
de Estudios Afrocubanos 1937: 11). One of the janus’s faces was black while the other was 
white and, therefore, symbolized “the two great races that constitute the Afro-Cuban 
ancestry” that the Society had dedicated itself to studying (11). However, “it was also 
convenient that the symbol had a classical and historical sense to signify more fully the 
character of the new organization” (11). The “classical and historical sense” of the image 
referred specifically to ancient traditions of magic since “it is very probable that the bifacial 
morphology of the vase had a sacred and ritual function of propiatory [propiciatorio] 
character” (12). In other words, SEAC wanted to represent itself with a “sacred and ritual” 
image meant to propitiate magically what it portrayed. Thus, the emblem proclaimed that like 
the janus-image SEAC directed its own magic at other magical forces coming from opposite 
directions.
Fittingly, Ortiz referred at one point to SEAC’s emblem as a “cubanismo,” or 
‘cubanism.’8 In the intellectual discourse under consideration in my discussion, the 
cubanismo served as the most familiar act of magic. The term most often referred to specific 
words or phrases but could apply to almost anything, including a whole novel or a particular 
action. In every case, a cubanismo was an act of creative will. The term applied when Cubans 
deliberately came up with an original word, move, or artistic production. The essence of the 
cubanismo was that it was a creation that called attention to its own originality. In doing so, 
the cubanismo was implicitly irreverent and interventionist. In proclaiming its own 
originality, the cubanismo exposed the reification of other, more familiar productions that 
8Because of the specific meanings and intentions bound up in the cubanismo within this Cuban 
intellectual discourse, I will continue to use the original term instead of its obvious translation as ‘cubanism.’
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obscured their own fictive origins. The self-consciously impertinent creations stood as 
‘cubanisms’ because they ostensibly embodied a tendency to and capacity for creative 
intervention unique to Cubans.
The magical parameters of the cubanismo, as an act of creative will, surface 
immediately. This sense of the magic at work only heightens in light of the material practice 
that characterized the cubanismo. Its originality stemmed from its status as a creative 
transformation—or displacement—of existing materials. It did not invent whole cloth. The 
crux of the cubanismo was that it brought together components from elsewhere in a new way. 
The effect of the cubanismo—the illumination of the fiction at work in itself and in the 
sources on which it drew—arose by making explicit the unprecedented contact between the 
various elements. In that regard, SEAC’s emblem serves as a powerful illustration of the 
cubanismo. The explanation of the symbol highlights that the image itself, with its two 
different faces, is a composite of forms. In turn, this composition reflects how the cubanismo
brings different sources—in this case, a component from a “classical and historical” vase that 
carries a “sacred and ritual sense”—into a contemporary, scholarly project intended to 
destabilize familiar images of Cuban society. 
Therefore, in purpose and structure, the cubanismo paralleled familiar examples of 
“primitive” magic. Like a magical formula intended to bring two people together 
romantically by mixing the spit from one with the fingernail clippings of another, a 
cubanismo tries to unsettle settled ideas and images by mixing materials. It operates 
according to the principle of contagion that James Frazer so famously identified in The 
Golden Bough as the foundation of all forms of magic. It is no accident, then, that Frazer’s 
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theory of magic as well as specific examples of “primitive” magic frequently surfaces in the 
Cuban intellectual discourse that so prominently proclaimed and practiced the cubanismo.9
5.
It is in situating the development and activities of the Society for Afro-Cuban Studies 
within a magical Cuban intellectual discourse on magic that my account comes upon a 
pivotal cubanismo. Following the establishment of the Society for Afro-Cuban Studies in late 
1936, the intellectuals collected in and around the Society tried to initiate wider public 
reconsideration of the place of Afro-Cuban traditions—and of Afro-Cubans themselves—
within modern Cuban society. With that objective, the editors of SEAC’s journal received in 
1941 a section of a work-in-progress by Rómulo Lachatañeré, a protégée of Ortiz and one of 
SEAC’s rising stars. Lachatañeré’s project, sent from New York, created a stir within SEAC. 
In the final portion of the manuscript, Lachatañeré unleashed a fierce critique on Ortiz. 
Lachatañeré held his mentor—the President of the Society and the recognized founder of 
Afro-Cuban studies as a field of social scientific inquiry—personally responsible for creating 
dangerously misguided stereotypes of Afro-Cubans. According to Lachatañeré, Ortiz’s 
pioneering and influential work from the first decade of the twentieth century introduced and 
reinforced “the false term ‘brujería’” as a blanket description for Afro-Cuban traditions. The 
word figured all Afro-Cuban ideas and practices as “fetishistic” witchcraft or sorcery, that is, 
as a dangerous species of “magic” rooted in anti-social, criminal impulses. Lachatañeré 
9For extensive and illuminating analysis of the cubanismo and of particular examples, see the work of 
Gustavo Pérez-Firmat (e.g. Pérez-Firmat 1989). Pérez-Firmat unabashedly frames his own studies of 
cubanismos as  ‘new cubanismos.’ In a future project, I plan a fuller discussion of Pérez-Firmat’s work as part 
of a contemporary intellectual discourse that aims to perpetuate ‘displacing magic’ through the production of 
‘nuevo cubanismos,’ or ‘new cubanisms.’
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implied Ortiz had done nothing to discredit this idea. Building on the historical and 
ethnographic research outlined in the rest of his manuscript, Lachatañeré argued that a single 
term—especially an implicitly pejorative one like ‘brujería’—could not represent the 
diversity of Afro-Cuban traditions. In fact, most Afro-Cuban traditions were not “magic” at 
all. They were “legitimate religions” and warranted description as such. Lachatañeré 
proposed his own term, “santería,” as a viable alternative. 
Worried about the implications of an article so openly critical of the Society’s own 
President, the editors of Estudios afrocubanos asked for Ortiz’s response. In his reply, Ortiz 
took no offense to his student’s criticism and instead offered immediate and enthusiastic 
acceptance of ‘santería,’ Lachatañeré’s proposed term, as a “legitimate and well-formed 
cubanismo” to replace the vocabulary of ‘brujería’  that Ortiz himself had introduced. Ortiz 
celebrated Lachatañeré’s move because, as a “cubanismo,” it exploded reified notions of 
“religion” and “magic” with much-needed and typically Cuban creative intervention.
The latter section of my study explores this mediated 1939 exchange in Estudios 
Afrocubanos between Lachatañeré and Ortiz. I examine the texts in detail because, taken 
individually as well as a group, they reveal the critical dynamic of the intellectual discourse 
in which they surface. More specifically, the texts work on and as displacing magic. In each 
case, the writers identify a socially unsettling sphere of “primitive” magic that they hope to 
defuse by circumscribing it with new categorical distinctions. Significantly, these theoretical 
discussions of religion and magic figure themselves, according to their own terms, as 
“magical” acts, that is, as public performances in which the conjuring of specific words—
particular cubanismos—produces material effects to counteract other spells. In his piece, 
Lachatañeré characterizes ‘brujería’ in magical terms: once articulated, the term took hold 
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and shaped Cuban society in very real ways. In his response, Ortiz does not disavow 
Lachatañeré’s characterization. He discloses how in fact he did conjure ‘brujería’ into 
existence, with profound material consequences. However, Ortiz defended himself on the 
grounds that the effects were not necessarily those that he intended. 
Ortiz’s reflections on the consequential impact of ‘brujería’ are extremely ironic. In 
the 1939 exchange, Ortiz tries to account for the unforeseen effects of his formulation at the 
precise moment that Lachatañeré, while taking his mentor to task for his magical endeavors, 
lets loose his own spell. We only have to look on the shelves of almost any bookstore or 
library, where references to ‘Santeria’ abound, or to see the thousands of hits we get when we 
type ‘santería’ into an online search engine for definitive evidence of the entrenched reality 
in our world of Lachatañeré’s cubanismo. In this way, the 1939 texts—like the 
materialization of the Society for Afro-Cuban Studies decades after Ortiz’s call for that type 
of scholarly organization—force us to reflect upon the peculiar yet acutely real magic at 
work in the early-twentieth-century Cuban intellectual discourse on magic. 
6.
Yet, if the emergence of Santeria as a global presence in the decades since 
Lachatañeré first offered his cubanismo suggests a viable magic at work, that same history 
also reminds us that all of this working with magic is tricky business. The fact is that Santeria 
today does not coincide exactly with Lachatañeré’s idea. With his original formulation, 
Lachatañeré wanted to introduce a technical term that distinguished a particular Afro-Cuban 
“religion” from other traditions and practices. He emphasized that Afro-Cuban “magic” 
existed in other forms separate from “santería.” However, a quick review of the first few 
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pages of search-engine hits demonstrates that Lachatañeré’s cubanismo now carries many 
different meanings, including associations with the kind of magic that Lachatañeré explicitly 
distinguished from “santería.” In other words, santería spiraled out of Lachatañeré’s control 
somewhere along the way in the same manner that ‘brujería,’ another of Ortiz’s cubanismos, 
took on a life of its own. Similarly, “Afro-Cuban” and “Afro-Cuban studies” moved in 
directions Ortiz did not foresee. So, even if all of those cubanismos had magical effects, the 
Cuban intellectual discourse of displacing magic has generated a displaced magic. Its 
productions have gone off course.
7.
Clearly, my account of the development of Afro-Cuban studies during the late 1930s 
tries to connect early-twentieth-century Cuban intellectual activities to the wider dynamics of 
modern discourse. But what kind of account can adequately convey the complex movements 
of a discourse of displacing magic? First, my study inevitably must be selective. In exploring 
the foundations of Afro-Cuban studies, my discussion may seem to contain some notable 
omissions.10 As I have already suggested, insteading of aiming for comprehensiveness I 
10Lydia Cabrera stands as glaring absence in my discussion. Cabrera’s foundational role in Afro-Cuban 
studies cannot be underestimated. Her first book, Cuentos negros de Cuba [Black Stories of Cuba], first 
appeared in 1937 (in French by a Parisian publisher) and thus falls directly within the late-1930s time period on 
which I focus. She was a founding member of the Sociedad de Estudios Afrocubanos as well as an active 
participant in many of the intellectual endeavors to which I refer. Fernando Ortiz, who was her brother-in-law, 
encouraged Cabrera’s ethnographic pursuits and contributed enthusiastic prefatory remarks to the original 
Spanish edition of Cuentos negros (see Cabrera 1940). Similarly, Cabrera’s El monte, released in 1954, falls at 
the tail end of the period I consider. Arguably, El monte remains the most widely read and influential account to 
date of Afro-Cuban practices. As practitioners around the world readily admit, they often use the book as a 
reference guide. (The 1975 Ediciones Universales version of El monte (Cabrera 1975) is the standard edition 
available in the U.S. Due to the unabated interest in Cabrera’s work in Cuba, a state publishing house, Letras 
Cubanas, finally released the book in 1993 despite Cabrera’s official status on the island as an exile and traitor 
to the Revolution.) See also Edna Rodríguez-Mangual’s recent study (Rodríguez-Mangual 2004), which ably 
situates Cabrera’s life and work—as well as Afro-Cuban studies more generally—in the wider context of 
twentieth-century debates about Cuban identity. I originally planned to include discussion of Cabrera and her 
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focus on cases that I consider both foundational to and exemplary of developments in Cuban 
intellectual discourse between the early 1930s and mid-1950s. 
Thus, Displacing Magic is necessarily circuitous. My study jumps back and forth and 
from side to side in an attempt to illuminate more fully through mimesis the peculiar 
workings of modernity. I am primarily concerned with historical developments related to 
Cuba between 1902 and 1956, but my account does not follow a straight chronological line 
and definitely does not stay in one place. As I have already indicated, Ortiz’s concluding 
remarks at the January 1937 inauguration in Havana of the Society for Afro-Cuban Studies 
have already set the account in motion and then reappear as a touchstone throughout a 
discussion that moves backward, forwards, and laterally along a network of discursive lines 
passing through that historical and geographical spot. The circuitous movements of my 
account are part of my argument. Displacing Magic cannot simply portray a discourse 
circuit; my study necessarily moves within its own intellectual network. My study draws on 
and contributes to different scholarly fields, including religious studies and Latin American 
cultural studies. At the same time, Displacing Magic also functions as a transmission point 
where these scholarly fields come into contact in new, potentially effective ways. 
As a dissertation written within a department of religious studies, my study most 
immediately engages that discipline. Displacing Magic connects with a growing field of 
historical scholarship on discourses on religion and magic.11  Within the burgeoning body of 
foundational texts in the present study. I have decided to leave those considerations for a separate project. My 
reasons for doing so are both pragmatic and historical: adequate discussion of Cabrera’s work demands time 
and space not practically available here; at the same time, Cabrera did not actively engage in the theoretical 
considerations of “magic” and “religion” that serve as the focus of my present discussion.
11This body of scholarship includes but certainly extends beyond the following examples: the 
pioneering work of Jonathan Z. Smith (e.g. 1982, 1998); William Pietz’s genealogy of ‘fetish’ and ‘fetishism’ 
(1988, 1987, 1988); explorations in and of ethnographies of magic by Michael Taussig (e.g. 1980, 1992, 1997); 
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literature, Randall Styer’s work—especially his recent Making Magic—operates as an 
immediate point of articulation, ever-present though largely unidentified, in the circuit of 
discourse my discussion establishes. In Making Magic, Styers presents a variety of scholarly 
theories on and invocations of magic since the late nineteenth century. In this review, he 
shows how the modern discourse on magic is magical according to its own terms. As Styers 
emphasizes, this paradox especially illuminates the parameters of modernity itself. “Perhaps 
the most significant subtext that will emerge from these theories,” he explains in setting up 
his review of the discourse on magic, “is the scholarly effort to conjure—or conjure away—
what it means to be modern. Debates over magic provide an extraordinarily rich ground for 
exploring the nature of modernity, its values, and its limits” (2003: 4). Clearly, my own 
project follows Styers’ lead and lends additional support to his argument. I situate early-
twentieth-century Cuban intellectual discourse as one of the “debates over magic” in which 
contributors’ particular attempts to make sense of modernity offer “provide extraordinarily 
rich ground” for our own wider explorations of “the nature of modernity, its values, and its 
limits.” 
Still, the narrower scope of my study enables me to extend Styers’ project—and, I 
insist, the historical scholarship on discourses of religion and magic more broadly—beyond 
current limits. Styers openly acknowledges the boundaries of his project and welcomes its 
development. He notes that, “for both practical and theoretical reasons,” his study focuses 
mostly on English-language examples of “the ‘anthropology of religion’” within the 
“Western scholarly literature” of nineteenth- and twentieth-century “religious studies and 
social sciences” (22-3). “These limitations serve only the interest of space,” he admits. “It is 
Godzich 1987; Stocking1992; Asad 1993; Masuzawa 1993; Benavides 1997; McCutcheon 1997; Molendijk and 
Pels 1998; Peterson and Walhof 2002; Dubuisson 2003.
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important to recognize that modern discourse on magic is as polymorphous and boundless as 
the phenomenon it purports to describe” (22). 
It is not a criticism of Styers’ work to point out that the move beyond the boundaries 
of his project necessarily complicates his main argument. He needs considerable critical 
acumen to show the magic in the body of literature on which he focuses because, as he 
highlights, those “scholarly texts on magic have exerted potent forms of surreptitious –and 
often mystifying– power” (3). I need considerably less analytical prowess to make a parallel 
claim about the field of discourse under consideration here. The power play, the magic, at 
work in the Cuban sources is not surreptitious at all. As I have already suggested and as I 
highlight throughout my discussion, the Cuban intellectuals continually call attention to the 
magic of their knowledge-production. That open will-to-power is exactly the point. And, 
from that angle, Styers may be all the more on the mark. Perhaps the self-reflexivity of the 
discourse of displacing magic makes it all the more surreptitious, mystifying, and potent. So, 
as I proceed, I consider the potency—and potential impotency—of a demystifying discourse 
that constantly proclaims its own furtiveness.
In any case, one of my objectives with Displacing Magic is to transmit Latin 
Americanist critical perspectives more directly into religious studies. In that regard, Latin 
American cultural studies offers one immediate and important contribution to the “Western”-
centered scholarship on discourses of religion and magic. For decades, observers of Latin 
American intellectual production have highlighted its characteristic reflexivity with regard to 
modernity: Latin American intellectuals frequently use modern discourses of knowledge to 
reflect openly upon the limits of modernity. The corollary of this observation is that this 
“double-consciousness”—that awareness of standing simultaneously inside and outside of 
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modernity—is itself typically modern. It is a species of post-Kantianism enabled by and 
peculiar to “the Modern Order.” 
Since I build on this critical point as it plays out in Roberto González Echevarría’s 
influential studies of Alejo Carpentier, I will invoke his scholarship as a specific example of 
Latin Americanist scholarship that could contribute significantly to the development in 
religious studies of wider histories of discourse on religion and magic. At the same time, 
González Echevarría’s work also serves as a reminder that the circuits of scholarship pass 
back and forth. Just as Latin American cultural studies can enrich religious studies, so too 
can the latter widen the perspectives of the former. González Echevarría often utilizes 
categories from religious studies in order to illuminate the dynamics of Latin American 
cultural production. For instance, he considers the relation of “magic” to Carpentier’s 1948 
prologue, and in one of his most influential studies, Myth and Archive (1998), he explores the 
mythic components of Latin American narrative more generally. In doing so, González 
Echevarría challenges established modern categories that imply clear separation of genres 
like “fiction,” “myth,” “law,” “ethnography,” and so on. However, in drawing on categories 
of religion to contest reified literary boundaries, González Echevarría generally relies 
unquestioningly on reified terms from the modern anthropology of religion. In other words, 
he does not subject the social scientific discourse on religion and magic to the kind of 
rigorous historical analysis he wants to bring to modern knowledge-production on literature. 
González Echevarría is far from alone among Latin Americanist cultural critics in this regard. 
A more powerful circuit between his primary areas of study and histories of discourse on 
religion and magic could energize each field of scholarship in that network.
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Still, González Echevarría offers a point of entry into these interlocking circuits of 
modern discourse. González Echevarría suggests that in 1948 Alejo Carpentier already made 
the point that, decades later, contemporary Latin Americanist cultural criticism hammers 
home. According to González Echevarría, the prologue to The Kingdom of This World
unsettles accepted categories of modern cultural production in order to call modernity itself 
into question. Is it possible then that Carpentier’s text, with its “double-consciousness” of 
modernity, also tried to displace familiar notions of magic? This question carries me to Paris 
and Surrealism and then back again to Carpentier’s text, to Afro-Cuban studies, and its place 
in a Cuban discourse of displacing magic.
CHAPTER 1:  BEWITCHING SPOTS: MAGIC, POSITIVISM, AND CARPENTIER’S 
MARVELOUS AMERICAN REALITY (1949)
Your study is located at the crossroads of magic and positivism. That spot is 
bewitched.
Theodor Adorno, to Walter Benjamin (1938)
But what many forget, in disguising themselves as cheap magicians, is that the 
marvelous becomes unequivocally marvelous when it arises from an unexpected 
alteration of reality (a miracle), a privileged revelation of reality, an unaccustomed or 
singularly favorable illumination of the previously unremarked riches of reality, an 
amplification of the measures and categories of reality, perceived with particular 
intensity due to an exaltation of the spirit which elevates it to a kind of ‘limit state.’
Alejo Carpentier (1949)
1.
In November of 1938, Theodor Adorno sent a letter to his friend Walter Benjamin 
with commentaries on a draft of a study called “The Paris of the Second Empire in 
Baudelaire.” In submitting the pages to Adorno, Benjamin had indicated his conception of 
them as a pivotal and exemplary section of the self-described “Arcades Project” on which he 
had been working for nearly a decade. As Benjamin had explained to Adorno on many 
occasions, the Arcades Project circled around the notion of Paris’s nineteenth-century 
shopping arcades as emblematic of what Marx (in one of his own letters to a friend) had 
called the city’s emergence as “the new capital of the new world.”12 Benjamin had completed 
an initial exposé of the project in the spring of 1935 called “Paris, the Capital of the 
12Marx’s comment surfaces in an 1843 letter to Arnold Ruge (Marx and Engels 1978: 12).
26
Nineteenth Century.” With the title, Benjamin made explicit his effort to engage Marx and 
Marxism. Benjamin indicated his immediate intention to turn Marx’s thought back on itself: 
the Arcades Project would follow a Marxian tack in an attempt to situate Marx’s work and 
the development of Marxism during the mid-nineteenth-century consolidation of industrial 
capitalism. In using Marx’s work to spiral back on the development of Marxism, Benjamin 
wanted to release the tradition from what he considered its reliance on a simple-minded 
economic credo of ‘material-base-causes-superstructure.’ He explained his hope to identify 
the non-rational components—especially the roles of sense and desire—that enabled 
capitalism and its continued expansion. 
On a number of occasions, Benjamin had admitted to Adorno and other interlocutors 
that, in searching for a new approach to the non-rational contours of capitalism, his project 
built directly but ambivalently on André Breton’s Surrealism.13 Even before taking up 
residence in Paris in 1929 and moving tangentially through Surrealist circles, Benjamin had 
shown an interest in Breton’s pronounced “modern materialism,” a deliberate effort to build 
on Engel’s critique of “mechanical materialism,” and in the Surrealists’ attempts to enact that 
theory as revolutionary practice.14 Once in Paris, Benjamin quickly recognized the decisive 
influence of Surrealism on and points of critical divergence from his own thinking. In an 
13See, for instance, Benjamin’s November 1928 letter to Gershom Scholem: “In order to lift [the 
Passagen-Werk] out of an all too ostentatious proximity to the mouvement surréaliste that could become fatal to 
me, as nature and well-founded as it is, I have to expand it more and more in my mind….” (Walter Benjamin, 
Briefe, I, 483; as cited in Cohen 1993: 7).
14Breton cites Engels and coins “modern materialism” in his 1927 “Second Manifesto of Surrealism” 
(Breton 1969: 141). In his notes on the epistemological and methodological foundations of the Arcades Project 
(contained in his famous file marked as “Konvolut N”), Benjamin’s cites Breton’s 1935 Political Position of 
Surrealism): “‘I can’t stress enough that, for an enlightened materialist like Lafargue, economic determinism is 
not ‘the absolutely perfect instrument’ that ‘might become the key to all the problems of history.’” Benjamin’s 
emphasis on this citation attests to his continued interest in Breton’s “modern materialist” revision of the 
Marxian base-superstructure problematic. See Cohen 1993: 4 for further source information on and discussion 
of Benjamin’s citation of Breton.
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essay produced during his first year in Paris, Benjamin explored the promise as well as the 
limits of the kind of “modern materialism” posited by Breton. In “Surrealism—The Last 
Snapshot of the European Intelligentsia,” Benjamin emphasized that the Surrealists’ pivotal 
contribution derived from their tireless quest to critique from the inside out the modern 
rationalism from which capitalism derives and on which it depends. The Surrealists pressed 
‘theory’—the ostensible domain of and fulfillment of reason—toward the service of non-
rational experiences that would unsettle the rationalist “mystifications” that grounded modern 
capitalism. In his first Manifesto (1924), Breton figured “the marvelous” (le merveilleux) as 
the alternative domain in which the irrational elements of social reality appeared. Surrealist 
pursuits focused on the delineation of and encounter with “marvelous” as means to transform 
unjust capitalist society. Benjamin summarized the Surrealist Group’s objectives in its quest 
for le merveilleux: “To win the energies of intoxication for the revolution—this is the project 
about which Surrealism circles in all of its books and enterprises,” (1978: 189).
Upon reading Benjamin’s 1935 Arcades Project exposé, Adorno immediately 
recognized his friend’s attempt to bring revolutionary “energies of intoxication” to Marxian 
theory despite Benjamin’s identification of the limits of the Surrealists’ “enterprises.” In an 
August 1935 letter to Benjamin, Adorno expressed his uneasiness with the exposé’s mimicry 
of the Surrealist project. He was particularly troubled by Benjamin’s use, like the Surrealists, 
of Freudian notions of the unconscious and dreams. The exposé suggested that collective 
desires surfaced through an epoch’s material goods, which functioned as “wish-images” akin 
to unconscious expression of desires through dreams. Benjamin proposed that the cultural 
critic could properly mobilize images of those products to create “dialectical images” with 
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the socially transforming power to “awaken the world from the dream of itself.”15 In 
response, Adorno expressed his opinion that “the theory of the dialectical image” was 
fundamentally “undialectical.” With the notion of “wish-images,” Adorno opined, Benjamin 
relied on capitalism’s effects—that is, a key part of its problem—as the means to a solution. 
According to Adorno, what Benjamin needed was a return to Marx’s theory of how a 
society’s “dreams” manifested the ideology that empowered the ruling class.
Thus, three years later Adorno read “The Paris of the Second Empire in 
Baudelaire”—a foundational part of Benjamin’s Arcades Project—with considerable 
disappointment. Adorno did not mince his words in commenting on Benjamin’s draft. 
Adorno expressed his opinion that the theoretical limitations of the 1935 exposé had only 
worsened. As far as Adorno could tell, Benjamin had retreated too far toward a vulgar 
materialism by implying that economic circumstances directly and easily explained 
Baudelaire’s poetry. In any case, Benjamin did not say. He offered no theoretical grounding 
for reading his study. “Unless I am very much mistaken,” Adorno proposed, “your dialectic 
lacks one thing: mediation. Throughout your text there is a tendency to relate the pragmatic 
contents of Baudelaire’s work directly to adjacent features in the social history of his time, 
preferably economic features” (Taylor 1980: 128). After a couple of pages of examples and 
conjectures, Adorno summed up his view of the problem:
The ‘mediation’ which I miss, and find obscured by materialistic-
historiographic invocation, is nothing other than the theory which your study 
omits […]. If one wished to put it drastically, one could say that your study is 
located at the crossroads of magic and positivism. That spot is bewitched. Only 
theory could break the spell (131).
15Benjamin here cited again from Marx’s 1843 letter to Ruge. See Cohen 1993: 21f for further 
discussion of these quotations and of Adorno’s November 1935 reply to Benjamin’s exposé.
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Since Adorno first offered this opinion—and especially in recent decades as interest 
in Benjamin’s work has grown exponentially—third-party observers have weighed in on the 
accuracy of the assessment. Many critics have agreed with Adorno’s own admission that he 
may have missed the theoretical implications of Benjamin’s lack of explicit theory.16
Benjamin intimated as much in responding to Adorno. He explained the implicitly theory in 
his juxtaposition of Baudelaire’s work with information about the period. His intention had 
been to illuminate how Baudelaire’s images operated as part of the material structure of 
nineteenth-century Paris instead of as a simple reflection of that “base.” What Benjamin did 
not admit to Adorno was that, in its form and objectives, the Baudelaire study continued to 
pursue the Surrealist enterprise “to win the energies of intoxication for the revolution.” 
Benjamin hoped that, more than support a theory, his project would generate a socially 
transforming experience akin to the collective “awakening” he imagined possible through 
“dialectical images.”
And, in that regard, the value of Adorno’s comments on Benjamin’s 1938 Baudelaire 
study derives from the very terms in which he casts the purported problem. Is it accidental 
that Adorno figures “magic” and “positivism” as contiguous domains that converge at some 
“bewitched” junction? Why does he suppose that only “theory” stave off the dangerous 
“spell” of magico-positivist contagion enacted in Benjamin’s “materialistic-historiographic 
invocation”? Whether intentionally or not, Adorno echoes a conception of “magic” that 
Benjamin uses in the Baudelaire study. Like Adorno, Benjamin uses “magic” as an image of 
a “spot that is bewitched” by the obfuscation of the causality behind material production. 
“Baudelaire does not say farewell to the city without invoking its barricades,” Benjamin 
16Jurgen Habermas is a notable exception. In an essay on Benjamin, Habermas argues that Adorno was 
on the mark about his friend’s flight from Marx’s thought into “theology” (Habermas 1988: 26).
30
wrote. “He remembers ‘its magic cobblestones which rise up to form fortresses.’ These 
stones, to be sure, are ‘magic’ because Baudelaire’s poem says nothing about the hands that 
set them in motion” (Benjamin 1973: 15). 
On one level, Benjamin’s highlights the “magic cobblestones” as a way to point to 
Baudelaire’s Marxian awareness of the nature of labor under capitalism, where the identity of 
the worker disappears from the commodity he or she works to produce. On another level, 
Benjamin’s play on magic also recalls the Surrealist notion of “the marvelous,” where 
familiar material entities suddenly produce an unsettling, non-rational sensation that carries 
transformative potential. In citing the images of the city’s “magic cobblestones,” Benjamin 
followed the Surrealists as well as Baudelaire in positing the eruption of other registers of 
“reality”—those outside of the grasp of or repressed by modern rationality—at specific 
material sites. For Baudelaire, Breton, and Benjamin alike, the image-sphere offered a 
privileged material space where such intrusions might reveal themselves and where they 
might also be deliberately invoked. The figure of magic embodied all of those double 
movements of mystification and demystification, of capitalism and its others, of familiar and 
unfamiliar registers of reality. 
So, whether or not Adorno agreed with the method, he correctly identified the nexus 
of terms at play in Benjamin’s Surrealist-influenced project: “magic” marked the place where 
positivism could break another “spell”—that of “theory” itself—by effacing rationalist 
mediation in order to expose its usual self-effacement, its own tricky “magic.” Adorno’s 
criticism, by locating a “bewitched spot” where magic appears, isolates fundamental 
epistemological issues raised by Surrealist pursuits of the marvelous and by Benjamin’s 
reformulation of that project: What is the relationship between representation and reality? 
31
What is the role of the image-maker in that relationship? How are images and image-makers 
implicated in material production?
2.
Still, if Adorno’s (mis)reading of Benjamin locates images “at the crossroads of 
magic and positivism,” is there necessarily only one “bewitched spot”? In the rest of this 
chapter, I pursue that question by exploring a 1949 text in which Alejo Carpentier enacts his 
own critical engagement with the Surrealist legacy. The effort represents another attempt to 
unsettle the enchantments of modern rationalism with a species of magical positivism. 
Significantly, a related term—‘magical realism’—has since attached itself to Carpentier’s 
text. By the mid-1960s, Carpentier’s essay had achieved popular recognition as the initial 
manifesto for magical realist aesthetics, now one of Latin America’s most familiar cultural 
exports. 
While the phrase ‘magical realism’ has circulated so widely in recent decades as to 
lose most of its descriptive specificity, Carpentier’s 1949 text gave shape to the most familiar 
formulations of the term with regard to Latin American intellectual production.17 In the 
ongoing discussions about the term among cultural critics since the 1960s, a general
consensus holds that ‘magical realism’ refers to aesthetic production that attempts to account 
for the social simultaneity of radically different epistemologies. The ‘magical realist’ work 
presents divergent worldviews alongside each other—such as indigenous creation myths that 
17See the introduction to Zamora 1995 for a history of ‘magical realism’ as well as for an example of 
the summary formulation I describe in the following paragraph. Sangari 1987 also represents what I call “a 
general consensus” about the sytlistics of “magical realism.” James Clifford’s famous essay, “On Ethnographic 
Surrealism” (included in Clifford 1988), directly connects magical realism to Surrealist pursuits of the 1930s. I 
explore this important link in the next chapter, when I examine in more detail Carpentier's relation to 
Surrealism. Chanady 1985 offers a well-known alternative perspective on the history and aesthetics of “magical 
realism” as does, in a different context, Taussig 1980.
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encounter modern astronomy—without trying to explain or privilege any of them. The 
‘realism’ of the method ostensibly derives from its accurate representation of societies like 
those of Latin America, where widely different logics still co-exist as a result of cultural 
heterogeneity. In other words, the style stands as a form of positivism, presenting societies in 
all of their complexity. ‘Magic’ supposedly adheres to this positivistic method because it 
necessarily creates the effect of unsettling an audience’s dependence on a modern rationalism 
that needs to make sense on its own limited terms of unfamiliar forms of logic (including 
‘magic’ itself). Thus, according to the critical consensus, effective ‘magical realist’ 
production seeks to generate socially transforming experience by liberating rationalism from 
its own limitations and opening it up to alternate structures of knowledge. 
Indeed, Carpentier’s 1949 text sets down that familiar ‘magical realist’ position. He 
calls on image-makers to develop “chronicles” of the world. He argues that, instead of 
inventing fictions whole cloth, artists should present natural, historical, and social facts 
without theoretical intrusion so that entities can speak for themselves. In Adorno’s terms, 
Carpentier imagines “materialistic-historiographic invocation” as a means to revelation of 
realities that unsettle modern rationalism. In that regard, Carpentier’s text directly takes up 
the Surrealist effort “to win the energies of intoxication for the revolution.” Like Benjamin 
and the Surrealists, Carpentier posits positivist representation as a path toward experience, 
that is, as the source of unforeseen “illuminations” that have the potential to transform 
society. And, also like Benjamin, Carpentier associates effective images, including his own 
text, with magic. Accordingly, we could say that his 1949 essay rightfully occupies its 
privileged place as a reformulation of Surrealist ‘magical positivism’ into Latin American 
‘magical realism.’ 
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However, such an assessment is fraught with irony. Most immediately, Carpentier 
stakes out his position by explicitly distancing himself from and harshly criticizing 
Surrealism. In doing so, he locates the “marvelous” sought by the Surrealists as part of the 
exclusive domain of the Americas and of Americans. In other words, Carpentier refigures 
Adorno’s “bewitched” place as a literal—that is, geographic—spot that lies at enchanted 
American “crossroads.” With his essay, Carpentier attempts to wrestle “the marvelous” away 
from the Surrealist legacy in particular and from Europe in general and to lay a claim to the 
American revelation of socially transforming realities. More specifically, Carpentier pursues 
a critique of modernity in order to lay the foundations for an openly Americanist politics of 
culture. 
But, in order to carry out these gestures, Carpentier resorts to mimicry. In searching 
for the limits of modernity, he plays a modernist game that he links to contemporary 
European intellectual movements. Carpentier’s essay calls attention to its own tricks in a way 
that exposes modernity’s contradictions. Therefore, Carpentier’s essay asserts regional 
difference through the kind reflection on reflection that characterizes modern Latin American 
intellectual production. And, as I underscore, the mimicry of Carpentier’s project becomes 
especially apparent through magic. What enables Carpentier to put forth his Americanist 
claim is the same elusiveness in the figure of magic that Benjamin plays off in situating his 
project—as well as Marx and Baudelaire’s critiques—in and against modernity. 
3.
The original version of Carpentier’s famous 1949 essay first appeared on April 8, 
1948 in the Venezuelan daily, El Nacional. Carpentier had moved to Caracas in 1945 to work 
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in Publicidad Ars, an advertising firm founded by his friend Carlos Frías. Between 1947 and 
1948 and again between 1951 and 1959, Carpentier held a regular column in El Nacional as a 
cultural critic.18 At the time of the essay’s original publication, Carpentier was also finishing 
a work of historical fiction. When that book was published in Mexico in 1949 as El reino de 
este mundo [The Kingdom of This World], a slightly revised version of the April 1948 essay 
appeared as the novel’s “prologue.”
Carpentier’s essay attempts—with the paradoxical gestures I summarized above—to 
theorize away theoretical reflexivity in the name of the kind of ‘magical positivism’ 
dismissively marked by Adorno. In the piece, Carpentier never explicitly defines “magic” 
and deliberately reinforces the concept’s ambiguity. In fact, his uses of the term divide magic 
into two distinct spheres, and it is that process of rupture that characterizes Carpentier’s 
mode of operation in the essay. In dividing key terms, he struggles to keep the parts separate. 
His conceptual and linguistic divisions serve as a way to rupture and reconfigure modernity 
by tearing apart its language in order to reconstruct it. His method is one of exploding some 
of modernity’s essential binary terms by first bifurcating each of the dualities. 
Carpentier immediately sets out on his project of differentiation by situating his 
discussion at a particular place and time. “At the end of 1943,” the essay begins, 
I had the good fortune to visit the kingdom of Henri Christophe—the ruins, so 
poetic, of Sans Souci; the imposing bulk of the Citadel of La Ferrière, intact in 
spite of thunderbolts and earthquakes—and to discover Ciudad del Cabo, still 
Norman to this day –the Cap Français of the former colony– where a street of 
18The 1947-1948 column was entitled “Visión de América” [Vision of America]; from 1951 to 1959, 
the newspaper used the heading “Letra y Solfa” [Letter and Syllable].
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very long balconies leads to a stone palace once occupied by Pauline 
Bonaparte. (ix; ¶1)19
Carpentier’s invocation of Haiti, figured in his recollection and his text through “poetic” but 
decaying traces of the country’s past, is his first shot across modernity’s bow. His reference 
to “the kingdom of Henri Christophe” serves as his reminder that any history or conception 
of modernity’s formation must center on the Americas and on the Caribbean in particular. 
Columbus first landed in that theater, and the islands served as the staging ground for the 
continual circulation of raw materials, manufactured goods, people free and enslaved, ideas, 
creatures, plants, and habits that enabled European colonial economies. And, as Carpentier’s 
images recalls, the world’s largest self-contained plantation economy—the French colony of 
Saint-Domingue—became beginning in 1791 the site of the first, most dramatic, and 
singularly successful uprising of slaves and descendents of slaves against their oppressors 
since the emergence of that global colonial system. In other words, Carpentier’s reference to 
Henri Christophe, the first ruler of an independent Haiti, recalls the Caribbean as site and 
sign of perpetual cycles of violence—the brutal oppression and fierce resistance—that 
underlies any claim to “modernity.” For Carpentier, Haiti’s “ruins, so poetic,” embody the 
powerful contradiction of the modern legacy: how its promises of liberty and progress have 
played out in oppression and revolution; how the crumbling material remnants born of those 
realities also testify, as ‘poems’ of modernity’s failures, to its potential fulfillment. 
Where could Carpentier find a better place from which to develop a vision for the 
realization of modernity’s promises than on the ground of those “ruins, so poetic”? The 
Kingdom of This World stands as an explicit territorial claim by Carpentier in his quest to 
19My citations of Carpentier’s essay include two references. The first indicates the page number of the 
original Spanish (as published in Carpentier 1964). The second part of the parenthetical citation identifies the 
paragraph number of the English translation included here as Appendix A.
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redeem modernity. As Carpentier explains in the last paragraph of the prologue, the novel 
recounts “a sequence of extraordinary happenings which took place on the island of Santo 
Domingo, in the space of a period which does not equal the span of a man's life” (xv; ¶5). 
Carpentier offers The Kingdom of This World as an explicit engagement with modernity: by 
narrativizing one of its most “extraordinary happenings” in fantastic detail, he sees a path by 
which to convert that history of failures into a recovery operation. And, more specifically, his 
historical redemption will reveal the Americas as the source of a new social order, that is, as 
the Promised Land Europeans always imagined ‘the New World’ to be. 
Carpentier’s objective in the prologue is to identify the contours of his critical task 
and how his text sets the redemptive project in motion. In light of his initial invocation of the 
elegiac remains of Haiti’s revolutionary era, Carpentier recalls his sudden realization in 1943 
of the underlying futility of contemporary European-derived artistic trends: 
Having felt the indisputable charm of the Haitian landscape, having found 
magical portents in the red roads of the Central Plateau, and heard the drums of 
the Voodoo gods Petro and Rada, I was moved to compare the marvelous 
reality I had recently experienced with that exhausting attempt to invoke the 
marvelous which has characterized certain European literatures of the last 
thirty years. (ix; ¶1)
Carpentier’s statement marks a second shot at modernity, but with this salvo he 
obviously has a particular—and somewhat surprising—entity in his sights. His references 
indicate that the brunt of his attack is directed toward the legacy of André Breton’s Surrealist 
Group. Carpentier, born of French parents and a resident of Paris between 1928 and 1939, 
had been actively involved in and sympathetic to the Surrealists’ marvelous pursuits during 
his years in France.20 Regardless of his personal affinities with Surrealism, Carpentier attacks 
an intellectual camp that would seem to be among his closest allies in the critique of 
20I address Carpentier’s shifting relations to Surrealism in the next chapter.
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modernity and its legacy of rationalism. Surrealism would appear to be a form of artistic 
modernism that, like Carpentier, sought to critique modernity in order to bring its promise to 
fruition. 
However, Carpentier mimics Surrealism in critiquing it. He invokes another “reality” 
that splits the “marvelous” into opposing domains. Carpentier eventually calls out Surrealism 
by name as he outlines the familiar register of “the marvelous” pursued tirelessly in 
contemporary European literature:
The marvelous, pursued in old prints of the forest of Brocelianda, of the 
knights of the Round Table, the wizard Merlin and the Arthurian cycle. The 
marvelous, pathetically evoked in the skills and deformities of fairground 
characters—will the young French poets never tire of the freaks and clowns of 
the circus, to which Rimbaud had already bade farewell in his Alchimie du 
verbe? The marvelous, produced by means of conjuring tricks, bringing 
together objects which would normally never meet: the old and fraudulent 
story of the chance encounter of the umbrella and the sewing machine on an 
operating table, which spawned the ermine spoons, snails in a rainy taxi, and 
the lion’s head in a widow’s pelvis of the Surrealist exhibitions. (ix-x; ¶1)
Throughout his discussion, Carpentier intensifies his attack on the “exhausting” 
strategies unleashed by Surrealism in preceding decades. However, his initial assault on 
Surrealism makes clear that he targets the means, not the ends, of that apparently hollow 
quest. By splitting “the marvelous” into two registers, he leaves part of it intact and hones in 
on “the marvelous” that is “pathetically evoked” and “produced by means of conjuring 
tricks.” Carpentier sharpens this point, underscoring how, “determined to invoke the 
marvelous at any cost, the miracle workers turn into bureaucrats[, c]alling on timeworn 
formulae which reduce certain painting to a predictable jumble of drooping timepieces, 
dressmakers’ dummies, and vague phallic monuments.” All of these efforts, Carpentier 
summarizes, disclose the “imaginative poverty” of the miracle-workers-turned-bureaucrats 
for whom the invocation of the marvelous only “consists in learning codes by heart” (x; ¶2). 
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His attack on aspirations of “certain European literature of the past thirty years” leads 
Carpentier to the turning point in his discussion where he begins to mark off that other 
register of “the marvelous” that he sensed on his 1943 Haitian tour: 
What many forget, in disguising themselves as cheap magicians, is that the 
marvelous becomes unequivocally marvelous when it arises from an 
unexpected alteration of reality (a miracle), a privileged revelation of reality, 
an unaccustomed or singularly favorable illumination of the previously 
unremarked riches of reality, an amplification of the measures and categories 
of reality, perceived with particular intensity due to an exaltation of the spirit 
which elevates it to a kind of ‘limit state’. (xi; ¶2)
The main task of Carpentier’s prologue is to parse out the implications of this passage. His 
discussion circles around a conception of “reality,” and in these lines he sets down in the 
broadest terms the means to and effects of “a privileged revelation” of that actuality. The 
methods involve some kind of “unaccustomed or singularly favorable illumination” that 
result in “an exaltation of the spirit which elevates it to a kind of ‘limit state.’” At different 
points in the essay, and especially in its last section, Carpentier more fully considers these 
means and ends. 
But, more immediately, he explicates another fissure, which stands as the division 
that structures his entire discussion. After all, what really separates “the marvelous” pursued 
by Surrealism from “the marvelous reality” evident to Carpentier in Haiti? In the end, what is
it exactly that enables the “miracle” in which that other, hollow version “becomes 
unequivocally marvelous” and raises “the spirit […] to a kind of ‘limit state’”? Carpentier’s 
distinction between marvelous forms brings him to the root of the problem. “First of all, the 
sense of the marvelous presupposes a faith,” Carpentier asserts, and with this one stroke he 
traces the line of demarcation between two radically different domains. Along the fault line 
of “faith” he establishes the axis that separates “marvelous reality”—and all that is linked to 
it—from the sphere of the unreal, the province that the European literati inhabit and from 
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which they appear unable to escape. Carpentier repeatedly associates the components of 
disbelief with superficiality; he casts them as surface appearances that are false and 
ultimately impotent deceptions. In contrast, he imbues the elements of faith with a depth 
derived from that overwhelming, enduring, and transforming “marvelous reality.” 
To reinforce the pivotal role of “faith,” Carpentier offers a list of examples of 
prominent and powerful figures whose history-altering efforts sprang from acceptance of the 
marvelous reality that always subsumes art and reason: Cervantes, Marco Polo, Luther, 
Victor Hugo (who “believed in spirits because he was convinced that he had spoken, in 
Guernsey, to the ghost of Lèopoldine”), Van Gogh. . . . In contrast, “those who do not believe 
in saints will not be cured by the miracles of saints,” Carpentier notes (xi; ¶2). He goes on to 
excoriate the Surrealists and two other contemporary intellectual camps for their spurious 
claims to represent realities that are no more than faithless fictions: 
The marvelous born of disbelief—as in the long years of Surrealism—was 
never more than a literary ruse, as tedious, after a time as certain brand of 
‘ordered’ oneiric literature, certain eulogies of madness, with which we are all 
too familiar. . But this is not, of course, to concede the argument to those who 
advocate a return to the real—a term which acquires, then, a gregariously 
political meaning—who do nothing more than substitute for the magician’s 
tricks the commonplaces of the committed man of letters or the eschatological 
humor of certain existentialists. (xii; ¶2)
In order to summarize his point about the fallacious and powerless pursuits of these 
faithless European intellectuals, Carpentier refocuses his attack on the progenitors of “the 
marvelous born of disbelief”:
It is undoubtedly true that there is scant defense for poets and artists who praise 
sadism without practicing it, who admire a miraculous virility on account of 
their own impotence, who invoke spirits without believing in spells, and who 
found secret societies, literary sects, vaguely philosophical groups, with saints 
and signs and arcane objectives—never attained—without being able to 
conceive of a valid mysticism or abandon their petty habits in order to gamble 
their souls on the fearful card of faith. (xii; ¶2)
40
The language of these passages paints a clear picture of the results of disbelief: the “literary 
ruse” of “poets and artists who praise sadism without practicing it” is full of hypocrisy; these 
intellectuals’ faithless appeals to “the marvelous” only hide “their own impotence” and veil 
“arcane objectives” that are “never attained”; their efforts are invalid, “petty,” and weak. 
Ultimately, in chasing after a “marvelous born of disbelief,” the “miracle workers turned 
bureaucrats” do not have the courage to abandon their own limited rationalism—despite their 
claims to the contrary—and remain incapable of “gambl[ing] their souls on the fearful card 
of faith.”
Carpentier’s emphasis on faith is striking. His insistence reveals the surprising twist 
his discussion takes in building its critique. Is his turn really only a return? In emphasizing 
“faith,” does Carpentier simply come back to a species of theology supposedly displaced by 
modernity? Such questions linger, even after the end of Carpentier’s essay. It is possible to 
read “the marvelous reality” as Carpentier’s substitute for “God.” Carpentier never asserts 
the definitive existence of an overarching and independent presence that precedes human 
design. Significantly, he talks only about means to perceptions—or intuitions—of “the 
marvelous.” I will return to this critical distinction shortly. Nevertheless, Carpentier poses the 
“Prologue” as a kind of alternate theology that subsumes familiar rationalistic pursuits. At the 
same time, his refusal to invoke God is also telling. In the first sentences of the essay, he 
gestures toward the volatile place of ‘God’ in modernity. Such volatility surfaces in the ruins 
of “the kingdom of Henri Christophe.” Columbus set off on a voyage in the name of God, 
and that endeavor led him to the Caribbean and put history on its course to the present form 
of modernity. As a critique of that legacy, Carpentier understood his inability to fall back on 
the same old terms. He hoped to develop his project at the places of rupture in modernity’s 
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language; he wanted to build on its linguistic as well as its monumental ruins. His 
invocations of “faith” emerge at the center of that tricky task.
Carpentier’s objectives come into clearer focus as he proceeds. His proclamation in 
the opening passages of his prologue of the need for “faith” in “the marvelous reality” 
divulges the archaicism of his project. Whether one describes his argument as theological, 
onto-theological, or in other terms, he lays bare the ontological grounding for his argument: 
“the marvelous reality” is arche, the source of history and society itself. His desire to connect 
with that arche has already become apparent. He makes no secret that, unlike the European 
literati, he faithfully seeks those “miracles” in which “the marvelous becomes unequivocally 
marvelous” and raises “the spirit […] to a kind of ‘limit state.’” Carpentier’s rebuke of the 
Surrealists’ “marvelous born of disbelief” shows that, for him, archaic experiences 
“presuppose faith” in a reality that includes phenomena that exist outside of reason and 
confound it. In Carpentier’s view, the Surrealists may be correct in exposing rationalism as a 
root of modernity’s problems but their disbelief keeps them trapped in the rationalist sphere.
4.
According to Carpentier’s initial terms, the path across the fault line between the 
European literati’s “marvelous born of disbelief” toward recognition of “the marvelous 
reality” should be fairly straightforward, even if the road is not an easy one. What one needs 
to do, it would seem, is to make the leap of faith, to accept the appearance in reality of 
phenomena that subsume the bounds of reason and confound it. Nevertheless, the fame of 
Carpentier’s essay stems in part from the other points of difference that he identifies. The 
dividing line that splits the marvelous into two domains does not run exclusively along the 
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ground between disbelief and faith. According to Carpentier, the rupture is also geographic. 
He suggests that European intellectual disbelief develops largely from the fact that “the 
marvelous reality” shows itself in particular places. It does not typically appear in Europe 
and belongs especially to the Americas. In one of his most famous passages, Carpentier 
returns to recollect the where and the when—namely, Haiti 1943—of his realization of the 
roots of European intellectual futility. Again, the location of his revelation is critical: The 
Europeans’ lack of faith
became particularly clear to me during my stay in Haiti, where I found myself 
in daily contact with something which might be called the marvelous in the 
real. I was treading on land where thousands of men anxious for freedom had 
believed in the lycanthropic powers of Macandal, to the point where this 
collective faith produced a miracle on the day of his execution. I already knew 
the extraordinary tale of Bouckman, the Jamaican initiate. I had been in the 
Citadel of La Ferrière, a work without architectural antecedents, foreshadowed 
only in the Imaginary Prisons of Piranesi. I had breathed the atmosphere 
created by Henri Christophe, a monarch of incredible exploits, far more 
astonishing than all the cruel kings invented by the Surrealists, so fond of 
tyrannies of the imaginary variety, although they never had to endure them in 
reality. At every step I encountered the marvelous in the real. But I also 
thought that the presence and prevalence of this marvelous reality was not a 
privilege unique to Haiti, but the patrimony of the whole of America, where 
there has yet to be drawn up, for example, a complete list of cosmogonies. 
(xiii; ¶3)
In Carpentier’s view, “the marvelous” repeatedly appears in the realities of the history and 
landscape of the Americas. He runs through some historical examples that illustrate how “the 
fantastic is to be found at every stage in the lives of men who inscribed dates on the history 
of the Continent and who left names still borne to this day” (xiii; ¶3). In other words, the 
names of places throughout the Americas record historical truths “far more astonishing” than 
anything an artist could invent. By underscoring that it was by “treading on land” that “the 
patrimony of the whole of America” revealed itself to him, Carpentier underscores how the 
inscription of the marvelous reality on the landscape is natural as well as historical. 
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From the first lines of the prologue—well before he makes the point explicitly—
Carpentier intimates the idea that the marvelous reality surfaces exclusively in the American 
domain. As we have seen, his revelations about European “imaginative poverty” arise from 
“having felt the indisputable charm of the Haitian landscape, having found magical portents 
in the red roads of the Central Plateau, and heard the drums of the Voodoo gods Petro and 
Rada.” In another early passage, Carpentier slips in another comparison that exposes non-
American “impotence” and suggests the necessary exclusivity of the marvelous reality:
Note that when Andre Masson wanted to draw the jungle of the island of 
Martinique, with its incredible tangle of plants and the obscene promiscuity of 
certain of its fruits, the prodigious truth of the subject devoured the painter, 
leaving him all but impotent before the blank paper. And it was left to a painter 
from America, the Cuban Wilfredo Lam, to show us the magic of tropical 
vegetation, the unbridled Creation of Forms of our nature—with all its 
metamorphoses and symbioses—in monumental canvases of an expressiveness 
unique in contemporary painting. (x-xi; ¶2)
The passage is crucial to Carpentier’s project by implying that, even if non-Americans have 
“faith” in the marvelous reality, they remain fundamentally incapable of perceiving it. In a 
footnote to the passage, Carpentier reinforces that idea: “Note with what prestige the works 
of Wilfredo Lam stand out, in their profound originality, among those of other painters 
collected in the special issue—an overview of modern art—published in 1946 by Cahiers 
d’Art” (xi; ¶2). 
Still, as Carpentier’s references to Lam make clear, the American patrimony of the 
marvelous reality extends beyond the realm of perception. In one of the prologue’s most 
recognized sentences, Carpentier summarizes his discussion of the American “patrimony” of 
the marvelous reality. In his statement, he identifies its traces in the natural and historical 
landscape of the Americas, in Americans’ powers of perception, in their ideas, traditions and 
stories, and finally, in their bodies. “The point,” he concludes, “is that, because of its virginal 
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landscape, its formation, its ontology, the Faustian presence of both Indian and Negro, the 
Revelation represented by its recent discovery, and the fertile interbreeding it has fostered, 
America is far from having drained its well of mythologies” (xiv-xv; ¶4). 
With this statement, Carpentier suggests that the unprecedented collision of races 
endows Americans with a marvelous reality that non-Americans—and especially European 
intellectuals—could never understand, even with wholehearted faith. And in that gesture 
toward exclusivity, Carpentier splits his own critical term. He qualifies “the marvelous 
reality” as “lo real maravilloso Americano,” that is, as “a marvelous American reality.” He 
does nothing to dispel the implication that “the marvelous reality” and “the marvelous 
American reality” are, in fact, one and the same thing. If his alternative vision of reality 
occupies a deliberately interventionist position by marking off the limits of rationalism and 
gesturing toward another kind of intellectual politics, Carpentier’s prologue also literally 
situates that critique in the Americas. He presents the region as the primary—and, quite 
possibly, only—province of the marvelous reality.
5.
As Carpentier’s prologue plays around ruptures in key terms to offer an Americanist 
engagement with modernity, another set of unexamined terms repeatedly surfaces: “magic,” 
“magical,” and “magicians.” He never explicitly addresses the nature of magic, but his 
pivotal characterization of the “unequivocally marvelous,” in splitting the marvelous into two 
divergent registers, also ruptures magic along the fault line of faith. Most tellingly, 
Carpentier refers to the spokesmen of “the marvelous born of disbelief” as “cheap 
magicians” and describes their tactics as “conjuring tricks.” These characterizations imply 
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that the “magic” of the faithless is nothing more than deception. These magicians “bring 
together objects which would never normally meet” and then try to pass off their fantastic 
creations as reflections of some “marvelous” externality. However, since they lack faith in 
the realities they claim to represent, the “miracle workers turned bureaucrats” can never 
escape the false world of their own art. Ultimately, their “conjuring tricks” only refer back to 
their own aesthetics and have no effect. Carpentier reinforces this conception of bogus magic 
in taking on “those who advocate a return to the real,” which only replaces “the magician’s 
tricks” with other kinds of deceptive appeals to realities that do not extend into the 
“marvelous” register that “presupposes faith.” 
Yet, if Carpentier calls attention to “cheap magicians” who rely on deceptive and 
impotent “conjuring tricks,” he also invokes another type of magic. Like the “unequivocally 
marvelous” that contrasts with “the marvelous born of disbelief,” the second sphere of magic 
falls across from “cheap” magic on the far side of faith. Or, more accurately, this other magic 
resides in that other sphere that the faithless do not accept. In Carpentier’s system, there are 
valuable forms of magic that only the faithful can recognize since these true types issue forth 
from “the marvelous reality.” Unlike “the conjuring tricks” of “cheap magicians,” the other 
kinds of magic do not properly belong to the sphere of human action. They are embedded in 
reality itself and, accordingly, expose it to the faithful as “marvelous.” 
Without explanation or any trace of reflexivity, Carpentier refers to this magic in the 
opening passage of the essay. It is after “having found magical portents in the red roads of 
the Central Plateau” of Haiti that he “was moved to compare the marvelous reality I had 
recently experienced with that exhausting attempt to invoke the marvelous which has 
characterized certain European literatures of the last thirty years.” In other words, “the 
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magical portents” embedded in “the red roads” point Carpentier directly to “the marvelous 
reality.” In another passage, he refers, once again without any trace of irony, to magic in a 
similar vein. Magic arises as a material element embedded in Haiti’s landscape: “It was left 
to a painter from America, the Cuban Wilfredo Lam, to show us the magic of tropical 
vegetation [esa mágia de la vegetación tropical], the unbridled Creation of Forms of our 
nature—with all its metamorphoses and symbioses—in monumental canvases of an 
expressiveness unique in contemporary painting.” Like “the red roads of the Central 
Plateau,” “tropical vegetation”—and, more broadly, “nature” with its “unbridled Creation of 
Forms” and “all its metamorphoses and symbioses”—carries “magic” as part of its 
constitution.
Carpentier seems to have established a clear boundary between the “tricks” of “cheap 
magicians” and a “magic” that arises as a material constituent of the marvelous reality, but 
then he refers to other “magical” forms in ways that threaten to wipe out his line of 
demarcation. In these other references, Carpentier takes magic out of the landscape and puts 
it back into the social sphere. For instance, he refers to “magic” as a system of practices 
surrounding Macandal, the legendary figure often credited with galvanizing the slave 
resistance that led to the Saint-Domingue Revolution and the eventual independence of Haiti. 
In following the basic structure of his essay, Carpentier underscores how the marvelous 
reality emanating from the Macandal case exposes the inconsequentiality of contemporary 
European intellectual pursuits:
There is a moment, in the sixth of the Chants de Maldoror, when the hero, 
pursued by all the police in the world, escapes from an “army of agents and 
spies” by adopting the form of different animals and making use of his gift of 
being able to transport himself in an instant to Peking, Madrid or Saint 
Petersburg. This is “fantastic literature” at its most uninhibited. But in 
America, where nothing similar has been written, there existed a Macandal 
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endowed with these same powers by the faith of his contemporaries, and who 
inspired, with that magic, one of the strangest and most dramatic uprisings in 
History. Maldoror—Ducasse himself confesses it—was never anything more 
than a “poetic Rocambole.” His only legacy was a literary school of ephemeral 
duration. The American Macandal, on the other hand, left behind a whole 
mythology, along with magical hymns, preserved by an entire people, which 
are still sung in Voodoo ceremonies. (xiv; ¶4)
According to the passage, Macandal and the traditions he inspired possess an enduring and 
socially transforming power that amplifies Maldoror’s relative insignificance. The fantastic 
events of the Chants de Maldoror never escape the confines of literature while Macandal’s 
“magic” and the “magical hymns” based on his legend exist in another realm. Again, 
Carpentier emphasizes faith as the component that separates Maldoror’s fantasies from the 
magic of and about Macandal. In Carpentier’s formulation, what “endowed” Macandal with 
his magic powers and catalyzed “one of the strangest and most dramatic uprisings in History” 
was, quite simply, “the faith of his contemporaries.” In turn, the “magical hymns” are 
expressions of that faith. 
But what do these references make of magic in Carpentier’s discussion? Is “magic” 
expression of faith or its object? Does “magic” play out in human practice or does it arise 
elsewhere as a component of “the marvelous in the real”? Carpentier’s understanding of 
magic becomes somewhat clearer in another passing reference. He invokes the magical as he 
comes to the end of the passage in which he asserts that “the presence and prevalence of this 
marvelous reality [is] not a privilege unique to Haiti, but the patrimony of the whole of 
America.” In highlighting how the “patrimony” of the marvelously real does not extend to 
Europe, Carpentier offers an example: 
It is clear that, whereas in Western Europe folk dance, for instance, has lost all 
magical or invocatory character [todo cáracter mágico o invocatorio], rare is 
the collective dance in America that does not incorporate a deep ritualistic 
meaning, becoming almost a ceremony of initiation: such as the dances of the 
Cuban santería, or the extraordinary negro version of the festival of Corpus 
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Christi, which can still be seen in the town of San Francisco de Yare, in 
Venezuela. (xiv; ¶3)
Here, in what seems like afterthought, Carpentier links “magical” and “invocatory” as 
synonyms. Still, the juxtaposition of terms illuminates a critical notion that he never directly 
explains. As “invocatory,” that which is “magical” offers itself as a conduit for the marvelous 
reality. The magical ‘invokes’ in the literal sense: through itself it makes another entity 
present. Invocation is more than mimicry-in-absence. 
Significantly, Carpentier also connects “magical or invocatory character” to 
“collective” expressions that “incorporate a deep ritualistic meaning, becoming almost a 
ceremony of initiation.” These statements tie back into Carpentier’s pivotal description of 
how “the marvelous becomes unequivocally marvelous,” and the two passages help to clarify 
each other.21 The “magical,” with its “ritualistic meaning” and sense of “ceremony,” are 
“collective” efforts to ‘invoke’ “marvelous reality” in the social sphere, that is, to create a 
channel for its irruption into the human world. In the first passage, Carpentier highlights the 
potential effects of “magical” endeavors: “a miracle” might result from following certain 
“invocatory” patterns, by enacting rituals or “ceremonies of initiation”; the undertaking 
might produce “a privileged revelation of reality” that, in turn, leads to “an exaltation of the 
spirit which elevates it to a kind of ‘limit state.’” In other words, the “magical,” as 
“invocatory,” calls upon “the marvelous reality” to make itself palpable in order to provide 
means for transforming the social sphere by altering perception (“an amplification of the 
measures and categories of reality, perceived with particular intensity”). In Carpentier’s 
21Remember that in an earlier passage Carpentier already establishes an implicit relation between 
magic and marvelous reality. He sets up his description as a corrective to other, unreal types of magic: “But 
what many forget, in distinguishing themselves as cheap magicians, is that the marvelous becomes 
unequivocally marvelous […]” (xi; ¶2).
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estimation, the “dances of Cuban santería” and “the negro version of the festival of Corpus 
Christi” serve as outstanding examples of such “invocatory” collective undertakings. 
From this standpoint, Carpentier figures magic as pivotal, in multiple senses of the 
term. Although he never explicitly describes it in such terms, magic acts as instrument of 
mediation in his system.  “The marvelously real” becomes visible through magic, whether it 
is the “magic” inscribed in the landscape of the Americas, Macandal’s “magic,” or the 
“magical” invocations that actively seek “a privileged revelation of reality.” 
6.
In identifying the transforming experiences of the marvelous reality enabled by 
magic, Carpentier hints at the objectives of his own pursuits. His essay points toward a mode 
of artistic production that takes its cue from the “magical hymns” of Voodoo and ritual of 
“magical or invocatory character.” Specifically, Carpentier signals a form of writing that, like 
those magical forms, lets “the marvelous reality” emerge on its own terms through 
invocation. In the final section of the prologue, Carpentier describes his text—or, more 
precisely, the novel that the essay introduces—in precisely that way. In the last line of the 
essay, Carpentier poses a rhetorical question that he has already answered by that point: 
“What is the history of America if not a chronicle of the marvelous in the real?” (xv; ¶5). The 
question echoes back over the preceding section and across the essay as a whole. The final 
phrase reveals that Carpentier’s task all along has been to establish the basis for an aesthetics 
that, in drawing on “the history of America,” functions as “chronicle of the marvelous in the 
real.” 
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From that standpoint, Carpentier offers his novel as a record of the episode in Latin 
American history around which his prologue circles all along: the Saint-Domingue slave 
uprising that led to Haiti’s creation and marked its already-fantastic landscape and culture 
with Macandal’s magic and other traces of “the marvelously real” that enveloped Carpentier 
on his 1943 trip. In presenting the text as a “chronicle,” Carpentier makes his critical move: 
he tries to erase his own authorial role. Carpentier insists that the book was written “without 
any systematic intention on my part” (xv; ¶5). He describes himself as an archivist instead of 
an author: 
It must be stressed that the ensuing story is based on the most rigorous 
documentation, which not only respects the historical truth of events, the 
names of characters—including secondary ones—places and even streets, but 
which conceals, beneath its apparent intemporality, a meticulous collation of 
dates and chronologies. (xv; ¶5)
The construction of the text, according to Carpentier, follows from “rigorous documentation” 
and “meticulous collation of dates and chronologies.” He suggests that, as author, he does 
nothing more than relate the ‘who, where, and what’ of an important historical epoch. The 
Kingdom of This World, Carpentier explains, “narrate[s] a sequence of extraordinary 
happenings which took place on the island of Santo Domingo, in the space of a period which 
does not equal the span of a man's life” (xv; ¶5). This method of narration, Carpentier 
emphasizes, reveals that he did not write The Kingdom of This World; the book was written 
through him. By recovering and presenting “the historical truth,” The Kingdom of the World 
“allow[s] the marvelous to flow freely from a reality precise in all its details.” As chronicler, 
he functions merely as an instrument of revelation, as a cipher. “And yet,” Carpentier asserts,
because of the dramatic singularity of the events, the fantastic elegance of the 
characters encountered at a given moments at the enchanted crossroads of the 
Ciudad del Cabo, everything seems fabulous in a story impossible to situate in 
Europe, and which is nonetheless just as real as any exemplary incident 
consigned, for the purposes of pedagogy, to scholarly textbooks. (xv; ¶5)
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By now, the Americanism of Carpentier’s project is clear, and this last statement only 
reinforces the point. Only the Latin American appears to have access to “the marvelous [that] 
flow[s] freely from a reality precise in all its details.” Because of the fantastic domain in 
which the Latin American lives, he understands that “everything [that] seems fabulous […] is 
nonetheless just as real as” the so-called ‘facts’ of rationalist historiography. He has “faith” 
in “the marvelous in the real.” Thus, The Kingdom of This World is “a story impossible to 
situate in Europe” and also, Carpentier implies, a story impossible for a European to tell. The 
prologue’s last section on method completes Carpentier’s efforts at displacement. In the end, 
he has inscribed “magic” into the Latin American text in order to displace “the conjuring 
tricks” of Europe’s “cheap magicians.” 
Carpentier’s prologue closes with a rhetorical question, and it solicits other questions. 
If The Kingdom of This World is a “history of America” that functions as “a chronicle of the 
marvelous in the real,” what is that sort of “chronicle” if not a claim to magic? When the 
question is turned back around into a statement, it show how Carpentier’s description of The 
Kingdom of This World positions the novel—according to the prologue’s own implied 
terms—as a form of magic. As noted above, Carpentier’s references cast magic as an 
“invocatory” pursuit, that is, as “ritualistic” procedures through which to create conditions 
that generate “a privileged revelation of reality” in its full marvelousness. Carpentier’s 
description of The Kingdom of This World clearly fits that notion of magic: “In [the story] is 
narrated a sequence of extraordinary happenings which […] allow[s] the marvelous to flow 
freely from a reality precise in all its details.” And as such—as magic—Carpentier also 
indicates without explicitly stating that he endows his text with magical effect. Specifically, 
he conceives of the novel—with its lack of “any systematic intention”—as the means to “a 
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miracle,” as the catalyst “to an exaltation of the spirit which elevates it to a kind of ‘limit 
state.’” For Carpentier, the text acts as ritual. Like the “dances of Cuban santería” and “the 
magical hymns […] sung in Voodoo ceremonies,” the “chronicle” presents itself as a conduit 
for “the marvelous” into the world of humans endowed with a reason that cannot grasp 
reality in its entirety. Carpentier hopes that, as it erupts into that seemingly mundane sphere, 
“the marvelously reality” will generate “an unexpected alteration” and transform society. 
7.
So what to make of all of these different forms of magic that appear in Carpentier’s 
essay? His emphasis on the magic embodied in The Kingdom of This World may be alluring, 
but the prologue quickly reveals itself as an open trick. What becomes almost immediately 
apparent in the final section of Carpentier’s prologue is the paradoxical relation between the 
essay and the book it introduces. The most obvious paradox is that Carpentier has to call 
attention to the magical textual manifestations of the marvelous reality enabled by his 
purported lack of design. He feels compelled to point out systematically and intentionally
that he compiled his novel “without any systematic intention’; he is moved in the 
introductory essay to reflect on and to theorize the ostensible unreflexivity and absence of 
theoretical presuppositions in the story that follows. Therefore, the distance between what the 
prologue is—a polemical and inherently political meditation on the status of mediation and 
mediators—and what the prologue says—that the marvelous appears through the mediator’s 
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refusal to premeditate—already destabilizes the foundations of Carpentier’s claims about, 
and to, the magic of the marvelously real.22
The foundational instability deepens in light of the actual composition of The 
Kingdom of This World. As various critics have demonstrated in dissecting the novel, many 
of Carpentier’s claims appear valid: his text does develop from “a meticulous collation of 
dates and chronologies”; the “story is based on the most rigorous documentation [that] 
respects the historical truth of events, the names of characters—including secondary ones—
places and even streets”; and, in its attention to archival material, the novel is marvelously 
“precise in all of its details.”23 Some scholars have identified the likely sources for
Carpentier’s “collation” and, indeed, The Kingdom of This World directly incorporates many 
first-hand accounts of people, places, and episodes from the Saint-Domingue uprisings.24
And within the historically verifiable “chronologies” that Carpentier assembles, some 
awesome correspondences seem to emerge. Historical events link with natural and temporal 
cycles: predictions that Macandal’s uprising would begin with thunder and lightning came 
true; ceremonies calling for the downfall of colonial power repeatedly occur on festival 
Sundays while subsequent fulfillment of the ritual invocations invariably take place some 
time later yet always on a Monday. Marvels such as these crop up throughout the story as 
well as in the structure of Carpentier’s “narrat[ion of the] sequence of extraordinary 
22I am far from the first reader to the note the paradox inherent in Carpentier’s prologue and in its 
relation to the story the essay introduces. For an early commentary that touches on the issue, see Alegría 1960. 
23See Volek 1969. González Echevarría (1990: 125-54) develops Volek’s analysis of the composition 
and structure of The Kingdom of This World in order to show Carpentier’s role in designing the text despite his 
claims in the prologue to the contrary.  As indicated below, I draw especially on González Echevarría’s 
discussion in my summary of the issue below. 
24Cf. González Echevarría 1990: 131-35.
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happenings which took place on the island of Santo Domingo.” The marvels “flow freely”—
and, it seems, endlessly—from the precision of Carpentier’s chronicle.
However, the source of the text’s marvelousness remains in question because, despite 
Carpentier’s insistence on the lack of “any systematic intention on my part,” he undoubtedly 
played a role in the design of the story. As Roberto González Echevarría demonstrates in an 
extended and careful analysis of The Kingdom of This World, in the book “coincidence is 
startling […] but it is not completely historical” (1990: 139). Carpentier’s “collation” is 
selective as well as selectively doctored. He includes only dates and events that suggest a 
marvelous reality at work in history and, if necessary, he even changes historical facts to fit 
the ostensibly cosmic scheme: the only days that Carpentier chooses to mention are Sundays 
and Mondays, and he shifts a key event—the Sunday of Henri Christophe’s death—from 
October 8, 1820 to August 22 to create a pattern of ritual and historical change according to 
certain dates (González-Echevarría 1990: 139). Other examples of Carpentier’s intervention 
abound. 
Thus, the explicit intentions of the prologue and the concealed designs of The 
Kingdom of This World appear to undermine the whole system that Carpentier circumscribes 
around the magic of aesthetic non-intentionality. In the end, “the marvelous reality” that he 
invokes and on which he stakes his Americanist polemic seems like a wonder born of the 
same kind of “conjuring tricks” for which he excoriates the European literati. The only 
potential point of separation between Carpentier and those “disguised as cheap magicians” is 
faith, and even that issue remains uncertain. Does Carpentier’s critical insistence that “the 
marvelous presupposes faith” simply serve as a new disguise for cheap magic? Do the 
interlocking fictions that Carpentier creates in and between the prologue and The Kingdom of 
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This World enable him to move out of the aesthetic sphere that, he insists, set the boundaries 
of European intellectuals’ disbelief?
Suddenly, Carpentier’s text comes full circle. The intricacy of The Kingdom of This 
World, the complexity of the entire set up, can only mean one thing: Carpentier wanted to 
make his tricks obvious. He did not simply misjudge the intelligence of his readers, believing 
that they would never pick up on his manipulations. He put them there deliberately and for 
anyone to see . . . if the reader is willing to look closely enough. He hoped that discerning 
readers would do what he does: call his whole enterprise into question. But why does 
Carpentier turn his whole purported system on its head? Where does “the marvelous” appear 
in his now-duplicitous “chronicle” of “the real”? Carpentier’s explicit duplicity brings the 
problem back to the prologue’s critical engagement with Surrealism. Even with the 
revelation of Carpentier’s tricks in The Kingdom of This World, the novel’s prologue signals 
a departure from the European aesthetes’ disbelief. 
Still, the ground of faith has shifted once again. It turns out that Carpentier does not 
take the Europeans to task for their faithlessness toward some kind of Platonic “reality.” In 
fact, another look at the prologue reveals that it is the Surrealists who take too seriously the 
idea of “the marvelous” as an order of reality beyond the bounds of reason. Carpentier talks 
about how the marvelous is “pursued” and “evoked” by the European literati. The folly of 
their endeavors—their whole “literary ruse”—stems from a misunderstanding of the 
fundamentally fictive nature of the marvelous in the first place. The Europeans try to conjure 
the marvelous through clumsy “conjuring tricks”—using “a certain brand of ‘ordered’ oneiric 
literature” and “bringing together objects which would normally never meet”—without 
realizing that “the marvelously real” only appears through a subtle sleight-of-hand. The 
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magic of the European “magicians” is “cheap” because they believe they can draw the 
marvelous into this world through thoughtless and arbitrary acts. Carpentier’s dismissal of 
“the marvelous born of disbelief” refers to the Europeans’ bad faith toward their art, arising 
from too much faith in a marvelous reality separate from their creations. It turns out that, for 
Carpentier, the marvelous is the handiwork of qualified magicians after all. For him, where 
does the order in “‘ordered’ oneiric literature” derive? It does not stem from the esoteric, as 
implied in the Surrealist celebration of the unconscious-as-cipher. Rather, a marvelous order 
arises from literature itself, and therefore only hyperconsciousness will do. In the end, “the 
kingdom of this world” is textuality itself. In Carpentier’s tricky scheme, we are caught in the 
reality of our own aesthetic creations, in the marvelous truths of the “texts” we write into and 
on to the world.
From this standpoint, Carpentier’s project sublimates—in a truly Hegelian sense—
European modernism’s engagement with modernity. The prologue follows Surrealism’s 
critique of modern rationalism in order to turn that critical endeavor back on itself. In 
juxtaposing the “ruins” of Haiti with “that exhausting attempt to invoke the marvelous that 
has characterized certain European literatures of the last thirty years,” Carpentier implicates 
modernism in the ruinous processes it seeks to unsettle. By placing ultimate faith in a 
marvelous ontological reality, the Surrealists give further strength to the idea of a non-social 
‘truth’ undergirded the repressive ‘modernity’ of history. Carpentier does figure his text as 
magical—and, more specifically, as a form of displacing magic—but the pivot in the whole 
scheme is the power of perception. Perception is—to use Carpentier’s critical qualifier for 
magic—“invocatory.” The cognitive act functions as the determining mediator that literally 
“invokes,” or makes present, other marvelous realities. In a pivotal section of his essay, 
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Carpentier insists, “there is scant defense for poets and artists […] who invoke spirits without 
believing in spells.” Again, this critique of the Surrealists points to faith in the power of 
“spells” more than in some external reality. 
This continual doubling-back on cognition in Carpentier’s prologue exposes the text 
as a curiously modernist critique of modernity. It draws directly on the Kantian legacy of 
reflecting on reflection and, in so doing, discovering simultaneously the limits and 
possibilities of knowledge. As I demonstrate in the coming chapters, the essay’s self-
reflexivity arrives as a late example in a longer line of Cuban intellectual discourse. And, as 
such, Carpentier’s famous 1949 prologue—in disclosing its own artifice as a way to unsettle 
reified images of order—functions as a deliberate, magically conceived cubanismo. 
CHAPTER 2: DISPLACED POLITICS: FLIGHTS OF CUBAN CULTURE (1924-1936)
Mankind, which in Homer’s time was an object of contemplation for the 
Olympian gods, now is one for itself. Its self-alienation has reached such a 
degree that it can experience its own destruction as an aesthetic pleasure of the 
first order. This is the situation of politics which Fascism is rendering aesthetic. 
Communism responds by politicizing art.
Walter Benjamin (1936)
I had the misfortune of getting mixed up in politics.
Fernando Ortiz (1942)
1.
I began the last chapter with an epigraph from and corresponding discussion of 
Walter Benjamin’s ambivalent engagement with Surrealist activities in Paris between his 
arrival there in 1929 and his flight from the city in 1940. My subsequent discussion of Alejo 
Carpentier’s famous prologue to his 1949 novel, El reino de este mundo [The Kingdom of 
This World], demonstrated that references to Benjamin with regard to early-twentieth-
century Cuban intellectual discourse serve as more than theoretical invocations. While 
‘Benjaminian thought’ functions as an increasingly common touchstone within contemporary 
criticism, Carpentier’s prologue—as another critical response to Surrealism’s efforts “to win 
the energies of intoxication for the revolution”—shows that the debate over “theory” between 
Benjamin and Adorno moved in a circuit of discourse through which Cuban considerations 
of magic and modernity also passed. Benjamin’s and Carpentier’s texts were 
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contemporaneous and coincidental, and their correspondences in time and theme reveal direct 
historical connections between today’s popular ‘Benjaminian’ and ‘magical realist’ critical 
postures. 
In this chapter, I continue to explore those historical connections in order to illustrate 
how the links between the European avant-garde and Cuban intellectuals of the 1920s and 
1930s went far beyond Benjamin and Carpentier and their mutual engagements with French 
Surrealism. I provide an historical frame that shows the degree to which Carpentier’s 
prologue emerged out of and exemplified a more general Cuban intellectual dynamic. In fact, 
the ongoing engagement with the European avant-garde defined the discourse of displacing 
magic all along. In that regard, Carpentier’s prologue from the late 1940s stands as a more 
recent example enabled by critical developments of the 1930s. As I highlight in this chapter 
and in those that follow, it was in responding critically to the activities of the European 
avant-garde during the 1930s that Cuban intellectuals began to articulate more clearly an 
interventionist politics based on truthful “documentation” of Latin American history and 
culture. Carpentier subsequently formalized this idea by calling in his prologue for 
“chronicles of the marvelous in the real.” In the current chapter, I focus especially on how 
Carpentier’s stance—clearly a politics rooted in the aesthetics of particular kind of 
“chronicle”—reflects a general retreat after 1933 of Cuban intellectuals from direct modes of 
political engagement into a more clandestine ‘politics of culture.’ 
And, from that standpoint, the similarities and differences between Cuban and 
European intellectual activities during the period are so telling. On one hand, the Cubans’ 
reliance on “culture” as intervention paralleled European developments during a decade of
rising conservative, or openly fascist, political tides in Latin America as well as in Europe. 
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Intellectuals in both regions looked more often toward culture when confronted with 
shrinking spheres of traditional politics. Perhaps nothing indicates the transcontinental 
common ground among intellectuals of the period better than the actual ground across which 
many of them moved. In other words, many intellectuals—Latin American and European 
alike—were forced into flight. In the late 1920s and throughout the 1930s, they found 
themselves suddenly, and often unexpectedly, displaced. 
On the other hand, the trajectories of the politics of culture diverged as the Latin 
Americans—drawing on but also reacting to the European avant-garde—turned to modernist 
realism, that is, to “aesthetic theatricalizations” and “chronicles” of their region’s marvelous 
‘realities.’ The Society for Afro-Cuban Studies materialized in this historical context among 
Cuban intellectuals, many of whom were physically displaced at one time or another 
beginning in the late 1920s and for whom the discourse of displacing magic operated as a 
unique and seemingly necessary political strategy. As a way to outline these historical 
developments, let me once again turn to Alejo Carpentier’s story by way of Walter Benjamin. 
2.
In addition to certain correspondences in time and theme, another significant parallel 
arises from Walter Benjamin’s and Alejo Carpentier’s engagements with Surrealist activities. 
As mentioned in the last chapter, both of those projects stem from the two writers’ 
coincidence of place. For both men, that concurrence also arose from a mutual experience of 
displacement. They arrived in Paris around the same time—1928 in Carpentier’s case; 1929 
for Benjamin—in trying to escape perceived threats to their lives amidst the political ferment 
embroiling their native countries. Carpentier came from Havana after a stint in jail for 
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involvement in leftist political protests while Benjamin, a non-religious Jew, arrived from 
Berlin in the hopes of finding more work and relief from the rising tide of anti-Semitism. 
And just as political uncertainty at home led them to Paris, so too did it force them into flight 
from the city: Carpentier and Benjamin each remained there for around eleven years and then 
left within months of each other as the likelihood of Nazi occupation of Paris increased.
It was during those last months in Paris that Benjamin composed his famous “Theses 
on the Philosophy of History.” In the text, Benjamin imagined a mode of philosophy that 
could unsettle the growing forces of oppression at work at that moment. “It is our task to 
bring about a real state of emergency,” he writes, “and this will improve our position in the 
struggle against Fascism” (Benjamin 1968: 257). For Benjamin, “historical materialism” 
operates as the catalyst to this “state of emergency.” But, in his view, “historical 
materialism” has to make a surprise move. It has to overcome escape the limitations of 
modern rationalism that ground critical historiography. “ ‘Historical materialism’ is to win all 
the time. It can easily be a match for anyone if it enlists the services of theology, which, as 
we know, is wizened and keeps out of sight” (253). 
Through this image of a “‘historical materialism’” that “enlists the services of 
theology,” Benjamin hoped to address the urgent situation that he had marked in closing 
another essay from 1936. In a now-familiar conclusion to “The Work of Art in the Age of 
Mechanical Reproduction,” Benjamin summarizes a key point of his argument: that after 
Kant, the aesthetic powers of humans have become the primary object of their own 
reflection. According to Benjamin, this solipsism has led to a dangerous form of “self-
alienation”: “Mankind, which in Homer’s time was an object of contemplation for the 
Olympian gods, now is one for itself. Its self-alienation has reached such a degree that it can 
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experience its own destruction as an aesthetic pleasure of the first order” (Benjamin 1968: 
242). He interprets his contemporary socio-political environment accordingly. “This is the 
situation of politics which Fascism is rendering aesthetic,” he decries. In other words, the 
Nazis and other Fascists had turned politics into a gruesome aesthetic spectacle that the 
public witnessed as spectators, as if they were not actually participants. From Benjamin’s 
standpoint, the necessary response is evident: “Communism responds by politicizing art.” 
“Communism”—by which Benjamin figures a viable opposition to Fascism—takes up “art,” 
or culture more generally, as a “political” tool to counteract the aestheticization of politics. 
Social revolution depended upon the politicization of cultural endeavors. 
Benjamin’s “Theses on the Philosophy of History” sets forth terms by which that 
revolutionary project should proceed. His call for a theologically savvy “‘historical 
materialism’” that would “bring about a real state of emergency” and “improve our position 
in the struggle against Fascism” points to the mobilization of historical images—
historiography as “art”—as a way to invoke alternatives to current or familiar realities. As 
mentioned in the previous chapter, Benjamin referred to interventionist representation as 
“dialectical images.” In the last passages of the “Theses,” Benjamin links “dialectical” 
critical historiography with a kind of “magic” in which time—the very framework of our 
endeavors—assumes significance neither as “homogenous” nor “empty” (264). Those hollow 
experiences of time pervade modernity, Benjamin suggest, and the recovery of a theological 
sensibility by “historical materialism” would counteract the pull of “Fascism” by infusing 
modern life with a sense of “Messianic” import.  People would recover a fuller, much-needed 
sense of significance to their actions. 
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Undoubtedly, Benjamin’s ideas about “politicizing art” as a counter-“Fascist” project 
were unique. Still, as I considered in the last chapter, his thinking was part of a wider circuit 
of discourse. As suggested by his 1938 exchange with Adorno, Benjamin’s essays from the 
late 1930s bear the clear marks of Surrealism. He echoes the explicit objectives of Surrealist 
endeavors by gesturing towards a politicized art that “enlists the services of theology” and, in 
so doing, verges on “magic.” Once again, Benjamin’s 1929 characterization of Surrealism 
could be applied to his own expressed goals for a politics of culture: “to win the energies of 
intoxication for the revolution.”
3.
From that perspective, the correspondences between Benjamin’s and Carpentier’s 
histories intensify and make the juxtaposition of their work all the more illuminating. In 
some respects, Carpentier’s thinking as he fled Paris moved along a trajectory parallel to 
Benjamin’s work. During the months that Benjamin was working on “Theses on the 
Philosophy of History,” Carpentier also was busy with a Surrealist-inflected project with 
theological overtones. In his own set of theses, he imagined an urgently needed personal and 
social spiritual revitalization catalyzed by the production of transforming images along the 
lines of Benjamin’s “dialectical images.” Carpentier, whose political involvements in the late 
1920s forced him to run to Paris in the first place, left the city a decade later to arrive at a his 
own call for a politics of culture that would circumvent a sphere of traditional political 
activism that seemingly had closed by late 1939.
But if the various correspondences between the physical and intellectual flights of the 
displaced German and the displaced Cuban in 1939 are striking, the differences in their 
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movements were also critical. Most immediately, Benjamin’s escape from Paris ended in 
death by his own hand on the French-Spanish border while Carpentier’s getaway from the 
city and its intellectual circles became for him the multifaceted rebirth in America that he 
would textualize almost a decade later in The Kingdom of This World and its prologue. 
Invigorated by an arrival in Havana that was at once a break from and return to the origins of 
his French-born, Cuban-located family, Carpentier went on to produce all of the major work 
in his long and illustrious career. And, as we have already seen, Carpentier’s physical 
relocation to the Americas led him to an engagement with Surrealism that, by virtue of its 
insistence on “chronicles” of the Americas, diverged from Benjamin’s call for a mode of 
illuminating historiography that was not necessarily limited to a particular hemisphere. The 
explicit Americanism of Carpentier’s work of the late 1940s appeared to germinate with his 
return to Cuba.  
One of the first projects that Carpentier undertook upon his arrival back on the island 
in 1939 was a series of articles for Carteles, a leading cultural journal, entitled “La Habana 
vista por un turista cubana” [Havana Seen By a Cuban Tourist].25 The articles clearly echo 
prominent Surrealist literature, like Aragon’s Le paysan de Paris (1926) and Breton’s ‘Paris 
trilogy’ [Nadja (1928), Les vases communicants (1932), and L'amour fou (1937)]. As in 
those texts, Carpentier wanders familiar urban terrain and discovers its “marvels,” that is,
those surprising and previously unrecognized elements embedded in the history and contours 
of the city’s landscape. “An eleven year absence indisputably confers upon anyone returning 
to his country the soul of a tourist,” Carpentier observes in the first installment. 
25The five articles were published at two-week to month-long intervals between October 9 and 
December 17, 1939.
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One places oneself before one’s own things—those that were the setting of 
childhood and a complement to adolescent dreams—with new eyes and a spirit 
free from prejudice. Besides, wanderings through other lands bring to mind 
more than one point of reference and comparison […]. And spurred by a new 
curiosity, the spectator in his own home feels impelled to revise values, to 
revitalize old conceptions, to visit carefully the neighborhood that long ago 
appeared uninteresting, to explore the street that he never crossed before.26
With those “new eyes and a spirit free from prejudice,” Carpentier takes up a familiar 
Surrealist posture as he comes to recognize the hidden code written all over Havana in 
elements that he and others had always considered mundane under the familiar light of 
reason. The numbers on lottery tickets and the names of cafés point Carpentier toward 
another register of truth on which a new social order might be founded. 
In that regard, “Havana Seen By a Cuban Tourist” also echoes the Baudelaire poems 
that, as Benjamin had studied, so forcefully reverberate through the Surrealist texts. 
Carpentier exposes the “magic” residing in the colonial structures that draw “tourists” like 
him. Like the “magic cobblestones” that Baudelaire encountered in Paris, Old Havana’s 
buildings—and the city and the country more generally—rest on the invisible powers of the 
slave labor that produced them. But Carpentier’s drive “to revise values, to revitalize old 
conceptions,” only follows from his “wanderings through other lands.” He already gestures 
in 1939 toward the explicit break he would make ten years later: the full magic of modernity 
does not surface in every urban context but rather only in a specific place like Havana. In 
walking through that Latin American city born of European colonialism, two truths about the 
modern system magically appear: that it depends on forced labor as well as on the 
obfuscation of that dependence.
26Carpentier 1939:16, as cited and translated by González-Echevarría (1990: 95).
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Thus, the first passages of “Havana Seen By a Cuban Tourist” already encapsulate the 
key paradox of Carpentier’s 1949 prologue: his ability to differentiate forms of “the 
marvelous American reality” and of its “magic” stems from the modern European aesthetic 
modes with which he purportedly breaks. The Carteles series shows that Carpentier, in 
positioning himself as “the spectator in his own home,” could only recognize the hidden 
truths in his formative environment and about himself through distance from them (“one 
places oneself before one’s own things” after “wandering through other lands”). Still, what 
compels him “to revise values” is his adoption of Europe’s “old conceptions” through which 
to understand Havana and its people. In this way, Carpentier assumes the classic posture of 
twentieth-century Cuban intellectual discourse. In 1939, he already begins to turn to a 
displacing magic born of displacement. His paradoxical reliance on ostensibly displaced 
modern terms in claiming a different modernity for Latin America repeats the defining 
double-gesture of the discourse of displacing magic. 
What is most unique in Carpentier’s case is the timing of the change. In the rest of 
this chapter and the sections of the dissertation that follow, I show that by 1939—when 
Carpentier returned to Havana—the ambivalent shift in positions toward the European avant-
garde was already firmly in place in Cuban intellectual discourse. The textual exchange 
between Lachatañeré and Ortiz—carried out around the same time as Carpentier’s Carteles 
series, immediately after Lachatañeré had taken flight from Havana—indicates that by the 
late 1930s other Cuban intellectuals had preceded Carpentier in trying to reconfigure the 
avant-garde quest for socially transforming experiences as a new politics of culture. 
Carpentier would codify the move in The Kingdom of This World and its prologue, but during 
the later 1930s other Cuban intellectuals took up magic—implicitly in some cases and 
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explicitly in others—in searching for the magic of ‘authentic’ presentations of Latin 
American historical and cultural realities.
4.
Despite his expressed sense of intellectual and spiritual rejuvenation upon his 1939 
homecoming, Carpentier’s experience after his return to Havana is marked by dislocation. It 
would take Carpentier’s various physical displacements for him arrive by the late 1940s at 
the critically displacing formulations of Europe’s “cheap magicians” with his own textual 
magic. He remained in Cuba until 1945, when he moved to Caracas to begin the work in 
public relations with Publicidad Ars. He returned to Cuba only occasionally over the next 
fourteen years until his return to the island in 1959, shortly after the Revolution, in order to 
direct some book fairs planned in 1958 by the Peru-based Organización Continental de los 
Festivales del Libro [Continental Organization for Festivals of Books].27 During the 1940s—
with Havana and then Caracas as home base—Carpentier traveled throughout Latin America, 
in some cases for extended periods. He further explored Cuba, especially its eastern sections 
in and around Santiago. In 1943, he took the trip to Haiti during which—if his 1949 prologue 
is to be believed—he suddenly perceived the marvelous American reality.28 In 1944 he 
27See González-Echevarría 1990: 213f. for details on Carpentier’s 1959 return to Cuba. In August 
1961, he was named executive director of Cuba’s Editorial Nacional [National Publishing House]. In 1967, 
Carpentier moved to Paris as a cultural attaché for the Cuban government. In an ironic—but perhaps telling—
twist on his deep but ambivalent relations with that city of his and his parents’ youths, he maintained his 
primary residence there until his death in 1980. 
28According to interviews and press clippings, Carpentier joined the French actor Louis Jouvet and his 
company on its tour of Haiti. The Haïti-Journal reported in late December of 1943 on two lectures that 
Carpentier, identified as “Cultural Attaché of the Government of Havana,” delivered at the Paramount Theater 
in Port-au-Prince on “The Cultural Evolution of Latin America” (González-Echevarría 1990: 101n10).
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traveled through Mexico on vacation. In 1947 and again in 1948 he undertook prolonged 
research trips along the Orinoco River and through the jungles of Venezuela.
Still, with all of his movement between locales during the 1940s, perhaps 
Carpentier’s most significant transition was his original passage to France in 1928. That 
initial dislocation was spurred by national and international events that transformed Cuban 
society and made it much different in 1939 than it had been when Carpentier left eleven years 
earlier. His move to France constituted a self-imposed exile from Cuba during a period when 
Gerardo Machado, carried to the Presidency in 1924 on a wave of populism, made his 
decisive moves to consolidate power. Carpentier—known primarily as a journalist at the 
time—had been a founding member of a group of anti-Machado leftist intellectuals based 
around Revista de Avance [The Avant Review], a journal founded in 1927 that proclaimed its 
avant-garde allegiances in its title and initiated active protest against the government.29 Most 
of the Avance intellectuals also aligned themselves with the more directly political Grupo 
Minorista [Traders' or Retailers' Group], formed in May 1927 around the charismatic young 
activist Rubén Martínez Villena.30 Due to his open involvement in some cultural and political 
protests against Machado during 1927, Carpentier spent around forty days in jail. Upon his 
release, he decided that a temporary leave from Cuba would be in his best interest, and he 
took advantage of family ties and professional connections to resettle in Paris as a 
29For history of and selection from Revista de Avance, see Casanovas 1965. Ripoll 1964 offers 
additional historical perspective. Carpentier was a founding member of the journal’s board but, citing 
“professional incompatibilities,” resigned after the publication of the first issue (Casanovas 1965: 8-9).
30For more on the Grupo Minorista, see Cairo Ballester 1978. Luis E. Aguilar (1972) also discusses 
Revista de Avance and Grupo Minorista.
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correspondent for Latin American and French cultural reviews.31 From this perspective, 
Carpentier’s cycles of departure from and return to Cuba —those physical dislocations tied 
up with critical displacements—would mirror the experience of many of his intellectual 
compatriots. Even if the length of Carpentier’s time away from the island was unusual among 
his contemporaries, his 1928 flights to and from Cuba turned out to be a sign of the times.
5.
The early 1920s marked a time of growing economic, political, and social turbulence 
in Cuba.32 Many of those developments evolved within what Antonio Benítez-Rojo has 
called “the discourse of sugar.”33 While the sugar industry had stood for centuries at the 
center of the Cuban economy –and, in turn, of the island’s politics and culture– the opening 
decades of the twentieth century marked a distinct change in sugar production and its 
consequences. While Cuba had gained political independence in 1902 after three years as a 
U.S. protectorate, control of the island’s economy clearly remained in the hands of the North 
American companies that owned the majority of Cuban sugar mills.  By 1927, about eighty-
two percent of the sugar production on the island came from U.S.-owned centrales, the 
31From the start of his career, Carpentier was recognized as an accomplished musician and expert on 
music and its history. Some of his best-known nonfictional work—such as the groundbreaking La música en 
Cuba [Music in Cuba] (1946)—includes musicology. Various critics (e.g. González Echevarría 1990: 103-5) 
point to the importance of Carpentier’s research on the history and forms of Cuban music for his 1946 book as 
pivotal to the development of The Kingdom of This World and the marvelous-realist position outlined in its 
prologue.
32Pérez 2006 (first edition: 1988) and Thomas 1998 (first edition: 1971) focus extensively on the 
political and economic developments in twentieth-century Cuba and remain standard English-language 
historical overviews. Pérez 1988 is a now-dated but still essential guide to historiographic sources on Cuba. I 
also rely on Benjamin 1990 and Masó 1998, which is among the indispensable general references in Spanish.
33Benítez-Rojo defines and discusses “the discourse of sugar” in a number of articles, some of which 
appear in his collection, The Repeating Island (1996). For a useful overview of the impact of the discourse of 
sugar on Cuban intellectual production during the 1920s and 1930s, see Vera Kutsinski’s Sugar’s Secrets: Race 
and the Erotics of Cuban Nationalism (1993: 134-162). 
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enormous manufacturing networks into which smaller, Cuban-owned farms had been 
consolidated (Benjamin 1990: 69n37). The expansion of North American holdings remained 
controversial among Cubans leading up to and during World War I, yet the soaring price of 
sugar on the international market during this period—coupled with the increasing vigilance
of the U.S. military presence—helped to keep the situation from erupting into violence. But 
as prices began to fluctuate and then settle downward during the 1920s, political conflicts 
intensified and spilled out into civil society.34 The presidential election of 1924 arose amidst 
the intensifying polarization and marked a clear shift in Cuba’s political tides. The election 
put Machado in the executive office, where he remained for nearly a decade. Machado’s 
entrenchment in power soon gained a proper name of its own: the “Machadato.” The naming 
signals that a major political development soon became a defining social and cultural 
experience. 
Machado had emerged quite suddenly during the early 1920s as a political force. He 
moved up quickly through the Cuban military to the rank of general by taking advantage of 
internecine disputes within military and political camps and by cultivating his image as a 
charming, self-made populist. Machado won the 1924 presidential election handily, earning a 
popular mandate for a nationalist platform that promised the reform of political institutions 
and the expansion of social programs in the face of the island’s ongoing economic 
turbulence. He initially seemed committed to that agenda after assuming the presidency of 
the Republic in May 1925, but by 1928 he made clear his intentions to retain power, 
regardless of his repeated insistence that he would not run for reelection in order to advance 
34Sugar prices soared to almost twelve cents per pound in 1919, fluctuated around nine or ten cents 
during various boom-and-bust cycles of the 1920s, and then spiraled below two cents a pound in 1931 and, 
finally, fell under one cent in 1932-33 (Benjamin 1990: 69).
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his agenda instead of his political career. In direct opposition to public opinion and to his 
reformist campaign, Machado began systematically to consolidate his power by forcing 
constitutional revisions that increased instead of ameliorated executive authority. His 
accumulation of self-assigned titles that far exceeded his constitutional role (e.g. Salvador de 
la Patria [Savior of the Fatherland], Primer Obrero de Cuba [Cuba’s First Worker]) reflected 
a more profound accrual of power. 
For many observers, Machado’s defining act came in 1928 when he essentially 
outlawed existing political parties and created a de facto one-party puppet government under 
a forced reorganization euphemistically called “cooperativismo” [cooperativism]. Instead of 
real political cooperation, cooperativismo catalyzed short- and long-term trends in exactly the 
opposite direction.35 Cuban society became palpably more polarized between a small 
minority that directly benefited from the President’s patronage and the great majority 
infuriated by, among other developments, the institutional deepening of the political 
favoritism that Machado had pledged to purge.
In the wake of cooperativism, political opposition to the Machadato profoundly 
radicalized.36 In turn, political radicalization contributed to a wave of tumultuous reactions 
and counter-reactions, compressed most forcefully and symbolically in Machado’s 
resignation in August 1933. A leftist alliance, aided by urban guerrilla tactics, had put 
enormous strain on the Machadato, and the U.S. put the final pressure on Machado to step 
down. A “Provisional Government” led by Manuel de Céspedes lasted less than a month, 
35The literature on the Machadato in general and on cooperativismo in particular is wide. I draw 
especially on Aguilar 1972, Pérez-Stable 2005, and Masó 1998.
36As indicated in the subtitle (Prologue to Revolution) of Cuba 1933, Aguilar (1972) argues that 
political polarization and radicalization during the Machadato created the ideological and structural foundations 
for the emergence and eventual success of the Castro-led revolutionary movement of the 1950s. 
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followed by the four-month tenure of a “Revolutionary Government” headed by Ramón Grau 
San Martín. By mid-January of 1934, the Revolutionary Period was already done and another 
defining era in Cuban history was underway.
That new era, beginning in 1934, was ‘the age of Batista.’ Fulgencio Batista—another 
charming young military man who, like Machado before him, used populist rhetoric and 
temporary alliances to rapidly consolidate his power—had been named head of the military 
after Machado’s downfall. As the Revolutionary Government floundered, Batista situated 
himself as the United States’ main contact and best political hope. With the Government’s 
collapse, Batista was able to move in as the head of a more conservative, U.S.-backed 
opposition front that displaced Grau and installed Carlos Hevia as Provisional President. 
When certain military and political factions objected to Hevia, Batista helped place Carlos 
Mendieta as the new President two days later. Batista himself would not assume the 
Presidency until 1940, but he remained the primary force in Cuban political affairs until his 
infamous overthrow by Fidel Castro’s Revolutionary Forces almost exactly twenty-five years 
later.37
However, as the eventual triumph of the Revolutionary Forces indicates, Batista’s 
hold on power was never absolute. Ramón Grau San Martín, the head of the short-lived 
Revolutionary Government of 1933, won the Presidency in a free election in 1944 on an anti-
U.S. platform. Carlos Prío succeeded Grau San Martín in 1948 with initial independence 
from Batista.38 While Batista maintained control of the military throughout the period, he 
37As head of Cuba’s military, Batista exercised considerable control over the administrations of 
Mendieta (1934-1937) and his successor, Federico Laredo Bru (1937-1940).
38
 In a bloodless coup in March 1952, Batista took over the Presidency again and cancelled the pending 
elections. He remained Head of Government until his flight from Cuba on New Year’s Eve of 1959.
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always depended largely upon the Cuban public’s general acquiescence to his power. 
Castro’s success resulted from the fact that, by the mid-1950s, most Cubans had come to see 
the regime as more of a detriment than a benefit. Especially during the first decade under 
Batista’s control, much of the island’s population tolerated the situation because of the sense 
of stability it provided. 
It was that palpable desire for political calm that settled over Cuba after the turmoil of 
the late Machadato and the political transitions of 1933 and amidst the new turbulence that 
rocked international affairs throughout the 1930s and into the 1940s. Of course, Cuba’s 
economic, political, and social crises during the 1920s and 1930s had not occurred in a 
vacuum. Developments on the island tied in with complex and volatile global affairs of a 
period marked by the fallout of one World War and building toward another. The U.S. 
economic boom of the 1920s; the Great Depression that followed; the rise of European 
fascism and the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War: these and other developments played out 
profoundly in Cuba too and reverberated especially among Cuban intellectuals.
6.
Batista was notoriously dismissive of intellectuals, and many politically active figures 
found themselves closed out of traditional politics after the collapse of the Revolutionary 
Government in January 1934. The failure of that government also created considerable 
disillusionment among the intellectual elite that had helped to define and then to lead the 
exhilarating but fleeting political experiment. As usual, Ortiz was exemplary, in various 
senses of the term. His experience was outstanding in certain respects but, more 
fundamentally, it reflected a common pattern among Cuban intellectuals at the time. From 
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the very start of his career, Ortiz had been tied up in political service. He began work as a 
consul in Spain, France and Italy in 1903, when his own professional life and that of the 
Cuban Republic were both brand new. After his return to Cuba in 1906, he remained active 
in public affairs. He was a visible, prolific, and respected commentator on domestic and 
international political developments, and as a professor of criminal law at the University of 
Havana he participated frequently on government commissions regarding social policy. In 
1916, he won a seat as a member of the Liberal Party in the National Congress. Amidst the 
growing socio-economic crises that would eventually sweep Machado to victory in 1924, 
Ortiz was already growing disillusioned with politics. In 1922, he did not run for reelection 
on the grounds that his cultural and scholarly endeavors offered more effective means of 
political intervention than involvement in government.39
Nevertheless, Ortiz joined in the opposition protests leading up to the 1924 elections, 
such that the Liberal Party asked him to join the House of Representatives again that year as 
a specially appointed member. He accepted, but by 1926 he could no longer stomach his 
involvement in Cuba’s “squalid political structure.” He renounced his seat once again—this 
time leaving government for good—and took Machado in particular to task for his now-
obvious intentions to backtrack on his original promises of institutional reform.40 Ortiz 
39For instance, in renouncing his political involvements upon the expiration of his term in 1923, Ortiz 
insisted that “to reconstruct the history of Cuba based on the precise knowledge of its ethnic, demographic, and 
cultural foundations” would more profoundly transform Cuban society by bypassing “its squalid political 
structure.” He went on to argue for more developed approaches to the study of “Cuban culture,” in which an 
“age-old bonfire” of struggle continued to light the way to a truer “freedom” than the limited political 
independence won after the 1898 end of Spanish colonialism (Ortiz 1923: 208f).
40Following Machado’s victory in 1924, Ortiz—like many left-leaning intellectuals—expressed hope 
about the possibilities of political reform. As many historians have noted, Machado initially appeared to move 
in a reformist direction, and one of his first moves was the formation of a Presidential Comisíon Codificadora 
[Policy Commission] charged with rewriting Cuba’s criminal code. Machado tapped Ortiz as the obvious choice 
to lead this project, and Ortiz worked tirelessly over the next year and a half to produce the Proyecto de Código 
Criminal Cubano [Project for the Cuban Criminal Code]. In presenting the Código Criminal to the Presidential 
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became one of the most vocal critics of Machado and of Cuban political institutions. Within 
four years, Ortiz could tolerate the situation no more. He declared that Machado’s 
elimination of political opposition in 1928 under the euphemistic guise of “cooperativismo” 
had enabled open “despotism,” and in 1931 he went into self-imposed exile in Washington, 
D.C. He moved to New York in 1933 to join a group of exiles sympathetic to the political 
resistance back home and calling themselves the Cuban Revolutionary Front. From the U.S., 
Ortiz campaigned for international isolation of Machado’s dictatorship. After the overthrow 
of Machado in August 1933, Ortiz returned to Havana. But he left the task of government to 
others. In reflecting more than eight years later on his life in politics, Ortiz remained 
unequivocal about his previous political involvements. “I had the misfortune of getting 
mixed up in politics,” he concluded (Ortiz 1998: 21).41
Fittingly, Ortiz offered this assessment in the midst of his famous 1942 Club Atenas 
speech “On the Cuban Integration of Blacks and Whites.” After all, that talk was both a 
genealogy of and a manifesto for Afro-Cuban studies. It was precisely scholarly and cultural 
endeavors to which Ortiz and his intellectual compatriots largely returned after 1933. So 
whether by conscious withdrawal or external exclusion from political affairs, most Cuban 
intellectuals in 1934 and in the years that followed made the same move as Ortiz: they 
conceded the political sphere to Batista. They focused instead on intellectual interventions 
carried out in the name of “culture.” 
Commission in 1926, Ortiz introduced it as the result of “the effort of all, drawing on the reformist impulse of 
General Machado, who is very interested in legislative renovation.” The project did not win Congressional 
approval as the political tides began to shift away from reform in 1926, but his Código Criminal earned 
immediate and lasting fame as outstandingly progressive. For instance, Enrico Ferri—the famed Italian 
criminologist who had mentored Ortiz during 1903—declared, “the foundation of the Project for the Criminal 
Code of Cuba constitutes a magnificent and excellent affirmation of the principle of social defense.” For an
illuminating discussion of Ortiz’s Código Criminal and its context, see Bronfman 2005.




The turn—or, rather, return—of Cuban intellectuals to culture was not necessarily a 
move of last resort. For Ortiz and his colleagues, “culture” had been the primary sphere of 
action all along. As Consuelo Naranjo Orovio and Miguel Angel Puig-Samper Mulero have 
suggested, invocations of “culture” within early-twentieth-century Cuban intellectual 
discourse generally reflected notions of the term within contemporary social science (2005: 
22f). Despite significant differences among fields of social science, they shared an 
underlying post-Kantian assumption: Because of their unique powers of reason, humans were 
simultaneously part of and separated from the rest of the world. Humans acted in the world, 
but their actions worked on it and altered it. Therefore, “culture” encompassed all human 
endeavors that, whether deliberate or not, transformed the “natural” state of world. “Culture” 
also helped constitute “society,” that is, the system of relations between humans. From this 
perspective, “politics”—in its limited connotation of processes and mechanisms of 
government—was only an integral part of the broader “cultural” and “social” spectrums. 
Similarly, “culture” was inherently “political” in a wider sense. In its more expansive 
meaning, “politics” referred in this discourse to the mechanisms by which groups of different 
sizes tried to constitute—or reconstitute—the state of “social” relations. 
Cuban intellectuals developed these social scientific concepts from working with 
various sources. For instance, the ethnological work of Franz Boas—grounded in an 
explicitly post-Kantian theorization of “culture” and the attendant notion of “folklore”—
circulated widely and gained popularity with Latin American intellectuals in the first decades 
of the twentieth century. For Ortiz, the meaning of “culture” stemmed most directly from the 
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Krauspositivist social scientific traditions in which he had been trained in Spain. The 
hallmark of those traditions was the idea that education functioned as a foundational political 
mechanism by which “culture” could be directed and “society” could be determined.42 In the 
Spanish context, this Krauspositivist emphasis on education surfaced as the driving force 
behind a perceived need for the “regeneration” of a “Hispanic” society that had lost its moral 
bearings under the “decadence” of nineteenth-century Spanish imperialism. Accordingly, 
“culture” often played out under the banner of “regenerationist” programs that imagined the 
revitalization of a “Pan-Hispanic culture” united by history, language, and religion. 
Ortiz’s Spanish background and education gave him a uniquely intimate familiarity 
with these ideas. But, again, his particular experience contributed to a typically Cuban 
reaction. Already in the first decade of the 1900s—as Cubans were trying to establish the 
independence of their Republic on political and non-political terms—Ortiz and others had 
staked out their own, alternative “regenerationist” position. They too called from the 
revitalization of Cuban society through narrowly “political” and broadly “cultural” means 
like education, but Cuban intellectuals rejected the idea that theirs was part of a “Pan-
Hispanic culture.” Rather, they sought to reaffirm the independence of “Cuban culture” in the 
past, present, and future. Politics—narrowly conceived—would function as a key part of that 
effort, but present cultural endeavors—such as scholarly investigations into Cuba’s cultural 
past—also would critically define the nation’s future culture and, ultimately, its social 
relations.
It was within this tradition of Cuban intellectual activism that Ortiz insisted in 1923 
that “culture” served as the “age-old bonfire” to light Cuba’s way toward a more viable 
42Refer to the introduction for more on Krauspositivism and its influence on Ortiz.
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“freedom” (Ortiz 1923: 208f). Ortiz’s statement, made in a speech to Cuba’s Academia de 
Historia (Academy of History), reflects how political progressivism of the 1920s germinated 
within scholarly organizations and cultural associations. It made sense that intellectual 
activity would sprout once again from those kinds of institutions after 1933. 
8.
The Revista Bimestre Cubana [Bimonthly Cuban Review] served as the logical center 
for renewed politics of culture. The Revista Bimestre was the principal publication of one of 
Cuba’s oldest and most influential intellectual forums, La Sociedad Económia de Amigos del 
País [The Economic Society of Friends of the Nation], which had been founded in 1793 as a 
bastion for Enlightenment thinking in the Spanish colonies. Throughout the nineteenth 
century and into the twentieth, the Society stood as the institutional center for Cuba’s great 
liberal causes—ranging from abolition to independence to 1920s reformism—by providing 
space and resources for exchange among sympathetic intellectuals, Cuban and non-Cuban 
alike. The Society—popularly known by the acronym SEAP—had initiated publication of the 
Revista Bimestre in the early 1900s as a medium for social, political, and economic ideas—
and, hence, “for the diffusion of culture”—in the new Republic. 
In 1910, Ortiz took over responsibility for the editorial direction of the Revista 
Bimestre (a responsibility he would maintain until 1959). Upon his return to Cuba and in the 
wake of the collapse of the Revolutionary Government, Ortiz emphasized the role that the 
Sociedad Económica de Amigos del País and other intellectual organizations should play in 
post-1933 Cuba. He explained that the organizations could nurture national culture at an 
uncertain moment in Cuba’s history by undertaking new scholarly investigations into the 
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island’s past and present. Such scholarship, as exploration into and expression of “Cuban 
culture,” should reemerge as the primary realm of social intervention. He promised that 
SEAP would lead the way in initiating new cultural endeavors and that its Revista Bimestre
would publish them.
In making a commitment to this cause, Ortiz undertook a research project to serve as 
a model. The result was an important series of articles that eventually included four pieces 
appearing one-a-year between 1934 and 1937. The first three pieces were published in 
Revista Bimestre. In a telling sign of how Cuban intellectual cultural politics developed after 
1933, Ortiz would incorporate the fourth study into his January 1937 inaugural address to the 
Society for Afro-Cuban Studies, and the article would serve as the centerpiece of the first 
issue of the new Society’s journal.
Taken as a whole, the articles comprised a multifaceted exploration of a significant 
cultural development of the late 1920s and early 1930s, a trend that Ortiz would identify as 
poesía mulata [mulatto poetry]. Ortiz’s use of that designation offers an immediate indication 
of the reformulated intellectual position that emerged after 1933. As Ortiz made clear in the 
first article, “mulatto poetry” reflected cultural formations that undermined notions of race. 
According to Ortiz, the poems themselves were “mulatto,” not the authors. Ortiz’s main point 
across the poesía mulata series was to delineate the poems’ mixture of formal elements—
such as vocabulary and rhythm—as well as modes of thought from African as well as 
European traditions. He focused mainly on the work of Cubans but also extended his 
analysis—and the category of poesía mulata—to include other Spanish-speaking Caribbean 
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writers who incorporated African elements into their work. He identified Luis Palés Matos, a 
Puerto Rican, as an outstanding poeta mulato (mulatto poet).43
By establishing the “mulatto” nature of the poems, Ortiz reinforced the critical claim 
that Caribbean—and especially Cuban—culture had been and always would amount to 
unique historical expressions structured by the peculiar colonial past that forced together so 
many diverse elements. “Poesía mulata” functioned as another of Ortiz’s cubanismos. The 
designation tried to unsettle the concept of race by pushing racial terms onto poetry that 
technically, as a non-biological entity, could belong to no “race.” Rather, the idea of race was 
itself an element of culture, a fallacious category superimposed by human reason onto a 
confusing world and thereby altering society. For Ortiz, poesía mulata exposed the race-
concept as an aesthetic production, as part of the domain of fiction. And in unveiling the 
cultural parameters of race, poesía mulata—and the scholarly exploration of that field of 
literature—offered ripe possibilities for dramatic intervention. 
Ortiz laid down these themes in the first article, which appeared at the end of 1934 in 
SEAP’s Revista Bimestre under the title “La poesía mulata: Presentación de Eusebia Cosme, 
la recitadora” [Mulatto Poetry: Presentation by Eusebia Cosme, the Reciter]. In his opening 
study of poesía mulata, he outlined the contours of the genre by emphasizing the poems’ 
increased impact in oral renderings. He suggested that the work of Eusebia Cosme—who had 
43Palés Matos (1898-1959) is a pivotal figure in the development of Afro-Caribbean studies. Critics 
often recognize his 1926 poem, “Pueblo negro” [Black Village], as the beginning of the “negrismo” movement 
in the Spanish Antilles. In a move that observers continue to make regularly, Ortiz paired Palés Matos with 
Nicolás Guillén as the main pillars of the “Afro-Antillean” movement that earned wide attention during the late 
1920s and early 1930s. Like Guillén, Palés Matos—who also had partial African ancestry—drew criticism for 
creating exotic stereotypes of Afro-Caribbean traditions and eventually abandoned “negrismo” pursuits for 
more openly political verse. Most of Palés Matos’s “Afro-Antillean” poems are collected in his famous 1937 
book, Tuntún de pasa y grifería [Drumbeats of Kinkiness and Blackness] (Palés Matos 1993). For more on 
Palés Matos, including introductions in English, see Kutzinski 1993, Marzán 1995, and Ruscalleda Bercedóniz 
2005.
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gained renown in Cuba with her dramatic recitations—advanced poesía mulata even more 
than the original poems that she performed. Ortiz explained how Cosme’s recitations 
animated the poems as unique cultural expressions and, in so doing, generated social effects 
among her audience that surpassed the original written versions. “Culture,” he suggested, 
unfolded as an ongoing performance, and Cosme’s dramatic interpretations transformed the 
culture they ostensibly expressed. Her performances functioned as a powerful political
mechanism. Ortiz developed these themes across the other three articles in the series: “Los 
últimos versos mulatos” [The latest mulatto verse] (1935); “Más acerca de la poesía mulata, 
escorzos para un estudio” [Another look at poesía mulata: Sketches of a study] (1936); and 
“Religión en la poesía mulata” [Religion in poesía mulata] (1937). 
Significantly, the last article ended where the first one began: by considering the 
social effects of Eusebia Cosme’s dramatic recitations. Yet, in the later piece Ortiz would 
come at the issue directly through magic in the hopes of letting loose a displacing magic
modeled on Cosme’s performances. In the next chapter, I will return to that final, critical 
move in Ortiz’s poesía mulata series. The arc between those two different discussions of 
Cosme’s work—one in 1934, the other in 1937—traces a shifting politics of culture in and 
beyond Ortiz’s work during that two-and-a-half-year period. Still, Ortiz’s poesía mulata
series developed within the confines of scholarly organizations clustered around the Sociedad 
Económica de Amigos del País and the Revista Bimestre Cubana. The conditions of the 
project’s production serve as a reminder that the evolving cultural politics of the 1930s 
played out primarily within the sphere of intellectual institutions. 
9.
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For a variety of reasons, institutionally based Cuban intellectual politics intensified 
considerably during 1936. By that time, many of the intellectuals who had left Cuba during 
the turbulence surrounding Machado’s fall had returned to the island. After two years under 
the Batista-influenced Mendieta administration, life seemingly had regained a measure of 
political, economic, and social stability for many Cubans. But, of course, that sense of calm 
at home differed markedly from—and, to some extent, stemmed from—the growing turmoil 
abroad. Demand for Cuban sugar once again increased as sectors of the international supply 
shifted or closed. 
And then, in July of 1936, the simmering tensions in Spain erupted into a full-scale 
civil war. The outbreak of that conflict impacted Cuban intellectual life in a profound and 
decisive manner. The ties between Spain and its former colonial jewel were much more than 
historical. The flow of Spaniards to Cuba—whether as short-term visitors or long-term 
residents—remained consistently heavy, even after Spain’s 1898 loss of the colony. 
Spaniards remained a familiar part of Cuban society, including its intellectual circles. Not 
surprisingly, the flow continued to move the other way too. Even after 1898, many Cubans 
with the means to do so followed the familiar colonial tradition of traveling to Spain and, 
quite frequently, of taking up temporary or permanent residence there. A majority of Cubans 
arguably had some Spanish ancestry and, in many cases, maintained contact with relatives in 
Spain and its territories. Ortiz stood out in this regard too. His mother hailed from the island 
of Minorca, one of the Balearic Islands off of the coast of the Spanish region of Catalonia, 
and Ortiz had spent most of the first fifteen years of his life there and much of the next five 
years in Barcelona (where he completed his university degree) and in Madrid (where he 
completed his doctorate in law). Therefore, for Ortiz and many others in Cuba, the political 
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violence in Spain before, during, and after the1936 outbreak of the Civil War hit home in 
literal as well as figurative ways. 
In light of the circumstances in Spain, Ortiz and other intellectuals in Cuba intensified 
efforts to revive a previously established organization, the Institución Hispano-Cubana de 
Cultura (IHCC) [Hispanic-Cuban Cultural Institution]. The IHCC had originally emerged out 
of the Sociedad Económica de Amigos del País in November 1926.44 In a November 12 
lecture at the SEAP, Ortiz proposed the formation of the IHCC, and only ten days later it was 
officially established with the professed goal of “endeavoring to increase the intellectual 
relations between Spain and Cuba through the exchange between scientists, artists, students, 
the founding of professorships, and publicizing activities geared toward the intensification 
and diffusion of our own [Cuban] culture” (SEAP 1926: 896). 
From the beginning of 1927 through the end of 1930, the IHCC actively and 
productively pursued those objectives. The group managed to secure donations from and 
special agreements with private sources, including Spanish social and cultural organizations 
like the Casino Español and the Institución Cultural Española de Buenos Aires [Buenos Aires 
Spanish Cultural Institution], the publisher Cultural, the retailer Fin de Siglo, and the 
steamship company Transatlántica Española. The IHCC also forged productive 
collaborations with institutions in Cuba, Spain, and elsewhere. The University of Havana and 
the Junta para la Ampliación de Estudios e Investigaciones Científicas [Committee for the 
Growth of Scientific Studies and Investigations] (JAE) in Madrid agreed to house courses 
and lectures offered by visiting intellectuals to Cuba and to Spain, respectively, while the 
44For a brief history of and background on the IHCC, see Naranjo Orovio and Puig-Samper Mulero 
2005: 24-31. In the following pages, I draw on Naranjo Orovio and Puig-Samper’s discussion, based on their 
original archival research.
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Spanish Cultural Institutes in New York and Mexico City, the Hispanic Institute of New 
York, the Instituto Hispano -Mexicano de Intercambio Universitario [the Hispanic-Mexican 
Exchange Institution], the University of Puerto Rico, and organizations in other parts of Latin 
America supported joint activities and exchanges. 
This network of relations resulted in an exchange program that, in 1927 alone, 
brought physicist Fernando de los Ríos, chemist Blas Cabrera, and infectious-disease 
specialist Luis Sayé to Cuba from Spain for lecture series. In turn, Rita Shelton, a Cuban 
medical researcher, and Arsenio Roa, an economist, traveled to Barcelona and Madrid, 
respectively, to work with counterparts in Spain. Over the next three years, the exchanges 
expanded further to include many notable programs, such as two annual scholarships for 
Cubans in Spain and lecture tours of Cuba by two of Spain’s most prominent contemporary 
intellectuals, the literary historian Américo Castro (in 1928) and the writer Federico García 
Lorca (in March 1930). 
In 1928, the Institution inaugurated its main journal, Mensajes de la Institución 
Hispanocubana de Cultura [Messages of the Hispanic-Cuban Cultural Institution], followed 
in 1930 by the monthly Surco. Cuba’s most popular daily, Diario de la Marina, substantially 
increased the IHCC’s public profile by agreeing to announce and review the organization’s 
proceedings. However, shortly after the launch of Surco, the activities of the IHCC came to a 
virtual standstill. As Ortiz and others fled Cuba under the tightening grip of the Machadato, 
the IHCC’s administration and membership dried up. During Ortiz’s absence between 1931 
and 1933, the IHCC did manage to organize a few isolated lectures by scholars who already 
resided in Cuba, but the group was unable to carry out any exchange programs and even had 
to cancel planned visits by several Spanish figures. When Ortiz and other intellectuals 
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returned to Cuba after Machado’s fall, funding remained limited and, like most other 
intellectual organizations, the IHCC remained mostly dormant. 
However, by 1936 the IHCC had regrouped and began to show signs of new life. The 
organization’s reemergence reflected the wider move toward institutionally grounded 
intellectual activity after 1933 and resulted directly from Ortiz’s effort to use the Sociedad 
Económica de Amigos del País as the initial staging ground for a revitalized cultural politics. 
On May 24, 1936, the IHCC, under the auspices of SEAP, sponsored its first lecture by a 
visiting Spaniard in five years. In a talk entitled “The Significance of the Spanish 
Revolution,” Félix Gordón Ordás, the Spanish ambassador to Cuba, spoke about the victory 
in the recent February elections of the leftist Popular Front. 
Ordás’s optimism in that talk was questionable and, ultimately, proved short-lived. 
After the February election, the Popular Front pushed through a ban on the right-wing 
Falange Party, and the move transformed the tensions of the campaigns into the first of the 
waves of armed confrontation that would ensue over the next three years in streets and 
countrysides across Spain and its territories. March, April, and May had been marked by 
street riots in parts of the country, and then, in July, came the military uprisings in Spanish 
Morocco and in some places at home. By September, a military junta had installed Franco as 
Head of State and Commander-in-Chief of the Spanish Armed Forces. 
With this severe turn-of-events, the IHCC’s renewal assumed added urgency, and the 
group quickly increased its cultural programming as a means to aid some of the flood of 
intellectuals trying to escape Franco’s Nationalist forces in Spain.45 In light of the 
45Among the Spaniards that the IHCC directly aided were: the poet Juan Ramón Jiménez and his wife, 
Zenobia Camprubí, who arrived in Cuba in November 1936; Ramón Menéndez Pidal, who came in January 
1937 and delivered a series of lectures on the history of Spanish literature; the biologist Luis Amado Blanco; 
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circumstances, the Institución also founded a new, Ortiz-initiated journal, Ultra, which 
would remain a fixture on the intellectual scene until it gave way in 1947.46 As Ortiz outlined 
in the section “Afirmaciones de Cultura” [Affirmations of Culture] that appeared in Ultra’s 
first issue and that became one of the journal’s regular features, the IHCC and its new 
publication would confront urgent domestic and international affairs as a much-needed forum 
through which to cultivate “tolerance.” Ortiz explained: “Without mutual tolerance, which is 
the livening factor behind culture, science is reduced to chatter, religion to sterile 
‘fanaticism,’ justice to oppressive despotism, and the power behind social rhythm turns into a 
suffocating, repelling beast” (Ortiz 1936b: 79, as quoted in Ortiz Herrera 2005: 7).
Ortiz’s invocation of “the livening factor behind culture,” along with the chosen 
heading “Affirmations of Culture,” signal the cultural politics at work in Ultra. The journal 
formalized the ideas behind Ortiz’s poesía mulata studies. “Culture” emerged clearly as the 
primary sphere of intellectual engagement. Ortiz’s statement, with its references to “sterile 
‘fanaticism’” and “oppressive despotism,” overtly addressed global political dynamics and 
set up “culture” as the counterforce to the dangerous “power behind social rhythm [that] 
turns into a suffocating, repelling beast.” Apparently, Ortiz’s politics of “culture” had more 
than Cuban affairs in its sights. Its target was nothing less than human intolerance and its 
manifestations in fascism abroad. That project of worldwide social transformation would 
musicologist Regino Sainz de la Maza; Adolfo Salazar; hematologist Gustavo Pittaluga (arrived May 1937); 
historian Claudio Sánchez Albornoz (March 1938) and Américo Castro (also 1938); and, in early 1939, law 
professors Luis Recasens Siches and José M. Ots Capdequí. See Naranjo Orovio and Puig-Samper Mulero: 30-1 
for further details of IHCC’s efforts between 1936 and 1940 regarding exiled Spanish intellectuals.
46On the significance of Ultra during its run from 1936 to 1947, María Fernanda Ortiz Herrera (Ortiz’s 
daughter) writes: “I do not know of any other magazine in any language that can be compared to Ultra as to 
useful information, interesting material, and universal cultural values for the general reader. There is nothing 
like it published in English […]. In 1939, Stella Clemence, a writer and a book fan, director of the Harkness 
Collection and the Latin American section of the Library of Congress in Washington, D.C., referred to Ultra in 
the following terms: ‘I encourage you to read these messages by Fernando Ortiz and the content and diversity of 
the articles published in Ultra. I believe that the real value of Ortiz’s scholarship lays there, reflected in his 
work and his teachings’” (Ortiz Herrera 2005: 7).
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require other new intellectual institutions related to but different from SEAP and the Revista 
Bimestre and from the IHCC and Ultra.
10.
On June 1, 1936—one week after the May 24 reinauguration of the Instituto Hispano-
Cubana de Cultura with Ambassador Ordás’s talk—Ortiz and a number of other prominent 
intellectuals gathered in Havana to draft the statutes of another new intellectual organization 
spurred by the Sociedad Económica de Amigos del País. The new endeavor would pursue a 
particular aspect of the critical drive toward the “diffusion of culture.” Specifically, the group 
would revolve around scholarly exploration into the “African” legacy in Cuban history and in 
the island’s contemporary culture. Given that expressed purpose, the appropriate name for 
the organization seemed obvious: La Sociedad de Estudios Afrocubanos [The Society for 
Afro-Cuban Studies].47
But what does a name really say? In this case, the clarity of the choice was telling. 
For, as already discussed, the term “Afro-Cuban” was not timeless; it only took hold slowly 
in the decades following Ortiz’s 1906 original use of the term and leading up to the group’s 
formation. Accordingly, the notion of “Afro-Cuban studies” was also something of a novelty 
during those years. The fact that a group of intellectuals formally adopted the designation for 
the first time in 1936 indicates that, as Ortiz would highlight in his 1942 speech, his “Afro-
Cuban” cubanismos—with their intentions of unsettling established categories—had settled 
by the mid-1930s into “common parlance.” 
47Key information about the formation of the Society appears in “Notas y Noticias” at the beginning of 
the inaugural issues (1937-1938) of the group’s journal. See Sociedad de Estudios Afrocubanos 1937.
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It was perhaps in recognition of the potential power of names that when the Spanish 
Civil War exploded the next month, the group began to consider a longer designation that 
would leave no doubts about the organization’s interventionist intentions. By the time the 
founding members approved for release the group’s first public statement on December 26 of 
1936, they had agreed to lengthen the organization’s official name to La Sociedad de 
Estudios Afrocubanos Contra los Racismos (The Society for Afro-Cuban Studies Against 
Racism). In a document proclaiming its “advertencia, comprensión y designio”
[announcement, understanding, and purpose], the Society insisted that its ostensibly narrow 
historical and cultural focus had immediate relevance to contemporary global affairs. The 
manifesto-style pronouncement—addressed “to Cubans and their fellow citizens”—
explained how global affairs had created an urgent need for so-called “Afro-Cuban studies”: 
The social attitude of reciprocal ignorance, when not from open antipathy and 
hostility among the various racial elements that make up a population, is very 
frequent throughout the entire world, especially when it corresponds to a 
correlative economic structure, and could not help but present itself in Cuba. 
All of humanity is suffering profoundly from the absurd prejudice of racial 
hatred, obscuring the play of other truer and more transcendent factors. 
(Sociedad de Estudios Afrocubanos 1937: 4)48
The Society “Against Racism” took it upon itself to confront the “absurd prejudice” from 
which “all of humanity is suffering profoundly.” “Afro-Cuban studies”—a conceivably 
innocuous academic endeavor with apparently world-saving potential—would serve as the 
group’s weapon in that confrontation. 
Of course, that weapon was also magical. How could it not be? A group dedicated to 
Afro-Cuban studies—a field arising largely from Ortiz’s displacing magic—would rely on 
48
“Esta actitud social de recíproca ignorancia, cuando no de abierta antipatía y hostilidad, entre los 
varios elementos raciales que integran un pueblo, es muy frecuente en el mundo entero, máxime cuando 
corresponde a una correlativa estructura económica, y no podía dejar de presentarse en Cuba. Toda la 
humanidad está sufriendo profundamente por la absurda prédica de los odios raciales, disfazando el juego de 
otros factores más verdaderos y trascendentes.”
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some of that magic in its own efforts. So, appropriately, magic served as a key consideration 
in the group’s first official meeting. After proclaiming its purpose and intentions, SEAC—the 
acronym by which the Sociedad de Estudios Afrocubanos became known—set January 16th
of the new year, a date a less than three weeks ahead, for its official inauguration. The event 
would be held at Club Atenas and would revolve around a presidential keynote address by 
Ortiz. Since he almost was finished the fourth of his studies of poesía mulata, Ortiz decided 
that the presentation of that work—entitled “La religión en la poesía mulata” [Religion in 
poesía mulata]—would serve as an appropriate topic as well as a fitting bridge to the new 
SEAC from the venerable SEAP. The move symbolized that the post-1933 intellectual 
activity nurtured in the established Revista Bimestre Cubana had come into its own 
intellectually and institutionally by 1937 as reconfigured politics of “culture.”
It is to that cultural politics expressed in Ortiz’s inaugural address and embodied in 
the Society for Afro-Cuban Studies that I now move. As I do so, I point back to where I 
began this chapter: Walter Benjamin’s late 1936 call for “politicizing art” as a way to 
counteract “Fascism.” At almost exactly the same time, Ortiz and cohorts also looked to new 
forms of cultural production, already implicitly political, that could counteract “the absurd 
prejudice of racial hatred.” And like Benjamin, the Cuban group also turned to magic as both 
cause of and solution to peculiarly modern forms of ethnic tension. 
CHAPTER 3: ‘THE CORONATION OF A LONG UNDERTAKING’: RITUAL, 
RELIGIOSITY, AND MAGIC AT THE INAUGURATION OF AFRO-CUBAN STUDIES 
(1937)
Every Culture passes through the age-phases of the individual man. Each has 
its childhood, youth, manhood and old age.
Oswald Spengler (1918)
The three phases of religious evolution are reflected in Afro-Cuban lyric:  the 
gods emerge, the gods triumph, the gods die.  Mana, myth, and science. The 
same stained-glass window of the temple filters diverse colorations according 
to the sun's position at twilight or at its zenith.  Mulatez refracts different 
shades according to the angle at which the sun kisses it.  Thus some will be 
able to see in the lyric of Pedroso and of the poets, like him, who sing of the 
coming of redemptions, an essence of religiosity.
Fernando Ortiz (1937)
1.
In the late 1970s, literary critics rediscovered Oswald Spengler’s Decline of the West
and its profound influence on Latin American intellectuals of the 1920s and 1930s. The 
renewed attention given by Latin Americanists to Spengler stemmed in large part from 
Roberto González Echevarría’s discussion in his influential 1977 study of Alejo Carpentier 
of the impact of The Decline of the West on the region’s intellectuals.49 As González 
Echevarría (1990: 54f) highlights in his monograph, Spengler’s ideas gained immediate and 
enduring traction in Latin America through José Ortega y Gasset and his Revista de 
Occidente [Review of the West]. The Revista’s premise was to introduce European 
49See especially the second chapter (“Lord, Praised Be Thou”) of González Echevarría 1990.
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philosophy and culture to the Spanish-speaking world, and Ortega himself was particularly 
drawn to Spengler’s thought. He assisted Manuel García Morente’s 1923 translation of The 
Decline of the West, which instantly became a best seller throughout Latin America. 
Spengler’s view of history as a perpetual ebb and flow of unique cultural forms obviously 
appealed to Latin American intellectuals who found in the book a philosophical grounding 
for their region’s autonomy and historical import vis-à-vis “the West.”
The renewed attention to Spengler’s prominence in Latin America between the 1920s 
and 1940s is significant. Still, the primary value of González Echevarría’s discussion arises 
from his observation that Latin American interest in Ortega’s Revista del Occidente and in 
Spengler’s The Decline of the West reflects a broader fascination at the time with different 
conceptions of Kultur—“culture”—since the late eighteenth century. Spengler offered only
one of a number of appealing notions of “culture,” and González Echevarría instructively 
points to a popular 1924 Revista del Occidente article by Francisco Vela to underscore that 
fact. The piece coincided with a visit by Leo Frobenius to Madrid, and Vela used the 
occasion to identify Frobenius’s place within a broader spectrum of related ideas: 
We have then three doctrines of culture. The doctrine of progress, in which 
there is only one culture that advances incessantly in a single direction. The 
doctrine of Spengler, for whom there are multiple cultures, closed, 
noncommunicating, of limited life and foreseeable phases, that die and never 
revive again. Frobenius’s doctrine, according to which, in large territorial 
expanses, there exists, like a soil deposit, an unchanging reservoir of culture, a 
cultural predisposition; an ‘original culture’ that sometimes germinates and 
bears fruit in the form of temporal ‘historical’ cultures which pass as 
ephemeral vibrations, as a dream gives forth from itself various other dreams, 
to leave the earth again in its primeval stillness.50
In differentiating between these theories of culture, Vela implied that they in fact stemmed 
from a common seed: the post-Kantian conception of Kultur as both historical and ideal or, 
50Vela 124: 393, as cited and translated in González Echevarría 1990: 54.
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more precisely, as simultaneously phenomenological and transcendental. “Cultures”—plural 
phenomena—were temporally situated, organic systems of human action and expression 
rooted in particular modes of thought and shaped by environmental and historical forces.
Each of the theories figured specific “cultures” as particular reflections of an ideal, or 
transcendental, “Culture” toward which humanity collectively was striving. In other words, 
the progressive, Spenglerian, and Frobenian were distinct branches off of a common post-
Kantian philosophical tradition. In every case, “Culture” invoked a universal history and the 
critical question was how particular “cultures”—such as those of the Americas—fit into the 
overarching framework. 
Vela’s characterization of the “three doctrines of culture” already foregrounds the 
appeal of Spengler’s and Frobenius’s theories over the “doctrine of progress.” In opposition 
to the claim that “there is only one culture that advances incessantly in a single direction” 
(presumably toward Europe and “the West”), Spengler’s and Frobenius’s perspectives not 
only allowed for cultural autonomy but also pointed to an inevitable superiority of American 
cultural formations at some point within the totality of history. Nevertheless, Vela’s summary 
of the “three doctrines” also suggests that, while the Kultur-concept held special attraction 
during the period, Latin American intellectuals confronted various formulations of the term. 
González Echevarría gives particular attention to the Spenglerian version that he considers 
especially relevant to Carpentier’s work during the 1920s and 1930s. But the broader 
implication in González Echevarría’s discussion is that, even for Carpentier, The Decline of 
the West was only one articulation of “culture” among many. Accordingly, González 
Echevarría situates Carpentier’s project in a wider frame:
Contemporary Latin American literature is, with few exceptions, a bourgeois, 
post-Romantic literature, not the direct descendant of an autochthonous 
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tradition going all the way back to a primal birth in the colonial period. As a 
post-Romantic literature, it draws its thematics from the late eighteenth and 
early nineteenth centuries, the period when, coincidentally (but not 
accidentally), most of Latin America became politically independent from 
Europe. The question of Latin American identity has been traced back to that 
second birth, propitiated by figures such as Andrés Bello. Being bourgeois and 
post-Romantic, Latin American literature centers around a lack, an absence of 
organic connectedness, and its mainspring is a desire for communion, or, in a 
Hegelian sense, for totality through reintegration with a lost unity. That lack 
leads Latin American writers to invoke ‘culture’ as the ontological and 
historical entity from which their works have sprung and to which they must 
return. But the lack is never overcome, for culture becomes in their works an 
entelechy (in its etymological sense of a finished teleology), a static, reified 
end product lacking temporal dimension. […] Culture appears as a dead, 
though always desired, source. (1990: 20-1)
2.
By situating the popularity of The Decline of the West and its influence on 
Carpentier’s work within this context, González Echevarría’s influential ‘recovery’ of 
Spengler serves as a useful point of departure for a more detailed consideration of the official 
inauguration of the Society for Afro-Cuban Studies on January 16, 1937. As explained in the 
last chapter, the founding members of SEAC presented both Afro-Cuban studies and the new 
society dedicated to that pursuit as expressions of and means to “culture.” But if SEAC’s 
founders seemed to draw consciously on the general notion of Kultur, the inaugural 
proceedings also revealed how the Cubans played simultaneously with the different theories 
in searching for the own formulations. This engagement with what González Echevarría calls 
“post-Romantic” notions of culture becomes especially apparent in Ortiz’s speech on the 
occasion. At various points in his discourse, Ortiz refers directly to Frobenius and to his 
notion of territorial “reservoirs of culture” that “bears fruit” as particular cultural expressions. 
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Throughout the speech he also makes clear references to Spengler and to other elements of 
continental philosophy.51
At the beginning of the talk, Ortiz frames the new Society’s efforts as a matter of 
culture: “The Society for Afro-Cuban Studies has to continue the task of the old liberators, 
putting science and art, the culture of this epoch, at its service” (Ortiz 1937a: 16).52 The
statement is telling. In Ortiz’s rendering, SEAC’s goal is nothing less than liberation; 
“science and art, the culture of this epoch,” serves as the means to that end. Or, to put it 
another way, the goal is the fulfillment of transcendental human “Culture” realized through 
the particular “culture” of “science and art.” Ortiz quickly reinforces these ideas and repeats 
the main components of SEAC’s December 1936 “Announcement.” “Abolitionism has not 
ended,” he asserts. Racialist fallacies continue to govern social affairs in Cuba and around the 
world, and the Society for Afro-Cuban Studies has to dedicate itself to the task of universal 
freedom:
We should pursue the secular work that, in one and the other race, the dignified 
abolitionist patriarchs undertook since there is now a social subordination in 
effect under the pretext of color, of ancestry or of caste, that greatly 
exacerbates economic subjugations so that these are aggravated by false 
categories of race and by their misleading preconceptions. (16)53
51Ortiz made no secret of his interest in Spengler. In 1924—the year after García Morente’s Spanish 
translation of The Decline of the West appeared as La decadencia del Occidente—he explored Spenglerian 
themes in a talk on “la decadencia cubana” (Ortiz 1924).
52All translations from the lecture are my own. Because I often refer back to the nuances in Ortiz’s 
language, I will continue to include corresponding untranslated text in footnotes. The subtleties and multiple 
implications of his text might also interest readers of Spanish. In this case, the original reads: “La Sociedad de 
Estudios Afrocubanos ha de continuar la faena de los viejos libertadores, poniendo la ciencia y el arte, la cultura 
de esta época, a su servicio.”
53
“El abolicionismo no ha terminado. Debemos proseguir la obra secular que, en una y otra raza, 
emprendieron los digno patricios abolicionistas, mientras haya vigente una supeditación social so pretexto de 
color, de abolengo o de casta, que harto lastiman las subyugaciones económicas para que éstas sean agravadas 
por falsas categories de razas y por sus preconceptuaciones mentidas.”
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These last statements indicate why, in Ortiz’s formulation of “culture,” “science” 
plays a defining but paradoxical role. In identifying “the culture of this epoch,” Ortiz referred 
more specifically to a current configuration of modernity. As one of the pillars of modern 
culture, science buttresses modernity’s revolutionary potential as well as its repressive 
realities. In the terms of Ortiz’s introductory comments, science works in the “service” of 
liberation but also stands as a root cause of “social subordination.” He makes this paradox 
clear in the next sentence: “Science, the mind’s unique but often-vacillating guide, proves 
that by original progeny and in the essence of spirit all men—black and white—are the 
same” (16).54 Ortiz’s implication is that, even while science “proves” the underlying equality 
of all “in essence of spirit,” frequent scientific vacillations also had misguided “the mind.” 
The “false categories of race” that Ortiz hopes science will displace had gained legitimacy 
under scientific pretenses. For instance, biology had lent a cover of authority to the 
“misleading preconceptions” that produced “social subordination […] under the pretext of 
color, of ancestry, or of caste.” 
Thus, Ortiz’s characterization of science as “the mind’s unique but often-vacillating 
guide” demonstrates why reason operates as the pivot in his entire system. “Science,” “art,” 
and the overarching sphere of “culture” all stem from the imaginative powers of “the mind” 
and from its ability to reflect upon those imaginings. Rational production defines the field of 
“culture.” Since the concepts born of the mind can be oppressive as well as liberating, 
“culture” is always driven by the tensions between possibility and actuality. The still-relevant 
“task of the old liberators” is to produce culture that could free the potential from the actual. 
And, in that regard, Ortiz immediately marks off the post-Kantian boundaries of his speech 
54
“La ciencia, guía a menudo vacilante pero único de la mente, prueba que los hombres por la original 
progenie y por la esencia del ánimo, negros y blancos, somos todos iguales.”
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and of the Society for Afro-Cuban Studies that the speech inaugurated. Ortiz implied that 
whether as “science,” as “art,” or in some other form, people constitute the social realities—
the “cultures” good and bad—with which they subsequently live. Social life is structured by 
aesthetic—or, in Ortiz’s terms, cultural—productions. 
3.
In establishing the cultural parameters of social realities, Ortiz place particular 
emphasis on “art,” the second pillar of “the culture of this epoch.” In the course of his 
speech, Ortiz figures art as SEAC’s primary means of cultural intervention in its pursuit of 
“the secular work that, in one or the other race, the dignified abolitionist patriarchs 
undertook.” To that end, Ortiz opens up his talk by framing the Society and its inception in 
fictional terms. He considers SEAC’s inauguration in terms of an allegory:
The peculiar character of this ceremony today—realized by a concurrence as 
numerous as it is significant, not only because of its values but also because of 
the heterogeneity of its social positions as well as of its positions and stances in 
the face of the future that dawns on the horizon—seems to me to resemble one 
of the old university ceremonies of investiture of degree in which, before the 
faculty and audience, the acquisition of the doctorate commemorated, more 
than the end of the student’s adolescence, the beginning of a life as a man 
prepared for civic responsibility and graduated to a new struggle, with greater 
capacity but with more responsibilities. (15)55
It would be hard to overstate the implications of this paragraph. Most immediately, it echoes 
Spengler’s outline in The Decline of the West of different periods within the development of 
particular cultures and of general human Kultur. “Every Culture passes through the age-
55
“El carácter peculiarísmo de esta solemnidad de hoy, realizada como está por una concurrencia tan 
numerosa como significativa, no solo por sus valores sino por la heterogeneidad de sus posiciones sociales y la 
de sus posturas y militancias ante el porvenir que alborea en el horizonte, pareceme como una de las antiguas 
ceremonias universitarias de investidura de grado, en que ante el claustro y el pueblo concurrente, el doctorado 
celebrada, más que el fin de una adolescencia de estudiante, el inicio de una vida de hombre preparado para la 
responsibilidad cívica y graduado para una nueva brega; con más capacidad, pero con más deberes.”
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phases of the individual man,” Spengler famously proclaimed. “Each has its childhood, 
youth, manhood and old age” (Spengler 1957: 107). As his reference to “the culture of this 
epoch” indicates, Ortiz deliberately invokes Spengler’s notion of cultural “age-phases” with 
his image of the “celebrated doctorate” that moves from the “adolescence of the student” to 
“the life of a man prepared for civic responsibility and graduated to a new struggle, with 
greater capacity but with more responsibilities.” Ortiz’s implications are clear: the formation 
of the Society for Afro-Cuban Studies marked Cuba’s transition to a new, more mature stage 
of culture.
To reinforce this idea, Ortiz presents his personal history within the allegory of 
Cuba’s—and, by extension, humanity’s—maturation. In an introduction that foreshadows in 
content and structure the opening move he would make five years later in his famous speech 
from the same spot in Club Atenas, Ortiz asks his audience for their “kind permission” to 
indulge in “some considerations of a personal character.”
I could not initiate my public collaboration in this Society for Afro-Cuban 
Studies, whose members have had the generosity to make me its first President, 
without telling you that today is, for me, a day of profound emotion, full of 
gratitude that—it must be said with inevitable paradox—is also a feeling of 
modest pride. (15)56
He explains that the “inevitable paradox” in his mix of satisfaction and appreciation stems 
from the current recognition of the critical importance of his life’s work after so many years 
of public disparagement. 
Thirty years ago I had the luck of initiating in Spanish-speaking America the 
objective study of the social phenomena produced here by coexistence with the 
races of Africa.  Today, a generation later, it fills me with satisfaction to see 
how that work has been followed, amplified and improved by competent and 
56
“Os pido venia benevolente para unas consideraciones de cáracter personal. No podría iniciar mi 
colaboración pública a esta Sociedad de Estudios Afrocubanos, cuyos miembros han tenido la generosidad de 
hacerme su primer presidente, sin deciros que hoy es para mí un día de emoción profunda, lleno de gratitud que, 
dicho sea con paradoja inevitable, es también un sentimiento de modesto orgullo.”
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enthusiastic compatriots, those who still attend to unraveling [the topic] as 
much as possible, more than through singular effort but rather through 
collective coordination of the activities of everyone as a common project.  For 
the one who speaks to you (again I ask for pardon for this intimate effusion of 
my soul) the constitution of this institute of Afro-Cuban studies is the 
coronation of a long undertaking, like the achievement of an honorary title 
after completion of one’s studies. (15)57
The critical turn in Ortiz’s reflections is his identification of “the constitution of this 
institute for Afro-Cuban studies” as “the coronation of a long undertaking.” His claim 
indicates once again that, by early 1937, the field of study he had imagined three decades 
before finally had earned its well-deserved “honorific title.” “Afro-Cuban studies” had 
materialized as a viable and recognized fact of life. But there is more to Ortiz’s language. 
The image of “the coronation” obviously links Ortiz’s personal history to the “old university 
ceremonies of investiture of rank” and, in turn, to Cuba’s transition to a new stage of culture. 
In this way, the various images that Ortiz superimposes upon each other do not add up to a 
master narrative of human development. The full story is less important than the critical 
points of transition: from “singular effort” to “common project”; from “adolescence” to 
civic-minded “man”; from “false categories of race” to liberating “science”; from “culture” 
to “Culture” . . . And what signals such transitions? With his images of “coronation” and 
“ceremonies of investiture,” Ortiz underscores the ceremonial component of the changes. 
Ortiz’s allegory is really about rites of passage. 
57
“Hace más de treinta años que tuve la suerte de iniciar en la América de habla hispana el estudio 
objectivo de los fenómenos sociales aquí producidos por la convivencia de las razas de Africa. Hoy, una 
generación después, me cabe la satisfacción de ver cómo aquella obra ha sido seguida, acrecida y mejorada por 
competentes y entusiastas compatriotras, los cuales aún se aprestan a desenvolverla hasta lo possible, más allá 
de los esfuerzos singulars, mediante de coordinación colectiva de las actividades de todos en una tarea común. 
Para quien os habla, (de nuevo pido perdones por esta efusión íntima de mi ánimo) la constitución de este 
instituto de estudios afrocubanos es la coronación de una larga tarea, como el logro de un título honorífico tras 
una carrera cursada.”
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But in calling attention to ceremonies, Ortiz also points up another cultural tension he 
hopes to overcome. He wants to move beyond the merely ceremonial—that is, giving formal 
recognition to a situation already in effect—to recover the power of certain rites of passages, 
of particularly intense rituals, to induce social change. Benjamin’s characterization of 
Surrealism relates to Ortiz too: he emphasizes how some ceremonies produce “energies of 
intoxication” that could be pressed into the service of some kind of social “revolution.” Like 
the Surrealists, Ortiz hopes to initiate those kinds of socially transforming rituals in modern, 
secular contexts. 
From that standpoint, his description of SEAC’s inaugural proceedings takes on 
larger import. By comparing the event to “one of the old university ceremonies of 
investiture” in which the boundaries of “faculty” (participants) and “audience” break down, 
Ortiz hopes to produce a similar effect. He wants to bring his own audience into the “new 
struggle, with greater capacity but with more responsibilities.” He seeks to enact a certain 
kind of magic through which desired outcomes materialize as social realities. His allegory 
functions as a spell in an unfolding magical rite in which his own “concurring public” plays 
an active role. 
Hence, he highlights “the peculiar character of this ceremony today—realized by a 
concurrence as numerous as it is significant.” Ortiz follows up this description with another 
set of personal reflections that underscore the high stakes in the rite of passage he and his 
audience had instigated that January night. He represents his personal investment in SEAC as 
a matter of “destiny” and sets out to convince all present that their ultimate fate is also tied up 
in Afro-Cuban studies: 
As an old man, it is a great honor to see how the thesis of the same project [I 
undertook decades ago] is taken up by the next generation; but these same 
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circumstances are a revitalizing tonic that reaffirms the youth of my spirit and 
puts me under even more pressure to dedicate my golden years to that same 
task that the vicissitudes of life and the intimate calling of vocation turned into 
my destiny: to work toward the unprejudiced study of a mistreated race and for 
the alleviation of its tremendous misfortune. (16)58
This last of Ortiz’s personal reflections in the speech is typically revealing. “Unprejudiced 
study” of Afro-Cuban history and culture serve as the expressed purpose of the Society, yet 
Ortiz explicitly links his scholarly endeavors to a certain politics of culture. Knowledge-
production, he reminds his audience, is part of the work of alleviating the “tremendous 
misfortune” of “a mistreated race.” 
4.
In a 1932 essay entitled “El arte narrativo y la magia” [The Narrative Art and Magic], 
another prominent Latin American intellectual—the Argentine writer Jorge Luis Borges—
points up the magic in any narrative. He underscores the unexpected associations and 
structures upon which stories depend and links these traits to James Frazer’s famous 
definition of magic: 
That procedure or ambition of ancient men has been held together by Frazer in 
a convenient general law, that of sympathy, which stipulates an inevitable link 
between distant things, whether because their shape is similar—mimetic or 
homeopathic magic—or because of an anterior proximity—contagious magic. 
Kenelm Digby’s ointment was an illustration of the second, for it was applied 
not to the bandaged wound, but to the guilty steel that inflicted it—while the 
wound, without suffering the rigors of barbaric cures, healed. (Borges 1966: 
88)
Borges calls attention to a similar reliance on “the convenient general law” of sympathy in 
narratives like the novel: “That dangerous harmony, that frenzied and precise causality, also 
58
“Por ser viejo, me cabe hoy este honor de ver como la tesis de la faena propia es continuada por la 
generación sucesiva; pero esta misma circunstancia es tónico vital que reafirma la juventud de mi espíritu, y me 
impulsa con más apremio a consagrar mis años maduros a esa misma obra que los azares de la vida y el íntimo 
llamamiento de la vocación pusieron en mi destino, la de trabajar por el estudio imprejuzgado de una raza 
maltrada y por el alivio de su tremendo infortunio.”
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rules the novel” (89). Narratives operate as “a precise game of observances, echoes, and 
affinities” (90).
Putting aside apparent historical correlations between “The Narrative Art and Magic” 
and the contemporary Cuban discourse of displacing magic, Borges’s analysis of the “laws” 
of stories illuminates the dynamics of Ortiz’s inaugural address to SEAC in January 1937. 
Borges’s argument that narratives mimic magic by playing “a precise game of observances, 
echoes, and affinities” frames the allegory of Ortiz’s speech as a magical act. As much as (if 
not more than) any other type of narrative, allegory operates magically according to Borges’s 
description. Allegory, by definition, functions mimetically. It is a dramatic device that seeks 
to establish “an inevitable link between distant things.” Following (Borges’s rendering of) 
Frazer’s law of sympathy, allegory works as a form of mimetic, or “homeopathic,” magic. It 
seeks specific material effects by creating a “dangerous harmony” and a “frenzied and 
precise causality” among the literal content of the narrative and some abstract principle or 
force. 
The relation between Borges’s 1932 essay and the inauguration of SEAC in January 
1937 is not entirely random. The juxtaposition of the two shows the extent to which Ortiz, 
with his allegory, consciously carried out the kind of mimetic magical tricks outlined by 
Borges. In the course of his discussion, Ortiz also cites Frazer’s characterization as well as 
various other theories of magic. Those citations signal the major correspondence at work in 
Ortiz’s talk: he attempts to enact a certain kind of magic by discussing magic. In that regard, 
his opening move—framing SEAC’s inauguration as a socially transforming ritual by setting 
up his talk as an allegory of rites of passage—establishes the tone for the rest of the night. He 
lays out a libratory “task” for the Society for Afro-Cuban Studies that was radically self-
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conscious. And, with that reflexivity, the Society’s politics of culture—as figured by Ortiz—
diverges at an underlying level from many of the theories of Kultur ostensibly at work in and 
on Cuban intellectual discourse. Both Frobenius and Spengler peg self-consciousness as 
deadly to culture. In Frobenius’s doctrine of “reservoirs of culture,” “historical” cultures 
spring organically and unconsciously from the underlying “original culture.” An historical 
culture begins to wanes when it reflects upon and makes explicit claims about cultural 
originality. For Frobenius, culture at its root sprang from instinct, not reflexivity. 
Spengler offers a similar idea. As outlined in The Decline of the West, the “cultured” 
man lives immersed in his culture and acts spontaneously, as if his actions are a matter of 
destiny. In contrast, the “civilized” man critically reflects on his culture and, in doing so, sets 
off its decline. As in Frobenius’s system, the self-conscious “civilized” man cuts himself off 
from his vital instincts in trying to analyze them. For Frobenius and Spengler, truly 
“cultured” people just live life; they do not think about life without actually experiencing it. 
Of course, Frobenius and Spengler offered these “post-Romantic” visions of instinct in 
opposition to Hegelian Idealism in which the culmination of history and of humanity arrived 
with humans’ complete self-consciousness. In that tradition, the “civilized” individual took 
precedence over the “cultured” man as the full awareness of self instead of instinct brought 
the reflexive person to life. As in the wider intellectual discourse of which Ortiz’s speech was 
part, the tension between these different perspectives played out forcefully in the inaugural 
address. Ortiz spoke the post-Romantic language of Spengler, invoking “destiny” and 
“epochs” of culture. 
5.
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Having outlined the urgent and universal import of Afro-Cuban studies, Ortiz insists 
that it is time to take up the labor of “unprejudiced study of a mistreated race”: “Now we will 
move to the dissertation that has been put at our charge, and its theme is religion in poesía 
mulata” (16; italics in original). Ortiz signals with that transition his intention to pursue the 
magic of talking about magic, as circumscribed by his introductory allegory. The topic of 
“religion in poesía mulata” leads him directly into a theory of religion and, in turn, of magic 
too. 
Ortiz first offers an overview of his topic, including a telling disclaimer. “Th[is] 
writing is not ready to be read,” he admits.
It will be only a selection of some completed concepts drawn from a study still 
in the forge that treats the beautiful flowering of Cuban genius that is called 
black or mulatto poetry and the demopsychological elements that one discovers 
in it, so as to be able to interpret better, with documentary objectivity and 
serene analysis, the contribution of the races to the soul of Cuba. (16; italics in 
original)59
This apologetic summary carries clear traces of Kultur philosophy. Most immediately, Ortiz 
describes his subject—“black or mulatto poetry”—as a “beautiful flowering of Cuban 
genius” that reflects “the soul of Cuba” (el alma de Cuba). Ortiz’s invocations of Cuban 
“genius” and of the population’s “soul” especially echo key Romantic terms that had worked 
their way into influential contemporary social scientific discourse, such as the ethnology of 
Franz Boas. (Shortly thereafter, Ortiz offers the first of his direct citations of Boas on 
“genius” and collective “soul.”) 
Ortiz’s characterization of his talk as incomplete, as part of a work-in-progress (a 
typical move for him), functions as more than a means of covering his discourse’s 
59
“No está hecho el escrito para ser leído. Será sólo una selección de conceptos comprendidos en un 
estudio que tenemos en la fragua acerca de esta hermosa floración del genio cubano, que se llama la poesía 
negra o mulata, y de los elementos demopsicológicos que en ella se descubren, para poder interpretar major, 
con objetividad documental y sereno análisis, el aporte de las razas al alma de Cuba.”
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shortcomings in advance. The notion of incompleteness also reflects a critical, post-Kantian 
component of his argument. Ortiz’s disclaimer implies that his project, like all cultural 
expression, is necessarily inchoate. In its unfinished state, his “study still in the forge” 
gestures toward transcendental “Culture” and reminds his audience of that elusive—if not 
impossible—goal. This point—how a feeling of incompleteness creates a fundamental 
human drive toward cultural completion—soon emerges as central to his argument. Once 
again, Ortiz is already establishing associations between his “long undertaking,” the speech, 
and its subject. Just as he means to cast SEAC’s inauguration as socially transforming ritual 
by introducing allegorical rites of passages, Ortiz once again lets on that his speech mimics 
its topic. He hints that his talk, as part of a rite of passage marking (or inducing) Cuba’s 
transition to cultural maturity, is also a cultural expression. It is a “beautiful flowering of 
Cuban genius” that, in its incompleteness, strives for a final, liberating sense of completion. 
But how does Ortiz arrive at those ends? How does he mark off the drive for cultural 
realization as a basic human impulse and establish direct correspondences between his 
expressed theme, “religion in poesía mulata,” and his discourse on that topic? Again, his 
hook is a universalist characterization of religion, and he gets there by considering poesía 
mulata as cultural expression. Ortiz expands the summary of his discussion by explaining 
that his broader “study, which still does not have a title,” takes up as one of its
principal themes how poesía mulata reflects the unhappy position of a race and 
its consequent social resentment. Next we try, in successive chapters, to 
comprehend the reactions that the condition of suffering has produced in that 
race and how they reverberate through contemporary poetry, in its lyrics, in its 
elegies, in its hymns, in its satires, in its songs. (16-17)60
60
“En nuestro estudio, que aún no tiene título, se trata como uno de los temas principales el de cómo se 
reflejan en la poesía mulata la posición infeliz de una raza y su consiguiente resentimiento social. Después 
tratamos, en sucesivos capítulos, de comprender las reacciones que en esa raza ha producido su condición 
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According to Ortiz, “one of the chapters [of the larger work] is dedicated to religion, and 
from that section we select these paragraphs that, as first fruit, we submit to your benevolent 
judgment” (17).61
6.
Ortiz’s characterization of his chapter on religion and its relation to poesía mulata as 
“first fruit” once again resonates with theories of Kultur. As Francisco Vela had noted in his 
1924 review, Frobenius posits “an ‘original culture’ that sometimes germinates and bears 
fruit in the form of temporal ‘historical’ cultures.” In his description, Ortiz figures religion—
an element “in” poesía mulata—as well as his commentary about those religious 
components—the “first fruit” of scholarship—as corresponding expressions, or 
‘germinations,’ of Cuban cultural “genius.” In the course of his talk, he inverts the relation, 
locating the origins of the poetry and of culture more generally in religion.
More immediately, he sets out to explain the “principal theme” of “how poesía 
mulata reflects the unhappy position of a race and its consequent social resentment.” He 
begins his examination with a question he locates at the heart of the issue: “Has religion been 
able to give to the Afro-American black an antidote to alleviate the poison produced in his 
spirit by the witches’ brew of social mistreatment?” (17).62 Ortiz quickly settles the issue. In 
an apparent summary of his argument, he answers his own question affirmatively, 
underscoring the therapeutic effects of religion among African-Americans. Religion has 
sufrida y cómo ellas son reverberadas por la poesía contemporánea, en su lírica, en sus elegías, en sus hímnos, 
en sus sátiras, en sus canciones.”
61
“Uno de esos capítulos es el dedicado a la religión y de él seleccionamos estos párrafos que, como 
primicia, confiamos a vuestro juicio benevolente.”
62
“¿La religión ha podido darle al negro afroamericano un antídoto para aliviar el envenenamiento 
producido en su ánimo por la ponzoña del maltrato social?”
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provided the sphere in which the socially oppressed could release “the poison” of their unjust
experiences. “The black,” Ortiz insists, “has sought and continues to seek in his religious 
rites of intense collective emotivity a complement to his present, a catharsis of his boxed-up 
impulses, a satisfaction of his calabiotic desire, such as all other people of analogous culture 
have done” (17).63
As already noted, Ortiz refers directly to Frobenius and to Franz Boas in the course of 
his argument, but those influences surface in this summary statement early in the lecture. 
Ortiz’s remarks rest on the assumption that cultural types—akin to Frobenius’s “original 
culture”—play out in particular ways depending on socio-historical circumstances. Thus, 
Ortiz figures “the black” as a singular entity that correlates to “other people of analogous 
culture,” and his question is how “black” cultural impulses manifest themselves in certain 
contexts. As he proceeds, Ortiz shows that socio-historical factors determine forms of 
“black” expression but that the underlying structure follows a particular transhistorical 
pattern. “The black,” he implies, acts essentially the same under distinct forms of “social 
mistreatment”: by turning to “his religious rites” for a physiological, or “calabiotic,” 
emotional release of “boxed-up emotions,” a literal “catharsis” that brings a measure of 
“satisfaction” necessary to endure “his present” by temporarily creating a “complement” or 
alternative reality. 
The majority of Ortiz’s speech unfolds accordingly: as a comparison of “black” 
cultural expressions in North America and in Cuba. He delineates how the common “intense 
collective emotivity” of an African ‘original culture’ plays out in radically different 
63
“El negro ha buscado y busca en sus ritos religiosos, de intensa emotividad colectiva, un 
complemento de su presente, una catarsis de sus impulsiones comprimidas, una satisfación de su anhelo 
calabiótico, tal como han hecho los demás hombres de análoga cultura.”
107
“religious rites” within each region’s distinct ‘historical cultures.’ Ortiz offers poetry as a 
point of entry into the study but emphasizes that this approach makes comparison especially 
tricky.  He notes that, first of all, very few black poets in either region seem to touch on 
religious themes. In fact, “if we must judge merely by its literary expressions, it appears that 
religious aura rises few times to the mind of the Afro-American poet; not the Christian aura 
that came to it through the faith of whites, nor that of its nearby and antecedent paganism” 
(17).64 “The Afro-American poet,” Ortiz implies, is a predominantly secular creature. The 
difficulty of approaching “black” religion through poetry is exacerbated in the Cuban case 
because, in contrast to North America, religion seems to crop up nowhere in Afro-Cuban 
cultural expression. “Observe most of all how Afro-Cuban poetry has not had the exuberance 
of Christian themes that make themselves known in Afro-Anglo literature,” he notes (17).65
A major portion of Ortiz’s discussion fleshes out this contrast and its roots in each 
region’s unique colonial history. He highlights the differences that stem from the 
predominance of the Protestantism derived in North America via northern Europeans versus 
the institutional presence in Cuba of the Spanish Catholic Church. Protestants in North 
America actively—and, by the mid-eighteenth century, successfully—tried to Christianize 
blacks. Colonial powers in Cuba took a much different approach and generally kept 
Catholicism away from blacks, either because of their own disinterest or because they feared 
the consequences of slaves’ discovery that within the Church all members were in theory 
spiritual equals. These denominational factors created drastically different developments 
64
“Si hemos de juzgar meramente por sus expresiones literarias, tal parece que a la mente del poeta 
afroamericano sube escasas veces al aura religiosa; ni la cristiana que le llegó por la fe de los blancos, ni la de 
su próxima y antecedente paganía.”
65
“Obsérvese ante todo que la poesía afrocubana no ha tenido la exhuberancia de temas cristianos que 
se advierten en la literature anglonegra.”
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among blacks in each region. And, according to Ortiz, the regional contrasts surface clearly 
in other forms of cultural expression even if they do not played out in Afro-American poetry. 
To prove his point with regard to the North American situation, Ortiz offers multiple 
extended citations from Newbell Niles Puckett’s influential 1926 study, Folk Beliefs of the 
Southern Negro. In the first case, he quotes Puckett’s observation that “‘it is an evident fact 
that among the religious songs of the blacks of North America, those that have earned the 
admiration of the world, one finds little or no music of special valor with profane character.’ 
In contrast,” Ortiz continues, 
in the mulatto lyric of Hispanoamerica there are no sacred songs, in the 
traditionally liturgical and standardized sense of those distinct from the profane 
and ‘made-up.’ One could say that all are made in sin. In a reversal of that 
which happens in the United States, the songs of blacks in Cuba are not 
predominantly religious. Why? The causes are many (17).66
Ortiz goes on to delineate various reasons already mentioned, but he singles out one 
particular point: the Christianization of North American blacks succeeded because Protestant 
denominations offered collective emotional release energized by the promise of a better 
future. Religious music not only reflects that hope-driven catharsis but also catalyzes it. “In 
that way, the spirituals sprout in the slave through an ideological evasion of his economic 
unhappiness,” Ortiz asserts. But 
aside from the social content that the religious hymns of Protestant blacks 
customarily had, more powerful still was the cathartic effect of the rhythm, of 
the music, of the song, of the swing or sway almost like a dance, and of the 
shout or ambulatory rhythm. All of this gave to the black mass an emotional 
collective expansion that for the duration of its life was its only liberty, its main 
diversion, an alleviating effect, as much as through the reality of the relaxation 
66
“En cambio, en la lírica mulata de Hispanoamérica no hay cantos sagrados, tradicionalmente 
litúrgicos y fijos, distintos de los profanes, “pecaminosos,” y “compuestos.” Pudiera decirse que todos son 
hechos en pecado. Al revés de lo que ocurre en los Estados Unidos, los cantos de los negros de Cuba no son 
predominantemente religiosos. Por que? Son varias las causas.”
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of its nervous tension than through the imaginary of its mystic hopes for 
fulfillment. (18; italics in original)67
This passage is pivotal in Ortiz’s discussion because it establishes the critical 
junction—the point of contact and divergence—between “Afro-Anglo” and “Afro- Cuban” 
cultures. Ortiz marks that cultural intersection by shifting the ground of religion away from 
content and into human physiology. The “ideological” framework of Protestantism—namely, 
“the imaginary of its mystic hopes for fulfillment”—matters much less in Ortiz’s view than 
the “cathartic effect” of the rituals themselves. Ortiz suggests that Christian theology, with its 
promises of physical and material redemption, really only matter to the extent that those 
images inspire blacks to engage in much more prosaic activities that generated “emotional 
collective expansion.” What counts most for Ortiz are sounds and movements that, regardless 
of the ideas expressed, work on the participants’ emotions and, most importantly, on their 
nervous systems. For Ortiz, the power of religion comes down to its ability to induce “the 
relaxation of nervous tension” among a group of individuals so that they can continue life’s 
struggle. The “collective” experience of that emotional and physical catharsis is vital and 
revitalizing. It strengthens the social bonds that the participants need in order first to survive 
and then to thrive.68
67
“Así, los spirituals brotan en el esclavo por una evasión ideological de su infelicidad económica.[…] 
Aparte de este contenido social que solían tener los himnos religiosos de los negros protestantes, era mas 
poderoso aún el efecto catártico del ritmo, de la música, del canto, del swing o balanceo casi danzario, y del 
shout o rito ambulatorio. Todo esto daba a la grey negra una expansion emocional colectiva que para su dura 
vida era su única libertad, su mayor diversion, un efectivo alivio, así por lo real descanso de su tensión nerviosa, 
como por lo imaginario de sus místicas esperanzas de satisfación.”
68With Ortiz’s emphasis on the importance of collective emotion, his silence about and lack of citation 
of Durkheim’s work is both curious and significant. I have yet to find a reference to Durkheim in any of Ortiz’s 
writings although I find it impossible to believe that he did not read anything by the pioneer of French 
sociology. Of course, Ortiz’s work reveals the traces of Durkheimian thought through its proliferation in Ortiz’s 
discourse network. In future research I hope to look further into this notable absence of Durkheim name in 
Ortiz’s oeuvre. 
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To this point in his discussion, Ortiz already hints that socially transforming cathartic 
experiences most commonly arise in religious contexts. After all, Christian theology got the 
ball rolling in the case under Ortiz’s immediate consideration. The insistence on the slave’s 
ultimate liberation moves them to song and dance in the first place. And, as Ortiz 
underscores in subsequent passages, the literal places of religion are also essential. The 
atmosphere of religious spaces, marked off as sites where divine energy irrupts and filled 
with elements to stimulate the senses, help create optimal conditions for “emotional 
collective expansion.” Thus, Ortiz repeatedly calls attention to the activities of “the temples.” 
For instance, he describes “the decisive cause” for the successful Christianization of North 
American blacks and the failure of that process in Cuba:
The black African, upon being catechized by the Protestant clergy of America, 
was taught to sing in the temples. It is not that the pastors to the black flock 
used music on purpose for their catechism. The common Protestant liturgies 
are very much based, particularly in the sects most separated from Catholicism, 
in the collective song of believers gathered together in the church. (19)69
As he focuses on religious spaces that enable and optimize “collective song,” the 
terms “sacred” and “profane” emerge as increasingly important in Ortiz’s discussion. His 
frequent references to activities of “the temples” make it clear that he uses the words in their 
literal senses: “profane” endeavors occur ‘pro fanum,’ literally ‘outside the temple’; “sacred” 
affairs are defined similarly by their location in the temple, near the sacro (‘seat’ or ‘altar’). 
With his literalist usage of “sacred” and “profane,” Ortiz raises the possibility that ostensibly 
“sacred” activities—such as North American blacks’ liberating religious rites—might occur 
not only in the “temples” but also in literally “profane,” non-religious spaces. Ortiz already 
69
“La causa decisiva fué que el negro africano al ser catequizado por los clérigos protestantes de 
América, fué enseñado a cantar en los templos. No es que los pastores de la grey negra usaran adrede de la 
música para su catequismo. Las communes liturgias protestantes se basan mucho, particularmente en las sectas 
más apartadas de la católica, en el canto colectivo de los fieles reunidos en la iglesia.”
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has hinted at that idea by noting how “in the mulatto lyric of Hispanoamerica there are no 
sacred songs, in the traditionally liturgical and standardized sense of those distinct from the 
profane and ‘made-up.’” At the end of his discussion, Ortiz describes the liberating 
possibilities of a politics based precisely on that kind of move of enthusiastic collective 
liturgies from “sacred” to “profane” places. But more immediately, his description of the 
nature of Afro-Anglo Protestantism begins to displace religion on at least two levels: from 
content to catharsis and from “the temples” to the profanum. 
7.
In considering the Cuban context, Ortiz builds on the implications in his discussion of 
Afro-Anglo Protestantism that religion is grounded in places other than those commonly 
expected. He goes on to explain how Cuban blacks, exposed to standardized Catholic liturgy 
instead of more spontaneous Protestant forms, had a much more distant relation to 
Christianity than their counterparts in North America. Nevertheless, Afro-Cubans still found 
viable religious outlets for their social oppression. Without Christianity, Cuban blacks also 
managed “emotional collective expansion” that provided a measure of “liberty,” “diversion,” 
and “an alleviating effect.” Since they were excluded from Catholic institutions explicitly, 
missionized half-heartedly, or exposed to formalized rituals that gave them little solace, 
slaves in Cuba recreated ancestral “cultuses” [cultos] in the Caribbean context.70 These 
“Afro-Cuban” religious institutions developed with relative independence from Christianity 
and operated away from the view of social, economic, political, and religious authorities. 
70Ortiz and his colleagues frequently use “culto.” Throughout my discussion, I translate this term as 
“cultus” instead of as “cult” in order to retain the technical meaning of culto as any system of ritual practice. In 
this regard, culto carries no pejorative implications.
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“Through all of these circumstances,” Ortiz summarizes, “Afro-Cubans conserve still their 
beautiful religious songs with far less contamination, with their verses, their music, their 
instruments and their mimetic dances, in secret or separate liturgical ceremonies, closer to 
their African roots. And outside of their temples one does not hear the sacred canticles” (21-
2).71
This characterization of religious developments among blacks in Cuba enables Ortiz 
to reinforce his earlier implications about the unexpected grounds of religion. As in 
describing the structure of Afro-Anglo Christianity, Ortiz points to “cathartic effects”—
simultaneously emotional and physiological—as more important in Afro-Cuban cultuses than 
theological content. He also sets up the possibility that the catharsis set off by “sacred 
canticles” might be reproduced in “profane” contexts by drawing the powerful songs out of 
“their temples.” However, the second implication—with its latent politics—depends upon the 
first inference about the underlying workings of religion in and on the human nervous 
system. It is to that task—the articulation of a coherent theory of religion—that Ortiz 
dedicates the core of his talk. 
The mutual presence among blacks in North America and in Cuba of “sacred songs” 
arising in transformative collective expressions from different kinds of sanctuaries—Anglo-
Negro Protestant churches in the first case; Afro-Cuban “temples” in the second—brings 
Ortiz back to the issue that he initially identifies as the focus of his talk: the apparent lack of 
religious themes in “black or mulatto poetry.” Ortiz marks this ostensible absence of religion 
in the poems as potentially contradictory—or counterintuitive at the very least—since he has 
71
“Por todas estas circunstancias, los afrocubanos conservan todavía sus bellos cantos religiosos con 
mayor incontaminación , con sus versos, sus músicas, sus instrumentos y sus danzas miméticas, en secretas o 
apartadas solemnidades litúrgicas, más próximos a sus veneros africanos. Y fuera de sus templos no se oyen los 
cánticos sagrados.”
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just argued, in answer to another of his opening questions, that religion has been able “to 
give to the Afro-American black an antidote to alleviate the poison produced in his spirit by 
the witches’ brew of social mistreatment.” Why then did it “appear that religious aura rise 
few times to the mind of the Afro-American poet”? How could religion—a fundamental 
aspect of the “Afro-American” cultures of North America and Cuba—not work its way into 
those cultures’ poetic expressions? But, then again, Ortiz’s professed “dissertation” implies 
that there in fact is “religion in poesía mulata.” How does he account for this disjunction 
between poesía mulata’s appearances and its realities? 
Ortiz works to resolve the tension by exposing it as a result of familiar conceptions of 
“religion.” The problem does not arise from gaps in his argument or from contradictions in 
“black” American cultures themselves. In the opening sections of his talk, he implies that the 
roots of religion lie elsewhere than commonly perceived. The middle portion of his discourse 
explicates his intention to displace limited notions with another broader, more accurate 
theory of religion that he has already implicitly introduced. He underscores the 
misconceptions about religion that many people project onto Afro-Cuban culture: “The 
typical black in Cuba is accustomed to being so removed from Catholic practices that some 
of us are surprised that poesía mulata could reveal religious themes” (22).72 However, that 
surprise is unwarranted because, in fact, Afro-Cuban culture is drenched in religion. Despite 
Afro-Cubans’ distance from Catholicism, the religious parameters of poesía mulata “should 
not surprise anybody. On the contrary, it is logical and inevitable that this should be the case. 
72
“Tan apartado suele estar el actual negro cubano de las prácticas católicas, que alguien 
sorprendiéndose  de que en la poesía mulata pudiera darse el tema religioso.”
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Is not the Afro-Cuban, with what he has of the black African and of the white Spaniard, 
saturated with religiosity? Is not all of religion poetry?”73
Ortiz poses those last points as questions only for rhetorical purposes. In fact, his 
inquiries are critical declarations. With them, he identifies the character of poesía mulata and 
how the common inability to recognize the poetry’s nature urgently demands radical 
reconceptualization of religion. His last question gestures toward an expansive 
understanding: religion does not simply arise in poesía mulata; rather, that genre exemplifies 
religion, which is poetic by nature. 
But Ortiz’s questions also play on two related but distinct critical terms: “religiosity” 
and “religion.” As he proceeds, he outlines the connection between the two. “Religiosity” is 
an essential element of the human constitution. A “biotic desire for overcoming is the 
definite essence of all religiosity,” he asserts later. As such, as a component embedded in the 
nervous system, “religiosity” gives rise to “religion” as a singular transcultural phenomenon 
as well as to multiple, culturally situated “religions.” This relation between “religiosity,” 
“religion,” and “religions” relates to and parallels conceptions (such as in Frobenius’s 
system) of historical “cultures” as ‘flowerings’ springing from underlying reservoirs of 
‘original culture’ embedded in some way in an individual’s make-up. “Religion,” it seems, is 
part of that ingrained “culture.” 
However, Ortiz’s terms went go and invert the dynamic. In his system, religion has 
deeper roots than culture, which largely remains for Ortiz the material by-product of ideas 
and actions. So from where does human thought and motivation spring? With the notion of 
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“Sin embargo, no hay que asombrarse de ello, antes, al contrario, es lógico e inevitable que así 
suceda. ¿No está el afrocubano, por lo que tiene de negro africano y de blanco español, saturado de 
religiosidad? ¿No es la religión toda ella poesía?”
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“religiosity,” Ortiz circumscribes the seeds of human life in a particular “biotic desire for 
overcoming.” This places “culture” within “religious” parameters. Those common social 
structures, “culture” and “religion,” as well as their historical manifestations as distinct 
“cultures” and “religions,” all originate in Ortiz’s perspective from a universal drive for 
fulfillment, from “religiosity” itself. 
From this perspective, a more accurate description of Ortiz’s topic would be 
“religiosity in poesía mulata” since he sets out to expose how the Afro-Cuban is “saturated 
with religiosity,” even when no “religion” is apparent. Also, we recognize in retrospect that 
Ortiz has been talking about “religiosity” all along in identifying the common ground among 
“Afro-Anglos” and “Afro-Cubans.” The drive in both cultures toward “liberty,” “diversion,” 
and “alleviating effects” is not only “the antidote” to “the witches’ brew of social 
mistreatment.” “Religiosity” remains latent in all people and among all social groups. The 
task toward which Ortiz already gestures is the channeling of the powerful “biotic desire to 
overcome” in productive, socially revitalizing directions. 
*
In the early sections of his talk, Ortiz implies that religiosity, while universal, still 
surfaces more directly and more forcefully in certain situations and among particular groups. 
He makes this idea clear with one of his rhetorical questions by suggesting that the Afro-
Cuban was “saturated with religiosity” because of “what he has of the black African and of 
the white Spaniard.” Therefore, in order to illuminate the nature of Afro-Cuban culture as 
well as to carry out his critical reconfiguration of religion, Ortiz delineates the essence of 
religiosity as revealed through “the white Spaniard” and, especially, “the black African.” 
This move casts his argument as undeniably primitivist. He figures the Spaniard and the 
116
African as primitive and archaic in the sense that they move observers closer to the arche—
the ‘opening’ or origin—from which human culture springs. 
Much of Ortiz’s primitivism derives from his use of influential contemporary 
European and North American anthropological scholarship. He eventually makes his typical 
move to unsettle ethnocentric implications of this scholarship, but in the immediate term he 
draws on his well-known European and North American peers. In an important paragraph, 
foundational to his argument and peppered with references to Lucien Levy-Bruhl, Raoul 
Allier, Franz Boas, and Bronislaw Malinowski, Ortiz lays out the archaic “black African” 
religiosity that profoundly shapes Afro-Cuban culture: 
The black of Africa lives submerged in religion and magic. His intense religion 
is concomitant with that paralogical mentality that does not analyze the causes 
of phenomena because, still ignoring them, he understands them by common 
sense. Religion kills his intellectual curiosity with the consciousness that he 
has to know the magical and suprahuman cause of everything, particularly 
those that are unusual and surprising. Religion makes perennial his sociable 
and tranquil feeling, makes him hypersensitive to all novelty but an enemy of 
any radical innovation. Religion makes him live fearful at all times of the 
mysterious danger of spells or of supernatural caprice, and he submits and 
resign himself to it, without the broad perspectives of time or space.  And all of 
his society is sustained by religion. 'Among primitives, religion is the cement 
of the social fabric.' (22)74
In its reliance on contemporary ethnography, Ortiz’s characterization sounds notably 
pejorative. The passage, in building first on Levy-Bruhl’s work, demarcates "the primitive 
mind" that follows “that paralogical mentality that does not analyze the causes of 
phenomena.” According to Ortiz, this lack of self-consciousness make the black African 
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“El negro de Africa vive sumergido e la religión y la magia. Su intensa religión es concomitante de 
esa mentalidad paralógica que no analiza las causas de los fenómenos, porque aún ignorandolas, las tiene por 
bien sabidas. La religión mata su curiosidad intellectual por la conciencia qeu tiene de conocer la causación 
mágica y sobrehumana de todo, particularmente de lo insólito y sorprendente. La religión hace perenne su 
sentido gregario y quietista, hipersensitivo a toda novelería, pero enemigo de toda innovación. La religión lo 
hace vivir temiendo en todo instante el peligro misterioso del maelficio o del capricho sobrenatural, y lo somete 
y resigna, sin extensas perpsectivas de tiempo ni espacio. Y toda su sociedad está sometida por la religión. 
‘Entre los primitivos, la religión es el cemento de la fábrica social.’”
117
passive, scared, and weak: he “lives submerged in religion and magic”; he “does not analyze 
the causes of phenomena”; “religion kills his intellectual curiosity” and “makes him fearful at 
all times of the mysterious danger of spells or supernatural caprice,” to which “he submits 
and resigns himself.”
Nevertheless, the last sentence—a citation lifted directly from Malinowski’s Magic, 
Science, and Religion—underscores the positive aspects of the “black African” mindset. 
Despite his refusal to think about “the causes of phenomenon,” “the black of Africa”—
according to Ortiz’s description—still maintains vital societies. With religion as “‘the cement 
of the social fabric,’” African societies thrive. They warrant admiration. Ortiz develops the 
point by continuing along the same lines. Citing other texts by Malinowski, Ortiz identifies 
how religious expressions like myths, an “incredibly important cultural force,” “shaped 
[Africans’] most profound religious, ethical and social judgments and their pragmatic rules of 
everyday life.  Their religion, like their economy is collective, socialized,” Ortiz concludes 
(22). In his view, those traits are admirable. Already, he is anticipating the final portion of his 
talk, when he presents a specific way to channel Africans’  “collective, socialized” economic 
and ethical sensibilities, born of the cement of “religion,” into self-conscious, modern forms 
that would create similarly strong social bonds without falling prey to the dangerous 
passivity of “that paralogical mentality.” In circling around archaic religiosity, Ortiz is 




In trying to isolate “religiosity” as a fundamental component of human nature, Ortiz 
works in the next section of his discussion to show that what the Afro-Cuban “has from the 
white Spaniard” is, in fact, a similar lack of Christianization: 
This absence of catechism for the black has reflected a similar situation for the 
white. Already by the nineteenth century, when the black population reached 
its apogee, travelers used to point to the lack of religiosity in Cuba as a 
characteristic of the population. (27)75
The nineteenth-century travelers’ comments about Cubans’ “lack of religiosity”—“la 
irreligiosidad”—brings Ortiz back to his key point about long-running misperceptions about 
religion. The “absence of catechism”—that is, the weak presence of the Catholic religion—
does not amount to “lack of religiosity.” After all, “the white Spaniard” has contributed to 
exactly the opposite effect: the saturation of the Afro-Cuban with “religiosity.” Ortiz 
corroborates the opinion of the historian Antonio Las Barras y Prado that Cubans are “better 
called scarcely devout [poco beato]” than “scarcely religious [poco religioso].” For centuries, 
they have exhibited little interest in—and often outright hostility to—Catholic institutions, 
but that characteristic only amounts to “la irreligiosidad” if interpreted according to a 
limited conception of religion.
According to Ortiz, Cubans’ turn away from Catholicism in fact has a paradoxical but 
fundamentally "religious" quality. In their rejection of the colonizers' religious institutions, 
Cubans stumbled into their own worldview that parallels primitive paralogic in relying on 
impulse and tradition instead of critical analysis. At root, Cuban scorn for the Church is an 
expression of religiosity; it is driven by the “biotic desire to overcome.” However, this 
religious impulse also produces a general state of alienation and unhappiness among Cubans. 
75
“Esta ausencia de catequismo para el negro ha reflejado una parecida situación para el blanco. Ya 
desde el siglo XIX, cuando el apogeo de la población negra, los viajeros advertían en Cuba la irreligiosidad 
como un carácter de su población.”
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To make the point, Ortiz quotes himself from his 1913 "Open Letter" to Miguel de 
Unamuno:  
We do not have religion. We are non-believers. Our ideas about the life beyond 
do not cease being coarse and badly sketched superstitions.  Neither are we 
fervent for any cultus, nor partisans of free thought. What for? Our lazy 
mentality is left lulled to sleep by rites in which we hear with nostalgic 
pleasure, when we are old, the advice of our nursemaids, and we would lament 
to lose that poetry.  And we do not go beyond [the choice of] practicing a 
religion or being atheist; thinking about the great dilemmas […] is considered 
silly. (28)
With this self-citation on Cuban indolence and passivity, Ortiz once again gestures toward 
self-conscious collectivism. Cubans need to “think about the great dilemmas” in order to 
break out of a “cultus of disbelief.” They have to consider together life’s great mysteries. 
This collective reflection would unite them in a commitment to the common good.
But, according to Ortiz, if Cubans’ rejection of Catholicism reflects a lack of self-
consciousness, the religiosity from which the dismissal stems also provides an opening. The 
Cuban people "are religious, at times deeply so.” This tendency indicates that “they feel the 
emotion of the numinous, even if generally in the pretheological phase of religiosity.  They 
are religious because they always hope for the prodigious from the mysterious.” Cubans’ 
sentiment corroborates the "ancient and oft-repeated saying that although the gods were born 
of fear, all religion, in its pristine essence, is hope more than terror" (33).  In this way, Ortiz 
illuminates the ironic benefits of “pretheological religiosity.” Popular religion in Cuba is 
misguided, incapable of critical reflection, yet this limitation generates an uninhibited, 
hopeful outlook that ultimately drives the populace toward a collective ethic.
Ortiz gives further shape to what he sees as the obliquely admirable nature of popular 
religion. "These human masses […] want first of all charity," he explains, and "charity, the 
most social of virtues, is a commerce of love between the gods and men.[…] Their religion 
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was an agreement with the supernatural mystery" (33-4).  The agreement is "contractual.” As 
"commerce," popular religion appears as a matter of understandable self-interest, but "it is 
not that [these people] are materialists in the set fashion of modern commercialism" (34).  
Religious transactions rest on the principle of personal gain, just like capitalism, but the 
religious economy recognizes the ultimate interdependency of individuals in the system, the 
recognition of which many participants in capitalist economies fall short. Ortiz sets up 
“religious” economies against the “materialism” of “modern commercialism” that dictates 
only selfish concern. These passages demonstrate how Ortiz’s entire discourse unfolds as a 
politics of culture directed toward the displacement of the magic of capitalism.
To that end, Ortiz quickly points up a key limitation of the commerce of popular 
religion. To some extent, the transactions in popular religion parallel capitalism. "The 
theoanthropic economy,” he explains, “is not of long-term credits […] that one day, upon 
death, produces eternal returns; rather, this is religion of immediate consumption, rites of 
exchange without loans or accumulated interest" (34; emphasis in original). Similarly, 
capitalism and the theoanthropic economy both “confide much in that mana called ‘luck.’” 
Both systems hinge on the faith in powers that humans themselves have created and that 
"cloud the mind regarding the cause of things and of natural and social phenomena" (34).  In 
this way, without referring to Marx directly, Ortiz links selfish capitalist materialism to the 
backward “paralogical mentality.” Both systems rely on magical conceptions of causality. 
He returns shortly to magic not only to critique it but also to recover it. In order to do 
so, he has to circumscribe the key point of his lengthy reflections on the religiosity of the 
Cuban population. The "theoanthropic economy" carries the benefit of preserving "an 
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inextinguishable messianic hope," Ortiz emphasizes (35). But this impulsive expectancy 
holds uncertain potential:
All of the outrageous arrogance of social resentment or the erotic impudence of 
manliness in the individual and directed toward physiological coupling 
becomes at times eunichism upon passing from familiar range to the sphere of 
the group, of the city, and of the nation in whose collective ambiance the 
courage, always necessary in order to transcend, requires other tensions, other 
forces, and other forms of discipline for social fecundity. (35)
In other words, the source of collective virility comes from religious impulses, grounded in 
overpowering hopes for better lives, but these hopes threaten to lead people off into an 
emasculating world of fantasy in which humans abdicate control over their lives. 
“Eunichism”—the misdirection of religiosity’s vital drive for transcendence—can mislead 
people toward the idea that “‘one man’ could change the course of things, to faith in ‘the 
strong man’ [caudillaje], and to the collective incapacitation of [the population’s] own 
intelligent, unified, and sustained power" (35).
This passage reveals the simultaneous repulsion and attraction of popular religion for 
Ortiz. He implies that religiosity, despite its common root, could lead in very different 
directions as it manifests itself in historical cultures.76 Certain trajectories are beneficial 
76In underscoring potentially different manifestations of universal “religiosity,” Ortiz’s theory of 
religion correlates directly with another contemporary intellectual development: so-called ‘phenomenology of 
religion.’ In an earlier version of the present study, I focus on this connection. I argue that Ortiz’s text should be 
read as an example of phenomenology of religion (Shefferman 2000). The designation ‘phenomenology of 
religion’ should not be confused with Husserlian thought or other familiar uses of ‘phenomenology.’ 
Phenomenology of religion shares certain Kantian and pre-Kantian distinctions and presuppositions with other 
phenomenologies but developed as a separate field after the 1920s. Scholars have disputed the boundaries of 
phenomenology of religion from the start. Nevertheless, the term has been used mostly by philosophers of 
religion who locate their own work in a distinguishable ‘tradition’ that includes figures such as: W. Brede 
Kristensen (Norwegian; 1867-1953), Rudolf Otto (German; 1869-1937), Gerardus van der Leeuw (Dutch; 
1890-1950), Joachim Wach (German; 1898-1955), Mircea Eliade (Romanian; 1907-1986), and Åke Hultkrantz 
(Swedish; 1920- ).  The majority of these scholars trained with proponents of (or emerged directly from) 
nineteenth-century continental theology.  The phenomenologists of religion also draw heavily on contemporary 
anthropologists, like Lèvy-Bruhl (French; 1857-1939) and Frobenius (German; 1873-1938), and on historians of 
religion, such as Raffaele Pettazzoni (Italian; 1883-1959). As I have already highlighted, Ortiz cites many of 
those scholars in his January 1937 speech and elsewhere in his work. All of this intertexuality demonstrates 
clearly that ‘phenomenology of religions’ was clearly part of the wider discourse circuit in which contemporary 
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while others can be deadly. With the potential benefits and dangers of popular religion, what 
should be done?  Standing at this crossroads, Ortiz's next move is decisive.  He claims the 
coexistence of virility and danger as a fundamental characteristic of religion itself and seeks a 
way to channel along proper lines the potentially explosive impulse of religiosity. He once 
again points to reflexivity as the answer and proposes to “descend” into the territory of 
religiosity’s manifestations in order to get a better handle on the matter. It is a tricky 
endeavor, Ortiz suggests, but his speech’s introductory allegory reminds the audience that the 
future of humanity depends upon proper theoretical understanding of religiosity. Only with 
this accurate knowledge can Ortiz and his allies in Afro-Cuban studies act effectively.
9.
Ortiz’s turn to specific manifestations of religiosity force him to distinguished further 
the terms —“magic,” “religion,” and “science”—that he has been using all along. His central 
point is that poesía mulata, as a product of the diverse cultural streams that fed into Cuba 
over the course of its development, “refract” magic, religion and science (as he puts it later in 
his speech) as they play out in Cuba. According to Ortiz, magic, religion, and science 
represent three modes of religiosity distinguished according to perceptions of material 
causality. “Magic” hinges on the idea that practitioners can induce particular material effects 
by following prescribed actions, that they can manipulate causes.77 “Religion” involves 
Cuban intellectual activity moved. For more on phenomenology of religion, see Allen 1987 and Sharpe 1986 
(especially Chapter 10).
77From the start of his career, Ortiz identified “fetishism” as the most primitive form of magic, one that 
had passed to Cuba with African slaves. Following contemporary definitions of fetishism, Ortiz characterized it 
as a magical mode in which particular material objects assume divine power, such that the fetishist never even 
arrived at the idea of invisible and capricious “gods.” The fetishist was too much of a literalist to imagine the 
unseen. Ortiz opened the body of his first book, Los negros brujos [The Black Witch-Doctors] (1906), along 
those lines:  
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beliefs in animate higher beings that cause events in the world. For Ortiz, “myth” exemplifies 
this mode of thought by offering far-reaching, fantastic cosmological perspectives. In both 
magic and religion, causes are irregular, subject to the felicitous will of magicians and gods. 
In contrast, “science” assumes the ordered march of time governed by predictable ‘natural’ 
laws, including the Newtonian principle of action and reaction. 
Ortiz goes on to place the three modes in a progressive framework of “evolution”:
“magic” is the most “primitive,” governed by a misguided “paralogic” regarding the ability 
of individuals to cause specific external effects; “religion” situated causality in a broader 
field governed by powers beyond human control and thus represents a logical step forward 
toward “science,” in which “the broad perspectives of time and space” subsume religion’s 
“fear”-inducing notions of “supernatural caprice” (22).78 Despite the value judgments 
implicit in his reference to an upward “evolution” of logic, Ortiz does not hold the judgment 
as absolute. In other words, magic is not necessarily and implicit ‘bad’ nor science always 
and everywhere ‘good.’ As indicated at the beginning of his talk, “false categories of race” 
If one bears in mind that the western regions of Africa, the regions from which almost all of 
the slaves brought to Cuba were snatched, are the bastions of fetishism; that this religious form 
constitutes a very simple cult, finding for itself in all places and within reach things to convert 
into fetishes; and that the religious ideas are those that take root most firmly and defend lives 
against the fiercest missionization, then one will comprehend without effort that in the 
psychological evolution of the black race in Cuba, superstition survived the shipwreck of 
almost all other African social factors.  The Afro-Cuban, although he begins to call himself 
Catholic, continues being fetishistic.[…] African fetishism entered Cuba with the first black.  
But fetishism does not signify for African societies the expression of a pure religious ideal 
[idealidad].  Fetishism is the most primitive form of religion, the beginning of the social 
differentiation of the religious phenomenon; there is that which appears completely 
amalgamated with other social phenomena, especially with one of those, still latent, if one can 
put it that way; a phenomenon that should achieve a subsequent germination, a more elevated 
position in the scale of the gradation of social phenomena, which is the scientific.  For the 
black fetishist his religion is the shield that blocks the unknown forces that scare him into 
endeavoring to convert them into favor.  (Ortiz 1973: 23-4)
At a number of points in the January 1937 lecture (e.g. Ortiz 1937a: 34), he follows the same idea: that 
“fetishistic” perceptions of causality constitute “a very simple cultus” within the sphere of magic.
78I refer the reader back to Ortiz’s description about “the black of Africa,” who “lives submerged in 
religion and magic,” for clear evidence of how Ortiz distinguishes terms without explaining them directly.
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circulate in the name of science, indicating that scientific claims also point to suspicious or 
illogical causes. Like the Cuban intellectual discourse that it simultaneously reflects and 
shapes, Ortiz’s endeavor rests on an unrelenting admiration for magic. Ortiz sees in the 
“paralogical mentality” of “the black of Africa” an essential social “cement” urgently needed 
in contemporary Cuba. But, more fundamentally, he considers magic gutsy. It embodies “the 
courage, always necessary in order to transcend” and to generate “social fecundity,” that 
Cuba—and, it seems, modern society as a whole—has lost through “collective incapacitation 
of its own intelligent, unified, and sustained power.” If nothing else, magic is bold and vital. 
Magic faces down the immediate shortcomings of life with a motivation, an assertion, to take 
action in the world, on the world, to change it by force of will. Ortiz’s move, archetypical of 
the Cuban discourse of displacing magic, is to try to bring science to the study of magic in 
order to push the best of both modes—science’s “broad perspectives of time and space” and 
magic’s “courage”—toward another modality that transcends both of them. 
Ortiz drives toward that objective by urging his audience to take the plunge with 
him—through a pathway opened by poesía mulata—into a nebulous and threatening territory 
where magic, with its audacious attitudes toward the material world, resides:
To encounter the religious theme in Afro-Cuban lyrics at times one has to 
descend toward magic and, still more, has to understand magic and religiosity 
in that primary phase of its formation, in that ideological magma of the sacred 
[…] where reverential terror and the propitiation of the mysterious that 
constitutes its nucleus has not yet arrived at the expression of the individuated 
concept of the numen. (35)
This transitional paragraph presents the key images in Ortiz’s theory of religion: “one has to 
descend toward magic” where it rests, with “religiosity,” in an “ideological magma of the 
sacred”; that most primitive, or “primary phase,” of the sacred “has not yet arrived at” 
religion, which entails “the individuated concept of the numen” as distinct deities; rather, at 
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that base level magic exposes the “nucleus” of “the sacred”—and the roots of “religiosity”—
as a sense of undifferentiated “mysterious” power that inspires “reverential terror” and 
“propitiation.”
Building on contemporary scholarship, Ortiz figures the “nucleus” floating in the 
“ideological magma of the sacred” as “mana.” The term, he insists, captures a fundamental 
human instinct about greater powers at work in the world. In that regard, mana is the seed of 
religion, science, and philosophy, which all try to make sense of the world’s ambiguities. He 
offers some examples of “theoplasmic concepts” in Cuba that parallel mana. All of the terms 
are "vague and confusing like the [great] mystery itself”:  
The words cocorícamo, merequetén, bilongo, timba, rabia, zumba, and other 
terms of Afro-Cuban folklore express 'the ineffable,' that 'I don't know what' 
that shuns all definition, that moves us for example in feminine beauty, in 
stirring music, in the deepest caverns, in heroic sacrifice, in human pain, in the 
unsolvable problem, in the sky… in life’s mystery…. (35-6; ellipses in 
original)  
Ortiz’s examples of the indescribable lead to a point of emphasis about the tangible, 
or ‘material,’ parameters of religion.  Citing Lévy-Bruhl, Ortiz explains, "More precisely 
mana for primitives is something vividly real; it is for them like the vital essence of all 
reality" (36).  He offers supporting citations from prominent contemporary scholars, 
including Codrington, Pettazzoni, and Marett, but finally attempts to put the problem into his 
own words.  
Mana is the nebulousness where the world of religion must take shape.  A 
theoplasmic, pretheological concept.  Mana tries to signify something like the 
sacred, but in a substantial sense that our Castilian language has not captured 
from the Latin word sacer, from which it comes.  Mana could be translated, for 
example, as 'sacripotency' [sacripotencia] or 'sagrality' [sagralidad], if those 
neologisms would be permitted.  Something like 'numinousness' 
[numinosidad], if that word did not already indicate a preconception of 
individuation. (37-8)
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Ortiz immediately identifies the valuable and necessary aspect of this element of religion by 
clarifying the importance of mana for understanding contemporary Cuban society: "Without 
a doubt, all religious conceptions of the great popular mass, and not only of the Afro-Cuban 
but also of the Euro-Cuban, float on a sea of clouds where chaos, mystery, and sacripotency 
prevail; mana, hoping for the verb that gives a beginning to reality, which is nevertheless 
imagined" (39).  The description lays bare Ortiz's persistent belief about reason’s mystifying 
power to reshape social realities. Having identified “theoplasmic concepts” like mana and 
their relation to “religiosity” and “magic,” Ortiz can move—finally!—to a consideration of 
poesía mulata itself. 
10.
Throughout much of his discussion of poesía mulata, Ortiz exhibits a clear 
ambivalence. Although most of the poets he discusses were his friends and in the audience 
that night, Ortiz largely takes them to task for falling prey to the tendencies of Cuban popular 
religion. He re-emphasizes one of the speech’s opening points: that the poems—like their 
creators—are decidedly secular and appear to exhibit no religious sensibility. They often 
incorporate religious themes but, like so much Cuban culture, lack reflexivity. As Cubans 
who openly disregarded the Church, the poetas mulatos often show scorn for the religious 
elements that make their way into the poems. The poetas mulatos do not recognize the vital, 
potentially revolutionary religiosity that courses through their work. Ortiz bemoans the 
scornful tone of much poesía mulata as a form of self-hatred. The denial of African roots 
contributes to the fundamental alienation of Cubans from primordial drives. “Today, the 
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scarce inclination of poesía mulata toward preterit perspectives has impeded the entrance of 
African mythology, with its anecdotal richness, into the literary domain," he notes (42-3). 
Ortiz singles out his friend Nicolás Guillén, who was present at the lecture as one of 
the new Society’s Vice Presidents. Guillén also had earned worldwide fame in recent years 
as the shining light of so-called “afrocubanismo” [Afro-Cubanism].  According to Ortiz, 
Guillén mimics “Afro-Cuban magic” for literary purposes only.  "The magic rite of 
[Guillen’s famous poem] ‘Sensemaya,’” Ortiz notes, “is an individual conjuring of African 
witchcraft revived aesthetically" (41). The poem depicts a ritual of propitiation. The 
participants bring on the death of a serpent by chanting what they want to occur:
Sensemayá, la culebra,
Sensemayá […]




The dead snake cannot eat […]
Sensemayá, it died!]
But, in Ortiz’s view, Guillén overlooks the most important aspects of African forms by 
incorporating only "mere descriptive narration." The poem verges on art-for-art’s-sake. 
Instead, "poesía mulata could, if it wanted, translate effusive mystic depths.[…] But the 
mulatto poets of the day no longer believe in the gods of their black grandparents.  And [the 
poets] even mock contraptions of magic and witchcraft" (43). Ortiz points to Guillén’s own 
description of the poem as indicative of the problem. “Guillén himself says it is ‘a song to 
kill a serpent.’” By Ortiz’s estimation, what Guillén underplays is how the poem “is a magic 
rite” in a very literal, not merely aesthetic, sense. The poem “is a ‘song’ like songs were at 
their origin, a ‘chant,’ an ‘enchantment’ […] The trembling reptile succumbs to the conjuring 
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of the sacred words” (40). Ortiz’s implication is that Guillén’s poem does not simply 
represent an Afro-Cuban “magic rite”; the poem operates the same way as a “conjuring of 
sacred words” to enact a material effect.79
Ortiz’s analysis of Guillén’s “Sensamaya” is crucial to the discourse of displacing 
magic. Guillén and Ortiz both employ notions of magic as a propitiatory act and apply that 
definition to the magic in the poem. However, Ortiz turns the idea back on Guillén, 
underscoring the magic of “Sensamayá.” Ortiz then pushes the issue further, imagining the 
libratory possibilities of that reclamation, that transposition of magic to intellectual 
production that so often talks about magic: “The day that [our] culture opens the doors of the 
black temples and a mulatto genius [un genio mulato] knows how to make use of their 
aesthetic treasures, humanity will receive the gift of a prodigious art that will give new value 
to the universal qualities of Cuba" (42). Ortiz’s statement is prophetic. Or, more to the point, 
it foreshadows a prophecy. His words set up the last portion of his talk, in which he 
unleashes a vision based on that very idea of “open[ing] the doors of the black temples” so 
that “mulatto genius” can “make use of their aesthetic treasures” for the sake of the nation 
and of humanity at-large. 
11.
In one of the last sections of his talk, Ortiz brings all of the threads of his discussion 
together around considerations of work by Regino Pedroso, a founding member of the 
79In the next chapter, I pick up on Ortiz’s suggestion that Guillen’s poem is “a magic rite.” 
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Society for Afro-Cuban Studies and another of the popular “mulatto poets.”80 Ortiz argues 
that Pedroso’s work effectively embodies the spirit of poesía mulata by revealing religiosity 
in its “diverse colorations.” If Guillén’s “Sensemayá” essentially is a magical portrayal of 
Afro-Cuban magic, Pedroso’s work contains within itself the full evolutionary spectrum of 
religiosity. His poems include elements of magic, religion, and science.
But rather than focus on a comparison between Guillén and Pedroso to make this 
point, Ortiz juxtaposes the latter to ‘Cuba’s Great Mulatto Poet’ of the nineteenth century, 
Gabriél de la Concepción Valdés, popularly known as Plácido.81 By Ortiz’s description, 
Plácido’s verse is not properly “mulatto.” It does not represent Cuba, or even mulattos, 
because Plácido was too ‘whitened,’ which also meant being too Catholic. The true 
“mulattoness”—mulatez—of Pedroso’s poetry stands out in contrast, Ortiz argues. “With 
Plácido, mulatto lyric only enters into the church,” Ortiz explains. “The religious poetry of 
Plácido is in the category of those types of imitative, conventional, and baroque lyric very 
common in that epoch among poets of color of all American nations” (54). Ortiz pinpoints 
the source of the ‘problems’ of “imitative, conventional, and baroque lyric” that Cuba artists 
need to overcome:  “One has to recognize that Plácido does not arrive at extremes in his 
submission precisely because his religion is white ”; the ‘Great Mulatto Poet’ never “reflects 
80Pedroso (b. 1896) was a celebrated writer who hailed from the Matanzas region of Cuba.  He began 
to earn recognition in the late 1920s as “Afro-Cubanism” gathered steam in Cuba and beyond. His poems 
appeared in the widely read literary supplement to Diario de la Marina. Throughout his life, Pedroso remained 
active within leftist intellectual circles. After the 1959 revolution he served as Cultural Minister in China and 
Mexico and traveled widely to advance literature and the arts as an integral revolutionary activity.  His 1939 
book, Más allá canta el mar [Farther Out the Sea Sings], won the Cuban National Prize for Poetry. For more on 
Pedroso, including primary and secondary bibliographies, see Instituto de Literatura y Lingüística 1984.  
81Plácido—an educated, city-bred ‘light-skinned mulatto’—was a renowned literary figure in the 1830s 
and 1840s.  He was the resident poet at one of Cuba’s daily newspapers, La Aurora de Matanzas, and a regular 
contributor to other publications. He was executed in 1844, at the height of his popularity, for his presumed 
leadership of the pro-independence and antislavery ‘Conspiracy of the Ladder.’  His execution became a 
worldwide cause célèbre, and he was glorified by many nationalists well into the twentieth century as one of 
Cuba’s great writers and as a national hero.  For more on Plácido, see Stimson 1964.  
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in his verses’ religious transmutation from paganism to Christianity”; he “always 
dissimulates his own color—of pigmentation and of social position—and evades all 
incorporation of the survival carried through negro ancestry.  All around Plácido is the 
religious silence of the mulatto muses” (54-5; emphases in original). 
As usual, Ortiz attributes the loss of vitality reflected in Plácido’s verse and its 
derivativeness to Cuba’s unique colonial history. He reiterates a key point from an early 
portion of his talk: that colonialism in Cuba created two separate domains. “In religion, as in 
literature, the economy, commerce, law, the family, and all other social institutions, there 
were two levels in Cuba: the official and the contraband, the real and the fake, the dominant 
and the dominated, the white and the black…” (55; ellipses in original). Plácido spoke the 
language of the first, “official,” “dominant” but, in doing so, gestured silently toward the 
world of “the contraband” in which the silent “mulatto muses” wait for their chance to speak. 
Ortiz’s images of Plácido galvanize his argument. Ortiz clearly sets up Plácido’s 
verse as a symbol of that which Cuba still struggles to overcome. To Ortiz, Plácido’s poetry 
reflects the weak sensibility of “the dominated.” It is derivative and “fake,” but Cubans are a 
“mulatto” people who are not like that. They need to celebrate and to continue to create 
culture that captures all parts—especially those “contraband” elements—of mulatto Cuban 
character. This idea frames Ortiz’s speech. His implication is that he too, in that very moment 
of speaking about Cuban culture, produces another form of cultural expression that stands in 
stark contrast to Plácido’s. Ortiz figures his own discourse on culture as a truly ‘mulatto’ 
inversion of ‘the Great Mulatto Poet’s’ phony cultural forms. In other words, Ortiz reinforces 
the nature of his talk as a cubanismo that unsettles an imposed, “official” European culture 
for the sake of originality and authenticity of spirit.
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Accordingly, Pedroso—a new ‘Great Mulatto Poet’—serves in Ortiz’s speech as the 
‘true’ voice of all Cubans. Ortiz presents him in an open, ongoing confrontation with Cuba’s
colonial history. In contrast to Plácido, who merely adopts the “white” ways of “the 
dominant,” Pedroso seeks to redeem the legacy of oppression. Thus, Ortiz assumes a new 
tone as his discussion shifts to Pedroso. “Redemption” and “liberation,” words that Ortiz had 
been using throughout his speech, suddenly take on new overtones. The words now signal 
future possibilities instead of simply describing the desires of Ortiz’s subjects of study. The 
turn to Pedroso makes the redemptive drive of Ortiz’s project more explicit. He does not hide 
his own desire to give larger meaning and purpose to suffering endured. Through Pedroso, 
Ortiz imagines the transformation of the injustices heaped on Cubans—and exemplified by 
the long-running social mistreatment of Afro-Cubans—into the very foundation of new and 
better social order.
It is logical that for Ortiz this turn hinges on magic. Most immediately, magic is part 
of the history of Cuban suffering and remains embedded in the island’s culture. It too has to 
be redeemed. But, in Ortiz’s allegorical reading of Pedroso, magic serves as the basis for the 
whole redemptive process. In the preceding section of the lecture, he presents magic as an 
impetuous manifestation of religiosity: magic requires “courage” to face down the world, to 
try to change it. Where else to root a redemptive politics of culture if not in the courageous 
magical impulses of religiosity? 
Ortiz moves in that direction by insisting that, unlike Plácido, Pedroso never “evades 
all incorporation of the survival carried through negro ancestry.” Therefore, ‘religion’ plays 
out entirely differently in Pedroso’s work than in Plácido’s verse. “The emotion of religiosity 
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also transpires in Regino Pedroso; but it is already another religiosity.”  It is “religion as 
present experience” and, as such, religiosity at its purest (57). Ortiz explains:
In the poems of Pedroso, there are various themes of religion.[…] At times 
Pedroso transmutes the elements of biblical myth into social parable. In his 
‘Canción de Fragua’ [Song of the Forge] he utilizes the Christian tradition of 
the Messiah born in Bethlehem, of God made man and shown to the Three 
Wise Men in the Epiphany, to compose a song of social allegory, guided by the 
star that illuminates toward redemption. (57-8)
That “transmutation” of “biblical myth into social parable” reveals the similarities between 
the two genres and exposes a common  “religious” impulse: the desire for “redemption.” 
Pedroso draws from all of the different religious forms that exist in Cuba, Ortiz 
remarks, and plays them off of each other in a search for final justice.
In all of his religious poems, Pedroso philosophizes the contrast between the 
anguish of human suffering and the bliss that does not arrive.[…] It is the New 
Testament of the whites glossed in black,[…] with the light of contemporary 
reason, without bent devotion, with erect piety. Perhaps in Hispanic poetry 
there is not anyone who has felt more honestly than Regino Pedroso that 
ideological conflict between the promised myth of redemption and the 
deception of unredeemed humanity.[…] Plácido asked for solace, Pedroso asks 
for explanations. (58)
In demanding “solace” and “explanations,” Pedroso is "a prophet” (“and every prophet is a 
poet,” Ortiz adds) much like the fiery figures of the Bible who question God in their search 
for final justice (59).  Still, “the attitude of Pedroso is not necessarily impious.[…] In a 
panicked lyric and in a divinely inverted epic, projected not toward the past but at that which 
is coming. Like every poet who feels life in tragedy, in a thirst for justice, such is Pedroso: he 
has a frenzy of premonition, ecstasy of revelation.” Whereas “Plácido arrives at the temple, 
kneels and prays, Pedroso enters, philosophizes proudly, and leaves” (59). 
Ortiz begins his lecture with a call for “documentary objectivity and serene analysis,” 
but the preceding passages show that his interpretation assumes an exuberant, almost 
apocalyptic tone. The pitch heightens as Ortiz continues. He parallels the poet to those key 
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figures in his own poems—“the Messiah […] guided by the star that illuminates toward 
redemption”—but Pedroso appears as a secular “prophet,” engaged in the “secular work” of 
the “old liberators” that Ortiz holds out in the article’s introduction as a model. Pedroso 
experiences “premonition” and “revelation” but takes ‘secular’ rather than traditionally 
‘religious’ action: he “philosophizes proudly” instead of genuflecting to God. More 
specifically, Pedroso’s messianism operates within the framework of “social allegory” that 
exposes “ideological conflict between the promised myth of redemption and the deception of 
unredeemed humanity.”  He never abandons the objective of “redemption” but, with his 
“thirst for justice,” unrelentingly critiques hypocritical “ideology.” These characterizations of 
Pedroso encapsulate Ortiz's vision of the developed Cuban intellect: socially engaged, 
critical, drawing upon all available resources. 
Still, Ortiz does not want to paint the prophetic, messianic Pedroso as singular. He is
exemplary and embodies what everyone could and perhaps should be.  More immediately, 
Pedroso represents for Ortiz what Cuba already is. Like Pedroso, the entire nation is 
“mulatto” and simultaneously possesses “distinct attitudes” that, by their very juxtaposition, 
are revelatory. Ironically, the purity of Cuba’s religiosity, embodied and revealed by Pedroso, 
derive from its amalgamated quality. Ortiz seizes upon this irony as he attempts to redeem 
perceived sources of Cuban underdevelopment as the ground of the island’s prophetic nature. 
‘Mulatto’ religiosity is rich and textured—unlike Plácido’s purely “white” religion —because 
of numerous racial and cultural confluences.  Yet, this ideal religiosity does not necessarily 
correlate to any of the religious elements themselves but rather to the simultaneity that allows 
for an overcoming of them. The juxtaposition of elements enables the transcendence of 
specificity into a pure, undifferentiated cultural “essence.”
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As he continues, Ortiz highlights this critical dynamic. Ostensibly, he has been 
talking only about Pedroso’ s messianic spirit, but he suddenly proclaims “the essence of 
spirit” embodied in “mulatto-ness”—“mulatez”—as revealed through poesía mulata
The three phases of religious evolution are reflected in Afro-Cuban lyric:  the 
gods emerge, the gods triumph, the gods die.  Mana, myth, and science. The 
same stained-glass window of the temple filters diverse colorations according 
to the sun's position at twilight or at its zenith.  Mulatez refracts different 
shades according to the angle at which the sun kisses it.  Thus some will be 
able to see in the lyric of Pedroso and of the poets, like him, who sing of the 
coming of redemptions, an essence of religiosity. (59; first italic in original)
Ortiz’s metaphor for mulatez is striking not only for its vividness but also in its ironic 
implications.  Typically, “mulatto-ness” indicates specificity of color. Ortiz inverts that sense 
of particularity and aligns mulatez with pure, undifferentiated light and with the prism that 
“filters diverse colorations.” As the entire spectrum of color as well as its refracting agent, 
mulatez has no hue of its own. As the “essence of religiosity” Ortiz’s “mulatez” does not 
stand for purity of color but rather for that fundamental reality illuminated in the flash of 
white light, namely the longing for salvation and the primordial base from which redemption 
issues forth. 
In the next sentences, Ortiz adds more force to his images. While most of the 
audience already may understand the implications of his logic—as “essence of religiosity,” 
mulatez also exposes the essence of humanity—Ortiz makes the point clear. Pedroso’s 
“laments,” as the embodiment of mulatez, “will resonate with many like prophetic verses and 
like songs of that hope that is more than the fear in religion but rather that biotic desire for 
135
overcoming that is the definite essence of all religiosity, already outside of all dogmatisms 
and theological ethics” (59).82
With that statement, Ortiz purportedly arrives through mulatez at the arche, at the 
opening from which all human life unfolds. Pedroso’s verse enables the “descent, through 
magic,” into the “magma of the sacred” where a universal “biotic desire for overcoming” 
resides. In Ortiz’s system, that impulse exists always “already outside of all dogmatisms and 
theological ethics” and any other historically specific system of ideas; religiosity endures 
across human history as one, if not the only, of its unchanging elements. Accordingly, 
humanity’s critical challenge is to control religiosity, to channel it in productive directions. 
Otherwise, the “biotic desire for overcoming,” with its brute force, can lead humans toward 
their own destruction. 
By this route, Ortiz’s theory of religiosity brings him once again to considerations of 
policy and politics. How should religiosity be controlled? The last portion of Ortiz’s 
inaugural address takes up such questions by moving further away from its opening call for 
“documentary objectivity and serene analysis” and deeper into prophecy. In the previous 
section of the talk, he had insisted, “The day that culture opens the doors of the black temples 
and mulatto genius knows how to make use of their aesthetic treasures, humanity will receive 
the gift of a prodigious art that will give new value to the universal qualities of Cuba" (42). In 
bringing his speech to a close, Ortiz develops that visionary proposition. He already has 
underscored the invaluable consequences to humanity in releasing “a prodigious art” from its 
now-exclusive enclosure in “black temples.” When he returns to the idea, he marks off more 
82
“Sus endechas resonarán a muchos como versículos proféticos y como cantos de esa esperanza que es 
más que el temor en la religión, de ese anhelo biótico de superación que es la esencia definida de toda 
religiosidad, ya fuera de todos los dogmatismos y éticas teologales.”
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immediate economic and political consequences for Cuba. Ortiz figures “culture,” if only it 
would “open the doors of the black temples,” as the advanced front—the literal avant-
garde—of a social revolution. The release of “aesthetic treasures” from “black temples” 
could generate, to invoke once again Walter Benjamin’s phrase, powerful ‘energies of 
intoxication’ that can transform society…if “mulatto genius knows how to make use” of the 
liberated “art.”
12.
Ortiz’s path to a revolutionary politics of culture passes through more familiar forms 
of political thought. To set up his conclusion, he juxtaposes seemingly disparate, presumably 
nonreligious—and some explicitly antireligious—ideologies as a way to prove that all belief-
systems stem from religiosity. He defers to the work of Luis Raugier to prove the point, 
incorporating various citations of Raugier’s into his own statements: "Proletarian 
revolutionarism all over the world, ‘which communist propaganda offers against orthodox 
religion, is not a scientific rationalism inspired by the French encyclopedists, Anglo-Saxon 
empiricism, or logicism of the school of Hegel: it is the ancient hope of the Judeo-Christian 
apocalypse, transported to Marxist language.’” This discourse, 
‘opposed to traditional faith, is not precisely a positivist conception of the 
Universe and of society, but rather a new mysticism, the messianism of the 
proletariat that should […] realize without defect a society without classes, 
living in a reign of economic exuberance, the true reign of God […]. When one 
asks how a people have been able to pass from one religious faith to an 
absolute atheism, the answer is easy: it happens through a simple phenomenon 
of substitution’[…]. Soviet antireligiosity translates in this way as a 
substitution of some fallen creeds for others of ideology synchronic with the 
scientific materialism of the day.  And that perhaps would be how one could 
interpret the attitude of Pedroso. (59-60)
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Ortiz concludes, "In all forms”—whether as proletarian revolutionarism, Soviet 
antireligiosity, Judeo-Christian apocalypticism—“it is the same driving impulse.”
But, at that point, Ortiz comes upon an important theoretical clarification: the “biotic 
desire for overcoming” was a materialist compulsion. Religiosity pushes humans toward the 
redemption of needs in this world:
More food, more luck in the hunt, more fertility for females, better harvests in 
the country, more wisdom for the elders, more mastery of nature, a better life, 
more love and more justice, desire for redemption, hope for the messianic 
journey to the promised land… Always hope as biological imperative; 
transcendence as vital impulse. (60; ellipses in original)
The Nietzschean overtones of Ortiz’s argument surface in these passages and soon become 
even more apparent.83 The characterization of religiosity reinforce the paradoxical idea that 
familiar forms of “religion,” as institutional systems like the Catholic Church, actually 
suppress the most “vital” aspects of religiosity. As Ortiz has hinted in preceding portions of 
his talk, the ostensibly “religious” rejection of material desires in the name of a ‘higher,’ 
spiritual fulfillment amount to life-denying means to power through the “sublimation” of the 
“biological imperative” toward “a better life” in the here-and-now.
These passages demonstrate Ortiz’s effort to develop an alternate materialist criticism 
that could circumvent the shortcomings of contemporary Marxism. The assessment of 
“proletarian revolutionarism” as a new form of “messianism” shows how Ortiz, in a move 
83Ortiz did not mention Nietzsche by name in the lecture. However, moments later he invokes 
Nietzsche more directly by referring to certain “sacred rites” as “Dionysian in nature.” The Nietzchean rhetoric 
surfaces in other passages too when he juxtaposes the life-affirming “Dionysian” mysticism of African practices 
with the ascetic “Apollonian” institutionalism of European Christianity. At one point, Ortiz describes “black 
mysticism” as “nothing but the sublimation of the desire to live” (here in this world) while “white religion” 
entails “the longing to die one time in order to live always” (in another world) (51). A few years later, in his 
famous Contrapunteo cubano [Cuban Counterpoint] (1940), Ortiz did make explicit mention of Nietzsche but 
only in a few passing remarks (e.g. “Nietzsche might have called sugar Dionysian and tobacco Apollonian.” 
(Ortiz 1995: 17)). Despite the limited number of citations, Ortiz’s papers reveal that he was actively reading and 
processing Nietzsche during the late 1930s. Some of those notes have turned up in recent years in organizing 
Ortiz’s extensive archives for the Fernando Ortiz Library. See InterAmericas 1998 and Font 2005 for further 
information on Ortiz’s engagements with Nietzschean thought. 
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typical of early-twentieth-century Cuban intellectual discourse, draws on Nietzsche and Marx 
in an attempt to come up with a materialist perspective born of and applicable to the 
Americas. Ortiz strives for a critical perspective that will stand as a cubanismo. His sly 
citationality transforms other discourses as part of his own, as exemplified by his literal 
incorporation of Luis Raugier’s words into his text. “Communist propaganda,” “scientific 
rationalism,” “French encyclopedists,” “Anglo-Saxon empiricism,” “logicism of the school 
of Hegel”: all of these post-Enlightenment discourses lead toward the critical ground of 
marked off by Ortiz’s lecture as it embraces a fundamental “religiosity” that those other 
“positivist” ideologies have rejected. Ortiz seeks a “divinely inverted,” “just” society lost 
amidst rampant rationalism. Like the early-nineteenth-century Romantics and the Surrealists 
of his own day, he looks to place where vital energies of intoxication surge forth. At the end 
of the lecture, the invocation of Pedroso’s “frenzy of premonition” and “ecstasy of 
revelation” point Ortiz back to where he had begun his discourse: to the “religious rites” of 
“the black Afro-American,” so full of “intense collective emotionality.”
13,
In the published transcript of Ortiz’s inaugural speech, the last two pages are set off 
by three centered marks (60):
* * * 
One can almost hear Ortiz pausing to catch his breath before driving toward his last word: 
“liberation.” In the wake of his characterization of Pedroso as prophet, Ortiz lets loose with a 
prophecy of his own. He also reinforces the idea that his prophetic role ties in with the 
ritualistic nature of his speech. 
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Ortiz reminds his audience of the limitations of poesía mulata. He agrees with the 
remarks of “a Spanish literary observer” who, having seen “certain recitations of Eusebia 
Cosme,” celebrated “that halo of religiosity that at times Afro-Cuban poetry exhales.” Still, 
poesía mulata—even when recited by Cosme (“‘the high priestess of a new cultus’”)—lacks 
something. Its religiosity is always of the second order. Ultimately, the poems pose 
themselves as aesthetic representations of some other experience. The poets and performers 
always separate themselves from their subjects. For instance, Guillén “mocks” the magic of 
his own poems, and Pedroso insists on speaking in “social parable.” Their work exhibits 
ardent religiosity, but neither Guillén nor Pedroso—both committed Socialists—want to 
acknowledge the profound religious parameters of their efforts. In a single sentence, Ortiz 
encapsulates the critical issue that surfaces out of his entire discussion: “The recitation of the 
new poetics—we repeat the point now—cannot give the emotive and aesthetic splendor of 
the liturgical act in its collective plentitude […] as an utmost and communitarian euphoric 
exaltation of life” (60). 
With that conclusion about the shortcomings of “the new poetics,” Ortiz has come to 
the heart of the matter. He has identified what modern Cuba lacks and what it most needs: 
some semblance of a “liturgical act” full of “collective plentitude” and “communitarian 
euphoric exaltation of life.” But how could a society that Ortiz, in the course of his 
discussion, has described as openly dismissive of institutional religion come to participate 
enthusiastically in a “liturgical act in its collective plentitude”? 
Ortiz gives an answer, but not a straight one. He launches into a prophecy that tells 
the audience clearly enough what, in his view, needs to be done:
One day we will see in Cuba those rites—sacred, Dionysian—emerge into the 
light of day like picturesque surprises, disguised as carnivals to bait tourists, 
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and the magic power of money will speak the 'Open Sesame!' that will make 
[the ceremonies] come out of the crypts. (60-1)84
With this vision of the future, Ortiz’s discussion spirals back on itself. He begins by framing 
his speech and SEAC’s inauguration as a rite of passage for Cuban society, moves into 
considerations of “the religious rites” of “the black Afro-American,” and passes through an 
argument about the material and materialistic impulse of religiosity at the root of all human 
activity . . . . And he follows that course to arrive at an end that lies close to where he had 
started. His prophecy announces that Cuban society needs more rites of passages, with his 
speech serving as a model. But among a notoriously skeptical people, the ceremonies also 
will have to be deliberate acts of profanation: Cubans should coax “sacred rites”—by 
definition, sanctuary-centered procedures—pro fanum, ‘outside the temple,’ and into the 
nation’s streets during “the light of day.” That conscious, profane displacement will release 
the ceremonies’ transformative “Dionysian” energies into the public at-large.
But how exactly would the profanation of “those sacred, Dionysian rites” have such 
profound effects “one day in Cuba”? According to Ortiz, the most immediate consequences 
would be economic. Those effects could set off a far-reaching chain of reactions. As he 
indicates, the entire process of social transformation revolves around a primary deception 
intended to infuse capital into Cuba’s economy: “sacred rites” had to be exuberant—or, more 
specifically, “Dionysian in nature”—so as to appear like “carnivals” that can effectively “bait 
tourists.” Ortiz reminds his audience that Cuban religious and political authorities have 
already proposed commercialized religious ceremonies as a form of tourist-bait. In a 
statement—one posed as a question—Ortiz notes how, for reasons more economic than 
84
“Un día veremos en Cuba esos ritos sagrados, dionisíacos, salir a la luz del día como surpresas 
pintorescas, disfrazadas de carnaval para cebo de turístas, y la potente magia del dinero dirá el sésamo ábrete
que las hará salir de las criptas.”
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spiritual, some cities have discussed the possibilities of street celebrations that mimic famous 
Catholic traditions:
Has it not already been suggested, for the pecuniary greed of industrial 
tourism, that the old Catholic processions of Cuaresma be resuscitated and that 
in ancient Trinidad—or in the haven of Guanabacoa—the picturesque hooded 
rows leave their churches for Holy Week, as in Andalucia, with candles and 
floats, with images of Via Crucis and clerics that softly sing to themselves the 
lugubrious psalms of those sorrowful days that precede the Pascal holiday of 
Christianity? (61)85
How can Ortiz accuse the proponents of these events of “pecuniary greed”? Why 
would the proceedings that Ortiz suggests be any different? Is not his own plan to “bait 
tourists” also directed toward the “pecuniary” ends of bringing people—and, more 
importantly, their money—to Cuba and its economy? After all, he admits –indeed, 
emphasizes– that his whole prophecy hinges on “the magic power of money”: Money-
bearing tourists will not come without the “bait”—the “sacred rites” that when “disguised as 
carnivals” look “like picturesque surprises”—but that bait also had to be baited . . . with 
money! Is not Ortiz’s implication that money -bearing observers would never be enticed by 
“Dionysian” ceremonies if money did not magically “speak ‘Open sesame!,’” that is, if the 
rituals themselves were not lured “out of the crypts” by the promise of financial gain? Are 
the duplicitous tactics Ortiz presents—tricking sacred rites and tourists alike by tempting the 
former with money and then disguising them as carnivals to fool the latter—any better than 
the “pecuniary greed” that ostensibly motivate the idea of fake “Catholic processions”?
Ortiz apparently recognizes the potential hypocrisy of his indictment of “pecuniary 
greed” since he immediately attempts to distinguish the ethical and economic implications of 
85
“¿No se ha sugerido ya, para las avideces pecuniarias del turísmo industrial, que se resuciten las 
viejas procesiones católicas de Cuaresma y que en la vetusta Trinidad, o en la remansada Guanabacoa, salgan 
de sus iglesias por Semana Santa, como en Andalucía, las hileras de pintorescos encapuchados, con cirios y 
pasos, con imágenes de Via Crucis y clérigos que canturren los salmos lúgubres de aquellos días luctuosos que 
preceden a la fiesta pascual del cristianismo?”
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his vision from his compatriots’ suggestions. He has grouped those events under the category 
of “industrial tourism,” characterized by “pecuniary greed,” and in order to highlight the 
contrast he coined a term for the kind of activities he envisioned: “indigenous tourism” 
[turismo indígena]. As he outlines his conception of this alternative form of tourism, Ortiz 
points out its economic benefits, but he presents them as only one component of the profound 
social change engendered by letting “sacred, Dionysian rites emerge into the light of day.” In 
addition to the commerce tied to the public display of these types of ceremonies, the events 
would heighten Cuban self-consciousness and, in turn, would inculcate national pride. 
“Industrial tourism” derives from non-Cuban traditions—such as the Catholic processions 
that copied Spanish processions—and serves the interests of foreigners. “Indigenous 
tourism” would feature homegrown traditions directed primarily at Cuba’s own citizens:
It seems necessary that, at the least—so much as to entertain foreign tourists 
and to bring them so that they will leave us money—we endeavor to please our 
own Cuban people, tortured and abandoned, with the same pleasures of their 
own collective art, and that we sustain a real system of diversions for Cuban 
tourists in their own land, with the objective of bringing the children of Cuba to 
the appreciation of their own country. In the end, this ‘indigenous tourism,’ 
from street to street and from town to town, would have to bring us more 
substantial benefits than those earned through alien tourism [el turismo 
alienígena], which includes the fortunate offerings of the restaurateur and the 
innkeeper on through the less savory elements of prostitution and gambling. 
(61-2)86
At the end of the passage, Ortiz does not use quotation marks to claim the phrase 
“alien tourism” as his own, as he does with “‘indigenous tourism.’” Still, the former term is 
also unique, and its originality is telling. Early in the passage, Ortiz refers to turistas 
86
“Parece necesario que, al menos, tanto como a entretener a los turistas extranjeros y atraerlos para 
que nos dejen dineros, procuremos divertir al propio pueblo cubano, torturado y en abandono, con los propios 
placeres de su arte colectivo, y sostengamos un verdadero sistema de divertimientos para turistas cubanos en su 
propia tierra, con objeto de atraer a los hijos de Cuba al goce de su misma patria. Al cabo, ese ‘turismo 
indígena’, de calle a calle y de pueblo a pueblo, habría de traernos más sustanciales provechos que los ganados 
en el turismo alienígena, desde los afortunados tratos del fotinguero y el hostelero hasta los menos 
recomendables del celestinaje y la tahurería.”
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extranjeros [“foreign tourists”]. However, instead of later using turismo extranjero [‘foreign 
tourism,’ or ‘tourism by foreigners’]—the logical and familiar extension of the earlier 
phrase—Ortiz marks contemporary tourism itself, not to the foreign tourists who participate 
in it, as “alien” or, in the more precise sense of the term alienígena , as “alienating.” In other 
words, Ortiz implies that the state of the “Cuban people” as “tortured and abandoned” related 
to the treatment of tourism as “industrial,” as nothing more than an industry. Those involved 
in this tourist industry have only one concern: to make a profit. They pursue that goal 
through the shortsighted focus on how “to entertain foreign tourists and to bring them [to 
Cuba] so that they will leave us money.” 
In his view, the Cuban versions of Spain’s “old Catholic processions” serve as clear 
evidence of “the pecuniary greed of industrial tourism” because the parades would have been 
so inconsistent with the skeptical Cuban character that he discusses earlier in the lecture. 
Ortiz points out the obvious contradiction:
We doubt that the social force of jest [choteo] would permit in Cuba the 
reproduction, without irreverent sacrilege, of the solemn ambulatory 
ceremonies of the Andalucian Church, with its masked penitents and its 
spectacular disciplinarians, without the aesthetic complement of the admirable 
polychromatic religious imagery of a Montañes and of the popular Catholic 
sensibility that sings passionate saetas to the Crucified and to the Virgin 
Macarena and that traditionally participates in those ambulatory centenary rites 
with a fervor that the Cuban public does not have and cannot improvise nor 
fake. (61)87
In Ortiz’s view, the proposed processions would amount to nothing more than bait for 
foreign tourists due to the inevitable discrepancy between Cubans’ “sacrilegious irreverence” 
87
“Dudamos que la fuerza social del choteo permita en Cuba reproducir, sin sacrílega irreverencia, las 
solemnes ceremonias callejeras de la iglesia andaluza, con sus penitentes enmascarados y sus espectaculares 
disciplinantes, sin el complemento estético de la admirable imaginería polícroma de un Montañes y de la 
católica sensibilidad popular que canta saetas apasionadas al Crucificado y a la Virgen Macarena y participa 
tradicionalmente de esos centenarios ritos desambulatorios, con un fervor que el pueblo cubano no tiene, ni 
puede improvisar ni fingir.”
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and “the solemn ambulatory ceremonies of the Andalucian Church.” While Ortiz’s earlier 
statements acknowledge that “it seems necessary […] to entertain foreign tourists and to 
bring them so that they will leave us money,” he also makes clear there that such objectives 
are not enough. The tourist trade has to “endeavor to please our own Cuban people […] and 
[to] sustain a real system of diversions for Cuban tourists in their own land, with the 
objective of bringing the children of Cuba to the appreciation of their own country.” Thus, in 
presenting the idea of “indigenous tourism,” Ortiz offers a vision of how to incorporate the 
tricks of industrial tourism into another “system” that would better serve Cubans by 
educating them about their own culture and history. This new system would instill national 
pride and would keep Cuban money—along with much-desired foreign capital—circulating 
through the domestic economy.
Ortiz’s far-reaching strategy for Cuba’s development hinges upon the use of “sacred 
rites” in a manner consistent with national character. He accentuates the need for 
“Dionysian” spectacles that, in contrast to “the solemn ambulatory ceremonies of the 
Andalucian Church,” enable new forums for collective enthusiasm. Public performance of 
“indigenous” traditions with “African” influences, he suggests, would be particularly 
effective as the foundation for “indigenous tourism.” He identifies some examples from 
Cuba’s past in which a “strong African instinct” shaped carnivalesque celebrations that 
embodied the exuberant spirit of the Cuban people: 
We have already had ‘Days of Kings’ and, later, Havana ‘comparsas’, and 
‘parrandas’ through the Villareña region of Remedios, and street ‘arrollaos’ 
through Santiago, as diversions in which the people search for their style and 
their genius. (61)88
88Comparsas, parrandas, and arrollaos were types of popular Cuban street processions. In the next 
chapter, I discuss the comparsas and the Day of Kings. The original Spanish reads: “Ya hemos tenido “días de 
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Ortiz returns again to the prophetic mode, bringing his lecture to a dizzying close, by 
imagining aloud how these historical cases might shape the future of Cuban society:
Some new street processions, well stimulated and protected by official favor, 
and some useful carnivals, with rivalries between neighborhoods in the 
exhibition of monumental lights and floats, supplemented by competitions of 
music, pregones [popular chants, such as by street vendors] and new songs 
from the cradle of folklore would give hours of amusement to our people, 
precisely with their own traditions, with that which is their own, with that 
which the public likes, with that which it desires and has a right to desire.[…] 
Above all, the incorporation of African liturgies into the common stock of 
popular and public traditions—and their subsequent aesthetic theatricalization, 
in stylized and mimodramatic forms—will have to be—and will be one day—a 
powerful, original, cubanísima and inimitable artistic attraction, forged with 
native elements that await liberation. (61-2)89
As the last word in Ortiz’s January talk, “liberation” lingers on after the passage’s 
conclusion and echoes back across the preceding text. In using the term, Ortiz explicitly 
names the goal toward which his entire discussion moves. Does not “liberation” evocatively 
encapsulate the possibility circumscribed by Ortiz throughout the passage and distilled into 
his plea to his compatriots to “endeavor to please our own Cuban people, tortured and 
abandoned” by building “a real system of diversions for Cuban tourists in their own land”? 
The final “liberation” establishes, once and for all, the aim of the cultural politics that 
generate the notion of “indigenous tourism.”
Nevertheless, if the last word clearly condenses a desire that propels the January 
lecture, the parameters of emancipation as invoked by Ortiz become more ambiguous upon 
Reyes” y luego “comparsas” habaneras, y “parrandas” por la villareña comarca de Remedios, y “arrollaos” 
callejeros por Santiago, como expansiones que el pueblo busca a su modo y a su genio.”
89
“En cambio, unas comparsas bien estimuladas y protegidas por el favor official y unas parrandas 
remedianas, con rivalidad de barrios en la exhibición de farolas y carrozas monumentales, acrecida por 
concursos de músicas, pregones y canciones nuevas de cuna folklórica, darían, y pensamos que darán horas de 
esparcimiento a nuestro pueblo, precisamente con sus tradicionces, con lo suyo, con lo que a él le gusta, con lo 
que él quiere y tiene derecho a querer. […] Sobre todo, la incorporación de las liturgias africanas al acervo de 
las expansiones populares y públicas, y su derivada teatralización estética, en formas estilizadas y 
mimodramáticas, habrán de ser, y serán un día, una poderosa, original, cubanísima e inimitable atración 
artística, forjada con elementos nativos que esperan una liberación.”
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reflection on the concluding remarks. After all, what kind of “liberation” does Ortiz mean? 
Who or what would be set free, and how so? Significantly, Ortiz’s final passage, when taken 
literally, does not refer to the release of “tortured and abandoned” Cubans into a new state of 
sovereignty. Rather, “native elements” —specifically, the “African liturgies” identified 
earlier in the sentence—“await liberation.” In this regard, Ortiz simply brings his concluding 
remarks full circle: he begins them by prophesizing about the emancipation of “sacred rites” 
that will “emerge into the light of day”; he ends the lecture by reinforcing the image of the 
ceremonies’ release, asserting that they actually “await liberation.” Still, these two visions of 
uncaging at either end of the conclusion frame Ortiz’s discussion about “industrial tourism” 
as a major factor in the tortuous limitations imposed on the Cuban pueblo’s development. By 
implication, the discharge of “African liturgies” would enable the pueblo’s “liberation,” and 
the final passages make the connection more directly. The emergence of the “African” 
“sacred rites, Dionysian in nature,” would unshackle and then satisfy a currently repressed 
need: the “amusement to our people, precisely with their own traditions, with that which is 
their own, with that which the public likes, with that which it desires and has a right to 
desire.”
However, the unmistakable link that Ortiz establishes between the “liberation” of 
“native elements” and of the Cuban pueblo manages to complicate the picture. A 
fundamental issue remains: in what specific ways does Ortiz see the two emancipations as 
related? Ortiz’s second-to-last word raises the question of agency. For whom or for what are 
“native elements” waiting as they “await liberation”? Once again, this final phrase gestures 
back a few passages. In his initial image of release, Ortiz implies that the ceremonies do not 
“emerge into the light of day” entirely of their own volition; they only enter the public sphere 
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by an external power that “makes them come out of the crypts.” So who or what does Ortiz 
figure as the liberators of “African liturgies” and, in turn, of Cuba’s “tortured and 
abandoned” population? What kind of force sets the process in motion by bringing 
“Dionysian” ceremonies “outside their temples”? 
In the initial iteration, Ortiz suggests that “money,” with its “magic power,” is the 
catalyzing force that “will make [them] leave their crypts.” Ortiz then rewrites that scenario, 
pointing more directly to human agents as the pivotal intermediaries. He suggests that well-
informed intellectuals and government functionaries, in particular, would control the process 
of Cuba’s social transformation. In envisioning the public spectacles that would be at the 
heart of “indigenous tourism”—the “parades” and “carnivals” and “contests of music,” so 
full of “rivalries” and “monumental lights and floats” and other excesses that “would give 
hours of amusement to our people”—Ortiz indicates that such ribaldry would have to be 
promoted by and regulated through apparatuses of the state. In his description, any such 
event that would serve the necessary purposes has to be “well stimulated and protected by 
official favor.” He proceeds to reinforce this idea of “official” control over events: the 
effectiveness of “African liturgies” on public life depended upon their “incorporation” and 
“aesthetic theatricalization.” In other words, some people—presumably non-practitioners 
who possess or represent “official favor”—would not only “liberate” Dionysian rituals but 
also would “incorporate” and “theatricalize” them as they “emerge” from their private 
sanctuaries “into the light of day.”
By placing political and cultural elites at the center of his prophetic vision, Ortiz 
resolves one apparent tension while he creates another. “Aesthetic theatricalizations,” 
organized by elites and adopted by skeptical population, demand self-consciousness. All of 
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the actors take part with certain intentions and desires for the transformation of modern 
society. Based on Ortiz’s discussion, that desired social revitalization requires spontaneous, 
primal experience. But how can that kind of primal experience be achieved among a self-
conscious population? It seems that reflexivity, the theorization of experience, is Ortiz’s only 
way out, and that path points the audience right back to the just-completed lecture. His theory 
of religiosity has been magical all along according to its own terms. Ortiz implicitly situates 
his talk as a manifestation of religiosity—of “that biotic desire to overcome,” of a will to 
power—that, like “magic,” seeks to channel the circulation of power in the world. 
It is precisely that effort to redirect “destiny” that Nicolás Guillén also undertakes 
with his writing. My next chapter focuses on Guillén’s magic as related to, but still distinct 
from, the magic at work in the official inauguration of the Society for Afro-Cuban Studies on 
January 16, 1937. 
CHAPTER 4: MAKING HISTORY: SACRIFICE, REDEMPTION, AND NICOLÁS 
GUILLÉN’S TEXTUAL ENCHANTMENTS (1951)
Guillén himself says that it is […] a magic rite, that it is a ‘song’ like songs 
were at their origin, a ‘chant,’ an ‘enchantment.’
Fernando Ortiz
I already know: there is ‘the marked day,’ as fatalists say. Destiny! Of course, 
the idea is consoling because it searches for a way to help us accept the 
consummate fact, bowing our head before the inevitable. I reject it.
Nicolás Guillén
Men make their own history, […] but under circumstances directly 
encountered, given, and transmitted from the past.
Karl Marx
1.
After the official inauguration of the Society for Afro-Cuban Studies in January 1937, 
what happened next? The organization’s subsequent activities reveal that Ortiz, as SEAC’s 
President, led the group’s effort to bring to fruition the strategic vision that he had presented 
at the conclusion of his inaugural address. In the closing paragraphs of the speech, Ortiz had 
imagined how “one day we will see in Cuba those rites—sacred, Dionysian—emerge into the 
light of day.” He had issued a call for a new system of “‘indigenous tourism’” based on “the 
incorporation of African liturgies into the common stock of popular and public traditions, and 
their subsequent aesthetic theatricalization, in stylized and mimodramatic forms.” Ortiz 
specifically envisioned “some new parades [comparsas], well stimulated and protected by 
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official favor, and some useful carnivals [parrandas], with rivalries between neighborhoods 
in the exhibition of monumental lights and floats, supplemented by competitions of music.” 
Most of the Society’s endeavors after its inauguration pushed directly toward Ortiz’s 
objectives. The group’s official archives identify its organization of and involvement with 
various performances during 1937. Many of the presentations represented the kinds of 
“aesthetic theatricalizations” of “sacred, Dionysian rites” that Ortiz apparently had in mind. 
For instance, on May 30, Ortiz presided over what was billed as an “ethnographic concert 
that gave a schematic exposition of the character, instruments, music, liturgical songs and 
dances of the sacred music of the black Yoruba.” According to SEAC’s records, a re-
enactment of an Afro-Cuban “sacred rite” followed Ortiz’s “schematic exposition” of the 
ceremony’s critical musical components. The official description of the May 30 event echoes 
key terms from Ortiz’s January inaugural speech: “sacred,” “liturgical,” “ethnographic,” 
“concert” (SEAC 1937: 163). Indeed, in his explanatory lecture on May 30, Ortiz celebrated 
the event as an initial but absolutely critical step toward the fulfillment of the strategic vision 
he had offered during his inaugural speech less than five months earlier. In introducing the 
event in May, Ortiz proudly proclaimed, “Until today these religious songs of the Yoruba in 
Cuba” that you will encounter tonight “have not left the temples of the blacks” (Ortiz 1937b: 
78). Throughout his May talk, Ortiz repeatedly underscored his hope that the “Dionysian 
exuberance” displayed in the proceedings of the “ethnographic concert,” an “aesthetic 
theatricalization” of African-derived “liturgies” in Cuba, would unleash transformative 
energies into the audience that politely sat in Havana’s Campoamor Theater and watched a 
profane version of a “sacred rite” that finally had “emerged into the light of day” (Ortiz 
1937b: passim).
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The records of the Society for Afro-Cuban Studies identify a number of other 
“ethnographic concerts” and “aesthetic theatricalizations” of Afro-Cuban “liturgical song and 
dance” during 1937 and in the years following. The group’s very first involvements show 
that its efforts were not only ‘political’ in a broad sense. Immediately after its official 
inauguration in January, the Society turned to a narrower political matter: public policies 
surrounding a specific cultural expression. The language of Ortiz’s inaugural address further 
demonstrates that his call for profane, public versions of “sacred, Dionysian rites” included a 
pressing political agenda. 
In identifying the need for “some new parades, well stimulated and protected by 
official favor,” Ortiz referred to the parades as “comparsas.” In using that term, Ortiz 
signaled to everyone in the audience the direct relation of his prophecy to contemporary 
politics. In January 1937, comparsas were a hot-button issue among intellectuals and 
politicians in Cuba. Although by that time “comparsa” could be used in reference to any 
troupe of musicians and dancers that paraded through the streets during February’s pre-
Lenten carnival celebrations, the origins of the comparsas—and the controversy surrounding 
them—were well known. The comparsas had developed among slaves on the island and, by 
the early nineteenth century, already had earned considerable attention in Cuban society as a 
source of fascination and fear. They emerged as part of the annual celebration of Epiphany 
on January 6, known in Cuba as “el Día de Reyes” [the Day of Kings]. Colonial religious and 
political authorities traditionally allowed slaves to participate in the Epiphany processions, 
which for centuries had been among the most important popular celebrations in cities and 
towns throughout Spain. In the Cuban context, slaves had used the processions as 
opportunities to re-enact other, African-inflected traditions. Slaves would move through the 
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streets as part of the processions, but the comparsas—the groups of slave musicians and 
dancers—would stand out amidst the overt Catholic imagery. The dancers moved wildly, 
with many of them dressed as so-called “diablitos”—‘little devils’—in spectacular costumes 
based on famous western African ritual styles. The music also seemed to derive from Africa, 
as the singers would repeat chants in unfamiliar languages according to complex rhythmic 
structures laid down on handmade drums. 
In a much-celebrated 1925 study, Ortiz describes the comparsas and their meaning: 
A troupe of Negroes leaping, dancing, and singing, carried on their backs, 
through the streets of Havana, an enormous, artificial serpent several meters 
long, stopping before the big houses where they would be given a Christmas 
bonus. The scene represented the death of the snake and the celebration of its 
characteristics: ‘Look at his eyes, they look like flame / and look at his teeth, 
the look like needles.’ With the snake stretched out on the ground, they danced 
around it, singing to it, ending with: ‘The snake is dead / Calabasón, són, són.’ 
(Ortiz 1925: 41)
According to Ortiz, the Day of Kings celebrations amounted to a complex social drama that 
revolved around magic. The “troupe of Negroes” reproduced a traditional African rite amidst 
the Epiphany processions in order to unleash magical spells aimed at liberation. The snake, 
Ortiz explains, represented the white oppressors that the group of “leaping, dancing, and 
singing” slaves ritually, efficaciously killed. As Ortiz highlights, the power of this magic 
depended for the comparsa upon its ability to carry out the ritual in front of the masters 
themselves: the whole drama took place within officially authorized religious observances 
that led the slaves “before the big houses where they would be given a Christmas bonus.” 
But, as Ortiz also emphasizes, the masters caught on to this magic at work in their midst and 
directed at the undoing of their power. Throughout the nineteenth century, many people 
called for a ban on the comparsas, which almost all contemporary observers characterized as 
spectacular but frightening. Beginning in 1880, Cuba’s colonial authorities officially 
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outlawed the comparsas on the grounds that, with the imminent end of slavery, the tradition 
was no longer necessary. 
Accordingly, Ortiz’s reference in his inaugural lecture to “some new comparsas, well 
stimulated and protected by official favor,” signaled the openly political move he had in 
mind. And, indeed, the very first activities of the Society for Afro-Cuban Studies after its 
official January 1937 inauguration related to the group’s effort to overturn the fifty-six-year-
old ban on the comparsas. The Society, led by Ortiz, pressed Havana’s political leaders on 
the issue, and exactly two weeks after the organization’s inaugural event the mayor of 
Havana released a notice calling for public debate about reinstatement of the comparsas.
SEAC’s official records include the following note of one of the group’s first endeavors:
In response to the request issued by the Mayor of Havana, Dr. Antonio Beruff 
Mendieta, on January 30, 1937, the Society released a report, edited by its 
President, Dr. Fernando Ortiz, and approved by the Executive Council, 
pronouncing itself in favor of the reinstatement of the popular Havana 
comparsas. The report was published as a twelve-page pamphlet edited by the 
City of Havana and released with the title ‘The Popular Comparsas of Havana 
Carnival: A Decisive Question.’ (162)90
The next entry in the records indicates that the Society for Afro-Cuban Studies continued to 
push the matter in the weeks following Ortiz’s inaugural lecture:
During the February Festivals of 1937, organized in Cuba’s capital by the 
Department of Municipal Tourism and its Planning Commission, various 
member of the Society formed part of the Panel that determined the prizes for 
the popular comparsas that paraded through the streets of Havana during the 
days of Carnival. (162; italics in original)91
90
“A solicitud formulada en 30 de enero de 1937, por el Sr. Alcalde Municipal de La Habana, Dr. 
Antonio Beruff Mendietta, la Sociedad emitió un informe, redactado por su Presidente el Dr. Fernando Ortiz, y 
aprobado por la Junta Ejecutiva, pronunciándose en favor del resurgimiento de las comparsas populares 
habaneras, informe que fué publicado en el folleto que editó el Municipal de La Habana con el título de Las 
comparsas populares del carnaval habanero, cuestión resuelta, La Habana, 1937, p. 9-20.”
91
“Durante las Fiestas de Febrero de 1937, organizadas en esta Capital por el Departamento de 
Turismo Municipal y su Comisión Asesora, varios miembros de la Sociedad formaron parte de los Jurados que 
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As notes on discussions among members of SEAC reveal, the group understood that the 
“popular comparsas” of the pre-Lenten festivities related to the old Day of Kings comparsas
but that the Carnival versions were not as openly “African” or as resolutely “magical.” 
Nevertheless, the Society saw those other comparsas as a path toward reinstatement of Day 
of Kings comparsa traditions and, more broadly, as important pieces in Ortiz’s plan for a 
system of “indigenous tourism.” 
But why did Ortiz and other members of SEAC even bother with the issue in 1937? 
Was not the Day of Kings comparsa a colonial tradition, a folkloric component of a slave-
based society that had passed away half-a-century ago? Again, Ortiz’s inaugural lecture had 
circumscribed the logic for what seemed like an untimely political maneuver. As he had 
stated in concluding his January talk, he did not want to revive the traditional comparsas but 
rather some “new comparsas, well stimulated and protected by official favor.” The objective 
Ortiz had laid down for the Society for Afro-Cuban Studies was the dispersal of magical 
“African liturgies” out their “crypts” and into Cuba’s public spaces.  The “pueblo” would 
seize upon the “Dionysian” energies of the liberated “sacred rites” with its own “stylized” but 
still-exuberant versions of the rituals. Most of all, members of the Society hoped that the new 
comparsas would mimic the old ones as magical confrontations to dissemble social 
oppression. The group saw a latent magic in the appropriating some “primitive magic.”
In the course of his inaugural lecture, Ortiz identified Nicolás Guillén’s 1932 poem 
“Sensemayá” as a small step in that direction. He pegged the verse as the embodiment of a 
new, profane, dissembling magic that gestured toward a reconfigured and more effective 
politics of culture. By way of a reconsideration of Ortiz’s critical analysis of “Sensemayá,” I 
discernieron los premios a las comparsas populares que desfilaron durante los días de Carnaval por las calles de 
La Habana.”
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focus in the remainder of this chapter on magic in “Sensamayá” and in a later, lesser-known 
essay by Guillén. Those pieces demonstrate how Guillen’s work served as a major but unique 
thread in the twentieth-century Cuban intellectual discourse of displacing magic.
2.
Due to the long-running ban on the Afro-Cuban comparsas, Ortiz’s 1925 study relied 
entirely on historical materials. In turn, his monograph almost single-handedly revived 
popular interest in the tradition. By the late 1920s, the Day of Kings comparsas had emerged 
as a central symbol in the modernist intellectual movement that became known as 
“afrocubanismo,” or “Afro-Cubanism.” As discussed in the previous chapter, the single most 
renowned “Afro-Cubanist” work during the period was—and still remains—Nicolás 
Guillén’s poem, “Sensemayá.” For that reason Ortiz focused on the work in the January 1937 
lecture about “religion in poesía mulata.” Ortiz’s discussion of “Sensemayá” created a 
strange circularity of discourse since, as Guillén had explained on a number of occasions, the 
poem materialized in response to Ortiz’s 1925 monograph. In a later interview, Guillén 
recalled the circumstances:
It was January 6, 1932, the Day of Kings. I was in bed sick in a Havana hotel 
[…] where I was staying. It may have been the enforced idleness that gave 
wings to my thoughts, flying backward toward my infancy. Ever since I was a 
child, in my homeland Camagüey, one of the black people’s songs had kept 
resounding in my ears, a popular song composed for killing a snake: “Sambala 
culembe; sambala culembe . . . ” How, and why, did that song come to me 
then? Perhaps because I had been reading the pages of Fernando Ortiz, the 
ones about black sorcerers, maybe it was the spirit of that day, the evocation of 
what had existed in colonial Cuba, the Día de Reyes. The day that was awaited, 
the only one, the great magnificent day on which the black slaves would get 
permission from their white masters to feel as though at home in their own land 
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and sing and dance in the warmth of their own family and their tribe and 
worship their gods and again be subjects of their king.92
Guillén’s recollections, coupled with Ortiz’s analyses, offer powerful reminders of 
the critical dynamic at work in the two writers’ circuit of discourse. In the 1925 monograph, 
Ortiz emphasizes how the comparsas functioned as a displaced and displacing magic: with 
the slave trade, a traditional African magical rite had made its way to the streets of 
nineteenth-century Havana, where the ritual re-enactment of killing a snake re-emerged as 
another magical undertaking to displace colonial powers and their systems of oppression. 
Inspired by Ortiz’s analysis of “black sorcerers” and their historical role during the Day of 
Kings, Guillén constructed his own poetic representation of the ritual less than seven years 
after the publication of Ortiz’s study. And then, almost exactly five years after the 
experiences that inspired Guillén’s work, Ortiz returned the favor with a critical examination 
of the by-now-famous 1932 poem. 
Significantly, in his analysis of “Sensamayá” Ortiz compares it to the displaced and 
displacing Afro-Cuban magic ritual that Guillén recalled from his own childhood, as 
mediated by Ortiz’s earlier writings. As Ortiz summarized in his January 1937 remarks on 
“Sensemayá,” the poem operates as a form of magic intended, like the outlawed comparsas, 
to unsettle conditions of social injustice through the creation of aesthetic correspondences. In 
1925, Ortiz pointed out how the magical rites on the Day of Kings “represented the death of 
the snake and the celebration of its characteristics”; in 1937, he described Guillén’s poem in 
similar terms. “Guillén himself says that [“Sensemayá”] is a magic rite, that it is a ‘song’ like 
songs were at their origin, a ‘chant,’ an ‘enchantment.’” Ortiz’s key point is that, like the 
ceremony that it portrays, Guillén’s poem relies on the efficacious power of patterned words. 
92Augier 1965: 212-13, as cited and translated in Benítez-Rojo 1996: 296.
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In the ritual described in “Sensamayá,” “the trembling reptile succumbs to the conjuring of 
sacred words,” and the poem itself tries to mimic that conjuring effect. The Day of Kings 
comparsas and “Sensemayá”—as “magic rites”, as “‘chants’” and “‘enchantments’”—both 
unfold paradoxically: as allegories of sacrificial killings intended to defuse social violence. In 
Ortiz’s estimation, that paradox—repeating certain words in order to make the opposite 
happen—typifies “magic” as embodied in and as Guillén’s poem.
It is important to recall that, in his January 1937 lecture, Ortiz takes Guillén to task 
for his portrayal of magic in “Sensemayá.” According to Ortiz, the poem operates as a 
powerful magical spell, but Guillén distances himself too far from the ‘primitive’ magic that 
his poem portrays. He readily acknowledges, even proclaims, the magical parameters of 
“Sensemayá, ” but as Ortiz points out Guillén and other “mulatto poets of the day no longer 
believe in the gods of their black grandparents. And [they] even mock [those] contraptions of 
magic and witchcraft” (Ortiz 1937a: 43). In verging on mockery of primitive magic in the 
name of a secular, modernist magic, Guillén missed the essential connection. In Ortiz’s 
estimation, Guillén mistakes his narrative techniques as the source of the poem’s magic; 
“Sensemayá” relies too heavily on “mere descriptive narration.” In Ortiz’s reading, the real 
magic of “Sensemayá” lies in its desire for redemption—that is, in its underlying 
“religiosity”—more than with its aesthetic tricks. The impact of the verse stems from its 
attempt to invert deadly violence—the oppressive force of slavery carried into the killing of 
the snake—into a vital source of life for the social group.93
93In The Repeating Island: The Caribbean and Postmodern Perspective, Antonio Benítez-Rojo (1996) 
builds on Ortiz’s work in presenting the argument that the redemptive thrust of Guillén’s “Sensemayá” 
exemplifies Caribbean cultural production in general. See especially Benítez-Rojo’s discussion of the poem in 
the last essay (“Carnival”) in his collection. 
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Ortiz’s criticism of “Sensemayá” is pivotal, at many levels. First, the discussion of 
Guillén’s famous poem marks a turning point in “Religion in Poesía Mulata.” Ortiz’s 
critique of Guillén set up his vision of a new politics of culture that would build on and 
ultimately transcend the afrocubanismo represented by “Sensemayá.” After his discussion of 
Guillén’s work, Ortiz offers Pedroso’s verse as an alternative that moves beyond “mere 
narrative description” toward open acknowledgement of religiosity and toward greater 
“documentary analysis.” In other words, the considerations of “Sensemayá” enable Ortiz to 
arrive at his vision of a new breed of Afro-Cuban studies that generates actual ritual 
experiences instead of merely offering literary or aesthetic representations of socially 
revitalizing “sacred, Dionysian rites.” 
As I want to demonstrate over the course of my discussion, Ortiz’s reading of 
“Sensemayá” serves as the structural pivot in the January 1937 talk, which in turn stands as 
an historical hinge in the development of Afro-Cuban studies. With his criticism of 
“Sensemayá,” Ortiz tried to enact a self-conscious break in Afro-Cuban studies with its own 
modernist, “Afro-Cubanist” past. He hoped to turn portrayals of Afro-Cuban history and 
culture away from what he considered aestheticist pretensions, that is, the idea that image-
makers could incorporate ostensibly “Afro-Cuban” elements in any way they saw fit. From 
that standpoint, Ortiz’s critique of Guillén in certain respects anticipated Carpentier’s attack 
on the Surrealists eleven years later. In noting how “mulatto poets of the day no longer 
believe in the gods of their black grandparents [a]nd even mock contraptions of magic and 
witchcraft,” Ortiz foreshadowed Carpentier’s 1948 dismissal of the “lack of faith” among 
European aesthetes and his subsequent demand for revolutionary “chronicles” of American 
history and culture.
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Ortiz quickly moved away from “Sensemayá” toward his discussion of the 
revitalizing force of religiosity in Pedroso’s work and beyond, but a fair account of Afro-
Cuban studies cannot dismiss Guillén too quickly. I want to linger for a while longer on 
Ortiz’s reading of “Sensemayá” in order to show that, fundamentally, his analysis of 
Guillén’s work is right on target. In fact, in emphasizing how “Sensemayá” operates as a 
“magic rite” based on “the conjuring power of words,” Ortiz identifies a critical dynamic that 
structures Guillén’s production more generally. Guillén did typically figure his writing as 
magical, but his conceptions of intellectual magic did not coincide exactly with the notions of 
Ortiz and other Cuban intellectuals. In that way, Ortiz’s 1937 critique of “Sensemayá” hints 
at significant differences within the early-twentieth-century Cuban intellectual discourse. 
Guillén’s position is a distinct form of displacing magic.
Unlike many of his colleagues in the Society for Afro-Cuban Studies, Guillén did not 
turn his focus in the late 1930s to the production of profane versions of “sacred, Dionysian 
rites.” Instead, he remained committed to the space of the text as the site where socially 
revitalizing, magical rituals could unfold. Even as his subject matter deliberately moved 
away from ‘primitive’ themes, Guillén continued to develop the critical notion at work in 
“Sensemayá”: that, in modern life, a literary representation—a poem, an essay, 
historiography, or other types of text—could serve the revitalizing, redemptive function that 
rituals held in non-modern societies. “Mere narrative description”—the point of Ortiz’s 
critique of Guillén—was enough. Moderns did not need to participate in a collective re-
enactment of a sacrificial killing. The experience of reading well-executed writing could 
have socially transformative, ritualistic effects. While non-moderns had to enact a collective 
portrayal of sacrificial death in order to give new life to the community, moderns could 
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exorcise and prevent social violence through an ingenious textual or aesthetic representation. 
With “Sensemayá,” Guillén wanted to do exactly what Ortiz decries about the poem: replace 
collective ritual with the revolutionary experience of textual magic. 
I know of no record of Guillén’s reaction to Ortiz’s analysis of “Sensemayá.” As one 
of the Vice Presidents of the Society for Afro-Cuban Studies, Guillén was at the front and 
center of Ortiz’s audience during the organization’s official inauguration on January 16, 
1937. As Guillén’s recollections about the origins of “Sensamayá” suggest, Ortiz’s work 
fascinated and inspired him. Guillén frequently expressed his admiration for Ortiz as a 
scholar, as a person, and as a friend.94 As I mean to highlight, the work of Ortiz and Guillén, 
two of the most famous intellectuals in Cuban history, connect at many levels. But, 
ultimately, what distinguishes Ortiz, Guillén, and other Cuban intellectuals from each other is 
their level of commitment to Marxism. Ortiz’s inaugural address shows his interest in 
Marxian theoretics, but even after the 1959 Revolution Ortiz never adopted an openly 
Marxist political rhetoric. Guillén and other members of the younger generation of Cuban 
intellectuals established more direct Marxist affiliations. Those commitments to Marxism 
would shape in important ways the different forms of displacing magic that surfaced within 
Cuban intellectual discourse of the period. 
In the rest of this chapter, I examine a short 1951 essay by Guillén in order to 
delineate the unique Marxist parameters of Guillén’s insistence on the magical powers of 
textuality. Guillén’s piece creates yet-another curious circuit of discourse. The essay serves 
as a eulogy for Rómulo Lachatañeré: a good friend of Guillén, another committed Marxist, 
and another of the founding members and prominent figures in the Society for Afro-Cuban 
94For instance, see Guillén’s tributes (1969a; 1969b) upon the occasion of Ortiz’s death in 1969.
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Studies. Written almost two decades after “Sensemayá,” Guillén’s tribute to his fallen 
comrade differs substantially in form and content from the famous 1932 poem. Nevertheless, 
the 1951 piece moves in fundamentally the same direction as “Sensamayá.” Like the earlier 
verse, the eulogy centers on an untimely death—in this case, Lachatañeré’s—and portrays a 
communal redemption of that fatality as a revolutionary, life-giving event. In both of 
Guillén’s pieces, textualization, the process of writing, functions as means of redemption. 
That act of vindication is a form of magic that spirals out from one of Marx’s most familiar 
statements.
3.
Among the many quotable fragments from Marx’s Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis 
Bonaparte, one line especially has served as a manifesto on its own: “Men make their own 
history, […] but under circumstances directly encountered, given, and transmitted from the 
past” (Marx 1964: 15). Ever since the publication of the text in 1851, Marx’s famous 
statement has been used to celebrate the force of free will over circumstantial determinants. 
Exactly one hundred years after the release of The Eighteenth Brumaire, Guillén invoked and 
reflected upon Marx’s dictum on the occasion of Rómulo Lachatañeré’s untimely and 
unsettling passing. Lachatañeré died on Friday, April 11, 1951, just over three months shy of 
his forty-second birthday. He was returning by plane to New York, where he had lived since 
1939, from San Juan, Puerto Rico. Shortly after take-off, the flight crew of the DC-4 carrying 
Lachatañeré and around 60 other passengers notified the air-traffic controllers back in San 
Juan that one of the plane’s four engines had failed and that the aircraft needed to return for 
an emergency landing. Instead, the plane plunged into the sea a few miles before the Bay of 
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San Juan. A number of people—including most of the crew—survived the crash, but 
Lachatañeré and fifty-one others perished. 
Guillén, who befriended Lachatañeré when both emerged together in the mid-1920s 
as respected ‘young lions’ among the Havana intelligentsia, did not immediately hear of his 
friend’s death, and the manner in which he eventually learned only added to the trauma of the 
loss. In a tribute to Lachatañeré that first appeared in the Venezuelan newspaper El nacional, 
Guillén recounted the shock of the news and his continuing struggle to come to terms with 
the situation. “It hit me with sudden impact, like a stone to the face,” he begins (Guillén 
1975: 100). Not only had he failed to hear of the situation sooner, he explains, but the news 
surfaced so unexpectedly, in a casual and offhanded way: 
It was hardly even a parenthesis, an incident in the midst of banal chatter… 
‘Do you remember Rómulo Lachatañeré?’ ‘Yes… He’s in New York.’ ‘No. 
He’s dead. He died with the plane that went down in Puerto Rico…’ That 
seemed to me improbable, as if planes do not go down every day and as if 
death were not ‘something that happens daily.’” (100; ellipses in original)95
The news of Lachatañeré’s death “shook things up in the manner of a damaged wheel 
that has lost one of its spokes” and forces Guillén to reflect more broadly upon the nature of 
life and loss. How do we confront the quotidian fact of death, the normalcy of pain? Guillén 
wonders. He immediately acknowledges one possible, reflexive response: “I already know: 
there is ‘the marked day,’ as fatalists say. Destiny!” (100; emphasis in original). Guillén 
admits that “of course, [the idea of fate] is consoling because it searches for a way to help us 
accept the consummate fact, bowing our head before the inevitable.” 
95
“Fue apenas un paréntesis, un incidente en medio de la charla banal… ‘Te acuerdas de Rómulo 
Lachatañeré?’ ‘Sí… Está en Nueva York.’ ‘No. Está muerto. Murió en el avión que se cayó en Puerto Rico….’ 
Aquello me pareció inverosímil, como si los aviones no se desplomaran todos los días y como si la muerte no 
fuera ‘algo que diariamente pasa.’”
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If the underlying sarcasm in this characterization does not already give away 
Guillén’s distaste for the fatalism, then the next statement makes his sentiments clearer. “I 
reject [the idea of fate],” he immediately retorts, and he proceeds to deflate the fatalist 
presumption of inevitability. “Why complicate things,” he mocks, “by thinking about a 
supernatural force that pushed [Lachatañeré] toward the Caribbean and later made him board 
a doomed plane in order to leave him hanging over nothingness, stopping his heart?” (100). 
With a quick summary, he dismisses such fatalist musings as ultimately unsatisfying and 
distracting: “In any case, it costs the same to think about destiny as to think about 
coincidence.” This conclusion reveals that, in the end, Guillén refuses any sort of passive 
stance that accepts life’s developments as beyond human agency, whether under divine 
control or driven by chance.
And by refusing to “bow his head before the inevitable,” even when confronted with 
the anguish and incomprehensibility of his friend’s death, Guillén implicitly calls up Marx’s 
observation about how people “make their own history” out of “circumstances directly 
encountered, given, and transmitted from the past.” From that point forward, Guillén’s 
memorialization of Lachatañeré became something more: an injunction to readers to social 
action, to transform their world. Guillén recognizes life’s felicitations and chance: “With all 
certainty, if Rómulo had stayed in New York he would not have died,” he concedes, and he 
offers that fact as all the more reason why history has to be ‘made.’ To reinforce the point, 
Guillén emphasizes Lachatañeré’s activist character. In life Rómulo continually tried to 
‘make history,’ Guillén suggests, and the advancement of that project serves as the ultimate 
redemption of his untimely and confounding death. 
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But if Guillén uses Lachatañeré’s passing as an occasion to motivate his readers to 
‘make history,’ what sort of action does he have in mind? What can be done? And with these
questions, others immediately follow: In Marx’s formulation, what does ‘history’ mean in the 
first place? What concept of history allows for it to be ‘made’? For Marx, history is the 
canvas on which social life is documented, and therefore it unfolds—somewhat 
paradoxically—in multiple directions simultaneously, a continual present that perpetually 
looks backward and forward. In other words, history is the total record of life as well as the 
particular events that comprise that totality. In that regard, ‘history’ for Marx parallels but 
displaces Kultur as the primary sphere of human action. Marx famously figures history as 
unfinished; it is continually being made. The future remains open-ended and indeterminate, 
and the human task—as suggested in the famous citation from the Eighteenth Brumaire—is 
to transform history, to write a social record that reveals how humanity eventually managed 
to create a society in which all members are served justly. 
And, for Marx, this ‘making’ of history pivots around the transformation of 
historiography. That is, the ability to shape the future stems, in part, from the power to 
represent the past. Accordingly, the image of history as canvas for the documentation of 
social life is an appropriate image: the historian acts as an artist who creates new visions of 
past events in order to bring specific images of the future to fruition, one who rewrites 
history in order to ‘make history.’ As a process of ‘making,’ history is fundamentally 
performative. Marx offers The Eighteenth Brumaire as an example of the artfulness, the 
performativity of historiography. The text is an historical intervention: it presents a distinct 
vision of Louis Bonaparte’s rise to power in an attempt to derail the trajectory of those 
crucial events in world history. And significantly, Marx’s study figures Bonaparte’s re-
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emergence as a massive spectacle—a one-time “tragedy” that returns as “farce”—in which 
the state orchestrates particular costumes, soliloquies, and movement of actors in order to 
authenticate—and ultimately mystify—its true power. 
Guillén, as a Marxist writer, consistently affirmed such Marxian notions about 
historiography and history as intimately related artistic endeavors. Life, he often asserted, is 
like a text: people can author their own destinies, using resources at hand to craft history and 
its representation. Therefore, his invocation of Marx’s dictum about ‘making history’—first 
signaled by his open rejection of fatalism—is a familiar move. His piece about Lachatañeré 
tries to set Marx’s ideas in motion once again by presenting Lachatañeré’s personal history 
from a particular angle. 
As Marx does in the Brumaire , Guillén’s historical reconstruction mimics his subject 
in essential ways by emphasizing the performative, history-making parameters of 
Lachatañeré’s life and work. Guillén follows the summary dismissal of a fatalist view of his 
friend’s death with a statement that opens up alternate possibilities for approaching the 
disturbing turn of events. Rather than consider Lachatañeré’s death a matter of fate, Guillén 
suggests, observers should focus on the theatricality of the situation and what it means. 
Therefore, he continues his reflections on destiny by reducing the situation to one ‘dramatic’ 
fact: “the only certainty, that which is dramatically true and indisputable, is that the plane in 
which Rómulo Lachatañeré was going from San Juan to New York went down . . . ” (100; 
ellipsis in original). 
Guillén finishes the statement with an ellipsis, as if to suggest that the matter of 
destiny must be left for another time, and he promptly shifts focus and tone with a sweet 
portrait of Lachatañeré, “that man of fine features and smooth voice” (100). However, by 
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placing emphasis on ‘dramatic truth,’ Guillén sets the stage for the rest of his discussion, 
which proceeds to emphasize the manner in which Lachatañeré developed artistic methods—
and, more specifically, modes of historical drama—that illuminated fundamental, 
transforming ‘truths.’
4.
It is this commitment to the historical self-determination through ‘dramatic truth’ that 
Guillén underscores, in style as well as substance, in his eulogy of Lachatañeré. Guillén 
offers his initial descriptions of his friend in terms of his activism: “that Cuban dedicated 
himself to his people, serving them every day with his writing and with his life, with his art 
and with his science” (100). Guillén poses art and science, the traditional domains of drama 
and truth, not as antagonists but as cooperative handmaidens in the service of social progress. 
As he continues, Guillén underscores how Lachatañeré’s commitment to his nation’s 
progress further undermines the fatalist perspective. He recounts the troubled history of 
Lachatañeré’s ancestors: his grandfather, a mulatto, descended from Haitian creoles who 
came to eastern Cuba at the end of the eighteenth century to escape the bloody slave revolts; 
he later died fighting against the Spanish for the cause of Cuban independence. The story of 
Lachatañeré’s grandfather, Guillén suggests, typifies the history of Cuba: he was another in a 
line of forced settlers, unexpectedly ending up on the island; “he was a cultivated mulatto, 
killed—like his grandson—in tragic circumstances battling for the liberty of Cuba” (101). 
Against the fatalists who want to view Lachatañeré and his grandfather as ‘marked by 
destiny,’ Guillén redeems the untimely passing of both men by highlighting their fight for 
Cuba’s freedom. 
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In the space of Guillén’s eulogy, the Lachatañeré's function in a manner similar to the 
serpent of “Sensemayá”: they die violently, but a ritual recovery through the act of 
textualization gives new life to the Cuban community. Guillén, as memorializer, takes an 
active role in inscribing the “dramatic truths” that might otherwise escape in the flow of 
“things that happen daily.” Guillén pulls the grand truth of the Lachatañerés’ lives out of the 
current of history in the same way that, at the beginning of the article, he was suddenly 
jerked from “the middle of banal conversation” by the news of his friend’s death. That flash 
of insight leads him to reject fatalism and embrace historical self-determination, and the 
eulogy itself serves as an immediate attempt to enact that principle. In order to redeem, 
Guillén also rescues: he snatches the events of Lachatañeré’s life and death from, at best, 
obscurity or, at worst, from the fatalistic impression of tragic inevitability. 
But if it seems that Guillén, ever the poet, takes his powers of inscription too 
seriously, it turns out that he assumes his role as historical agent in deference to and imitation 
of Lachatañeré. Guillén proceeds to describe Lachatañeré’s ethnographic writings—the “art 
and science” with which he “serv[ed] his people everyday”—in almost epic terms. Guillén 
highlights how Lachatañeré adopted distinct and original ethnographic approaches in order to 
dramatize the historic truths embedded in Afro-Cuban traditions, which served as his primary 
subject. In explaining the significance of Lachatañeré’s books, Guillén calls attention to his 
friend’s paradoxical ethnographic style. On one hand, Lachatañeré’s texts emphasized and 
even mimicked the creative spirit of Afro-Cuban religious expression; on the other hand, the 
studies insisted on immediacy and lack of mediation in ethnography. Guillén explains that 
Lachatañeré’s first book, ¡Oh, mío Yemayá! [Oh, my Yemayá!], is a 1938 “collection of 
black stories and songs” that “are, in reality, brief narrations, loaded with fresh, primitive 
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poetry: fabulous tales through which move the most prestigious deities of African 
mythology, transplanted to Cuba in the slave-trader’s boat” (101-2). 
Guillén discloses, “Rómulo did not very much like this book, published, according to 
him, with certain irresponsibility” (102). In hindsight, Lachatañeré considered the book, with 
its decontextualized dramatizations of the gods’ fanciful exploits, a misrepresentation of most 
Afro-Cuban traditions. “Nevertheless,” Guillén contends, the book “has more than one 
beautifully executed page and, although the style on others frays and threatens to unravel, 
[the text] is always sustained by the grace, the enchantment of the fable, the innocence of the 
yarn, stripped of all literary artifice, which stands out through its essential force” (102).
At first glance, Guillén’s description of the Afro-Cuban stories as they appear in ¡Oh, 
mío Yemayá! seems odd. The “fables” and “yarns” are full of “grace,” “enchantment,” and 
“innocence” because they are “stripped of all literary artifice.” The characterization sounds 
counterintuitive: fables and yarns, by definition, spiral around the tricks of storytelling. But, 
in the last instance, Guillén implies that the real test of this literature, the source of its ability 
to “enchant,” is not in deception but in the exposure of some “essence.” In this way, Guillén 
turns “literary artifice” on its head: to tell a tall tale in the right way, to spin a proper yarn 
might include flights of fancy but, ultimately, enchantment depends upon the use of artifice 
to supercede the artificial.
And, in describing the fables in such terms, Guillén actually means to convey the 
essential quality of Lachatañeré’s work. In calling attention to the “execution” and “style” of 
¡Oh, mío Yemayá! Guillén reminds readers that, even as the stories derive from African 
mythology, they actually come from Lachatañeré. He is the storyteller here, not his 
informants. Guillén underscores Lachatañeré’s reworking of the original material by quoting 
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the opening “note of reference” from ¡Oh, mío Yemayá!: “The stories collected in this 
volume,” Lachatañeré explains, were “inspired by legends collected in the city of Havana” 
(101; emphasis added). Guillén’s explanation illuminates the critical dynamic between 
Lachatañeré’s ethnography and its subjects. The ethnography offers no pretense of direct 
transparency to a subject; rather, the text mimics fables. “Beautifully executed” ethnographic 
writing deliberately mediates between reader and subject, mobilizing any rhetorical trick that 
might help reveal the subject’s “essential force.”
In addressing Lachatañeré’s second book, Guillén reinforces this image of his friend’s 
texts as fabulously illuminating. But whereas ¡Oh, mío Yemayá! foregrounds Lachatañeré’s 
role as interpreter, “the Manual of Santería is something else” (102), According to Guillén, 
the book, published in 1942, is more effective, more enchanting than the 1939 study because 
Lachatañeré disappears from the text. He captures the essence of his subject not by 
emphasizing his own interpretive role but by retreating into the world of his informants. In 
Manual de santería “Lachatañeré proposes to examine the phenomena of religious 
syncretism in Cuba from new angles, in opposition to academic methods,” Guillén explains. 
It is a valorous book as much for what it affirms as for what it negates; a book 
written from the bottom up, which is to say, beginning from his coexistence 
with practitioners, who he approached devoid of all intellectual or professional 
prejudice, so that it would be they themselves who talk and not their more or 
less wise, more or less erudite interpreters, who many times end up betraying 
[the informants]. (102)
Once again, Guillén’s description encapsulates Lachatañeré’s paradoxical approach. 
In direct contrast to the first book, Manual de santería aims for direct transparency. 
According to Guillén, Lachatañeré wants to eliminate unnecessary interpreters and to let the 
practitioners speak for themselves. However, this method does not necessarily contradict the 
purported objectives of ¡Oh, mío Yemayá! Guillén hints at Lachatañeré’s conception of his 
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ethnographic texts as activist, or affective, regardless of the apparent activity of the 
ethnographer. It is not enough for Lachatañeré to leave Afro-Cuban practitioners alone; 
circumstances require some sort of textual inscription. Lachatañeré may aim in his second 
book to act as the medium through which his informants might express themselves rather 
than as a privileged interpreter, yet Guillén underscores how Manual de santería also unfolds 
as another sort of fable, full of rhetorical devices that produce certain enchanting effects. The 
text’s success, its ingenuity and “valor,” arise from a literary construction—“written from the 
bottom up”—that, unlike ¡Oh, mío Yemayá!,  deflects attention away from itself.
Guillén’s characterization of Manual de santería identifies the immediate point of 
contention behind Lachatañeré’s strategy. The ethnographer’s “convivencia”—coexistence—
with his subjects serves as a challenge to the “academic methods” of misguided 
“interpreters,” full of “intellectual and professional prejudice,” who “end up betraying” the 
populations they describe. But as Guillén points out earlier in the piece, Lachatañeré’s tactics 
form part of his broader battle for “the liberty of Cuba.” In other words, his greater objective 
was in giving force of expression to people who had been “betrayed” by “interpreters” armed 
with the power of representation. Guillén’s key point is clear here: in helping to forge 
alternate representations of Afro-Cuban traditions against false interpretations, Lachatañeré 
also worked to transform negative images of Cuba in the world at-large. Both of his books 
must be viewed in this light, Guillén insinuates. 
Yet, of course, Guillén’s particular narrative about Lachatañeré does not tell the 
whole story. While Guillén identifies the dramatic shift in style between ¡Oh, mío Yemayá! 
and Manual de santería, he says nothing of the intervening period. When during the period 
between 1938 and 1942 did the change in Lachatañeré’s methods occur? Did anything other 
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than Lachatañeré’s dissatisfaction with ¡Oh, mío Yemayá! precipitate the shift?  How did he 
become disillusioned with the book in the first place? In the next chapter, I address precisely 
these concerns by focusing at length on a pivotal article by Lachatañeré from the intervening 
years. Guillén’s memorial usefully frames those considerations, on one hand, by providing an 
informed general introduction to Lachatañeré and his work and, on the other hand, by 
pointing—wittingly or not through silence—to new areas of investigation into those subjects. 
One critical point of consideration surfaces immediately in some specific statements 
by Guillén that, while providing information, say nothing about an important development. 
He describes Manual de santería and explains how “Lachatañeré studies santería not only in 
Havana but also in Matanzas, Santiago de Cuba y Guantánamo, discriminating the Yoruba 
influence from Congolese influence” (102). However, one fact that Guillén does not mention 
is that it was Lachatañeré who first used the term ‘santería’ in the manner that Guillén 
himself employs. In describing Manual de santería, Guillén gives no indication that the 
book’s revolutionary title prefigures the text’s original content. The text is the first extended 
study to describe Afro-Cuban traditions as ‘santería.’ As Guillén indicates, the originality of 
Lachatañeré’s notion of santería stems from his circumscription of Yoruba practices. 
Tellingly, Guillén describes his friend’s move as “discriminating,” a word and concept that 
surfaces prominently in Lachatañeré’s pivotal 1939 article. By drawing from Lachatañeré’s 
original vocabulary, Guillén implicitly signals the manner in which he also mimics the nature 
of his friend’s work as “discriminating” performance.
Still, Guillén’s eulogy serves as an even wider point of entry. It orients readers not 
only to Lachatañeré’s significant role in Afro-Cuban studies but also to the broad contours of 
that project as it includes and extends beyond Guillén’s friend. More precisely, the piece both 
172
identifies and reproduces the defining twentieth-century Cuban intellectual discourse of 
performative interventionism, and Guillén situates Lachatañeré as a pivotal figure in the 
development of that discourse. Once again, Guillén’s portrayal of Lachatañeré takes its cue 
from the latter’s own texts. Just as Lachatañeré employed specific rhetorical strategies, 
inserting himself in or retreating from his ethnographies in trying to reproduce the “essential 
force” of his subject, so too does Guillén mimic his friend’s work by attempting to transform 
the sense of tragedy surrounding Lachatañeré’s life into a self-determining narrative of 
triumph.
But if Guillén tries to offer a portrait of Lachatañeré as a profane sort of hero, as an 
exemplar of a history-making man, certain pressing realities keep creeping back into the 
picture and threaten to invert the agency of Guillén’s portrayal of a heroic everyman. Despite 
his transformative action, Lachatañeré—like his grandfather—cannot escape circumstances 
that Guillén describes repeatedly as “tragic.” In other words, Guillén’s narrative ultimately 
equivocates around the question of what kind of history Lachatañeré, or anyone else, could 
conceivably ‘make.’ Can the force of action really trump the tragedy of an untimely loss of 
someone like Lachatañeré, or does history eventually get the better of us? 
With its persistent equivocation on such issues, Guillén’s ostensible celebration of an 
active and artful life eventually pulls back toward Marx’s text of a century before. As a 
careful reader of Marx and a knowledgeable Marxist, Guillén knew full well that The 
Eighteenth Brumaire’s famous dictum about making history was not as simple as the familiar 
citation suggests. After all, Marx’s study portrays the restoration of the Bourbon monarchy in 
1848 as an apotheosis of counterrevolutionary state capitalism. In other words, the Brumaire
shows that social agency can cut many ways. The history that men make is not necessarily 
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‘good,’ and it is precisely this indeterminacy of direction to which Marx hopes to call 
attention. In the book, he delineates how the bourgeoisie seized control by shaping powerful 
images “transmitted from the past”: Bonaparte’s new monarchy, Marx proves, gained 
legitimacy by manipulating the imagery and rhetoric of the anti-monarchical Revolution of 
1789. Yet, even if he admires the veiled genius of this episode of political transition and 
presents it as an exemplary case of “making history,” Marx nevertheless abhors the 
developments. He dissects the events in order to expose the unrecognized mechanics of 
capitalism, to show how its ‘invisible hand’ actually works to strangle the masses to which it 
offers the promise of material comfort. Marx constructs these images to inspire a socialist 
inversion of, a truly revolutionary response to, Bonaparte’s Eighteenth Brumaire. For Marx, 
ever the materialist, the key point—embodied in the famous observation about making 
history—is to remind his readers of the defining paradox of social life: that so-called ‘free’ 
will is shaped by and never entirely liberated from its material determinants. 
Guillén certainly understood Marx’s points about the negative potentialities of acting 
on history and about the constricting force of material parameters on social agents. Guillén’s 
full appreciation of these Marxian paradoxes surfaces evocatively in a single paragraph—an 
epilogue of sorts—at the end of the eulogy for his dead friend. The implications in the text 
illuminate Lachatañeré’s life and work as well as the production of ‘santería.’
5.
The concluding paragraph of Guillén’s memorial to Lachatañeré reveals more than it 
immediately says. The paragraph follows an extended space that separates it from the 
preceding explanation of Lachatañeré’s work, and the formatting shift sets up a quick change 
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in focus and tone. Guillén returns from considerations of Lachatañeré as public citizen and 
pioneering ethnographer to a more intimate, concluding account of Rómulo’s outstanding 
qualities as a friend. 
Here too Guillén hopes to reinforce the principle task of his article: the redemption of 
his friend as a powerful historical agent, even if in an unfamiliar register. Guillén implies 
that, despite his untimely death, Lachatañeré’s actions continue to strengthen the Cuban 
social fabric: 
He was a firm, loyal friend. One of those friends whose deaths do not count as 
definitive and that live on at our side, not as the grand life of the heroic dead 
but rather in daily existence, full of small minutes, those small minutes of 
which centuries are made. This sort of life is one that does not know men 
called ‘important’ and that he lived amongst his people as in a great and pure 
river. (103)
However, the lines that precede this final stirring portrait of Lachatañeré evoke a 
somewhat different reality than a life “lived amongst his people as in a great and pure river.” 
Guillén, as he moves to this conclusion, reminisces about his last correspondences with his 
friend. He recalls the final time he saw Lachatañeré. It was in 1948 in New York, where 
Lachatañeré had been living for almost ten years. 
In New York, we spent a pleasant and memorable day together, accompanied 
by Eusebia Cosme. We lunched in Harlem and I remember that there he helped 
me buy a pair of shoes, which I still have. ‘Some shoes for a fine negro,’ as he 
then told me with great delight. During those days he was completely 
immersed in his photography hobby, such that he got away with taking some 
shots of Eusebia and of me. That night I ate at his house, with his daughter and 
his lady, as in the verse of Zenea, another great tragic death.
The last sentence refers to Juan Clemente Zenea (1832-1871), a Cuban poet and anti-colonial 
revolutionary who died in Havana at age 39 at the hands of a government firing squad. 
Guillén’s mention of Zenea accomplishes a number of different tasks. Notably, Guillén 
situates the episode with Lachatañeré in a poetic frame—the dinner happens as if in 
“verse”—and, in so doing, calls attention to the aesthetic parameters of his entire eulogy. 
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More immediately, Guillén parallels Lachatañeré with Zenea, who was an under-recognized 
martyr in the cause of Cuban liberty and who also sought political refuge in and organized 
revolutionary activities from New York. The offhanded reference to Zenea underscores the 
guiding thread of Guillén’s reminiscences: his friend was a hero—even if in a tragic vein—
who undermines fatalism; in life (and death!) he gave meaning to human existence, with all 
of its incertitude and suffering, through action, by creating powerful works and by fighting 
for the cause of liberty. Zenea and Lachatañeré, like Lachatañeré’s grandfather before him, 
gave Cuba new life through their tragic deaths.
But once again, transformative action—whether by Lachatañeré, his grandfather, or 
Zenea—cannot fully shake free of immediate, even if tragic, realities. In the same paragraph, 
Guillén offers other telling disclosures. He underscores the force of circumstance. First, he 
describes that final dinner with Lachatañeré in 1948 as “a creole night, full of memories and 
evocations of the beloved and distant Island” (102-03). And with that revelation Guillén 
suddenly recalls the immediate parameters of that life “lived amongst his people”: 
Lachatañeré spent a greater part of it from afar, with nostalgia and images as the primary 
conduit to the “great and pure river” of a Cuban pueblo that remained largely “distant” from 
Lachatañeré. 
Guillén’s next recollection further hints at the depth of Lachatañeré’s nostalgia and 
his efforts to connect with Cuba: “I had already returned to Havana when I received one of 
[Rómulo’s] letters, asking for the latest recordings of Cuban music. I sent the [records] to 
him, but they arrived broken” (103). In this way, Guillén’s description of the “creole night” 
suggests the absence of and longing for an idealized “Island” as much as, if not more than, 
fulfillment and pleasure in Cuba itself.
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Of course, there is a certain ‘tragic’ irony in Guillén’s concluding image of the 
broken records: the discs, like Lachatañeré himself, were shattered in transit from the 
Caribbean to New York. They suggest a broader sense of fracture in a Cuban community 
that, from its inception in the sixteenth century, consisted entirely of fragments of foreign 
populations. And almost immediately after its formation, that community of fragments began 
to fragment and to spread elsewhere. Lachatañeré’s desire for the records points to the 
displacement—and corresponding nostalgia—that frame his critical efforts. And, more 
pointedly, the records draw our attention to key characteristics of those contexts. Those slabs 
of cut vinyl, whose marks carry “the latest in Cuban music,” highlight systems of inscription 
on which all efforts to ‘make history’ depend. Whether or not they shatter en route, the 
records exemplify the manner in which ‘the Island’ and its constituent elements take shape as 
a series of inscribed and circulated images. 
Thus, without intending to do so, Guillén reveals how Lachatañeré’s experience of 
Cuba while in self-imposed exile relies, as for so many others, on the aural and visual images 
etched in some form of media. Guillén’s own Marxian theoretics come back to haunt his 
portrayal of his friend. The trajectory of history is not as straight—much less, as easily 
controlled—as Guillén would like. In an apparent celebration of how “men make history,” 
Guillén’s tribute—with its invocations of heroic striving, peregrinations, airplanes with failed 
engines, and records that arrive broken—finally ends up dramatizing on ongoing series of 
displacements. 
Ironically—or perhaps, most fittingly—Lachatañeré’s critical endeavors revolved 
around the notion that well-intentioned intellectual production often goes astray. In the next 
chapter, I examine work from the period of Lachatañeré’s professional life between 
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publications of his two books. During that pivotal time for Lachatañeré—1938 to 1942—he 
developed a biting critique in which he took, of all people, Fernando Ortiz to task for 
unleashing in 1906 an unwitting but dangerously potent magical spell in the form of an 
ethnographic characterization of Afro-Cuban traditions. And in trying to unsettle Ortiz’s 
creation, Lachatañeré came up with ‘santería,’ his own profoundly consequential trick that 
soon spiraled out of his control.
CHAPTER 5: OPTICAL ILLUSIONS: SHADOW-WORK AND THE FICTION OF 
‘SANTERÍA’ IN LACHATAÑERÉ’S “RELIGIOUS BELIEFS OF AFRO-CUBANS” 
(1941)
The continuous and exclusive use of this denomination has led us to recognize 




In the last chapter, I considered how a 1951 eulogy for Rómulo Lachatañeré reflected 
Nicolás Guillén’s decades-long association of magic with Marx’s insistence on self-
determination, or “making history,” in the face of historically determined circumstances. In 
this next chapter, I want to reinforce a critical point running throughout my study: that 
Guillén’s engagement with Marxian thought was part of a wider circuit of discourse among 
Cuban intellectuals of the period and directly linked them to intellectual contemporaries 
elsewhere. Nowhere are the connections more apparent than in Guillén’s 1951 eulogy since 
Rómulo Lachatañeré stood as one of the poet’s closest intellectual allies. Like Guillén, 
Lachatañeré also remained committed to Marxist political projects throughout his adult life 
while simultaneously reflecting on the current limitations and future possibilities of Marxian 
criticism. Thus, Guillén’s eulogy also served as a way for one good Marxian critic to honor 
another. This chapter follows the trajectories of Guillén’s tribute to his friend to consider 
more fully the relations of Lachatañeré’s work to Marx and magic. 
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As eulogy, Guillén’s 1951 essay is necessarily retrospective, and his backward glance 
marks a crucial link between the development of Lachatañeré’s thought and the formation of 
the Society for Afro-Cuban Studies around the beginning of 1937. In highlighting the 
importance of Lachatañeré’s scholarship, Guillén focuses on the development of his friend’s 
scholarly methods between the publication in 1938 of ¡Oh mío Yemayá!, the collection of 
Afro-Cuban inspired myths, and 1942’s Manual de santería, the ethnographic overview of an 
Afro-Cuban ritual system. This defining period of Lachatañeré’s intellectual production 
occurred in the years following the establishment of the SEAC. Just as Guillén was a Vice 
President of the Society at its inception, Lachatañeré was also one of the group’s founding 
members and an active participant in the organization from the beginning. His pioneering 
studies of Afro-Cuban history and culture developed within the context of the Society. 
Accordingly, my discussion here revolves around an investigation into how the 
development of Lachatañeré’s critical perspective related to SEAC’s agenda, as articulated in 
the December 1936 “Advertencia” and in Ortiz’s January 1937 inaugural address. As I 
highlighted earlier, SEAC’s founding statement explicitly marked a shift in Cuban 
intellectual endeavors toward an emphasis on the revolutionary political potential of cultural 
production. In the opening of his inaugural address, Ortiz reinforced the idea that a 
reconfigured politics of culture required greater “documentary objectivity and serene 
analysis.” In the course of his discussion, Ortiz used critical analysis of Nicolás Guillén’s 
most famous verses to argue for a move away from the unfettered creative license of so-
called ‘Afro-Cubanism—in which an artist incorporated ostensibly ‘African’ elements in any 
form he or she wished—toward more realistic portrayals of Afro-Cuban cultural forms. In the 
concluding passages of his speech, Ortiz insisted that the representations were necessarily 
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that: realistic approximations, or “aesthetic theatricalizations,” of inaccessible historical and 
cultural realities. Thus, Ortiz and the Society for Afro-Cuban Studies established 
“documentary objectivity”—or, as Alejo Carpentier would put it a decade later, “the 
chronicle of the marvelous American reality”—as the new model for politically effective 
Cuban intellectual production. 
Nicolás Guillén’s description of Lachatañeré’s 1938 and 1942 books indicates the 
extent to which the texts tried to live up to the new, post-1936 “documentary” ideal. As 
Guillén describes, Lachatañeré offered ¡Oh, mío Yemayá!—the 1938 work—as “a collection 
of black stories and songs.” Its most immediate purposes were documentary. With the book, 
Lachatañeré meant to anthologize “the fabulous tales through which move the most 
prestigious deities of African mythology, transplanted to Cuba in the slave-trader’s boat.” 
But, Guillén quickly adds, “Rómulo did not very much like this book, published, according 
to him, with certain irresponsibility.” Lachatañeré’s disappointment stemmed from his sense 
of failure to execute the chronicle properly. He recognized the “irresponsibility” as his own. 
He had altered the original material too much so that the sense of realism, according to 
Guillén, “frays and threatens to unravel.” Guillén underscores how in the 1942 book 
Lachatañeré rectified the perceived problem: “Manual de santería is something else.” It 
achieved the “documentary objectivity” that Ortiz had set in 1937 as a new standard and for 
which Lachatañeré subsequently strove. Lachatañeré’s 1942 text, Guillén summarizes, is “a 
valorous book […] written from the bottom up, […] devoid of all intellectual or professional 
prejudice, so that it would be [the practitioners] themselves who talk.”
But if Guillén’s characterization of the stylistically divergent texts identifies 
Lachatañeré’s common striving between 1938 and 1942 toward politically effective realism, 
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the 1951 tribute is also somewhat misleading. Guillén implies that his friend’s methodology 
took a quick, clean turn between 1938 and 1942. In fact, Lachatañeré’s change in methods 
was far less sudden. The shift developed over those years as a result of Lachatañeré’s 
involvement in—and, ultimately, his critical engagement with—the Society for Afro-Cuban 
Studies. 
This chapter focuses especially on Lachatañeré’s work following the publication of 
¡Oh, mío Yemayá!. That period—the latter part of 1938 through 1939 and into 1940—
encompassed SEAC’s first years and, for Lachatañeré, included profound personal as well as 
intellectual changed. In his 1951 tribute on the occasion of Lachatañeré’s untimely passing, 
Guillén referred to his friend’s residence in New York. That change of location had taken 
place in 1939, when Lachatañeré moved himself and his family from Havana to upper 
Manhattan for personal and political reasons. Due to his active involvement in the Cuban 
Communist Party, Lachatañeré received clear signals during the late 1930s—the epoch of 
Batista’s increasing consolidation of political control—that the military and police had him 
under close watch. Since his university degree training and source of income involved 
medical research, Lachatañeré decided to take advantage of a job opportunity at Columbia 
University’s Presbyterian Hospital. The Communist Party also wanted him to lend his 
considerable skills as a political organizer to the New York chapter.
While juggling his professional and political commitments as he made the transition 
to a new country and different daily idioms, Lachatañeré continued to pursue his 
ethnographic pursuits. He arrived in New York with his recent, well-received book on his 
curriculum vitae as well as an enthusiastic recommendation letter from Fernando Ortiz, who 
frequently had visited New York both before and after his yearlong residence there during his 
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self-imposed exile from Cuba in the early 1930s. Ortiz, who later received an honorary 
degree from Columbia, had many well-placed friends at the university and elsewhere in 
North American universities, and he encouraged Lachatañeré to apply for admission to 
Columbia’s renowned Department of Anthropology. Lachatañeré followed Ortiz’s advice 
and submitted an application that, by all indications, was well received. He developed 
working relationships with Ruth Benedict, Melville Herskovits, and other prominent North 
American anthropologists.96
 Even though Lachatañeré did not take up full-time anthropological studies after his 
move to New York, he did continue to work industriously on his follow-up to ¡Oh, mío 
Yemayá! However, the new book was not Manual de santería but rather another project that 
carried a working title of “El sistema religioso de los lucumís y otras influencias africanas en 
Cuba” [The Religious System of the Lucumís and Other African Influences in Cuba]. In 
1938, while still in Cuba, Lachatañeré had started the project with the help of his friends in 
the Society for Afro-Cuban Studies; in 1941, after moving to New York, he sent four 
chapters of the book back to those colleagues in Havana. All four sections would eventually 
appear in Estudios afrocubanos [Afro-Cuban Studies], SEAC’s house journal.97
96Apparently, Columbia University admitted Lachatañeré to its anthropology program. However, I 
have not been able to ascertain why he did not join the department. I presume that financial constraints and his 
other commitments precluded the luxury of full-time graduate studies. 
97As with many of the details of Lachatañeré’s activities during his first years in New York, accurate 
dating is a challenge. Lachatañeré worked on most of his “1939” series well into 1940 and probably into 1941. 
All four chapters appear in volumes of Estudios afrocubanos dated to 1939, but none of the issues actually 
appeared until 1941. The first chapter included a “Note” that explained that “the circumstances of the delayed 
publication of this volume, having already reached 1941, permits us to include the very important ethnographic 
study that our companion, Rómulo Lachatañeré, has submitted to us from New York” [la circunstancia de 
publicarse con restraso este número, ya entrado en el año 1941, nos permite incluir en él el muy importante 
estudio de etnografía que nos ha remitido desde New York nuestro compañero el Sr. Rómulo Lachatañeré] 
(Lachatañeré 1939a: 29). See Appendix B for the full translation of this “Editors’ Note.” 
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The articles from Lachatañeré’s years of geographic translocation reveal the 
corresponding methodological shift to which Guillén later called attention. However, the 
essays also show that the change in documentary methods did not occur as suddenly as 
Guillén suggests. The last of the published pieces especially exhibits a simultaneous 
continuity of and disjunction in the Cuban intellectual discourse of displacing magic, and it is 
that article that I examine in particular detail here. The piece, which Lachatañeré titled “Las 
creencias religiosas de los afrocubanos y la falsa aplicación del término ‘brujería’” [The 
Religious Beliefs of Afro-Cubans and the False Application of the Term ‘Brujería’], 
immediately gained notoriety due to the fact that Lachatañeré questioned the current state of 
Afro-Cuban studies and openly criticized the pioneering scholarship of Fernando Ortiz, his 
own mentor and enthusiastic supporter. In pursuing that critical undertaking, Lachatañeré 
made another move that drew considerable attention: he coined the now-familiar use of the 
word ‘Santería.’ 
My argument here is that the various critiques in Lachatañeré’s article arose from an 
ongoing effort to articulate new critical perspectives aimed at unsettling the mystifications of 
social relations. As part of the contemporary discourse of Afro-Cuban studies, Lachatañeré’s 
project deliberately played off the figure of magic. Like Ortiz, Carpentier, and Guillén, 
Lachatañeré also cast magic as a species of practices arising from misguided notions of 
causality. He too identified such misperceptions of cause and effect among “primitives” as 
well as at the heart of modern capitalism, and he wanted to displace each of those magical 
forms. But also like those his three compatriots, Lachatañeré circumscribed an alternate
practice—his own brand of displacing magic—as the means to sublimate the magic of 
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primitives and of capitalism. Lachatañeré sought to enact through that sublimation a measure 
of social transcendence.
In that regard, Lachatañeré’s project was thoroughly Marxian. It was a materialist 
reworking of Hegelian dialectics, and his critical objectives emerged forcefully in “Religious 
Beliefs of Afro-Cubans.” The article pivoted around suggestions—both direct and indirect—
that magic’s unsettling power, its invigorating but dangerous potential, stemmed from the 
magician’s underlying drive to change material conditions by taking matters into his or her 
own hands. And according to those terms, Lachatañeré clearly wanted to present himself as 
another type of wonder-worker.
Lachatañeré’s magical aspirations surface most explicitly at the conclusion of “The 
Religious Beliefs of Afro-Cubans,” so my discussion of the piece begins with analysis of that 
final portion. Curiously, Lachatañeré attempted to seal his materialist argument with the case 
of a ritual practice he referred to as “working a shadow.” He turned to the example to shore 
up the Marxian foundations of his discussion, arguing that the meaning of the act depended 
upon the unique socio-economic context in which the practice occurred. Lachatañeré 
described “working the shadow” as a form of African “magic” that changed into “mere 
superstition” after it moved through the slave trade into different material contexts in Cuba. 
However, Lachatañeré emphasized the common desire “to triumph in life” expressed in 
every version of the practice. In every case, “working the shadow” amounted to a 
practitioner’s demand to improve the material conditions of life.
Lachatañeré aligned his own motivations, including the objectives of the article, with 
that demand for just distribution of material resources. He cast himself as a kind of shadow 
worker. In that way, the concluding example in Lachatañeré’s “Religious Beliefs of Afro-
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Cubans” illuminates the critical dynamic of the entire article and, I want to suggest, of 
Lachatañeré’s intellectual engagements on the whole. I have used the verb “illuminates” 
deliberately in order to highlight the point: Lachatañeré figured his work in displacing magic 
in terms of tricks of light; he marked out what I call a politics of optics. Specifically, he 
wanted to make visible the social origins of seemingly natural forms that had come to 
structure social relations. In that sense, Lachatañeré pursued the familiar Marxist goal of 
‘demystification’ of ‘reifications’ through ‘ideological unveiling.’ Like Marx, Lachatañeré 
viewed the commodity itself as a socially derived component that in contemporary life had 
assumed naturalized, transhistorical status. 
But, for Lachatañeré, ‘ideological unveiling’ was not merely metaphorical. Rather, 
the sphere of images—including the literal manipulation of shadow and light—operated as a 
primary battleground in the struggle for social power. The production of images offered 
possibilities for oppressive as well as liberating forms of magic. Images shaped society, for 
better or for worse. Lachatañeré’s critique in his article of Ortiz and of Afro-Cuban studies—
and his subsequent proposal of “santería” as a part of a new descriptive vocabulary—can be 
understood from this perspective. In “Religious Beliefs of Afro-Cubans,” Lachatañeré tried 
to displace certain defining optical illusions with other, potentially liberating images. His 
concluding example made the idea explicit: he too was engaged in shadow-work, in a play of 
images, directed toward “triumph in life.” 
2.
Working at almost exactly the same time as Lachatañeré, Walter Benjamin used the 
phrase “dialectical image” to describe what he considered the most urgent task of the critic in 
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the late 1930s.98 The production of “dialectical images” also fittingly describes Lachatañeré’s 
critical undertaking. I do not mean to conflate Benjamin and Lachatañeré’s efforts. 
Nevertheless, the mutually optical parameters of their work provides context that, in this 
case, can appropriately be called enlightening. In earlier chapters, I delineated some 
connections between Benjamin’s project and the Cuban discourse of displacing magic. As I 
explained, Alejo Carpentier’s work reveals direct points of geographic, historical, and critical 
contact: Carpentier and Benjamin moved through leftist intellectuals circles in Paris during 
the late 1920s and across the1930s that led both men to critical engagements, through 
Surrealism, with Marxian theoretics. In Carpentier’s case, those experiences developed by 
1949 into the insistence on “chronicles of the marvelous in the real,” a claim that came to 
define so-called ‘magical realism.’ The historical connections between Benjamin and 
Lachatañeré are not as direct as those between Benjamin and Carpentier. Still, the 
comparison of Benjamin and Lachatañeré’s critical endeavors around 1939 exposes the wider 
discourse circuit to which early-twentieth-century Cuban intellectual activity belonged. 
Benjamin and Lachatañeré—each rethinking Marxian theoretics from their different 
geographic and critical positions at the time—tried to further Marxian theoretics by 
recovering the literality of Marx’s image of capitalism as phantasmagoria.
In the wake of Adorno’s criticism in the November 1938 letter discussed in Chapter
One, Benjamin’s critical vocabulary turned more openly Marxian when it came time in 1939 
to revise the 1935 exposé of his ongoing “Arcades Project” for a funding proposal that 
Adorno had steered his friend’s way. Marx’s well-known term, “phantasmagoria,” figured as 
a new keyword in the revised exposé. Marx had used the image to describe capitalism as a 
98I refer readers back to my discussion of in Chapter 2 (section 1) of Benjamin’s notion of the 
“dialectical image.”
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system based on illusion: it functioned through the circulation of commodities determined by 
a spectral “exchange value” that did not correlate with the labor that actually produced the 
good.99 To a large extent, Benjamin’s appropriation of the term directly echoed Marx. After 
all, according to his exposés Benjamin hoped to demonstrate the illusions through which 
capitalism had taken hold. As he explained, Marx was absolutely right to refer to Paris as 
“the capital of the nineteenth century.” The city’s arcades revealed how that “capital” came 
to be through the desires produced by capital, and Benjamin presented his project as an 
attempt to link the display of commodities in the arcades to profound, corresponding shifts in 
social relations. 
However, a number of files from the unpublished “Arcades Project” reveal that 
Benjamin wanted to go beyond Marx’s use of “phantasmagoria.” Or rather, he wanted to turn 
the word back on Marx. The history of phantasmagoria was as significant as the critical 
concept. The term actually derived from a form of entertainment invented in the mid-
nineteenth century. --- had coined the word, literally meaning “ghost machine,” for the name 
of one his inventions. A series of paper cut-outs produced shifting shadows—
“phantasms”!—on a front wall when an operator revolved the shapes on a spindle in front of 
a light source projected from behind the machine. The ‘ghost-machine’ became a popular 
diversion throughout Europe. The phantasmagorias were especially popular in Paris, where 
they often played in a room off of one of the shopping arcades. Curiously, the simple 
shadow-makers routinely produced panic in their audiences. Even though the viewers always 
99
 Writing on June 28, 1848 in the Neue Rheinische Zeitung about events in Paris, Marx framed the 
French counter-revolution in the following terms: “Are we to conclude that the struggle for new forms of the 
State is devoid of meaning, is illusory -- a phantasm? Only weak, timid minds would ask this question. The 
conflicts arising from the very conditions of bourgeois society have to be fought to the end; they cannot be 
reasoned away. The best form of state is one in which the social contradictions are not overcome by force, in 
other words, only by artificial and specious means. The best form of state is one in which the contradictions 
collide in open struggle and thus attain a solution.” (As quoted in Riazanov 1973.)
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knew the ‘trick,’ they frequently came to believe that the fanciful shapes embodied ‘real’ 
spirits. 
Marx adopted the phantasmagoria as a fitting image for capitalism. He saw a parallel 
between the open but effective ruse of that popular attraction of his time and the 
mystification of exchange value under capitalism. As with commodities, people lost sight of 
the human origins of the ghost machine’s shadows and mistook them as ‘natural’ forces prior 
to social existence. Benjamin agreed that the phantasmagoria served as a fitting image for the 
inversion of social agency under capitalism, but the shadow-makers were also at the root of 
the nineteenth-century consolidation of capitalism embodied in Paris’s arcades. Thus, 
“phantasmagoria” was both historical artifact of and critical trope for the mystification of 
power under capitalism. 
And, in that regard, Benjamin used phantasmagoria to expose what he considered a 
critical limitation of traditional Marxian theoretics: the underestimation of the power of 
images. Marxist criticism typically pointed to cultural production as a superstructural effect
of material conditions. By that view, a society’s art—that is, the images it produced—did not 
of themselves determine material conditions. Benjamin disagreed. He considered images as 
profoundly affective, as a key force in shaping social relations. Marxian theoreticians had 
generally missed the full import of Marx’s image of the phantasmagoria. As an image of 
capitalism, the ghost machine—a simple but powerful image-maker—provided historical 
evidence of the power of images at the root of capitalism. Benjamin drew on Surrealist 
endeavors, as described in Chapter One, in developing a critical perspective centered on the 
idea of generating “dialectical images” that could unsettle capitalism’s mystifying 
representations.  
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This brief history of the phantasmagoria—and of Marx and Benjamin’s invocations 
of it—cuts back toward Lachatañeré. The presence of the ghost machine in Marxian 
discourse already hints at the critical dynamic that was at work when Lachatañeré turned to 
the example of “working the shadow” at the end of “Religious Beliefs of Afro-Cubans.” 
After that article, Lachatañeré’s interest in shadow-work would only become more 
pronounced and more central to his critical endeavors. Clear indications of Lachatañeré’s 
optical politics surface in the 1951 eulogy discussed in the last chapter: Near the end of his 
snapshot of his friend’s life and significance, Nicolás Guillén notes that in fact Lachatañeré 
beat him to it. Guillén describes what would turn out to be his last visit with Lachatañeré: a 
day in 1948 that the friends spent together in Harlem. Guillén offhandedly recalls that 
“during those days [Lachatañeré] was completely immersed in his photography hobby, such 
that he got away with taking some shots of Eusebia [Cosme] and of me.” The offhandedness 
of Guillén’s recollection masks the importance of the disclosure. He offers no additional 
commentary about Lachatañeré’s “hobby” or his furtive attempts on this particular occasion 
to capture his friends on film. 
As it turned out, Lachatañeré’s death came about because he “was completely 
immersed in his photography hobby” at that time. In a prologue to the collected volume of 
Lachatañeré’s ethnographic writings, Isaac Barreal provides some crucial information that 
Guillén never mentions.100 Barreal notes that around 1945 Lachatañeré 
completed studies of commercial photography, which enabled him to acquire 
significant training as an ethnographic photographer. The mastery of this skill 
100Like Guillén’s tribute, Barreal’s 1992 prologue clearly portrays Lachatañeré in terms of his Marxist 
commitments. Barreal’s representation of Lachatañeré provides more rich ground for exploration of the ongoing 
ambivalence in twentieth-century Cuban intellectual discourse around the figure of Afro-Cuban magic. In 
another work-in-progress, I consider Barreal’s biographical essay from that standpoint. For the moment, I make 
use of Barreal’s prologue mainly as a source of biographical information about Lachatañeré. 
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was in his interest. Under these new conditions of work and with new 
possibilities of expression—and also taking advantage of some vacation at his 
job—he decided to travel to Puerto Rico, with the objective of collecting 
graphic material and information about the real situation of his brothers, the
Boricuan people. He stayed for some time on that island, where he became 
interested in the situation that the jíbaro and the black suffered under North 
American colonialist oppression (Barreal 1992: xx). 101
Barreal fleshes out Guillén’s description of Lachatañeré’s tragic death by providing more 
details about his return from that trip on April 11, 1951: “The plane in which he traveled, a 
four-engine DC4, […] would not fulfill its mission, producing the plunge to the sea (xx). 
Barreal immediately highlights the significance of the photographic pursuits that ended up 
costing Lachatañeré his life. “The Council of the Arts, Sciences and Professions—an 
institution to which Lachatañeré belonged and of which he had organized the section 
dedicated to the photographic arts— […] exhibited ‘various photographs taken by him in 
Puerto Rico’” (xx-xxi). Barreal explains how “the leftist The Daily Compass, in previewing 
the exhibition and in evaluating the impact of [Lachatañeré’s] ‘life, his work, and his death,’ 
dedicated an entire page—it was a tabloid—and reproduced two of the photos taken by him 
on the colonized island” (xxi). 
Barreal’s biography reveals that photography was not simply a “hobby”—as Guillén 
casts it—but rather a fundamental component of Lachatañeré’s life and work. He considered 
photography so essential to his endeavors as a leftist activist and ethnographer that he entered 
a program in professional photography and assumed organizational responsibility for the 
Council of Arts, Sciences and Professions's Photography Section. In other words, 
Lachatañeré approached photography both as profession and as critical grounding. As The 
Daily Compass suggested in the tribute to which Barreal makes reference, by 1951 
101
“Boricua” is a term for Puerto Rico and one of its natives, based on the name of island’s indigenous 
inhabitants at time of European conquest. “Jíbaro” is another colloquial reference to a native of the island. The 
translations of Barreal’s text are my own.
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Lachatañeré’s “life, his work, and his death” revolved the production of dialectical images. 
For Lachatañeré, photography—literally ‘light-writing’—was a way to confront a 
phantasmagoria on its on terms, to turn the tricks of capitalism’s shadow-work at its own 
game, to displace reified figures with new, liberating images. 
3.
Barreal emphasizes the Marxian dynamics of Lachatañeré’s photographic pursuits. 
Ostensibly, Lachatañeré “decided to travel to Puerto Rico with the objective of collecting
graphic material and information on the real situation of his Boricuan comrades”; he wanted 
to document the ills that many Puerto Ricans “suffered under North American colonialist 
oppression.” Barreal implies that Lachatañeré intended to unsettle a balance of economic and 
political power by circulating “graphic material” related to “North American colonialist 
oppression” that had stripped fellow Caribbean peoples of control of their own material 
assets. 
Barreal also hints that Lachatañeré was already in pursuit of optical interventions in 
the late 1930s. Writing in the early 1990s, Barreal identified Lachatañeré’s post-1938 project 
as a pivotal moment in Cuban scholarship. The Religious System of the Lucumís and Other 
African Influences in Cuba, he asserts, is
one of the most relevant of ethno-historical character dedicated to the study of 
people of African origin in [Cuba…]. This work contains so many significant 
aspects for the study of the formation of our nationality and our culture […] 
before the proper beginning of the treatment of what the author denominates 
“the religious system of the Lucumís” or, as it would be, Santería. (xvii)
Despite the apparent significance of the project, Lachatañeré never finished it. In presenting 
the 1992 collection of Lachatañeré’s writings, Barreal admits that scholars could finally 
“offer [the project’s] continuation in the guise of some unedited material, and with such 
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finality submitted by his daughter, Diana Lachatañeré, in a gesture that the editors 
profoundly appreciate” (xvii). 
Of the four chapters of the project eventually published by Estudio afrocubanos, the 
first three concentrate on historical factors in the formation of Cuban society in general and 
of Afro-Cuban communities in particular.102 In those sections, Lachatañeré hoped to show 
how the Lucumís, the predominant Afro-Cuban population in Cuba, derived not only from 
the Yoruba of western Africa but rather from a more complex process of “ethnic 
amalgamation” that began in Africa and accelerated quickly in Cuba. Lachatañeré’s key 
point is that the Lucumí are a distinctly Cuban group, forged over the course of the island’s 
peculiar history, and not a direct line of Yoruba in the Americas. 
The fourth chapter builds on this argument but amounts to something quite different. 
It delineates a different history, or better yet, a metahistory. More specifically, Lachatañeré 
offers a genealogy of Afro-Cuban studies in order to assert that the historiographic 
propositions outlined in his first three sections generate new “base concepts” for the newly 
recognized field. Existing methods, he asserts, are fundamentally and dangerously 
misguided.  Even the main terms for the study of Afro-Cuban history and culture are corrupt. 
To that point in time, the main area of consideration in the field had been Afro-Cuban ritual, 
and Lachatañeré takes immediate issue with the familiar term for these practices: 
‘brujería’.103 Lachatañeré’s title for the chapter highlights the misnomer: “Las creencias 
102The chapter titles read: “Nota histórica sobre los lucumí” [Historical Note on the Lucumí]; “Tipos 
étnicos que concurrien en la amalgama cubana” [Ethnic Types That Merged in the Cuban Amalgamation]; and 
“Notas sobre la formación de la población afrocubana” [Notes on the Formation of the Afro-Cuban Population] 
(Lachatañeré 1939).
103Brujería is often translated as ‘witchcraft.’ I generally leave the term untranslated since the 
expressed purpose of Lachatañeré’s article and of Fernando Ortiz’s response is the delineation of various, 
conflicting meanings of ‘brujería’. Still, as Lachatañeré shows, in all of its uses ‘brujería’ refers to an illicit 
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religiosas de los afrocubanos y la falsa aplicación del término ‘brujería’” [The Religious 
Beliefs of Afro-Cubans and the False Application of the Term 'Brujería'"]. Thus, 
Lachatañeré’s chapter functions as a call for alternative vocabulary—beginning with the 
substitution of ‘santería’ for ‘brujería’—to suit Afro-Cuban studies’ new methodologies.
Lachatañeré’s provocative stance was a key element of his Marxian strategy. As 
Guillén attempted to do in his tribute twelve years later, Lachatañeré offers an alternate 
history in an attempt to enact social change. Like Guillén’s piece, Lachatañeré’s post-1938 
project pursued Marx’s idea of ‘making history,’ but the articles pivot around the critical 
concept of dialectical materialism. Lachatañeré uses the principle as the filter through which 
to understand historical developments, most broadly, and the formation of Afro-Cuba, more 
specifically. Yet, like many other serious Marxist thinkers before and after him, he also 
probes the idea, searching for firmer epistemological ground on which to stake his materialist 
claims. After all, a precise definition of ‘dialectical materialism’—a term coined after Marx 
and Engel’s death by the Czech theoretician Karl Kautsky in the late 1880s and popularized 
after 1889 with the Second International—remains elusive even if the concept necessarily 
undergirds any Marxian theoretics. 
Schematically rendered, dialectical materialism simply refers to the fundamental 
principle that life is situated in, or stems from, matter, which is always in motion; as 
independent entities constantly move, some come into contact and change each other in the 
process.104 As a particular component of material existence, human reason follows this same 
form of “magic” defined in opposition to socially accepted “religious” pursuits. Lachatañeré’s focus on the 
conflicted term ‘brujería’ opens up his key point: that “religion” and “magic” serve as mutually constituting 
categories that can produce real social effects. 
104In Dialectics of Nature (1883), Engels explains the idea from which dialectical materialism unfolds: 
“Motion is the mode of existence of matter. Never anywhere has there been matter without motion, or motion 
without matter, nor can there be. Change of form of motion is always a process that takes place between at least 
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dialectical pattern: ideas unfold, circulate, and eventually bump up against different –and 
often contradictory– notions, producing the formation of new thoughts. Thus, Engels 
eventually refined the terms of his and Marx’s earlier discussions by characterizing 
“subjective dialectics (dialectical thought)” as a reflection of the “so-called objective
dialectics, … the motion through opposites which asserts itself everywhere in nature.”105
Marx’s agenda in The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte serves as a reminder that for 
him, as for Engels and others, history acts as the sphere in which the dialectics of social life, 
itself a component of “nature,” ostensibly play out. Most immediately, “objective dialectics” 
can be discerned in past history and through dialectical thought—“subjective dialectics”—
history-to-come can be dialectically enacted. 
This understanding of dialectics frames all of Lachatañeré’s post-1938 pieces. In the 
initial chapters of The Religious System of the Lucumí, Lachatañeré illuminates the dialectics 
of history on one hand, while he operates dialectically, on the other. Thus, he begins each of 
the initial four articles by illuminating the economic frame—namely, European 
colonialism—in which cultural oppositions and, ultimately, syntheses or “amalgamations” 
took shape in Cuba. However, he also tries to unsettle that pattern of development by 
organizing his own discussion as a series of dialectical confrontations. The project comes to a 
head in the fourth chapter of the series as Lachatañeré brings his analysis of historical 
developments to bear forcefully on the main historiographic and methodological “concepts” 
of social science in general and of Afro-Cuban studies in particular. 
two bodies, of which one loses a definite quantity of motion of one quality (e.g. heat), while the other gains a 
corresponding quantity of motion of another quality (mechanical motion, electricity, chemical decomposition).”
105Engels continues the passage above with the following clarification: “Dialectics, so-called objective
dialectics, prevails throughout nature, and so-called subjective dialectics (dialectical thought), is only the 
reflection of the motion through opposites which asserts itself everywhere in nature, and which by the continual 
conflict of the opposites and their final passage into one another, or into higher forms, determines the life of 
nature.”
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Lachatañeré’s discussion, his optical intervention, plays out as a critical genealogy. 
This tactic enables him literally to remake history by unmaking historiography, to produce 
his own forceful fictions by exposing the intellectual fabrications surrounding the 
contemporary study of Afro-Cuban life. Lachatañeré tracks the uses of the term ‘brujería’ in 
order to show how contemporary articulations perpetuate the social discrimination that 
produced the word in the first place. Thus, Lachatañeré depends on certain dialectical 
strategies aimed at unsettling established images of Afro-Cuban practice.106
4. 
From the start, Lachatañeré situates “The Religious Beliefs of Afro-Cubans” as an 
exercise in what Engels called “subjective dialectics.” His expressed purpose in the article is 
to confront his contemporaries for their role in shaping and perpetuating a popular image of 
Afro-Cuban traditions as conducive to criminal action. Lachatañeré presents his discussion as 
a direct response to the idea, which he later characterizes as a racially charged stereotype that 
has justified repressive treatment of Afro-Cubans. He sets the stage for his argument early in 
the essay by noting that “it seems that in our first quarter of the republican century, studies of 
anthropology pursued the Afro-Cuban type as good material by which to develop 
speculations in the field where this branch of science studies criminality” (197). Lachatañeré 
makes clear his opposition to the criminological focus of that “branch of science” by 
emphasizing its “failing in the election of appropriate methods for the discussion of other 
aspects of the life of the Afro-Cuban.”
106In this regard, Lachatañeré’s article is dialectical in the oldest sense of term. At its classical root, 
dialectics refers to a mode of logic based on confrontation and debate.
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While Lachatañeré takes the majority of the essay to excavate the roots of common 
beliefs about Afro-Cuban criminal propensities, he does not in fact address the issue directly 
until late in his discussion. Only after more than two-thirds of his discussion does he finally 
reiterate the pivotal issue around which the entire essay supposedly turns. “The question to 
make clear,” he eventually summarizes, “is whether in Cuba the so-called criminal actions 
were committed because of brujería” (201), and the remainder of Lachatañeré’s article 
focuses directly on whether any viable connection exists between Afro-Cuban practices and 
criminal behavior. The deferral of the article’s central question provides the first glimpse of a 
rhetorical maneuver that he employs throughout the article. 
Because of his postponement of the central issue, the concluding portion of article 
holds a key to understanding underlying Lachatañeré’s overall agenda. Structurally, the four 
articles in his original submission to Estudios afrocubanos rest upon this foundational portion
of “The Religious Beliefs of Afro-Cubans de los afrocubanos.” Lachatañeré does not 
disappoint. He uses the section to lay bare the theoretical suppositions that motivate his entire 
study. Lachatañeré begins the section by citing at length from some influential scholarship 
that provides cases that “seem to correspond to a ‘crime of brujería’” [parece corresponder a 
un “delito de brujería”] (202). That is, the studies “incline us to accept” [nos inclina a 
aceptar] that the crimes stem from “African brujería” itself. “But,” Lachatañeré quickly 
asserts, “those are criminal cases that should be catalogued outside of the study of religions. 
That the brujos would use such crimes to practice black magic is something very different 
from the idea that they carried out the crimes from religious impulses” (202-3) [Pero éstos 
son casos criminosos que deben catalogarse fuera del estudio de las religiones. Que los 
brujos usaran de tales crímenes para practicar la magia negra es cosa muy distinta a que los 
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llevaran a cabo con móviles religiosos]. Lachatañeré concludes, “one has to accept as well 
that [any crimes committed] pertain to the study of criminal pathology” (203).107 Religious 
practices, African or otherwise, cannot be the root cause. “One has to understand that any 
individual, pertaining to whichever race, with criminal inclinations of such a nature, is a 
demented type, a general paralytic, as we say” (203).108
In clarifying his point, Lachatañeré lays out a familiar Marxian frame of analysis. He 
rejects the possibility that criminality is religiously motivated and insists that criminal 
activity, like any social phenomenon, develops as an effect of a society’s underlying relations 
of economic power. In the last instance, a society’s “economic and social base” triggers what 
happens. From this traditional Marxian perspective, Lachatañeré explains how a “religious 
phenomenon” can shape individual “dispositions” but cannot function as a root cause of 
action. Ultimately, religion too is a superstructural consequence of that same economic and 
social structure: 
Crime in West Africa—if we wish to observe it from a western point of view—
was attenuated by the nature of the religious phenomenon, which by the 
manner in which they manifest or through the social conditions that envelop
them, combine to create certain dispositions in the individual developing in an 
atmosphere where there are susceptible fears, whose causes have to be ferreted 
out not from the religious phenomenon themselves but rather from the same 
economic and social base on which these primitive societies rest (203).109
107
“Ha de aceptarse también que éstos pertenecen al estudio de la Patología criminal.”
108
“Ha de entenderse que cualquier individuo, perteneciente a cualquier raza, con aficiones criminales 
de tal naturaleza, es un tipo demente, un paralítico general, digamos.”
109
“El delito en África Occidental—si lo queremos observar desde el punto de vista occidental—estaba 
atenuado por la naturaleza misma del fenómeno religioso, que por la forma de proyectarse en aquellas 
sociedades o por las consecuencias sociales que envuelve [SIC?], tiende a crear ciertas disposiciones en el 
individuo desenvolviéndose en un medio donde son susceptibles temores, cuyas causas han de escrudriñarse 
[SIC] no en el fenómeno religioso en sí, sino en la misma base económica y social en que descansan estas 
sociedades primitivas.”
198
Lachatañeré’s defining point is that degrees of access to and control over material goods –not 
religious practices– structure a society and what happens within it: simply put, those people 
who cannot satisfy basic material needs –because they cannot produce and are not given 
necessary goods like food and clothing– are more prone to criminal behavior.
In focusing this Marxian lens of analysis, Lachatañeré tries to seal his argument with 
a concrete example of how distinct “social manifestations” arise from the specific “economic 
and social base” on which any society “rests.” Lachatañeré looks at a specific practice of 
“African brujería” that, by his opponents’ logic, would intrinsically inspire illicit behavior. 
He builds an extended comparison between that phenomenon and developments in Cuba in 
order to demonstrate more definitively how the same action plays out differently in each 
context. Since the effects of the ritual differ in each social situation, the practice itself cannot 
be a source of delinquency. The cause must lie elsewhere:
Thus, for example, when a ‘portafetiches’ of the Congo tries to seize the 
shadow of an enemy in order to ‘work it,’ as we say in Cuba, toward the death 
of the person, it is something that one can consider as an act produced by or 
with reason for existence in that atmosphere paid to return certain possibilities 
of efficacy to such spells. But upon passing into the New World, these social 
manifestations should not have had a long continuity nor produced themselves 
in the same form, but rather once put in a completely distinct—and to a certain 
point antagonistic—social frame they should have evolved in accordance with 
the new environment and lost all of the initial grade of efficacy so that they 
converted, many times, into mere superstitions; by luck that—in order for us 
not to depart from the aforementioned example—in Cuba the concept of the 
shadow as a spirit of vital importance for the individual has transformed itself 
into an inoffensive superstition, such that common folk believe that if a person 
‘grabs the shadow of another’ it is like seizing their good dispositions in order 
to triumph in life. (203-04)110
110
“Así, por ejemplo, cuando un ‘portafetiches’ del Congo trata de apoderarse de la sombra de un 
enemigo para trabarla, como decimos en Cuba, hasta lograr la muerte de éste, es cosa que debe estimarse como 
un acto producto o con rázon de existencia en aquel ambiente abonado para brindar ciertas posibilidades de 
eficacia a tales encantamientos. Pero al pasar al Nuevo Mundo, estas manifestaciones sociales no debieron de 
tener una larga continuidad ni producirse en la misma forma, sino que puestas en un marco social 
completamente distinto y hasta cierta punto refractario, debieron de evolucionar de acuerdo con el nuevo medio 
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This comparison of the different trajectories of the practice of ‘working a shadow’ seems like 
a fitting end to Lachatañeré’s discussion. The essay arrives at this convincing demonstration 
of how different socio-economic contexts transform a specific cultural practice. In the end, 
the different “concepts of the shadow as a spirit of vital importance to an individual” prove 
that each socio-economic “environment” [ambiente, medio] determines “social 
manifestations.”
With this concluding example, Lachatañeré reinforces a traditional Marxist 
perspective by highlighting the evolutionary possibilities of historical development 
embedded in the trans-Atlantic “conversion” of shadow-work. His use of the verb “to 
evolve” is telling, of course. It situates the “transformation” of which Lachatañeré speaks 
within an evolutionary frame. In the following paragraph, he reinforces the point that the 
unsettling Congolese practice, with its stakes in death, “had to evolve” into “an inoffensive 
superstition” when transplanted to Cuba’s “completely distinct –and to a certain point 
antagonistic– social frame”: 
Accordingly, many acts of enchantment carried out by the brujo in primitive 
societies, upon coming into contact with an environment socially distant from 
the one in which they originated –and do consider that slavery in the New 
World cut at the root the economic reasons for these phenomena– little by little 
the hexes lost their original efficacy. (204)111
With this statement, Lachatañeré provides another familiar Marxist clarification: the 
“evolution” of which he speaks refers to socio-economic forms. His allusion to “primitive 
y perder todo el inicial grado de eficacia para convertirse, muchas veces, en meras superstictiones; de suerte 
que, para no salirnos del ejemplo señalado, en Cuba el concepto de la sombra como un espirítu de vital 
importancia para el individuo, se ha transformado en una inofensiva superstición, creyendo la gente del pueblo 
que si una persona ‘le coge la sombra a otra,’ es como si le arrebatara sus buenas disposiciones para triunfar en 
la vida.”
111
“De suerte que para muchos actos de encantamiento realizados por el brujo en sociedades 
primitivas, al ponerse en contacto con un medio socialmente distanciado del que les dio origen –y estímase que 
la esclavitud en el Nuevo Mundo cortó de raíz la razón económica de estos fenómenos– paulatinamente los 
maleficios perdieron su original eficacia.”
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societies” refers most directly to the complexity of their social organization and is not 
necessarily a judgment of their fundamental value. In fact, his reference to the severe impact 
of New World slavery serves as a reminder that complex ‘civilizations’ –the modern 
capitalist variety, in particular– hold no moral high ground on structurally “primitive 
societies.” 
Lachatañeré rests his case at this point. With the example of how ‘working the 
shadow’ changes across contexts, he reiterates his main assertion: “In the last instance, and 
returning to the problem of Afro-Cubans, if one wishes to designate their cultuses under the 
denomination brujería, given their great amount of magical practices, then one would be 
moving far away from the essence of the problem.”112 That is, “magical practices”—
categorized under the term “brujería”—are not the real origin of the “problem” of criminal 
activity among Afro-Cubans. According to Lachatañeré, to identify brujería as the final 
cause of delinquency is to miss the “essence of the problem” because magic is “an auxiliary 
category, structured in such cultuses as a consequence of their eminent realism, such that 
magic constitutes their economic base” [ésta toma una categoría auxiliadora, estructurada en 
tales cultos como consecuencia de eminente realismo de éstos, además que la magia 
constituye la base económica de ellos]. In other words, “magic” is an “auxiliary,” or 
superstructural, effect that only assumes structural force among Afro-Cubans in economic 
terms. That is, Afro-Cuban practitioners, with their “eminent realism,” know the truth about 
their “magic”: the practices ultimately spring from and gesture toward material realities, 
which is the “base” on which all social life “rests.”
112
“En última instancia, y acercándonos al problema de los afrocubanos, si se quiere designar a sus 
cultos bajo la denominación brujería, dado su gran contenido de prácticas mágicas, esto significa alejarse 
mucho de la esencia del problema.”
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In offering this distinction, Lachatañeré’s underlying appreciation for the disparaged 
practices, which is present throughout the section, comes to the forefront. By highlighting the 
“eminent realism” in Afro-Cuban “cultuses” regarding life’s material determinants, 
Lachatañeré challenges his readers to accept the same materialist principle. In this way, 
Lachatañeré’s crowning example throws a curious light on his entire project. If at first glance 
Lachatañeré seems to approach the practice of ‘working a shadow’ with ethnographic 
detachment, his parting allusion to the clear-sightedness of “magic” reveals that he does not 
keep as much distance from shadow-work as initially might appear. Thus, his explanations of 
African and Cuban variations of ‘working the shadow’ hint at the logic of the act within its 
context. Even the unsettling attempt of a Congolese ‘portafetiches’ to kill by taking the 
power of another’s shadow has a certain “reason” in “that environment.” Similarly, the 
Cuban folk practice of “‘grabbing the shadow of another’” makes sense in its place and even 
has a reasonable goal as a means “to triumph in life.” In both Africa and Cuba, Lachatañeré 
implies, ‘working a shadow’ is simply an attempt to achieve what everyone fundamentally 
desires: a sustained level of material comfort. 
5.
The shadow-work example at the end of “Religious Beliefs of Afro-Cubans” reveals 
that Lachatañeré works to build his own strain of dialectical materialism and that he does so 
dialectically. He rubs against the grain of familiar historiographic images in order to account 
for—and eventually redeem—the contradictions that have defined Cuba and Cubans. In the 
first sentences of the article, Lachatañeré alludes to the violence of European colonialism and 
of the slave trade that defined Cuban history and identity. Lachatañeré, like so many others, 
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tries to account for that conflicted history embodied in the spectrum of Cuban skin tones and 
in the multiplicity of Cuban cultural forms. He also wants to assure that the founding 
violence, which seems to him to endure, finds purpose and resolution. The figure of 
dialectics enables Lachatañeré to do so by highlighting the critical process itself as means to 
historical redemption. 
Therefore, Lachatañeré begins "The Religious Beliefs of Afro-Cubans and the False 
Application of the Term 'Brujería'" by highlighting the cultural encounters under European 
colonialism that continued to define Cuban society. Instead of focusing directly on dialectics, 
Lachatañeré first concentrates instead on what he calls “amalgamation.” The word denotes 
the fusion produced by the ongoing cultural encounters within the dialectics of history:
A product of amalgamation was the sedimentation, at the base of Cuba, of 
characteristics pertaining to the cultures of African people that made 
themselves known during the slave period; many elements of which have gone 
on structuring a Cuban cultural type that still is in its process of formation. 
(196)113
While the idea of the “sedimentation” of African cultural traits at the base of “a Cuban 
cultural type that is still in its process of formation” might seem curious, the geological 
image is clearly not accidental. Lachatañeré reinforces the point in the article’s second 
sentence, in which he notes that the formative clash of cultures actually predates the colonial 
period. “Amalgamation” among African tribes was well underway before European 
exploration, Lachatañeré explains, and the residue of that pre-colonial history endures among 
the contemporary Afro-Cuban population: 
113
“Producto de la amalgama fue el desplazamiento en el suelo de Cuba de rasgos pertenecientes a las 
culturas de los pueblos africanos que se hicieron sentir durante el período esclavista; elementos de los cuales 
muchos se han ido estructurando en una cultura tipo cubano que aún está en su proceso de formación.”
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Other [traits], through the force of their projections, have evolved, and 
continue to evolve, in the Afro-Cuban mass that expresses the essence of the 
amalgamation of African tribes.114
With these initial observations, Lachatañeré immediately reinforces his main line of
argument across the 1939 series. He reminds readers that Afro-Cuban culture, like “the 
Cuban cultural type” itself, has always been constantly “in its process of formation.” Neither 
Cuba nor Afro-Cuba is a direct transference of exogenous forms but rather a complex 
“product of amalgamation.” And to shatter completely the misconception that Afro-Cuban 
practices derive unadulterated from African Yoruba forms, Lachatañeré insists that the idea 
of ‘pure’ African cultures like the Yoruba is yet another myth. In calling attention to “the 
essence of the amalgamation of African tribes,” Lachatañeré trumpets the point that the 
African traditions brought to Cuba through the slave trade were always already hybrid.
In addition to reinforcing the key historical claim of the 1939 project, the opening 
paragraph of “The Religious Beliefs of Afro-Cubans” also set forth Lachatañeré’s ostensible 
task in the article: to excavate relations between “the cultures of African populations” and 
“pertinent traits” of the “Cuban cultural type” and of “the Afro-Cuban mass.” It is precisely 
this agenda that Nicolás Guillén would later describe, in his 1951 eulogy, as so innovative: 
Lachatañeré studies Santería not only in Havana but also in Matanzas, Santiago 
de Cuba y Guantánamo, discriminating the Yoruba influence from Congo 
influence, the former characteristic of blacks of the capital, and of pure form, 
the latter, of those who live in the eastern section of our Island. (Guillén 1951: 
102)
Fittingly, Guillén characterized Lachatañeré’s method as “discriminating.” The term 
calls attention to one of Lachatañeré’s primary tactics in “The Religious Beliefs of Afro-
Cubans.” The article’s first sentences already exhibit his key strategy: the distinction, or 
114
“Otros, por la fuerza de sus proyecciones, han evolucionado, y continúan evolucionando, en la masa 
afrocubana que expresa la esencia de la amalgama de las tribus africanas.”
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discrimination, of different cultural forms that reveal alternate, or ‘residual,’ histories. 
Visibility is at stake and, as Guillén suggested, the originality of Lachatañeré’s effort 
depended upon his ability to illuminate historical layers that other observers had not 
excavated. The opening paragraph of Lachatañeré’s article reveals the depth of his 
discriminating undertaking.
Nevertheless, Lachatañeré also admits that the task that he sets out for himself—the 
effort to distinguish between African, Cuban, and Afro-Cuban cultural influences—is 
ultimately impossible. After all, the paragraph builds toward an invocation of “the essence of 
the amalgamation of African tribes,” a phrase that serves as a reminder of cultures and 
cultural types constantly “evolving,” perpetually in “process of formation.” Despite Guillén’s 
claims that Lachatañeré delineated the “pure traits” [rasgos puros] of “Yoruba influence,” 
the opening paragraph of “The Religious Beliefs of Afro-Cubans” presents the Afro-Cuban 
culture as characteristically impure. Lachatañeré uses the term “rasgos”—the same term as 
Guillén—but suggests that the origins of Afro-Cuban “traits” are muddled as far back as 
historical perspective can see. 
This insistence on Afro-Cuban cultural impurity creates as an apparent contradiction 
in Lachatañeré’s argument from the start. He works toward purifying distinctions while 
simultaneously asserting the impossibility of clarity with regard to the sources of Afro-Cuban 
cultural traits. The reader can only turn toward Lachatañeré for help, and that move appears 
to be precisely what Lachatañeré intends. He calls attention to the ways in which the 
historian—himself in this case—makes distinctions that are clearly fictitious. They result 
from freeze-framing history’s flow into set types, into snapshots of culture. With the first 
sentences of “The Religious Beliefs of Afro-Cubans,” Lachatañeré already directs the 
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reader’s attention to the scholar’s role, to his role, as mediator and historical agent, as image-
maker and magician.
6.
Lachatañeré’s opening paragraph establishes the critical dynamic that plays out across 
the entire article. The portrayal of historical dialectics ultimately points back to the 
historiographer’s intervention in history through the production of dialectical images. In the 
case of “The Religious Beliefs of Afro-Cubans,” categorical reconfigurations, or ‘purified 
distinctions,’ function as Lachatañaré’s dialectical images. The article repeats the basic 
pattern again and again. 
Accordingly, the second paragraph plays upon a distinction introduced in the opening 
lines of the article: the division between Cubans as a whole (“a Cuban cultural type”) and a 
particular sector of the population (“the Afro-Cuban mass”). Lachatañeré tightens the 
distinction and then almost immediately begins to collapse the two entities together:
To the first [set of characteristics, those of the Cuban cultural type,] pertain the 
strong African vestiges that we observe in the vernacular arts and in other 
lower and higher artistic forms, as well as other social manifestations that sleep 
in the ‘subconscious’ of Cuban society. To the second [set of characteristics, 
those of the Afro-Cuban mass,] pertains everything that contributes to the 
modulation of the character and vital manifestations of the Afro-Cuban nucleus 
of Cuba’s population. (196)115
This description reinforces the earlier point: that some general “African vestiges,” carried to 
Cuba through an Atlantic slave trade seeped into Cuban society at-large in the “vernacular 
115
“A los primeros [rasgos] pertenecen los fuertes vestigos negros que observamos en las artes 
vernáculas y en otras más depuradas y elevadas formas artísticas, además de otras manifestaciones sociales que 
duermen en la ‘subconciencia’ de la sociedad cubana. A los segundos pertenece todo lo que contribuye a la 
modelación del cáracter y manifestaciones vitales del núcleo afrocubano de la población de Cuba.”
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arts” and “other social manifestations” while “the Afro-Cuban nucleus” still contains the 
markings of a pre-colonial ethnic diversity. 
Lachatañeré quickly identifies the locus of the “sedimentation” of African traits: 
Afro-Cuban “religion.” “Religion expresses one of the most exuberant forms of expression in 
the cultural mosaic of Afro-Cubans,” he explains, and therefore “it is to these Afro-Cuban 
religious beliefs that we will dedicate our attention in this part of our study.”116 However, in 
locating the residue of “the amalgamation of African tribes” in Afro-Cuban religious beliefs, 
Lachatañeré offers a significant qualification. He reveals that the traits related to pre-colonial 
African cultures actually have spread across the general public. Those traits now comprise 
part of the “the base of Cuban traits pertaining to African peoples that made themselves 
known during the slave period.” Thus, African religious beliefs remain as residue in the 
character of virtually every Cuban. As “one of the most exuberant forms of expression in the 
cultural mosaic of Afro-Cubans,” religion has reached a 
rate of expansion that has spilled out beyond the borders of the crucible in 
which were initially forged the elements that gave origin to the cultuses that 
give this amalgamation its tenor, expanding among a Cuban populace that 
easily absorbs the eminently realistic character of these beliefs.117
In other words, Lachatañeré argues that religious beliefs served as the primary point of 
exchange among African ethnic groups brought to Cuba, giving rise to new Afro-Cuban 
ritual traditions. These “cultuses” exemplify the “amalgamation of African tribes” mentioned 
116
“[…] expresando la religión una de las mas exuberantes formas de expresión en el mosaico cultural 
de los afrocubanos. […] Y a éstas [creencias] es a las que dedicaremos nuestra atención en esta parte de nuestro 
trabajo.”
117
“[…] cuyo grado de expansión ha vaciado los bordes del crisol donde inicialmente se soldaron los 
elementos que dieron origen a los cultos que dan el grado de esta amalgama, expandiéndose entre el pueblo 
cubano que fácilmente absorbe el carácter eminentemente realista de estas creencias.”
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in the article’s first paragraph. At the same time, those African-inflected forms of religious 
expression “spilled out” into and profoundly shaped “the Cuban populace” as a whole. 
Lachatañeré’s curious description—sharpening a distinction between “Cuban” and 
“Afro-Cuban” that quickly bleeds together again—circumscribes the specific terrain where 
the intermingling takes place. Cuban society—including its “Afro-Cuban nucleus”—comes 
together in the common ground of realism. “The eminently realistic character of [Afro-Cuban 
religious] beliefs” apparently jives seamlessly with the outlook of the Cuban masses, who 
can “easily absorb” and integrate realistic but “exuberant forms of expression.” 
Lachatañaré’s description points to his ending, in which he emphasizes how the practice of 
‘working a shadow,’ in all of its guises, arises from the “eminent realism” about material 
needs that fuels magical endeavors. This direct bridge between the article’s beginning and its 
end hints that Lachatañeré, even from the start, already is ‘working a shadow.’ 
7.
If a reader misses the trick, Lachatañaré makes his magic known in the next set of 
introductory paragraphs. Lachatañeré reinforces the dialectical pattern established in the 
article’s first sentences: he sets out different typologies and then almost immediately 
collapses them. In other words, he exposes his own intellectual constructs. The process leads 
him, at the end of his fourth paragraph, to openly synthetic distinction: ‘santería.’ 
He gets there by differentiating among African traditions brought to Cuba during the 
slave trade. Since his ostensible purpose is to explain something about Afro-Cuban religious 
beliefs, Lachatañeré emphasizes the diversity of African-influenced cultic practices in Cuba. 
As in the opening paragraphs, he relies upon a strategy of discrimination: “Here we will 
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discuss two groups of cultuses among those with which we are somewhat familiar: those of 
the [African] Yoruba and Bantú types—or Lucumí and Mayombé, which are the 
denominations used among Afro-Cubans for such cultuses” (196-7).118 With this distinction, 
Lachatañeré correlates differences between Afro-Cuban cultuses with the diversity of 
Africans forced into slavery in Cuba. Therefore, Afro-Cuban Lucumí cultuses appear to 
derive from the Yoruba of Africa while Mayombé origins would lie with the Bantú. At a later 
stage in his discussion, Lachatañeré’s particular distinctions between “the Lucumí type” and 
“the Mayombé type” will resurface as critical. For the moment, Lachatañeré wants to remind 
his readers of the starting point for his entire project on “The African Influences in Cuba”: 
that not all “Afro-Cuban cultuses” are the same, just as crucial differences among the African 
cultural sources. 
At the same time, Lachatañeré emphasizes that clear demarcation of African tribal 
practices is also a fallacy. Although “Yoruba” and “Bantú” are designations used to 
distinguish Afro-Cuban cultuses, the terms are misleading. He gestures to the core points of 
his other articles in his series on “The Religious System of the Lucumís and Other African 
Influences in Cuba”: first, that Afro-Cuban practices were unique and not simply New World 
versions of African traditions; second, as emphasized in the opening paragraphs, that the 
ethnicities and practices of African tribes were always already amalgamated. Thus, notions of 
“Yoruba” or “Bantu” purity were misleading and obfuscated the originality of Afro-Cuban 
forms. For that reason, he points out that his interest lies in understanding “the essence of the 
amalgamation of the African tribes.” With all of these layers of amalgamation, Afro-Cuban 
practices emerge in “a system of cultuses that, one has to suppose, shuffled the African 
118
“Aquí discutiremos dos grupos de cultos, con los cuales estamos algo familiarizados: los del tipo 
Yoruba o Lucumí y los del tipo Bantú o Mayombé, denominaciones dadas entre los afrocubanos a tales cultos.”
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religions pertaining to those villages of Africa” from which the practices derived (196).119
With this point, the article’s third paragraph introduces more typologies—“Yoruba/Lucumí” 
and “Bantu/Mayombé”—that Lachatañeré simultaneously dissolves.
Lachatañeré does not fret about the transience of his distinctions. The tension 
between distinction and dissolution points to Lachatañeré’s main concern: “the essence of 
amalgamation.” Thus, he returns to religion, which he identifies as the pivot in the 
amalgamating process. Lachatañeré adds another element to his description of “religion” as 
“one of the most exuberant forms of expression in the cultural mosaic of Afro-Cubans.” The 
fact that elements of Afro-Cuban religion “have spilled out” beyond their original borders 
and “expanded among the Cuban pueblo” exposes “the primordial character of the beliefs of 
Afro-Cubans” (196).120 Here Lachatañeré repeats a phrase—“the character of the beliefs”—
he also uses with regard to the “eminent realism” of Afro-Cuban ideas. The repetition 
provides another important bridge: the “religious beliefs” are “primordial” because of their 
“eminent realism.” They derive from a properly materialistic outlook and are directed toward 
“triumph in life,” which in discussing shadow-work traditions Lachatañeré underscores as 
primordial desire. In figuring “Afro-Cuban beliefs” as the embodiment of that desire, 
Lachatañeré locates a mechanism for understanding the multifaceted amalgamations that 
determined “the Cuban cultural type.” 
Lachatañeré then turns to another religious amalgamation that parallels the 
“shuffl[ing of] African religions” within the Afro-Cuban “system of cultuses.” In fact, his 
main assertion in the introduction is that “the primordial character of the beliefs of Afro-
119
“[…] un sistema de cultos donde ha de suponerse se barajaron las religiones africanas pertenecientes 
a aquellos pueblos de África.”
120
“[…] el carácter primordial de las creencias de los afrocubanos.”
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Cubans […] allowed for interchanges with the Catholic religion” (196). Lachatañeré 
proceeds to outline the notable amalgamation—which he calls a “syncretism”—that resulted 
from these “interchanges”:
From the interchanges realized between Catholicism and the aforementioned 
African beliefs arose the syncretism between the saints of the Catholic 
pantheon and the deities of the respective African pantheons, creating in the 
exchange a new type of deity of well-differentiated characteristics that is 
known among the Afro-Cuban believers under the name of el santo [the saint]. 
From the current use of this word one derives another utilized to designate the 
fusion of the cultuses: the term santería. The continuous and exclusive use of 
this denomination [of deity as ‘santo’] has led us to recognize this original 
religion of Afro-Cubans under the name santería or culto a los santos [cultus 
to the saints]. (197; italics in original)
With the benefit of retrospect, we now know that this description of “the syncretism 
between the saints of the Catholic pantheon and the deities of the respective African 
pantheons” gave name and conceptual shape to contemporary Santeria. And in light of 
Santeria’s familiarity today, the clear artificiality of Lachatañeré’s last move is striking. In 
the short description, the dialectic between “Catholicism” and “African beliefs” leads 
Lachatañeré to the formulation of the synthetic term “santería.” In Lachatañeré’s 
characterization, “this original religion of Afro-Cubans” is a “syncretism” and, therefore, its 
name should reflect “the fusion of the cultuses.” Lachatañeré mimics the originality of a 
tradition in which practitioners develop the innovative vocabulary of ‘el santo’ in order to 
designate the creation of “a new type of deity.” He makes no secret of his fabrication of his 
use of “santería.” Lachatañeré emphasizes that “the continuous and exclusive use of [‘el 
santo’]” inspires his idea for “the name santería” but that the designation only “derives” 
from current usage. 
Lachatañeré and most of his readers in the early 1940s knew that few, if any, 
practitioners actually used “santería” to identify their practices. Most Spanish speakers at the 
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time rightly would have presumed that practitioners would want to distance themselves from 
that term. It already had familiar connotations. For centuries, “santería” held colloquial 
meaning as a reference to the seemingly obsessive dedication by a Catholic individual to 
particular saints. Thus, “santería” was implicitly dismissive. The word identified someone 
who did not seem to understand the nature of ultimate power as conceptualized in either 
Catholic doctrine or secular scientific theory. Instead, the ‘santero’ or ‘ santera’ dedicated 
unreasonable amounts of time and energy to the propitiation of saints who were, at worst, 
yet-another religious delusion and, at best, minor players in the cosmic drama. In other 
words, the term “santería” traditionally marked misguided ‘magic’ masquerading as Catholic 
devotion. 
Was that Lachatañeré’s point: that the name “santería” would expose the true nature 
of Afro-Cuban practices as ‘magical,’ that is, as arising from mistaken convictions about 
personified “deities” who held power in and over human affairs? In his description, 
Lachatañeré already indicates that he intends “santería” to mean something quite different. 
He proposes the designation as a way to “recognize this original religion of Afro-Cubans.” In 
the core of the article, Lachatañeré explicates the critical implication in his characterization: 
that as “religion,” santería clearly differs from “magic.” 
Accordingly, Lachatañeré’s summary of the “syncretism” between Catholicism and 
“African beliefs” and in his proposal to designate that “fusion of cultuses” as “santería” is an 
open trick. He does not invent the word; he tries to revalue it. And in working to invest 
familiar vocabulary with new meaning, Lachatañeré’s use of “santería” is an open trick. It is, 
as Fernando Ortiz subsequently underscored, a classic cubanismo. With it, Lachatañeré calls 
attention to his optical politics. He wants to force his readers to see something that they do 
212
not yet recognize: the dangerous presumptions tied up in the common usage of ‘santería.’ He 
uses his own creative construction to expose familiar ideas about santería as social 
productions instead of as facets of timeless truth. For him, the word “santería”—as a familiar 
fiction, as his own artificial derivation, as an “original religion of Afro-Cubans”—embodies a 
range of social innovations. But, beneath all of the “amalgamation” and “syncretism” and 
“fusion” that surfaces in the opening of “The Religious Beliefs of Afro-Cubans,” 
Lachatañeré already has gestured toward the “primordial” foundation that lies beneath all of 
“the interchanges” and that he will identify openly in the variations on ‘working a shadow’: 
the fundamental “desire to “triumph in life.” 
8.
In order to move toward his final insistence about the unifying foundational drive “to 
triumph,” Lachatañeré returns to the critical point of divergence implied in his formulation of 
“santería”: the distinction between “religion” and “magic.” Lachatañeré considers more fully 
“the primordial character of the beliefs of Afro-Cubans.” In the opening paragraphs of the 
article, Lachatañeré suggests that the elemental nature stems from “African religions” of 
particular “villages of Africa” (196). This claim enables him to differentiate among African 
practices. The African religions of which he speaks “pertain to those villages of Africa” that 
possessed “elevated status and, at the same time, the high quality of such religious forms” 
(196).121 The “status” and “quality” of these particular “religious forms,” Lachatañeré 
clarifies, “allowed for interchanges with the Catholic religion.” This distinction paves the 
121
 “[…] las religiones africanas pertenecientes a aquellos pueblos de África que, por su cifra elevada a 
la vez que la calidad de tales formas religiosas.”
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way for his reference to “the Yoruba and Bantú types” as “two groups of cultuses among 
those with which we are somewhat familiar.” 
The claims about the different “status” and “quality” of particular types of “African 
beliefs” structure Lachatañeré’s entire argument. The distinction sets up a comparison 
between “beliefs” according to the typology of “religion” versus “magic.” Lachatañeré 
reinforces this typology immediately after presenting his claim about “santería” designates 
an “original religion of Afro-Cubans.” With his next statement, he begins to demarcate 
“religion” by contrasting santería with another belief-type. He stresses that the recognition of 
“this original religion” enables a necessary “throwing out as incorrect the denomination 
brujería that until now has come to be applied to such beliefs” (197).122 Suddenly, the 
purpose of the article shifts radically. Lachatañeré no longer focuses on the direct explication 
of “santería” as an “original religion” but rather concerns himself with showing that Afro-
Cuban traditions should not be called ‘brujería.’ The “religious” character of santería comes 
into view in Lachatañeré’s discussion indirectly: through the act of “throwing out the 
denomination brujería as incorrect.” Lachatañeré fairly represents this agenda in the title of 
the article: an image of “the religious beliefs of Afro-Cubans” takes shape by delineating “the 
false application of the term ‘brujería.’”
For Lachatañeré, the categorization of Afro-Cuban beliefs is much more than an 
academic exercise. His call for a forceful “throwing out” [desechando] conveys his sense of 
urgency in attempting to revalue Afro-Cuban traditions. His plea for the rejection of a “false 
application” indicates that he feels a great deal is at stake in establishing santería as an 
“original religion.” As Lachatañeré launches into an investigation of the trickiness of words, 
122
“[…] desechando, por incorrecta, la denominación brujería que hasta ahora se ha venido aplicando a 
tales creencias.”
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his own language is appropriately tricky. At first glance, his call for the “throwing out as 
incorrect” suggests that “the denomination brujería” is entirely corrupt. However, other 
looks at the title and at the introductory paragraphs of the article indicate that for Lachatañeré 
the error stems not from the category but from particular uses of “brujería.” According to the 
title, the “term” is not necessarily “false” but rather the “application” of it to “the religious 
beliefs of Afro-Cubans.” Lachatañeré’s later statement corroborates the point: what must be 
“throw[n] out” apparently is not “the denomination brujería” as a whole but rather the fact 
that the term “until now has come to be applied to such beliefs.” 
Accordingly, Lachatañeré focuses on questions of “application.” He sets his sights on 
the use of “the term ‘brujería’” as an intellectual act with profound consequences. 
Lachatañeré tries to intervene by literally rewriting coming terms. As word and concept, 
‘santería’ embodies that effort. Lachatañeré recasts the words by which particular Afro-
Cuban beliefs are known. He pursues that objective through a review of the history of Afro-
Cuban studies. It is a dialectical maneuver, and Lachatañeré wastes no time in assessing the 
impact of particular academic categories of Cuban social life. He immediately points up the 
stakes tied up in the ethnographic study of Afro-Cubans since the field’s inception. Afro-
Cuban studies, Lachatañeré reminds his readers, began as an offshoot of criminology: “It 
seems that in the first quarter-century of our republic anthropological studies set out on the 
path to taking the Afro-Cuban type as good experimental material for speculations in the 
field where this branch of science studies criminality” (197).123 In other words, the discipline 
123
“Parece ser que en nuestro primer cuarto de siglo republicano los estudios de antropología se 
encaminaron a tomar el tipo afrocubano como un buen material de ensayo para especulaciones en el campo 
donde esta rama de ciencia estudia la criminalidad.”
215
was founded on the principle that Afro-Cubans were prone to criminal behavior and that their 
activities needed to be studied in order to monitor and reform those dangerous tendencies. 
Lachatañeré immediately skewers those initial assumptions as false and notes how 
they have misdirected “speculations” in the field ever since. Anthropological studies during 
the twenty-five years following independence in 1902, he summarizes, “fail[ed] in the 
selection of methods appropriate to discuss other aspects of Afro-Cuban life” (197).124
Lachatañeré does not follow up his accusation with direct explanation of which “methods” 
would be “appropriate” but only hints at alternatives by way of further critique. He proceeds 
with his historical review of the founding methodological and conceptual “failing” of Afro-
Cuban studies. In a bold move, he singles out the initial “speculations” of Fernando Ortiz as 
pioneering but faulty:
Fernando Ortiz, who has the unquestionable merit of having discovered the 
existence of Afro-Cuban religious forms, pushed along this current in Cuban 
anthropological studies, leading to false execution in discussion of the material 
that he had carefully collected. (197)125
With this statement, Lachatañeré locates a key methodological error: the materials on which 
Ortiz depended, even if “carefully collected,” were unreliable. He details the problems:
In this material, or catalogue of reports received from informants and imbued 
with the weight of fact, there was erroneous information, perhaps because the 
informants at times were very reserved and in other cases had bad intentions. 
Moreover, such material was compared with information proceeding from very 
particular African sources. Add to this the failure in the election of a method of 
124
“[…] fallándose en la elección de métodos apropriados para discutir otros aspectos de la vida del 
afrocubano.”
125
“Esta corriente en los estudios antropológicos cubanos arrastró al professor Fernando Ortiz, quien 
tiene el mérito indiscutible de haber descubierto la existencia de las formas religiosas afrocubanos, al 
planteamiento falso de la discusión del material que cuidadosamente había colectado.”
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discussion, and the true nature of the problem was necessarily obscured. 
(197)126
 “But the first step was already taken,” Lachatañeré notes. On the next page, Lachatañeré 
summarizes the problem and offers a typical deferral of direct response: “Departing from this 
false interpretation of the foundational concept, our professor incurred other errors that we 
will revise further ahead” (198).127 For Lachatañeré, the bottom line is that Ortiz laid a shaky 
methodological and historiographic foundation for Afro-Cuban studies.
Nevertheless, Lachatañeré does not throw all the blame on his teacher. In fact, he 
asserts that Ortiz served as an intellectual missionary to Cuba of a theoretical doctrine that 
was not of his own design. Ortiz’s methodological imprecision, which enabled his loose 
“speculations” about “the Afro-Cuban type,” derived from flaws at the heart of turn-of-the-
century European and North American social science. In this way, Lachatañeré is able to 
celebrate his mentor as an intellectual pioneer who is not ultimately responsible for the 
“errors” that flow from his “foundational concept.” Lachatañeré highlights Ortiz’s “merits 
[as] initiator of modern Afro-Cuban studies.” Ortiz, he adds,
opened the doors to new investigations in this field—continued almost 
exclusively by him, such that Cuban scholars still look down on this class of 
studies or pursue it with reservations—and his work has shed much light on the 
discussion of the problem. (197)128
126
“En este material o catalogación de las informaciones recibidas de gentes enteradas, al parecer 
procedentes del lugar de los hechos, había datos erróneos, quizá porque los informantes unas veces fueron muy 
reservados, otras muy mal intencionados. Por otra parte, tal material fue comparado con datos procedentes de 
fuentes africanas muy exactas, y añadiendo a esto la falla en elección del método para la discusión, 
necesariamente se hubo de desvirtuar la real naturaleza del problema.”
127
“Partiendo de esta falsa interpretación del primer concepto, nuestro profesor incurre otros errors que 
revisaremos más adelante.”
128
“Fernando Ortiz abría las puertas a nuevas investigaciones en este campo, las cuales, continuadas 
casi exclusivamente por él, ya que la gente de estudio en Cuba aún desprecia esta clase de estudios o los sigue 
con reservas, han proporcionado mucha luz en la discusión del problema.”
217
However, despite Ortiz’s singular effort and influence, “the discussion of the Afro-Cuban 
problem” unfolded “in accordance with the concepts of contemporary social anthropology” 
(197).129
With this point, Lachatañeré situates Ortiz as an exemplar of a broader social 
scientific discourse that serves as the real focus of critique. His attack on the foundational 
“errors” of Ortiz—his mentor and a Cuban intellectual icon—is not personal but is, as 
Nicolás Guillén notes in 1951, an iconoclasm directed toward the hegemony of European and 
North American social science. Again, Lachatañeré perceives that Cuban social life hangs in 
the balance since “the concepts of contemporary social anthropology” shape Cuban identity 
at home and abroad. They function as “regulating concepts,” as he later calls them. They 
have powerful effects on the material lives of Cubans.
Accordingly, Lachatañeré does not let up on his critique. He continues to focus on the 
manner in which Ortiz instituted “regulating concepts” grounded in racial “prejudice.” He 
links the influential knowledge-production of “contemporary social science” to the specific 
words that he considers the embodiment of prejudice. Thus, Lachatañeré pinpoints the 
pivotal mistake of Ortiz’s groundbreaking 1906 book, El hampa afrocubano: los negros 
brujos [The Afro-Cuban Underworld: The Black Witch-Doctors]: its terminology. He notes, 
“in the discussion presented Fernando Ortiz employs the term brujería to designate the 
beliefs of Afro-Cubans; in that way Ortiz applies the term brujo to the priests of the cultuses” 
129In his published response to “The Religious Beliefs of Afro-Cubans,” Ortiz heartily agrees with 
Lachatañeré’s assessment that Afro-Cuban studies was founded “in accordance with the concepts of 
contemporary social anthropology.” In Chapter 5, I focus at length on Ortiz’s response and his description of his 
relationship to turn-of-the-century social science. 
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(198).130 Lachatañeré presents the consequential problem with Ortiz’s vocabulary: “the use of 
this designation, […] in its basic purpose, is discriminatory” (198).131 The terminology 
carries negative connotations about the nature of Afro-Cubans, such that they have been 
subjected to social discrimination. 
So how, specifically, is “the use of this designation, “in its basic purpose, 
discriminatory”? Again, Lachatañeré indicates that the issue boils down to the categorization 
of “beliefs.” When he points out that Ortiz “recognizes the term brujería to designate the 
beliefs of Afro-Cubans,” Lachatañeré implies that his teacher does not distinguish belief-
types; he racializes the discourse by lumping together all “Afro-Cuban beliefs” as if their 
character derives from some quality intrinsic to their “Afro”-ness. As Lachatañeré previously 
stated, “speculations in the field” stem from the presumption that “Afro” peoples are prone to 
criminal behavior. It is that issue—“whether or not in Cuba so-called criminal actions were 
committed because of brujería”—that he takes up later in the article. 
More immediately, Lachatañeré censures what he considers Ortiz’s imprecise 
distinction of words and concepts related to African traditions. Ortiz’s lack of linguistic 
discrimination, he implies, produces discrimination of another sort. As he continues, 
Lachatañeré even links Ortiz’s vocabulary to other “indiscriminately designated” but 
foundational terms: 
Professor Ortiz departed, in accepting the application of this terminology, from 
the word fetiço [Eng. ‘fetish’], utilized by the Portuguese during the Age of 
Discovery to designate indiscriminately objects of adoration among Africans, 
and from which was derived the term fetichero to designate priests. 
Accordingly, [Ortiz] says: ‘In Cuba one without doubt calls the fetichero
130
“En la discusión Fernando Ortiz se reconoce el término brujería para designar las creencias de los 
afrocubanos; así como se aplica el término del brujo a los sacerdotes de los cultos.”
131
“El uso de esta designación, la que, de primera intención, diremos que es discriminitiva.”
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‘brujo’ because, upon translating for the first time this word (whose root is 
Portuguese), it still had not been introduced into the vocabulary used in Cuba.’ 
(198)132
Lachatañeré follows up this historical excavation of Ortiz’s use of ‘brujo’ with an 
alternate genealogy of the term. In the second case, he explains how Afro-Cubans “apply 
[the] concept” of ‘brujo’. According to Lachatañeré, in African contexts the term has a 
technical meaning: it distinguishes particular types of “priests or priestesses […] who have a 
preference for the practice of black magic [magia negra].” Thus, Lachatañeré delineates 
some of the rich Afro-Cuban vocabulary regarding “clergy” of various types. 
Afro-Cubans designate priests in accordance with the cultuses, at times, and in 
other cases utilize the priestly lineages derived from Africa. In that way, they 
call the priests of the Mayombe cultuses Mayomberos and for those of the 
Lucumí cultuses they utilize distinct priestly hierarchies derived from the 
Yoruba, such as babalawo, ialisha o yalocha, etc.; and they call those priests or 
priestesses—or, people outside of the clergy who have a preference for the 
practice of black magic—brujos or brujas, applying such a concept in the same 
manner that it is applied in African societies. (198)133
Lachatañeré’s point is clear: Ortiz’s use of ‘brujo’ is an obvious and gross colonial 
generalization while the Afro-Cuban “concept” accurately reflects the social complexity of 
African and Afro-Cuban communities; Ortiz “accept[s] the application of this terminology 
utilized by the Portuguese during the Age of Discovery to designate indiscriminately objects 
of adoration among Africans” and even admits that ‘brujo’ was simply an approximate 
132
“Parte el professor Ortiz, para aceptar la aplicación de esta terminología, del vocablo fetiço, utilizado 
por los portugueses de la época de los descubrimientos para designar indiscriminadamente los objetos de 
adoración de los africanos, y del cual se derivó del término fetichero para designar los sacerdotes. Así, este 
autor dice: “Al fetichero se le llama en Cuba brujo sin duda porque al traducir por primera vez la palabra, que 
en el lenguaje africano significaba fetichero, aún esta última (cuya raíz es portuguesa) no había introducida en el 
vocabulario usado en Cuba.”
133
“Los afrocubanos designan a los sacerdotes de acuerdo con los cultos, unas veces, y otras utilizando 
las líneas sacerdotales procedentes de África. Así, a los sacerdotes de los cultos mayombe los nombran 
mayomberos, y a los de los cultos lucumí los nombran utilizando distintas jerarquías sacerdotales procedentes 
de Yoruba, tales como babalawo, ialisha o yalocha, etc.; y les llaman brujos o brujas a aquellos sacerdotes o 
sacerdotisas, o gente fuera del sacerdocio, que tienen preferencia por las prácticas de magia negra, aplicando 
dicho concepto en la misma forma que éste se aplica en las sociedades africanas.”
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substitute for that indiscriminate designation since fetichero “still had not been introduced 
into the vocabulary used in Cuba” at the time.
However, even if he is critical of a derogatory and generalized notion of ‘brujo,’ 
Lachatañeré highlights the lasting effects of Ortiz’s terminology. It quickly stuck, and it 
continued to circulate in scholarly and popular discourse alike. Lachatañeré holds Afro-
Cubans themselves largely accountable for the situation. They too played a pivotal role in 
ensuring the continued viability of the “false application” of terms to their own traditions. He 
explains: 
Later it is seen that Afro-Cubans did not think about those grammatical 
speculations rather than accepting that the terms santero or santera—as those 
that actually generically designate priests and priestesses, respectively—have 
been utilized in the wake of the studies of Fernando Ortiz. (198)134
Lachatañeré’s delineation of the variety of Afro-Cuban terms for “the clergy” [el sacerdocio] 
reinforces the point, as he underscores the inconsistency of language: practitioners “accept” 
outsiders’ terms, employ words “in accordance with the cultuses, at times, and in other cases 
utilize the priestly lineages derived from Africa." Afro-Cubans, it seems, corroborate —
through disinterest and tacit acceptance—the "grammatical speculations" with which they 
never have been concerned.
And by linking the array of Afro-Cuban terms for “priests and priestesses” to a 
genealogy of Ortiz’s “grammatical speculations,” Lachatañeré illuminates the trickiness of 
the subject at hand. He shows his readers, once again, that these distinct vocabularies also 
intertwine or eventually “amalgamate”: Ortiz exploits the “indiscriminate” terminology of 
the Portuguese colonial project in Africa while Afro-Cubans draw on the discriminating 
134
“Más tarde se ha visto que los afrocubanos no pensaron en esas especulaciones gramaticales, sino 
que, aceptando que el término santero o santera, con los que actualmente se designan genéricamente a los 
sacerdotes y sacerdotisas, respectivamente, se hayan utilizado posteriormente a los estudios de Fernando Ortiz.”
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technical vocabulary of those very African societies the Portuguese opened up to 
colonization; yet, these conflicting linguistic systems apparently congeal around the words 
‘brujo,’ ‘bruja,’ and ‘brujería,’ which endure in Cuba’s vocabulary because of racial 
prejudice and because Afro-Cubans never thought to contest the terms openly.
Lachatañeré takes it upon himself to unsettle the terminology. In typical fashion, 
Lachatañeré plays another open trick. He raises no questions about the designations for 
African and Afro-Cuban “clergy.” However, he once again employs terms—“sacerdotes and 
sacerdotisas” (priests and priestesses)—that are he calls “generic” but that practitioners 
themselves do not necessarily use. In fact, “The Religious Beliefs of Afro-Cubans” is full of 
transpositions of familiar Catholic terms to unfamiliar elements of “this original religion” 
that Lachatañeré has designated “santería.” He calls Afro-Cuban ceremonies “ritual and
liturgy” [ritual y liturgia] (200); the followers of the “priests” are “acolytes” [acólitos] (201); 
and so on. Lachatañeré uses Church terminology to unsettle common ideas and practices. 
The main purpose of his article, after all, is to challenge the “false application of the term 
brujería” and its attendant understandings of Afro-Cuban traditions. He points up these 
characterizations as “discriminatory” in order to argue that santería stands on its own as “an 
original religion” parallel and equal to Catholicism and other major “religions.” 
9.
But if Lachatañeré’s genealogy of terms for “priests and priestesses” reinforces the 
image of santería as an “original religion,” his discussion of the terminology also serves 
another purpose. The distinction of vocabulary sets up Lachatañeré’s characterization of non-
“religious,” or “magical,” types. At the end of the passage on competing terminologies, 
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Lachatañeré explains that ‘brujo’ and ‘bruja’ refer, in the technical sense, to a specific kind 
of “clergy.” Afro-Cubans, he notes, sometimes “call those priests or priestesses—or, people 
outside of the clergy who have a preference for the practice of black magic—brujos or 
brujas, applying such a concept in the same manner that it is applied in African societies.” 
However, the appositive clause in Lachatañeré’s statement pushes directly against the point 
of the sentence. Lachatañeré affirms that brujos and brujas are “priests” and “priestesses” of 
a particular sort. However, the aside says that they are no such thing; brujos and brujas are, 
in fact, “people outside of the clergy.” Their “preference for the practice of black magic” 
seems to cut them out of “the priestly lineages” that Lachatañeré mentions. 
In this way, Lachatañeré begins to flesh out a typology of two distinct social realities: 
“religion” and “black magic.” This distinction is profound because it leads to a key 
implication in Lachatañeré’s discussion: ‘brujería’ does actually exist. Its existence is all the 
more reason why the “false application of the term” to “religious beliefs” must be “throw[n] 
out as incorrect.” As the technical use of ‘brujería’ in Africa suggests, that word is simply 
another term for “black magic.” Through much of the article Lachatañeré uses “brujería” and 
“black magic” interchangeably in referring to non-“religious” types, and this tendency 
underscores his understanding that brujería is a social reality.
But what is brujería, or “black magic,” for Lachatañeré? What do brujos and brujas 
do that places them “outside of the clergy”? If “religious beliefs” do not naturally induce 
criminality, as Lachatañeré eventually argues, what about “practices of black magic”? Are 
they inherently “criminal”? In the remaining pages of the article leading up to the concluding 
section, Lachatañeré tries to sort out such questions about the differences between “religion” 
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and “brujería.” In doing so, he offers an answer to the last question that, at first flush, might 
sound surprising: In his estimation, “black magic” is implicitly criminal. 
This ostensibly straightforward characterization depends upon the critical distinctions 
that Lachatañeré develops in the opening and closing sections of the article. As he asserts in 
the concluding paragraphs, criminal activities—“so-called delitos criminales”—arise from 
specific material conditions, that is, from the “economic and social base” of a society. In the 
first paragraphs, he highlights the diversity of and in African and Cuban communities that 
necessitates a discriminatingly “appropriate method for discussing” social difference. By 
extension, criminal activity should be accounted for through better approaches than the 
“speculations”—conceptual as well as grammatical—of the criminological anthropology on 
which Afro-Cuban studies had been based according to Lachatañeré. 
His genealogies of terms and concepts intend to serve that purpose. Thus, 
Lachatañeré preserves the term “magic” as a way of signifying a certain type of materially 
determined activity considered “criminal” within its social context. He eventually makes that 
point through his concluding example of ‘working a shadow.’ In every case, it is a practice 
“that one can consider as an act produced by or with reason for existence in [its socio-
economic] atmosphere,” and therefore its “efficacy” shifts as it changes social contexts (203). 
Lachatañeré supports that critical idea through an intervening discussion of “black magic” 
and brujería. His assertion is that practices as well as their categorizations are always 
relational; a social act—and the manner in which it is viewed—arises from its specific 
“environment.” Therefore, Lachatañeré considers brujería and the more general term “black 
magic” as legitimate designations for practice that members of a society consider “antisocial” 
or “criminal.”
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Lachatañeré continues his genealogy of ‘brujería’ along those socio-historical lines. 
He reiterates his call to “throw out as incorrect the denomination” because ‘brujería’ derives 
from the dismissive outsider’s perspective of Portuguese colonizers:
As we said before, we are completely opposed to the utilization of the term 
brujería, not only to designate the beliefs of Afro-Cubans but also the 
manifestations of similar phenomena produced in other parts of the New 
World. (198-99)135
To build his case against the application of ‘brujería’ to any African-influenced, New World 
system of “beliefs,” Lachatañeré expands his description of how the “concept [of the ‘brujo’] 
was applied in African societies.” He illuminates once again the cultural diversity of Africa 
but explains that a similar notion of ‘the brujo’ cut across all African communities: 
In it original sense, this word—from the most rudimentary African society of 
the Bush Men or the Hottentots to the most advanced cultures of the Yoruba or 
the Bantu—is applied to determine an antisocial agent or disturbance. The 
brujo in any African society was always considered an unnatural whose 
criminal acts deserved complete repulsion. They were severely condemned 
with the penalty of death and precisely the same priests were charged with 
judging them.136
With this explanation, Lachatañeré tries to expose Ortiz’s articulation of ‘brujo’—ostensibly 
based on a translation of fetichero—as “false.” Lachatañeré appeals to the “original sense” of 
‘brujo’ and outlines the significance of native vocabulary. This history of the term reveals 
that every African society had a concept of “an antisocial or disturbing agent” defined in 
direct opposition to “priests” charged with judging outcasts. Lachatañeré’s genealogy of 
135
“Como decíamos con anterioridad, nosotros estamos completamente opuestos a la utilización del 
término brujería, no solo para designar las creencias afrocubanas, sino las manifestaciones de esta naturaleza 
que se produzcan en otras partes del Nuevo Mundo.”
136
“En primer término, este vocablo, desde la más rudimentaria sociedad Africana de los bush men o 
los hotentotes hasta la muy adelantadas culturas de los yoruba o los bantú, es aplicado para determinar un 
agente antisocial o perturbador. El brujo en cualquier sociedad Africana fue siempre considerado como un 
desnaturalizado, cuyos actos criminales merecían toda repulsión. Eran severamente castigados con la pena de 
muerte, y precisamente los propios sacerdotes estaban encargados de juzgarlos.”
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‘brujería,’ as an alternative to Ortiz’s explanation, suggests that the “antisocial agent” is an 
inevitable social category. 
As he proceeds, Lachatañeré underscores how the intrasocietal, relational sense of the 
term ‘brujería’ was lost in Ortiz’s translation, such that “African beliefs” as a whole are now 
marked as antisocial, unnatural, repulsive, and –in a word– criminal. He admits that, as 
“slaves transposed their beliefs intact to the New World,” “certainly” they “had to bring as 
well this concept of brujería as criminal” (199).137 However, the designation is now rotten 
beyond repair. “What happened,” Lachatañeré clarifies, “is that until a short time ago the 
study of the African survivals in the New World has been carried out with a distinct laziness 
and, at times, has applied to them racial and religious prejudices” (199).138
To drive the home the point as well as to offer an example of some of the recent 
exceptions to these “racial and religious prejudices,” Lachatañeré cites some critical 
observations made by Alice Werner in her 1925 text, The Mythology of All Races, about the 
“faulty establishment” of scholarship on African “survivals” in the West Indies and United 
States South: 
‘A mistake which has sometimes been made with regard to (the Obi and 
‘Voodoo’ rites in the West Indies and the Southern States of America) is to 
treat them as normal manifestations of African religion, where as they 
represent not mere unauthorized but illicit practice. It should be remembered 
that most, if not all, of the slaves VOLUNTARY sold by their own tribes, in 
the days when the trade flourished, were either criminals, or debtors. Similarly, 
we find some writers even now confusing witches and witch-doctors as much 
as if one made no distinction between the thief and policeman.’
137
“¿Por qué si los esclavos trasladaron íntegras sus creencias al Nuevo Mundo, no hubieron de traer 
también este concepto criminoso de la brujería? Ciertamente lo trajeron.”
138
“Lo que ocurre es que hasta hace muy poco tiempo el estudio de las supervivencias africanas en el 
Nuevo Mundo se ha llevado a cabo con cierta ligereza, y a veces aplicándose prejuicios raciales y religiosos.”
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Lachatañeré insists that “Werner, in recognizing the confusion that has been made between 
witch and witch-doctor—a very appropriate phrase for sure—gives us the key to 
understanding the manner in which this same error was committed in Cuba” (199).139 In the 
same way, scholarship in Cuba has conflated “priests” and “brujos” in that same manner that, 
according to Werner, “‘we find some writers even now confusing witches [religious figures] 
and witch-doctors [illicit magicians]’” when it comes to “‘manifestations of African 
religion.’” Lachatañeré’s “key to understanding” entails the recognition that people who 
“represent not mere unauthorized but illicit practice” did actually exist in every African and 
African-American community but that these “witch-doctors” were already a distinct and 
reviled minority even before Western scholars like Ortiz lumped together all African-derived 
practices as illicit. 
Despite his corroboration of Werner’s “very appropriate” observations, Lachatañeré 
does take issue with her claim that many slaves were sold into slavery by their own tribes 
because the “most, if not all, […] were either criminals, or debtors.” He turns to other 
contemporary scholarship, including the work of Melville Herskovits on Haiti, to underscore 
the diversity among Africans brought to the Americas. The Atlantic slave trade, Lachatañeré 
explains, 
was a business sufficiently well organized so that the avarice of the native 
traffickers, stimulated at the same time by the greed of the European 
traffickers, poured into the barracks of the western coast of Africa not only 
criminals and those stripped of all social status but also people of all 
categories, from priests probably up to princes. (199)140
139
“Alice Werner, al reconocer la confusión que se hace entre witch y witch-doctor, con una muy 
acertada frase por cierto, nos da la clave para entender de qué modo este error fue cometido en Cuba.”
140
“[…] fue un comercio lo suficientemente bien organizado para que la codicia de los traficantes
nativos, estimulados a su vez por la codicia de los traficantes europeos, vertiera en los barracones de la costa 
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This clarification enables Lachatañeré to build his argument for the legitimacy of santería  by 
(1) highlighting the clear separation between “religion” and “magic” in Africa and then (2) 
demonstrating that the bulk of Afro-Cuban tradition developed from legitimate “religions” 
and not, as typically conceived, from “black magic.”
Lachatañeré sharpens this point by insisting, in contrast to Werner’s characterization, 
that Afro-Cuban cultuses derived principally from the well-respected “clergy” and not from 
representatives of “illicit practice.” He makes this point in the strongest possible terms: “It is 
undeniable that in actuality the cultuses we find in Cuba were founded by elements with an 
intimate connection to the clergy of the African religions that contributed to [Afro-Cuban 
cultic] elaboration, if [those elements] were not in fact priests themselves” (199).141 To 
support this claim about the clerical roots of most Afro-Cuban traditions, Lachatañeré 
highlights the importance in the Cuban context of the Odus de Ifa, a collection of “high” 
Yoruba divination texts. He argues that the undiminished stature of the Odus de Ifa over 
many centuries demonstrates that non-magical, “religious” elements—a veritable religio-
political “aristocracy”—held primary influence in Afro-Cuban communities from the very 
start. “At the very least,” Lachatañeré continues,
the presence of the Odus de Ifa, coming from the Yoruba cultures, in the 
practices of the Lucumí, of which we have been able to collect three different 
versions, signifies that these were introduced by genuine babalawos or high 
Yoruba priests, since their complicated mechanism and the knowledge required 
for their operation makes it impossible that they pass to the general population. 
Moreover, those that patiently studied the operation of the divinations were 
people of the aristocracy who utilized the acquired wisdom in pursuit of the 
aforementioned texts of Ifa as a political instrument enmeshed in the relations 
occidental de África no solo criminales y gente desclasada, sino a personas de todas las categories, desde 
sacerdotes hasta quizá príncipes.”
141
 “Es indudable que los cultos que en la actualidad encontramos en Cuba fueron fundados por 
elementos en íntima conexión con el sacerdocio de las religiones africanas que concurrieron a su elaboración, si 
no fueron sus sacerdotes.”
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between the people and the State. People of this quality knew how to 
differentiate brujería from religion. (199-200)142
Lachatañeré’s underlying assumptions surface unmistakably in this passage, 
punctuated clearly by the last sentence. Lachatañeré highlights the “quality” of the African 
“priests” as proof that the Afro-Cuban traditions that they established constitute sophisticated 
“religions” and, by extension, that the communities they led were respectable. At the same 
time, Lachatañeré fortifies the notion of “religion” itself as socially acceptable—versus the 
unsettling possibilities of brujería—by emphasizing the discriminating wisdom of “genuine 
babalawos or high Yoruba priests” who would not succumb to such “illicit practices.” Still, 
this point only reinforces the reality of “unauthorized” endeavors. Lachatañeré—like the wise 
priests to whom he calls attention—recognizes the existence of “black magic” in showing his 
readers “how to differentiate brujería from religion.” He also reminds his readers of the 
Marxian contours of his discussion of Afro-Cuban traditions: esoteric knowledge, like any 
form of scholarship, necessarily functions “as a political instrument enmeshed in the relations 
between the people and the State.” 
10.
Lachatañeré’s whole project revolves around that nexus between knowledge and 
social power, and he continues to hone in on the link through an exploration of the mutual 
constitution of “magic” and “religion.” Accordingly, he investigates further the presence of 
142
“A lo menos, la presencia de los Odus de Ifa, procedentes de las culturas yoruba, en las prácticas de 
los lucumí, de los cuales hemos podido colectar tres versiones distintas, significa que éstos fueron introducidos 
por genuinos babalawos o máximos sacerdotes yoruba, ya que su complicado mecanismo y la sabiduría 
requerida para su manejo imposibilitaban que pasaran a la gente del pueblo. Además, que aquellos que 
pacientemente se aleccionaban en el manejo del oráculo eran gente de la aristocracía que utilizaban la sabiduría 
adquirida en el aprendizaje del mencionado oráculo de Ifa como un instrumento político engazado en las 
relaciones entre el pueblo y el Estado. Gente de esta calidad sabía diferenciar la brujería de la religion.”
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brujería in Cuba and throughout the Americas. Again, his critical assumption is that 
brujería—and “magic” more generally—exist as social realities against which the properly 
“religious” ‘santería’ takes shape. “It is also undeniable,” he asserts, “that as much in Cuba 
as in other parts of the New World where there was slavery, brujos entered, perhaps in 
greater proportion than priests; and if the aforementioned priests exercised their profession, 
similarly would such brujos use their evil arts” (200).143 Lachatañeré continues: “If one 
accepts [that such brujos used their evil arts], one also has to accept that their practices were 
in antagonism with the religious practices.”144 But this description of the mutually 
constituting “antagonism” between “brujería” and “religion” allows Lachatañeré to emphasis 
once again the dialectics of history. The implicit opposition between the two social forms 
enables a synthesis and, ultimately, gestures for Lachatañeré toward a measure of 
redemption. “It is very possible,” he notes, “that these brujos, through the process of 
amalgamation, evolved toward the original cultuses that were born, such that it is no longer 
brujería but santería” (200).145 Lachatañeré turns back to the previously discussed 
“syncretism” of African religions and Catholicism as the model for what probably happened 
between socially acceptable and illicit practices:
If one recognizes that the religious practices of Afro-Cubans are mixtures of 
elements of Catholic ritual and liturgy due to the aforementioned interchange, 
why would not Afro-Cuban cultuses appropriate—as in reality has happened—
certain ethical and moral principles of Christianity? […Similarly,] accept that 
143
“Es indudable también que tanto en Cuba como en las otras partes del Nuevo Mundo donde hubo 
esclavitud, entraron brujos, quizá en mayor proporción que sacerdotes; y si los sacerdotes mencionados 
ejercieron su profesión, justo es que tales brujos usaran de sus malas artes.”
144
“Si esto se acepta, también ha de aceptarse que sus prácticas estuvieron en antagonismo con las 
prácticas religiosas.”
145
 “Es muy possible,” he notes, “que estos brujos en el proceso de la amalgama evolucionaran hacia 
los cultos originales que nacían, lo que ya no es brujería sino santería, en el caso específico que estamos 
estudiando.”
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there could have been ‘alliances’ between brujos and sacerdotes [priests]. 
(200)146
This observation brings Lachatañeré to the end of his argument for why ‘brujería,’ when 
applied to “the religious beliefs of Afro-Cuban,” is “false.” By Lachatañeré’s logic, 
‘brujería’ does not fit as an umbrella term for Afro-Cuban cultuses because—in an 
amalgamation parallel to the “interchange” between the African and Catholic “religions”—
brujos clearly would adopt “certain ethical and moral principles” that would pull the “witch-
doctors” out of their sphere of “illicit practice.” “The ‘alliances’ between brujos and 
sacerdotes,” Lachatañeré summarizes, “could have endured up to the present moment, but 
they would not fall under the term brujería to designate the system of Afro-Cuban cultuses” 
(200; italics in original).147 Technically speaking, ‘brujería’ simply cannot encompass the 
diversity of those cultic forms. 
Nevertheless, palpable uncertainty surfaces in the paragraph in which Lachatañeré 
ostensibly seals his argument about the fallacious use of ‘brujería’ in reference to any and 
every Afro-Cuban tradition. In earlier paragraphs, he highlights that “illicit practice” is an 
inevitable social production determined by and determining the majority. However, his 
suggestion that “the process of amalgamation” could bring brujos—as social outcasts—into 
the “ethical and moral” fold points in another direction. Lachatañeré implies that 
marginalized populations actually can be integrated and that “criminal” is not only a relative 
concept. However, the syntax of the passage suggests that social integration remains more 
146
“Si se reconoce que las prácticas religiosas de los afrocubanos están colmadas de elementos del 
ritual y liturgia católicos a causa de los intercambios mencionados, ¿por qué los cultos afrocubanos no hubieron 
de apropriarse –como realmente lo han hecho– de ciertos principios éticos y morales del cristianismo? … 
Acéptese que pudo haber ‘alianzas’ entre brujos y sacerdotes.”
147
 “[…] ‘alianzas’ entre brujos y sacerdotes, las que puede que hayan perdurado hasta los momentos 
actuales, pero no se caiga en el término brujería para denominar el sistema de cultos afrocubanos.”
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hope than reality. Lachatañeré frames his observations, which are supposedly historical, in 
the subjunctive tense. The grammar makes clear that Lachatañeré’s historiography is
uncertain and somewhat hypothetical. For instance, he signals his shift in focus from 
acknowledgement of brujería’s existence in Cuba with a less-than-definitive assertion that “it 
is very possible that these brujos […] evolved.” At one point in the paragraph, he limits his 
proposition to “the specific case that we are studying.” 
Lachatañeré’s hesitation surfaces more noticeably in the Spanish constructions. He 
begins each of the two preceding paragraphs with the forceful keynote, “It is indubitable” 
[“es indudable”]. However, in this case he shifts registers to “es muy posible" [it is very 
possible], and the clause necessarily casts the following action—“that the brujos evolved”—
into the subjunctive mode. Lachatañeré uses “evolucionaran,” the subjunctive form of the 
verb evolucionar, to signal uncertainty. Even his forceful imperative (“acéptese” [Accept 
that…]) is marked by doubt. He implores his reader to accept only that “there could have 
been ‘alliances.’  Therefore, he must once again operate subjunctively: These alliances 
“could have endured” [puede que hayan perdurado] and Afro-Cuban cultuses “would not fall 
under the term brujería” [no se caiga en el término brujería].
By casting brujería’s status in Cuba in uncertain terms, Lachatañeré fortifies other 
important dialectical movements—between history and possibility, fact and will—within his 
discourse. Throughout most of his discussion, Lachatañeré’s focus is historical. In this 
section, his perspective drifts into the conditional. The uncertainty marks a challenge; it 
function as a call to action. The sense of historical incompletion foreshadows the article’s 
final section, where Lachatañeré returns to magic from another direction in order to lay hold 
of the redemptive drive implicit in shadow-work.
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More immediately, Lachatañeré shifts back to a more assertive tone. He strikes a note 
of conviction as he returns more directly to an exploration of the relation between 
knowledge-production and power. “It is certain,” he suddenly declares, “that in Cuba, among 
people alienated from the details of the Afro-Cuban problem, the term brujería is used in its 
occidental meaning” (200).148 With this transition, Lachatañeré adds another branch to his 
expanding genealogy of the concept of brujería. If Fernando Ortiz translated the unfamiliar 
Portuguese-rooted term ‘fetichero’ as ‘brujo,’ he apparently did so because the latter word 
had an “occidental meaning” that made it familiar to Cubans. According to Lachatañeré, that 
popular understanding colors the contemporary use of ‘brujería,’ overwhelming its technical 
connotations and rendering the term unusable. The “occidental meaning” of the term, 
Lachatañeré explains, is 
fed by religious prejudice, in the manner that everything that is not within the 
pompous magic of Catholic liturgy has to be considered heresy. The truth is 
that the regulating concept of brujería corresponds to that which was applied to 
medieval magicians and which was applied to the beliefs of Africans by the 
Capuchin monks that went to Christianize the Congo. (200-1)149
Lachatañeré then cites a long passage in order to “see if the assessment by the Capuchin 
Merolla da Sorrento about the nganga of the Congo is not the same that persists in official 
spheres of Cuba” (201).150 In the wake of the citation, Lachatañeré comes to the harsh 
conclusion that, indeed, the “sixteenth-century concept that missionaries to Congo had about 
148
“Es cierto que en Cuba, entre personas alejadas de los pormenores del problema afrocubana, se usa 
el término brujería en su acepción occidental.”
149
“[…] alimentada por prejuicios religiosos, de modo que todo lo que no esté bajo la pomposa magia 
de la liturgia católica ha de ser considerado como herejía […]. La verdad es que el concepto policiaco de la 
brujería está medido con el que se le aplicaba a los mágicos medievales, y que fue aplicado a las creencias de 
los africanos por los monjes capuchinos que fueron a cristianizar el Congo.”
150
“Veamos si la apreciación del capuchino Merolla de Sorento sobre los nganga del Congo no es la 
misma que perdura en las esferas oficiales de Cuba.”
233
the ‘rain-makers’ is practically the same as the one maintained by Cuban authorities to 
measure the ‘crime of brujería’” (201).151
As he continues, Lachatañeré reaches the climax of his discussion. He emphasizes 
that the use of ‘brujería’—with its “occidental meaning, fed by religious prejudice”—is 
enormously consequential. Real lives are at stake:
Police round-ups are still actually organized to imprison priests and their 
acolytes in the places where santería ceremonies and rituals are celebrated. 
This simply signifies the disdain that the study of this aspect of Afro-Cuban 
life has caused, which is reflected in other forms of racial discrimination.152
Lachatañeré’s reference to the various “forms of racial discrimination” actually “caused” by 
Afro-Cuban studies clearly lays out his understanding of the social effects of academic 
discourse and the subsequent need for his revaluation of conceptual and grammatical 
“speculations.”
From this angle, Lachatañeré comes to the decisive moment that sets up the 
remainder of his discussion. His critical revaluations carry special urgency in light of the 
policing and other discriminatory practices that stem from the inherent “religious prejudice” 
embodied in the term brujería. It is here that Lachatañeré insists, “The question to make clear 
is whether in Cuba the so-called criminal actions were committed because of brujería, during 
the slave epoch or in the Republican period.” Lachatañeré pursues that task—“to make 
clear”—with his review of the scholarship on Afro-Cuban practices. And with that phrase, he 
151
“Este concepto que tenían los misioneros que fueron al Congo en el siglo XVI sobre los rain-
makers, prácticamente es el mismo mantenido por las autoridades cubanos para medir el ‘delito de brujería’.”
152
“Aún actualmente […] se organizan redadas policiacas donde se aprisiona a los sacerdotes y sus 
acólitos en los lugares en que se celebraran las ceremonias y rituales santeros. Esto simplemente significa el 
desprecio que se ha hecho del estudio de este aspecto de la vida afrocubana, el cual se refleja en otras formas de 
discriminación racial.”
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reminds his readers once again that his project is a matter of optics and of the power that 
comes with illumination.
11.
By working toward the middle of “The Religious Beliefs of Afro-Cubans” by first 
considering the article’s ending and beginning section, I have tried to show how various 
threads in the piece come together around Lachatañeré’s understanding of the nexus of 
knowledge and power. This last part of my analysis of the article addresses the core of 
Lachatañeré’s discussion, where he most clearly outlines the disturbing effects of Afro-
Cuban studies. In the middle pages of “The Religious Beliefs of Afro-Cubans,” Lachatañeré 
offers his most powerful evidence in his case for critical revaluation.
Lachatañeré reiterates his concerns, raised in the article’s opening, about the 
fundamental “concepts of contemporary social anthropology” (197). As Lachatañeré stated at 
the outset, Cuban “anthropological studies,” by using criminology as a point of departure, 
had “fail[ed] in the selection of appropriate methods” and, in turn, had “necessarily obscured 
the true nature” of Afro-Cuban social life. He addresses that “failure” by highlighting the 
diversity of cultic types among Afro-Cubans and their African forbearers and by 
demonstrating that the term ‘brujería’ inaccurately and prejudiciously conflates these 
different cultuses as “antisocial agents.” 
Having exposed some of the actual effects of “the false application of the term 
brujería,” Lachatañeré returns to the broader problem: the underlying critical failure of 
“contemporary social anthropology.” He contends that a lack of theoretical discrimination by 
social anthropologists causes the type of “racial discrimination” of which he just spoke. Most 
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importantly, the anthropologists have not properly distinguished “magic” from “religion.” 
This conceptual limitation has “necessarily obscured the true nature of the problem” by 
glossing over the interrelated facts that: (a)“magic” and “religion” are real and distinct social 
phenomena; (b) the reality of and difference between magic and religion is determined by the 
power relations within a society, such that “magic” represents practices considered “illicit” or 
“antisocial.” 
From this perspective, Lachatañeré thickens his genealogies of the term ‘brujería.’ 
The “antagonism” between magic and religion reappears as a matter of socio-economic 
power. Lachatañeré turns his gaze squarely toward social anthropologist since they create 
and use many of the terms of classification applied to Afro-Cuban traditions. He implies that 
social anthropologists have bolstered—unwittingly or not—the structures of imperial 
knowledge-production. His references to Portuguese explorers and Christian missionaries in 
Africa accentuate the point: their capacity to “indiscriminately designate” a variety of 
practices in terms of fetiço and brujería stemmed from and reinforced the imbalances of 
economic, political, and social power within emerging colonial systems.
In that frame, Lachatañeré picks up his critique of Fernando Ortiz’s foundational 
work as developed “in accordance with the concepts of contemporary social anthropology.” 
As before, Lachatañeré takes his mentor to task for his dependence on unreliable secondary 
sources: “Fernando Ortiz, not having completed personal research in this area, limited 
himself to considering some cases mentioned in the press” (201).153 However, Ortiz’s greater 
“failure in the selection of a method of discussion” (197) stems from his reiteration of the 
racial and religious “prejudices” underlying those press accounts as well as his 
153
“Fernando Ortiz, no habiendo realizado investigaciones personales en este campo, se limita a 
considerar algunos mencionados en la prensa.”
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criminological interpretation of them. Lachatañeré offers some significant examples from 
Los negros brujos (1906) of Ortiz’s misreading of case material due to racialist 
criminological presumptions. For instance, he cites at length a passage in which Ortiz 
attempts to support his argument about the criminal propensity of Afro-Cuban practice. 
Lachatañeré shows how Ortiz uses a “case taken from the press that seems to have clear 
evidence” of the criminal tendencies of African-inflected traditions: Ortiz explains how, 
during “‘the period of slavery, […] a brown-skinned sexagenarian” from Aguacate (Havana 
Province) supposedly abducted around forty black children “‘on whom their parents had just 
put clothes to take them for baptism’” (202). Lachatañeré notes that, in Ortiz’s mind, the 
criminal “inclination” of the “brown-skinned sexagenarian” in this and other cases “seems to 
correspond to a ‘crime of brujería.’”
Lachatañeré explodes that idea. He concedes that, because of the socio-economic 
circumstance of slavery, 
it is very possible that among slaves—and in the first days of the Republic just 
after the abolition of slavery—acts of this type were committed by the recently 
liberated servants, given that one knows that there were brujos and criminals 
scattered among such slaves, whose corrupted life had to continue for some 
time. This situation was attenuated in the sugar plantations, where isolation and 
oppression marginalized the black man who had no law in this land and who 
would continue his excesses in that terrible environment.154
However, Lachatañeré does not let Ortiz—or the general “concepts of contemporary social 
anthropology”—off the hook. Ortiz’s inability—or rather, refusal—to recognize the material 
conditions that might explain criminal activity among slaves correlates to a lack of 
154
“Es muy posible que entre los esclavos, y en los primeros días de la República, se cometieran, por 
los siervos recientemente libertados, actos de esta naturaleza; puesto que se sabe había brujos y criminales 
tarados entre dichos esclavos, cuya vida maleante debieron continuarla por algún tiempo, y más en las 
plantaciones azucareras donde el aislamiento y la opresión daban margen a que el hombre, que no tuvo ley en su 
tierra, continuara sus desafueros en aquel terrible ambiente.”
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conceptual discrimination. “These are criminal cases that should be catalogued outside of the 
study of religions,” Lachatañeré contends. 
That the brujos used such crimes to practice black magic is something very 
different from the idea that religious motives moved them to carry out the 
crimes. Accept this last idea, or misrecognize the Afro-American religious 
phenomenon, or reinforce an indistinguishable theoretical jumble regarding 
magic and religion. (202-03)155
Presumably, Lachatañeré untangles that “indistinguishable theoretical jumble.” 
However, his use of “magic” and “religion” also appears confusing. “Magic,” “black magic,” 
and “brujería” sometimes seem interchangeable in his discussion; at other times, the terms 
have decidedly different connotations. Still, he casts all of these forms as necessarily defined
by and against “religion.” In other words, “magic,” “brujería” and “black magic” indicate 
socially marginalized types of activity determined by a society’s relations of economic and 
political power. Accordingly, Lachatañeré sets up his discussion of shadow-work with a 
paragraph that illuminates “the social and economic base” that produces brujería. This 
“base.” Lachatañeré explains, structures the distinct but interdependent phenomena of 
“magic” and “religion”: “If one wishes to study the phenomenon of brujería in Cuba taking 
as the point of departure this phenomenon in West Africa, situating it as a religious issue, 
then one has to make a great distinction between both social factors.” That is, the African and 
Cuban contexts are unique and must be considered separately. In the case of Africa, 
one has to keep in mind that as soon as religion approaches brujería it acts as 
an agent of repression because the religions in the majority of African 
societies, intimately connected with the repressive power of the State, pursued 
the ‘crime of brujería’ as a severely condemned antisocial element. And, 
moreover, obscuring in this process a purely economic motive, the priests in 
charge of the vigilance of these acts often abused their power, accusing an 
155
“Pero éstos son casos criminosos que deben catalogarse fuera del estudio de las religiones. Que los 
brujos usaran de tales crímenes para practicar la magia negra es cosa muy distinta a que los llevaran a cabo con 
móviles religiosos; y aceptar esto ultimo o es desconocer el fenómeno religioso afroamericano o bien hacer una 
indistinguible mezcolanza entre magia y religión.”
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enemy of such practices to dispossess them of their assets. Such abuse lowers 
the real percentage of cases of criminal inclination. (203)156
Thus, Lachatañeré’s explanation of brujería lands on “a purely economic motive” 
after all. He sticks closely to the Marxian script. He portrays “magic” and “religion” as 
realities determined in the struggle to accumulate political and, ultimately, economic power. 
His image of cat-and-mouse is evocative. “Religion” and “brujería,” it seems, define each 
other; they take shape only as one “approaches” the other. And the whole endeavor, 
according to Lachatañeré, is a clear play for political authority driven by desires for material 
gain. As “an agent of repression […] intimately connected to the repressive power of the 
State,” “religion” in African contexts circumscribes “brujería” as “antisocial” in order to 
“severely condemn” it. Thus, terms like “brujería” and “magic” serve as labels, as 
accusations, by which to take possession of the “assets” of others. In light of this 
characterization, is it any wonder that Lachatañeré—with his Marxist commitments to 
struggle for the liberation of the oppressed—considers magical practices as ways to fight 
back and to recover rightful “assets”?
In the last paragraph of the article, Lachatañeré reinforces this sense of struggle by 
offering a direct summary of his key point:
Having made the aforementioned clarifications, we now understand that the 
word brujería circumscribes a deficient concept, which loses its reason for 
existence as soon as we approach these cultuses with an appropriate method of 
study and accept without reservations the name that arises from the 
156
“Si se quiere estudiar el fenómeno de la brujería en Cuba tomándose como punto de partida este 
fenómeno en África Occidental, envolviéndola en el problema religioso, hay que hacer un gran distinción entre 
ambos factores sociales, y tener en cuenta que tan pronto la religión se acerca a la brujería es para actuar como 
un agente de represión, porque las religiones en la mayoría de las sociedades africanas, relacionadas 
íntimamente con el poder represivo del Estado, perseguían el delito de brujería como un elemento antisocial 
severamente condenado. Y aun más, ocultándose en esto una razón puramente económica, los sacerdotes 
encargados de la vigilancia de estos delitos, muchas veces abusaban de su poder para, acusando a un enemigo 
de tales prácticas, desposeerlo de sus bienes, lo que hacía que fuese menor el porcentaje real de los casos de esta 
índole.”
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aforementioned cultuses, that is, the name santería or cult of the saints. 
(204)157
But even here, in this neat encapsulation of his argument, Lachatañeré is still talking about 
relations of power. He describes an “approach” to the “false application of the term brujería” 
in a manner that mimics the mutually constituting encounter between religion and magic. 
Only in this case, he does not put the defining power in the hands of “priests” with dubious, 
self-interested motives. “We now understand that the word brujería circumscribes a deficient 
concept” and therefore must “approach” and defuse the crisis. With invocations of “we,” 
Lachatañeré places responsibility in his and his readers’ hands. With the right weapons of 
knowledge-production—most of all, “an appropriate method of study”—“we” come to his 
conclusion: “the name santería.” Fittingly, that cubanismo—by nature, an optical illusion—
stands at the very end of Lachatañeré’s critical strivings.
157
“Hechas las aclaraciones expuestas, entendemos que el vocablo brujería encierra un concepto 
deprimente, el cual pierde su razón de existencia tan pronto nos acercamos a estos cultos con un método 
apriopriado de estudio, y aceptamos sin reservas el nombre que desprende de los ya mencionados cultos, o sea, 
el de la santería o culto a los santos.”
CHAPTER 6: CONJURING AFRO-CUBAN STUDIES: MEMORY AND THE PLACE OF 
PERFORMANCE IN ORTIZ’S ‘BRUJOS OR SANTEROS’ (1941)
As schools of anthropology essentially do not distinguish religion from magic 
and one and the other continue to be pretty much mixed, it seems unacceptable 
today that both concepts are confused in such a way.  And we have to make an 
effort to see that the term santería, which is a legitimate and well-formed 
cubanismo, be accepted to designate the religious systems of Afro-Cubans. 
Fernando Ortiz
1.
When Rómulo Lachatañeré sent “The Religious Beliefs of Afro-Cubans and the False 
Application of the Term 'Brujería'” back to Havana after his translocation to New York, the 
article created an immediate stir. The editors of Estudios afrocubanos [Afro-Cuban Studies] 
reacted to the article with apparent surprise and anxiety. How should they handle 
Lachatañeré’s critique of contemporary social science in general and of Fernando Ortiz in 
particular? After all, Ortiz was largely responsible for the founding of Estudios afrocubanos
and of the Society for Afro-Cuban Studies. He remained one of Cuba’s preeminent 
intellectuals and the undisputed pioneer in the field of Afro-Cuban studies. 
Given the obvious historical and theoretical value of Lachatañeré’s essay, the editors 
clearly wanted to publish it in Estudios afrocubanos. They decided they would do so and that 
they would ask Ortiz for a written response. The two pieces—Lachatañeré’s “The Religious 
Beliefs of Afro-Cubans” and Ortiz’s rejoinder—were published together in one of the 
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journal’s 1939 volumes.158  Lachatañeré's essay was then introduced with a deferential 
editor's note:  
This work appears with special tribute to Dr. Fernando Ortiz, founder and 
president of the Society of Afro-Cuban Studies, who initiated in 1906 this 
research in Cuba. Since Mr. Rómulo Lachatañeré treats the original work of 
Fernando Ortiz, Los Negros Brujos, we have asked its author for some notes in 
relation to the commentary of [Lachatañeré's] present study, and he has put 
together for us some appended remarks that we will publish at the end of 
[Lachatañeré] study with the title ‘Brujos o santeros’ [Brujos or Santeros] 
(Editors’ note). (Ortiz 1939: 29)
The deferential tone of this prefatory note reveals the obvious discomfort that 
Lachatañeré's criticism of Ortiz created for the editors of Estudios Afrocubanos. However, in 
his “appended remarks” Ortiz shows no signs of hostility toward his protégée’s seeming 
impertinence. On the contrary, Ortiz exhibits great enthusiasm for Lachatañeré’s argument. 
‘The Master of Afro-Cuban Studies’ delivers a masterful performance in which he vigorously 
defends himself against the attack in order to reinforce the main components of 
Lachatañeré’s critique. Ortiz deflects the blame from himself and redirects it with even more 
force toward the main object of Lachatañeré’s attack: contemporary “schools of 
anthropology.” 
With this deflection, Ortiz explicates an implicit part of Lachatañeré’s project. In 
referring to “schools of anthropology,” Ortiz makes clear that both he and Lachatañeré find 
fault with the degree to which Cuban intellectuals have relied on European and North 
American theoretical models that do not properly account for Latin American socio-historic 
realities. Ortiz suggests that, by virtue of the primary locations outside of Latin America of 
158As mentioned in the last chapter, the 1939 volumes of Estudios afrocubanos did not actually appear 
until 1941. The journal’s editors explain that fact in publishing the four sections of El sistema religioso de los 
Lucumí y otras influencias africanas en Cuba, Lachatañeré’s work-in-progress at the time. (See Appendix B for 
the full translation of that “Editor’s Note.”) To reiterate, the chronology of Lachatañeré’s “1939” articles 
remains unclear. Similarly, the date of Ortiz’s “1939” response is uncertain, but he presumably wrote it in early 
1941.
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knowledge-production about the region, predominant scholarship lacks critical perspective 
and that Latin American intellectuals must take it upon themselves to rewrite—literally—the 
terms of social science. Cubans need to produce more cubanismos.
And that is precisely how Ortiz opens “Brujos or Santeros.” He celebrates 
Lachatañeré’s revaluation of ‘santería’ as a powerful cubanismo that especially unsettles 
leading ethnographic models of religious forms: 
Lachatañeré's thesis of not accepting the denomination of brujería to signify 
the religions of Afro-Cubans is really very laudable. As schools of 
anthropology do not distinguish essentially religion from magic and one and 
the other continue to be pretty much mixed, it seems unacceptable today that 
both concepts are confused in such a way.  And we have to make an effort to 
see that the term santería, which is a legitimate and well-formed cubanismo, be 
accepted to designate the religious systems of Afro-Cubans. (Ortiz 1993a: 193; 
¶1)159
This wholehearted endorsement of Lachatañeré’s “legitimate and well-formed cubanismo” 
extends far beyond mere support for ‘santería’ as a technical designation. Rather, Ortiz 
already signals his intention to build on Lachatañeré’s broader argument about “regulating 
concepts.” 
As discussed in the last chapter, Lachatañeré highlighted in “The Religious Beliefs of 
Afro-Cubans” the potentially profound material effects of certain academic terminology. He 
singled out “the false application of the term ‘brujería’” from that standpoint. Lachatañeré 
constructed interlocking genealogies of the term to show that the contemporary use of 
‘brujería,’ based on Ortiz’s institution of the word through his influential 1906 study, was 
not only technically imprecise but also dangerously effective. The conflation of all Afro-
Cuban cultuses as brujería—and thus as a type of ‘magic’—had resulted in decades of 
159Citations refer, respectively, to the page number of the 1993 reprint of the article as well as to the 
paragraph number of my translation of the text (Appendix B).
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discriminatory attitudes and actions against practitioners. Lachatañeré’s critical assertion was 
that santería, as a proper and “original religion”—did not fall within the category of 
“magic.” The misunderstood and much-maligned Lucumí traditions deserved respect instead 
of the mistreatment they continued to endure into the 1940s. 
From the start, Ortiz indicates his fundamental agreement with Lachatañeré’s point 
about “regulating concepts” in general and “brujería” in particular. “Schools of anthropology 
do not distinguish essentially religion from magic,” Ortiz agrees, and he underscores 
Lachatañeré’s point that this conceptual confusion is “unacceptable.” Moreover, Lachatañeré 
was absolutely right that the entrenchment of brujería as an all-encompassing moniker for 
Afro-Cuban cultuses inaccurately and unfairly homogenizes a spectrum of ideas and 
practices. Thus, Ortiz immediately echoes Lachatañeré’s assertion that Lucumí traditions 
constitute a viable “religion”: “Lachatañeré's thesis of not accepting the denomination of 
brujería to signify the religions of Afro-Cubans is really very laudable”; “we have to make 
an effort to see that the term santería” takes hold as a better designation for “the religious 
systems of Afro-Cubans.” Similarly, Ortiz’s emphasis on “the religions” and “religious 
systems” of Afro-Cubans reinforces another of Lachatañeré’s significant implications: that 
‘magic’ and ‘magical systems’ exist among— but do not constitute the entirety of—Afro-
Cuban cultuses. 
“Brujos or Santeros” functions as Ortiz’s attempt to substantiate Lachatañeré’s 
contentions about the conceptual confusion embodied in and the social effects of the 
widespread use of the term “brujería.” In his response, Ortiz extends Lachatañeré’s critical 
genealogy of the term. Like Lachatañeré, Ortiz highlights the racial discrimination linked to 
processes of categorical discrimination since the Sixteenth Century. However, he insists that 
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such discrimination is not fundamentally racialist but rather a product of inevitable struggles 
for economic and political power. Thus, he extends Lachatañeré’s ideas about ‘religion’ and 
‘magic’ as mutually constituting categories within particular social contexts in which the 
concepts operate.
In lengthening Lachatañeré’s genealogy of ‘brujería,’ Ortiz makes a familiar move: 
he first offers a personal account. As he did in the January 1937 lecture inaugurating SEAC 
and as he would do on the occasion of his honorary 1942 induction into Club Atenas, Ortiz 
provides a history of Afro-Cubans studies and of his role in establishing the field. However, 
in “Brujos or Santeros” Ortiz makes some unique and surprising disclosures about the 
development of Afro-Cuban studies. He divulges that the field emerged out of a dramatic 
performance that he delivered in 1901 to European colleagues during the completion of 
doctoral studies in Madrid. Ortiz provides this information in order to shore up the 
foundations of “The Religious Beliefs of Afro-Cubans.” For Ortiz, the episode proves one of 
Lachatañeré’s key points: that knowledge-production is a magical undertaking. The scholar 
creates material effects in the world when his or her “speculations” take root as accepted 
reality. Like Lachatañeré, Ortiz suggests that the naturalization—and denaturalization—of 
scholarly speculation occurs through the production of powerful images. In other words, 
Ortiz builds on Lachatañeré’s optical politics. He emphasizes the critical visual components 
that gave rise to Afro-Cuban studies. 
2.
Since Ortiz’s objective is to clear up the confusion enveloping the categories of 
religion and magic, he agrees “some clarifications seem advisable” (193; ¶1). Lachatañeré 
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had figured him as a major source of the problem, so Ortiz moves to explain himself. “Above 
all,” he notes, the clarifications follow “from a personal point of view.” Ortiz launches into a 
biographical sketch that, he presumes, holds import for his readers too: 
My book Los negros brujos [The Black Witch-Doctors] was published in 1906, 
having been composed by me between 1902 and 1905.  Of these years, I spent 
three in Italy and only one in Havana, where I began my direct research.  It is 
true that, like Dr. Nina Rodrigues160 had done shortly before in Brazil, I arrived 
at the ethnographic study of Cuba from the camp of criminal anthropology, 
with which I had my most fervent attachments. Perhaps some personal 
memories would not be inopportune.
In 1901 I finished in Madrid my university degree, which I had begun in 1895 
in Havana, my natal city. During my stay of one year in Madrid and at the 
Sociological Institute organized by Sales y Ferré,161 we reviewed excitedly the 
recently published book, La mala vida en Madrid [Criminal Life in Madrid], 
by Constancio Bernardo de Quirós,162 the famous criminologist who 
subsequently, due to the silly vicissitudes of luck, had to leave Spain and can 
now be found as a professor nearby at the University of Santo Domingo 
[Dominican Republic]. I was then known in that group of young students for 
my criminological commitments. My doctoral dissertation, which earned from 
the Tribunal the singular vote of three highest commendations against two 
failures, had been on a positivist thesis, and for these reasons obliged me to 
comment there on Bernardo de Quirós's book and to distinguish its contents 
from criminal life [la mala vida (lit. 'the bad life')] in Havana. I felt worried 
because very little did I know of the tricky affair; but I acquitted myself 
gracefully by talking of something so exotic there as that which is published in 
Trujillo Monagas's work Los criminales de Cuba [The Criminals of Cuba]163
and that which I had seen in the Madrid museum, Ultramar, where some suits 
of diablitos, instruments, and the rest of the accessories were kept of the [Afro-
160Dr. Raimundo Nina Rodrigues, Brazilian forensic scientist credited with initiating the study of Afro-
Brazilian culture. Ortiz frequently drew parallels between himself and Nina Rodrigues.
161Manuel Sales y Ferré was a prominent Spanish scholar under whom Ortiz studied.  See my 
discussion of Sales y Ferré and Spanish positivism in the introduction and in Chapter Two.
162Constancio Bernardo de Quirós and José María Aguilaniedo, La mala vida en Madrid (Madrid: B. 
Rodríguez Serra, 1901).
163José Trujillo Monagas, Los criminales de Cuba (Barcelona: Establecimiento Tipgráfico de Fidel
Giró, 1882). 
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Cuban] secret societies that had such theatrical fame during the colonial 
period.164 (193-94; ¶3-4; emphasis in original) 
Ortiz’s revelations about his “tricky affair” were unsettling in various ways. He had 
gained his reputation as the embodiment of Afro-Cuban studies because of the stature of the 
same studies about which he reminisces in "Brujos or Santeros."  Few admirers could have 
anticipated Ortiz’s admission that the famous and influential Los negros brujos grew out of a 
compulsion—or an obligation, as Ortiz frames it—to keep up appearances. Here he makes no 
secret that he tried to pass off his impressions –“very little did I know,” he concedes—as 
another “positivitistic thesis” in order to sustain the authority of his “criminological 
commitments” for which he “was then known in that group of young students.” 
Ortiz calls attention to the craftiness of his efforts. His Spanish cohorts, it seems, 
wanted nothing more than to believe fabrications he passed off about the perversions of 
certain inhabitants—criminals and blacks—in Spain’s former colony. “I acquitted myself 
gracefully,” he delights, “by talking of something so exotic there as that which is published 
in Trujillo Monagas's The Criminals of Cuba and that which I had seen in the Madrid 
museum, Ultramar, where some suits of diablitos, instruments, and the rest of the accessories 
were kept of the secret societies that had such theatrical fame during the colonial period.” 
Ortiz does not dissociate himself from the exoticism that plagued his colleagues in Spain. He 
suggests that he drew inspiration for his own skillfully executed production from the 
histrionic excesses of Quirós’s criminological study and, especially, from the artifacts of the 
legendary ritual performances of colonial Afro-Cuban confraternities. And by framing the 
164The diablitos were extravagantly costumed dancers who acted as sacristans within the rituals of 
Afro-Cuban secret societies. The dancers figured prominently in public celebrations as well, most notably the 
annual (January 6) “Day of Kings” comparsas discussed in section 2 of Chapter 4. Ortiz explains ‘diablito’ and 
related terms in the original Catauro de afronegrismos [Basket of Afro-Negrismos] (1924) and especially in the 
revised and expanded version, Nuevo catauro de cubanismos [New Basket of Cubanisms] (published 
posthumously in 1974).
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founding moment of Afro-Cuban studies in such terms, Ortiz gleefully highlights the layers 
of theatricality in his 1901 show: his vivid portrayal of outrageous criminal actions draws on 
the Ultramar Museum’s exhibition, which depends on the costumes, drums, “and the rest of 
the accessories” of earlier performances, and so on.
As he continues, Ortiz begins to address this ‘and so on.’ He reaches farther back into 
the colonial epoch to identify other types of theatricality tied up in the casting of “magic.” 
This act is also multilayered, according to Ortiz. Most immediately, the process involves 
specific pursuits of “magicians” and their clients as well as the casting of those endeavors as 
“magic” by European observers. Building on Lachatañeré’s discussion, Ortiz portrays the act 
of characterization itself— the course of deeming something as “magic”— as a defining 
rhetorical gesture within a far-ranging social performance. Thus, he works toward his 
extension of Lachatañeré’s limited genealogy of the term brujería. Ortiz picks up on two key 
points in Lachatañeré’s genealogy of the term brujería: first, that the category of brujería has 
a technical meaning that refers to a specific type within a wide spectrum of “magic”; second, 
that despite such gradations of magical forms, the familiar understanding of the word 
brujería derives from colonial efforts to vilify all of those different practices by 
homogenizing them as non-“religious” and, thus, as heretical.
The first point arises from Ortiz’s divulgence of his fabrication of ideas about ‘la 
mala vida’ in Havana. Despite “acquit[ing him]self gracefully by talking of something so 
exotic,” Ortiz further concedes that he perpetrated the hoax largely because he did not want 
to appear ignorant. He felt bad about the ploy and resolved to rectify the situation, not by 
admitting his ignorance to his European colleagues but by overcoming it:
In reality I knew nothing for sure of the ñáñigos, and from that point I 
proposed to myself to study them and to write a book that would be titled La 
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mala vida en La Habana [Criminal Life in Havana] and to include a chapter on 
ñáñigüismo as one of its most conspicuous chapters. (194; ¶2)
With this admission, Ortiz introduces some new terms into the discussion: “ñáñigos” and 
“ñáñigüismo.” Very generally, ‘ñáñigo’ refers to the ritual leader within Afro-Cuban secret 
societies. The word derives from ‘nganga,’ which European explorers in time came to 
understand as synonymous with ‘fetishes’—unique material objects with magical effect—as 
well as with an expert in making them. 165
Ortiz deliberately invokes the terms as a reminder of technical meanings: that ñáñigos
are a unique type of ritual leader within a narrow body of African-derived traditions. In other 
words, Ortiz wants to corroborate Lachatañeré’s key point about how Afro-Cuban cultuses 
reflect the diversity of African heritage from which they borrow. He also means to defend 
himself from Lachatañeré’s charge that he had no sense of that diversity when he instituted 
the “false application of the term brujería.” Ortiz simultaneously agrees with and distances 
himself from Lachatañeré’s critique by explaining,
I had not even initiated the study of the ñañigos when I came to understand that 
I would have to separate them from the brujos, as one commonly called them 
and calls them still. One and the other were confused, and both terms are still 
scrambled although they are expressive of very different things. And for that 
reason I continued to gather information for my study of the ñañigos, and I 
dedicated myself to substantiating my initial findings about the brujos. (Forty 
years of labor already have now gone by.) (194; ¶5)
With the last part of the statement, Ortiz further limits his role in the continued fact that 
‘ñáñigo’ and ‘brujo’ “are still scrambled although they are expressive of very different 
things.” The task of clearing up the confusion has not been easy. The endeavor already 
occupied “forty years of [Ortiz’s] labor” without end in sight. On one hand, the research 
165The long passage from Merolla da Sorenta cited by Lachatañeré in "The Religious Beliefs of Afro-
Cubans” includes a parenthetical reference to central African nganga (spelled, in this case, ‘ganga’): Sorenta 
recounts that “whilst I was in Bengo…my companion, father Francis da Monte Leone, seized upon one of the 
aforesaid wizards [los Gangas o Nzi]” (as cited in Lachatañeré 1939a: 201).
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takes time; on the other hand, circumstances have conspired against Ortiz, limiting his ability 
to carry out the effort. 
Ortiz explains these challenges in another passage. He admits some “error” on his 
part but largely absolves himself in light of the situation. He gladly cedes his ongoing project 
to any willing takers:
Upon my return to Cuba [in 1902], I thought that my criminological work 
would be a thing of a few months; but I soon realized my error. Havana had 
very peculiar issues in its mala vida, derived from its singular history and from 
the cultural conglomeration of white, black, and yellow peoples at its base. 
Facing these difficulties, which would demand a very long time, I joined with 
two good friends and distinguished writers of those years to write, among the 
three of us, the projected book. Miguel de Carrón, the fine novelist, was 
charged with studying the aspects of Havana prostitution, and the acerbic 
journalist Mario Muñoz Bustamante took charge of the examination of 
mendicancy. But the book about La mala vida en La Habana, with it attractive 
title and its alluring content, is still to be written. I offer the theme to any 
young and daring writing. Those companions died soon thereafter, and through 
another turn of fortune, I went for a stop in the land of César Lombroso and 
Enrico Ferri, with some information but without having written a line. (194; 
¶4)166
With his claim that even by 1901 he had come “to understand that I would have to separate 
[ñáñigos] from the brujos,” Ortiz feels he has defended himself from Lachatañeré’s charge of 
indiscriminate designation. He then proceeds to the address his protégée’s other criticism: 
that the term brujería, popularized during the epoch of European colonialism, homogenizes 
diverse but unorthodox forms of forms of practice in order to denigrate them all as 
categorically heretical.
With this move, Ortiz lengthens the genealogy beyond his own experience in order to 
substantiate Lachatañeré’s implicit idea about the function of typologies as weapons in the 
struggle for social power. Specifically, Ortiz broadens Lachatañeré’s argument to show how 
166See my commentaries in the introduction and in Chapter Two about the profound personal and 
scholarly influence on Ortiz of Lombroso and Ferri, the famed Italian criminologists.
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“regulating concepts” that establish “orthodox” and “heterodox” forms cut across all 
societies. In his next sentence Ortiz clearly depicts how the surge for power generally plays 
out in arenas of faith: 
In these kinds of religious affairs it is known that every priest believes himself 
repository of the only certain religion, of 'the true truth,' of the Truth with 
capital 'T,' and [considers] heterodox priesthoods wastebaskets of the worst 
ways, which to [the orthodox] are malicious, inspired by the spirits of evil, by 
demons, by the numens of enemy tribes, etcetera. (194; ¶6)
Building on this point, Ortiz delineates the basic structure of religious conflict as it 
developed in Cuba. He tracks the power struggle through a history of the discourse that took 
hold with the consolidation of Catholic power in Spain during the late fifteenth century. In a 
lengthy passage, Ortiz fleshes out Lachatañeré’s claims that “the regulating concept of 
brujería corresponds to that which was applied to medieval magicians and which was applied 
to the beliefs of Africans by the Capuchin monks that went to Christianize the Congo” and 
that “this concept […] is practically the same as the one maintained by Cuban authorities to 
measure the ‘crime of brujería.’” 
Ortiz begins this part of his genealogy with the following observation: Because 
“every priest believes himself repository of the only certain religion,”
in the vernacular tongue of Cuba, the black who had any relation with the 
supernatural would commonly be called brujo, which was the term that was 
much in vogue in Spain and the Indies since the Sixteenth and Seventeenth 
Centuries, when in the Iberian peninsula there were more witches than those 
later counted in Afro-American groups. (194-95; ¶6)
With this point, Ortiz suggests that the religious struggles that played out in Africa and in 
Cuba have deep roots in the social dynamics of the Iberian Peninsula. Again, he offers this 
observation mainly to solidify the foundation of Lachatañeré’s project. As his student does in 
"The Religious Beliefs of Afro-Cubans and the False Application of the Term ‘Brujería,’” 
Ortiz wants to demonstrate how typologies are not neutral; they arise from and reinforce 
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relations of power and can be contested or transvalued with “a legitimate and well-formed 
cubanismo” like ‘santería’. Therefore, Ortiz challenges Lachatañeré’s implication that, 
among Europeans, ‘brujería’ served as the general term for all unorthodox practices. Just 
because “the term that was much in vogue in Spain and the Indies” such that “the black who 
had any relation with the supernatural would commonly be called brujo,” the designations 
actually formed part of the Church’s larger technical vocabulary. In Ortiz’s view, the breadth 
of this typology of unorthodox forms only deepens Lachatañeré’s main point: the precision 
with which the Church defined its enemies proves how effective such “regulating concepts” 
really can be:
One only has to read the ecclesiastical writings of that period, the proceedings 
of the Inquisition, the treatises on moral theology, and the literary satires to see 
how full of brujería Spanish culture was with many of the essential attributes
that one says are characteristic of Afro-American brujería, such as the magic, 
exorcisms, trances, possessions, ecstasies, spells, incantations, orations, 
amulets, charms, ‘evil eye,’ curses, psalmodies, and dances, up to the sporadic 
aberrations of cannibalism and necrophilia well as with other fantastic or 
lubricious characteristics that never were known among Negroids, such as 
flights on brooms, nocturnal Witches’ Sabbaths, Satanic orgies, the 
freakishness of incubus and succubus creatures, and the prodigious rest in 
Catholic theory. As non-believers, such white brujerías were piously burned at 
the stake. Upon being transplanted to the lands of the Americas, the religion of 
the whites of Castile deemed those who did not take communion as:  'infidels,’ 
if they had never been baptized (like the Indians, Moors, and Jews); 'heretics' 
or 'apostates' if, having become Christians, they renounced the papacy or 
accepted whichever other dogma (like the Protestants, Huguenots, Molinists, 
Jansenists, Illuminists, etc.); and, finally, 'magicians,’ divided into brujos and 
hechiceros, if they had a direct treaty with the demons to create supernatural 
miracles against the mandates of the Church. (195; ¶7)
Ortiz continues the genealogy by explaining how the Church’s typology of the 
unorthodox entered and impacted American contexts: 
Given the general ignorance of the matter, the term 'brujería' prevailed to 
signify the magic of blacks, and the word 'hechicería' for the magic of whites. 
Since then, thousands of poor devils accused as brujos died in the dungeons 
and the autos de fe of the Santo Oficio because, in 1484—a bit before the 
discovery of America—Pope Innocent VIII, with his bull Summis desiderantes 
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affectibus, fulminated on the most terrible canonical penalties and inquisitional 
persecutions against brujería. The Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries were 
precisely when all of Spain was at its fullest with brujos and with demons. 
Until a king died from a spell. Logically, then, when in the Antilles, before the 
Sixteenth Century ended, they began to discover certain mysterious rites 
among black slaves, with strange liturgies and exotic music, and with 
unintelligible sing-song, the same vocabulary was applied to them as was 
applied in Spain to those analogous rites persecuted by the Inquisition. (195; 
¶7)
Ortiz lengthens his genealogy even further in order to advance his—and 
Lachatañeré’s—contention that categorization of belief reinforces relations of power. In the 
next paragraph, he links the Church’s strategies of denomination to developments within 
African and Afro-Cuban communities:
For the white Catholic, all of the black cultuses were brujería, an abominable 
thing inspired by demons for the ruin of human beings. In this expression was 
that same disdain that, in days gone by, was unanimous among the believers of 
one African cult against those of another. To the babalao, he who practiced 
mayombe or kimbisa was a brujo. It is curious to observe how still, among 
Catholic priests as well as among santeros, those who are not believers in their 
religion are typically classified as Jews, a word that in those centuries when it 
was seeping into the language of Cuba was one of the most abominable words 
in religious matters in every ambit of the Hispanic domain. (196-96; ¶8)
This set of observations rearticulates Lachatañeré’s idea that “in West Africa, […] as soon as 
religion approaches brujería it acts as an agent of repression because the religions in the 
majority of African societies, intimately connected with the repressive power of the State, 
pursued the ‘crime of brujería’ as a severely condemned antisocial element.” However, 
Ortiz’s rich genealogy recasts Lachatañeré’s example as a singular manifestation of an 
ostensibly transhistorical social phenomenon of “religious affairs [in which] every priest 
believes himself repository of the only certain religion, of 'the true truth,' of the Truth with 
capital 'T,' and [considers] heterodox priesthoods wastebaskets of the worst ways.” 
In addition to universalizing the African social dynamics identified by Lachatañeré, 
Ortiz clarifies another issue raised in "The Religious Beliefs of Afro-Cubans and the False 
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Application of the Term 'Brujería'". In summarizing a key issue, Lachatañeré insists at one 
point that “the study of the African survivals in the New World has been carried out with a 
distinct laziness and, at times, has applied to them racial and religious prejudices” 
(Lachatañeré 1939a: 199). Ortiz uses his genealogy of brujería to recalibrate Lachatañeré’s 
assessment. True, “the pejorative word continued—and continues—in common use,” Ortiz 
concedes. However, “it does not pertain to a racial prejudice but rather to one of originally 
ecclesiastical character.” He recognizes that “undoubtedly ethnophobias reinforce it and help 
to maintain it,” but racialism is a secondary consequence and not a primary cause (196; ¶8). 
For Ortiz, such distinctions are critical because they cast the fundamental issue more broadly 
as a matter of social conflict. In this frame, racial discrimination arises not as root source but 
only as an effect—albeit a prevalent and acute one—of the base struggle for control over 
material resources. Ortiz’s description places priests at the heart of that struggle for power. 
With his emphasis on the “originally ecclesiastical character” of discrimination embodied in 
the classification ‘brujería’, Ortiz reminds his readers that the clergy does not necessarily 
appear on the side of righteousness in the contest over resources and power.
3.
Ortiz builds on his preceding commentary to distance himself further from the 
perpetuation of the brujería-concept. He does so by appealing to material determinants that 
structure the social power plays he just outlined. First, he notes that his genealogy of brujería 
undercuts Lachatañeré’s accusation against him. Ortiz asserts that, in fact, he used the 
designation ‘brujería’ because of its specificity. It identified so precisely “the magic of 
blacks,” as opposed to “the word hechicería for the magic of whites”: “Upon entering the 
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study of the Afro-Cuban through the path of [the brujo’s] typical relations with the 
supernatural, I adopted for my book the expression, technically and philosophically improper 
but vernacularly and socially precise” (196; ¶10). This precision ran counter to Lachatañeré’s 
claim that Ortiz’s use of ‘brujería’ reproduced an indiscriminate “occidental meaning” that 
encompassed every form of heresy. Moreover, Ortiz contends that in Los negros brujos he 
even had attempted to categorize “the magic of blacks” in its full diversity: 
And later, in the course of my essay I try to go about separating, in the group of 
so-called brujos, the functions of the priest, those of the doctor, and those of 
the fortune-teller, and, after that, the criminal aspects in which at times those 
activities can manifest; not only those activities strictly of brujería or of black 
magic but rather all of the tendencies of antisocials, such as the false miracle, 
the capricious bilongo, the fraudulent okpelé, and illicit healing practices. 
Lachatañeré insists that the fundamental problem lies with Afro-Cuban studies stems from 
Ortiz’s lack of categorical precision. In his response here, Ortiz asserts that his attention to 
specificity in the 1906 study reveals an opposite methodological failure: ‘brujería’ was too
“vernacularly and socially precise.” It had strong popular connotations that enveloped the 
specificity of Ortiz’s discussion and rendered it “technically and philosophically improper” 
(196; ¶10). 
In this way, Ortiz’s historical reflections on terminology redirect the issue away from 
his role toward the larger issue of how the production and reception of his 1906 text reflect 
the social dynamics of the period. “If it is true that the word brujo expressed confusion,” he 
states, “this same confusion is already by itself a social phenomenon that was important to 
clear up” (196; ¶10; emphasis added). In other words, in interpreting the first decade of the 
twentieth century in Cuba Ortiz situates his study as an effect, not a cause, of social 
discrimination. He suggests that, despite his best efforts, his nuanced portrayal of Afro-
Cuban practices was swept up in an ongoing power struggle in which certain elements 
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inevitably get coded as “magic,” that is, as socially unacceptable, “heterodox” forms. This 
jumbling of his historically informed articulation of brujería with the “philosophically 
improper but vernacularly and socially precise” popular meaning of the term is what Ortiz 
means by the point that “confusion is already by itself a social phenomenon.” His key 
assertion, then, is that the distinction between “magic” and “religion” stems from and 
reinforces a society’s balance of power, and use of the categories illuminates those power 
relations. This standpoint informs his statement in the first paragraph of the article that “it 
seems unacceptable today that both concepts are confused” by “schools of anthropology 
[that] essentially do not distinguish religion from magic.” 
The last paragraph of the article reviews some of the specifics of Ortiz’s genealogy to 
reasserts the same idea about the basis of the “magic”/”religion” distinction. In making the 
point, Ortiz also practices what he preaches: he deliberately refers in the passage to “socially 
predominant and politically and legally coercive” institutions as “religion” and uses “magic” 
to describe groups not considered “orthodox”:
Thus, all of the magico-religious phenomenology of the black was considered 
by the white as brujería, such that every black priesthood of Africa—whose 
magic, not being orthodox ‘as God mandates’ conspires with the spirit of 
evil—qualifies as ‘dangerous heretics’ to the priests of the subordinating and 
outsider, or rival, religion. In the same way that, for still more complex reasons 
but socially analogous, all of the mass of black African slaves, because of the 
exoticism of all of their customs and languages, was considered by dominating 
whites as included—ipso facto—in the social category of ‘the bad life.’ This is 
all to say, the life not accepted as good, which is—naturally!—that of the 
group that is socially predominant and politically and legally coercive. (197; 
¶12)
But if “the magico-religious phenomenology” demonstrates that the 
“magic”/”religion” distinction surfaces from—and, in turn, describes—a society’s relations 
of power, Ortiz reminds his readers that power is fundamentally a material issue. That is, the 
struggle for “social power” unfolds from the impulse to gain control over material 
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circumstances. Lachatañeré supports this idea in “The Religious Beliefs of Afro-Cubans” by 
noting “that as soon as religion approaches brujería it acts as an agent of repression […], 
intimately connected with the repressive power of the State.” He then grounds these 
repressive actions in “a purely economic motive” that leads priests to “accus[e] an enemy of 
such practices to dispossess them of their assets.” Lachatañeré follows up this point about “a 
purely economic motive” by taking a look at the other, ‘repressed’ side. Namely, he moves to 
his example of ‘working a shadow,’ with which he demonstrates how forms of “magic” also 
arise from a desire for material gain: the practitioner works a shadow in order to gain some 
advantage “in order to triumph in life.” 
Ortiz also reinforces this critical foundation to Lachatañeré argument. In outlining the 
social dynamics that produce categories of magic and religion, Ortiz turns to examples of 
magic to underscore a primordial human concern about material conditions. First, he suggests 
that the marginalization of certain social elements in terms of “magic” stems from the 
perception that those entities threaten the physical wellbeing of “socially predominant” 
sectors. Ortiz traces these fear across time and place, as evidenced in his observations that 
“for the white Catholic, all of the black cultuses were brujería” just as the term held “that 
same disdain that, in days gone by, was unanimous among the believers of one African cultus 
against those of another.” Ortiz connects the power of categorization to a more fundamental 
struggle to determine human existence itself. In underscoring the socio-economic—and non-
racialist—origins of social action, Ortiz arrives at his other crucial assessment that “realities 
such as these arise—one can not deny—among whites and blacks alike because 
pigmentations have nothing to do with credulities and mischief.” 
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As does Lachatañeré’s case of ‘working a shadow,’ Ortiz’s specific examples of 
magic convey the purported material stakes in the constitution and operation of social 
categories. Again, he follows Lachatañeré’s lead by examining some cases of “magic” that 
demonstrate how each stems from a unique economic base in which all of the actors seek 
material gain:
Today, there is no doubt that at times in the most marginalized sectors of the 
ancestral traditions there are skeptical or exceedingly gullible subjects, who, by 
believing in everything or by not believing concretely in anything, sing to 
Babalú Ayé, light incense to Saint Lazarus, or prepare—for anyone who will 
pay—a spell to ‘lasso in’ a good catch that acts elusive. (196-97; ¶11)
The examples clearly parallel Lachatañeré’s discussion of ‘working a shadow.’ In this case, 
Ortiz mentions “a spell to ‘lasso in’ a good catch.” The practice immediately invokes 
Lachatañeré’s reference to how “a person ‘grabs the shadow of another’ [in] seizing their 
good dispositions in order to triumph in life.” And, once again, Ortiz universalizes these 
efforts to “triumph in life.” After offering the examples of so-called “magical” practices, 
Ortiz adds, “This [kind of propitiatory activity] occurs in the peripheral zones of all social 
groups” (197). 
Ortiz offers rich images of magical practices to support his argument that “magic”—
as a name for “marginalized” activities “in the peripheral zones”—is a universal social reality 
constituted in the struggle for access to material resources. Here too Ortiz’s response both 
supplements and diverges from Lachatañeré critique. Lachatañeré says very little in "The 
Religious Beliefs of Afro-Cubans" about the specifics of either brujería or “the original 
religion” he designates ‘santería.” In contrast, Ortiz provides a full list of types, artifacts, and 
practices associated with “magic.” One striking component of his genealogy is his catalogue 
of “essential attributes that one says are characteristic of Afro-American brujería,” in which 
he enumerates “magic, exorcisms, trances, possessions, ecstasies, spells, incantations, 
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orations, amulets, charms,” and so forth. In another place, he refers to the “rites among black 
slaves, with strange liturgies and exotic music, and with unintelligible sing-songs. And still 
further on, he mentions “not only those activities strictly of brujería or of black magic but 
rather all of the tendencies of antisocials, such as the false miracle, the capricious bilongo,
the fraudulent okpelé, and illicit healing practices.” 
By associating “magic” with these specific elements, Ortiz faces the danger of 
reinforcing the images that he and Lachatañeré supposedly want to disrupt. However, his 
intention is to show that “magic”—as a “regulating concept” that marginalizes elements 
considered unorthodox—does not merely exist in ecclesiastical or scholarly writings. Rather, 
magic, as a socially constituted category, is a social reality. Just as magic saturated Spanish 
culture in the sixteenth and Seventeenth centuries, so has it ‘been made’ to exist in 
contemporary societies as well. In this way, Ortiz further explicates Lachatañeré’s argument: 
certain categories of knowledge possess the magical power to transform themselves from 
ideas into lived realities.
4.
Through his mediations on magic, Ortiz turns back on the magical potential in 
Lachatañeré’s intervention. He reasserts the possible impact of the fiction of santería: 
Actually, the best treatment that the black and his things will continue to 
receive, apart from the general cultural expansion making itself known in 
Cuba, would come from the substitution of the term santería for the word 
brujería; and this is very plausible because it tends to cast away inexcusable 
incomprehensions and indecent diversions. (196; ¶9)
Ortiz mimics Lachatañeré by posing “the substitution of the term santería for the word 
brujería” as an optical affair: the “plausible” move would provide clarity of perspective by 
“cast[ing] away inexcusable incomprehensions and indecent diversions.” In Ortiz’s view, the 
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plausibility of the new vocabulary—its status as “a legitimate and well-formed 
cubanismo”—stems largely from the fact that ‘santería’ revalues familiar words. As 
Lachatañeré explains in proposing the term, it derives from the “new type of deity of well-
differentiated characteristics that is known among the Afro-Cuban believers under the name 
of el santo.” In turn, the figures that coordinate the ritual veneration of these deities, or 
‘saints,’ are known as ‘santeros’ or ‘santeras.’ 
Ortiz weaves another thread into the expanding critical genealogy that runs from 
Lachatañeré’s article through his own. Once again, Ortiz explicates important unstated 
implications in Lachatañeré’s discussion. He explains how Lachatañeré’s “legitimate and 
well-formed cubanismo,” in displacing “the false application of the term ‘brujería,’” revalues 
familiar meanings of ‘santero/santera’ and of ‘santería’ itself: He notes, “The term santero
is a very traditional word that appears in old dictionaries to signify someone devoted to the 
icons of a superstitious and indiscreet cultus” (196; ¶9). For that reason, Ortiz likes 
Lachatañeré’s transvaluation of the terms because it redeems marginalized social actors, in 
one move, and, in another, captures an underlying—if somewhat misguided—sense of 
morality endemic to the santero:
Without a doubt, [‘santero’] was originally applied by those same Spanish 
clergy to the blacks that in their confraternities [cabildos] venerated Mersé, 
Caridá, or Saint Barbara with unorthodox rites. With the word santero one 
expressed also something ecclesiastically disdainful and indecent in relation to 
the proper ritual conduct ‘as God mandates’; but in its pejorative sense it did 
not arrive—not even closely—at the slanderous meaning of the word brujo.
The santero is a mistaken one who adores celestial and good entities; the brujo
is a pervert who adores infernal and evil entities. (196; ¶9)
This last sentence encapsulates Ortiz’s main point and also validates Lachatañeré’s 
argument: typologies of belief flow from a society’s structure of power. “The group that is 
socially predominant and politically and legally coercive” enforces the terms by which a 
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society operates. Thus, ‘brujo’ and ‘santero’— the two distinct but related figures that serve 
as the title of Ortiz’s response—both “express something ecclesiastically disdainful and 
indecent in relation to the proper ritual conduct ‘as God mandates.’” Still, the distinct types 
of adoration are valued differently. While the santero may be “mistaken,” his social status 
diverges notably from the “pervert” brujo. Status, Ortiz insists, is a relative value determined 
by configurations of social power. 
5.
Ortiz’s portrayal of the relativity of value carries conflicting undertones. Something 
else surfaces in his distinction between santero as “mistaken one” and brujo as “pervert.” 
Does Ortiz really think that value is entirely relative? His other work, including the January 
1937 inaugural lecture, reveals that he had clear opinions about and preferences for certain 
kinds of ideas and actions. The “biotic” perspective of “Religion in Poesía Mulata” filters 
into “Brujos or Santeros.” Like Lachatañeré’s "The Religious Beliefs of Afro-Cubans,” 
Ortiz’s response esteems certain ideologies over others. It privileges systems of belief that 
attuned to the material parameters and materialist impulses of human endeavors. These 
preferences once again draw Ortiz reluctantly toward magic. Most of his discussion focuses 
on how struggles for social power circumscribe particular sectors of society as “heterodox” 
and prone to false logic and transgressions of “magic.” Ortiz clearly sympathizes with the 
“antisocials” and “marginalized sectors.” They suffer unfairly for the false representations 
thrust upon them, and Ortiz fights for a measure of justice on their behalf. He works to 
unsettle “regulating concepts,” as Lachatañeré called to them. And, like Lachatañeré, Ortiz 
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admires the bombast of so-called “magicians” who turn to “spells, incantations, amulets, 
charms,” and the like as their own means of intervention. 
Ortiz’s solidarity with the magicians emerges as he brings “Brujos or Santeros” to a 
close. The defining force of “socially predominant and politically and legally coercive” 
sectors, he explains, “can be comprehended more easily today, after forty years of research 
on Africa and with numerous museums and journals of Afrology now covering the most 
diverse aspects of black populations” (197; ¶12). In Ortiz’s estimation, the wider 
dissemination of “research on Africa” enables a much clearer view of the true nature of 
human activity: it unfolds within the ongoing contest for power over material resources. Ortiz 
celebrates the recent rise of “the dispossessed” in this continual struggle. “Above all, the 
great awakening of the dispossessed in this twentieth century has diffused greatly the 
elemental and basic criteria of social evolution and of the determinism of their factors, which 
favors objective comprehension” (197; ¶12). Ortiz offers his own contributions to “Afrology” 
as a way to advance that “great awakening of the dispossessed.” 
Nevertheless, Ortiz’s concluding remarks also demonstrate the ambivalence in his 
alliance with magic. His sympathy and grudging respect falls well short of outright 
acceptance. As in so many of his writings, Ortiz openly dismisses the “credulities and 
mischief” and “all of the tendencies of antisocials” that “arise among whites and blacks 
alike.” He adopts a similarly judgmental air when he notes, “there are skeptical or 
exceedingly gullible subjects” who turn to magic “by believing in everything or by not 
believing concretely in anything.” For Ortiz, these “most marginalized sectors” are 
exceedingly selfish. Magic functions for them only as a tool for self-enrichment. 
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And it is on that point that Ortiz moves toward displacing magic. He figures another 
kind of magic that would not fall prey to “credulities and mischief.” His methods serve the 
collective—and especially the collective Cuban—good. Thus, he concludes “Brujos or 
Santeros” by lauding Lachatañeré’s work, with its “legitimate and well-formed cubanismo,” 
as a significant contribution to the development of Cuban character:   
Afro-Cuban Studies has to feel very satisfied that the figure of Rómulo 
Lachatañeré, already acclaimed for a book treating the folklore of Lucumí 
mythology in Cuba, would dedicate his efforts to these ethnographic aspects, as 
much or even more indispensable to the knowledge of the national soul of 
Cuba than the episodes of the Romencero del Cid or the picaresque life of 
Rinconete and Cortadillo. (197; ¶12)
The summary statement is classic Ortiz. As he lauds Lachatañeré’s efforts for their role in 
shaping Cuban identity, he makes sure to establish the island’s distance for Spain. El Cid and 
the narratives of Rinconete and Cortadillo ground Spanish identity, but Ortiz dismisses their 
importance for Cubans. Nevertheless, as he reveals without reservation in his preceding 
discussion, Afro-Cuban studies emerged in Spain 1901 in another of Ortiz’s acts of 
dissociation. It appears that Cuban intellectuals’ displacing magic relates intimately to the 
experience of displacement, after all. 
EPILOGUE: UNBINDING TIES: THEORY AND/OF THE WILL TO POWER IN
“MAGIC AND RELIGION” (1956)
Generally, one interprets religion as the binding or tying of man as slave to 
supernatural or divine power, which is the Lord.[…]What seems to be clearer 
is to think about how the term religio signified a binding of man with 
superhuman mystery, capable of two expression or attitudes.
Fernando Ortiz
1.
Over the course of the introduction and past six chapters, I have tracked the figure of 
magic as it appears, in various guises, within a field of early-twentieth-century Cuban 
intellectual discourse. As I forewarned at the outset, my explorations have taken a circuitous 
route. I began with a scene: on a tropical winter’s eve in 1942 Fernando Ortiz stands at a 
podium in Havana’s Club Atenas and delivers a speech on past, present, and future race 
relations in Cuba. From that scene, I cut to and through many others: Ortiz in January 1937, 
giving another lecture from the same spot in Club Atenas; Alejo Carpentier in 1948, almost 
ten years after his return to the Americas from more than a decade of residence in Paris, 
confronting Surrealism and other interwar European intellectual trends; the cultural and 
personal flights of Cuban intellectuals during the 1920s and 1930s, when political life on the 
island moved through Machado’s rise to and fall from power, a short-lived Revolutionary 
Government, and in its wake the emergence of Fulgencio Batista as another enduring 
strongman; the international popularity of Nicolás Guillén and his poem “Sensemayá” during 
that especially tumultuous period around 1933; Guillén’s sweet and celebratory recollections 
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in 1951 on the occasion of Rómulo Lachatañeré’s untimely death; a decade earlier, 
Lachatañeré’s surprising critical engagement with Ortiz; the latter’s firm but concurring 
reply…. So, with all of those cuts, a discussion that opened with Ortiz’s early 1942 talk 
comes back almost to where it started: commentary from Ortiz in a short essay carrying a 
1939 publication date but actually composed and distributed around 1941. 
That last disjunction between purported and actual dates fits my study. One of my 
main points has been that a sense of dislocation inhabits the field of Cuban intellectual 
discourse through which I have moved back and forth, forth and back. What echoes through 
my discussion—as it winds from Ortiz’s 1942 speech to his “1939” reply to Lachatañeré—is 
an invocation of “magic” as object and means to displace. As I have highlighted, the 
ambivalence surrounding magic reflects Cuban intellectuals’ competing attitudes toward and 
their experiences of modernity. All of these writers badly want to help Cuba and Cubans 
“modernize.” On one hand, a certain kind of “magic”—the type endemic to “primitives”—
stands in the way. This magic was brought from Africa with slaves and seems to remain in 
Cuba. It depends upon a profound misunderstanding of what makes things happen in the 
world. In this magical perspective, people can willfully change the course of events through a 
properly enacted material representation. On the other hand, Cuban intellectuals admire the 
desire for change and the claim to agency implicit in such magical pursuits. The writers want 
to seize upon, to redirect the redemptive drive of primitive magic. They try to displace it from 
Cuba in order to displace elements of contemporary modernity. And, in that regard, “magic” 
takes on other possibilities for Cuban intellectuals as a tool both to diagnose and to transform 
so-called “modern” life. They see magic as a fitting description for the illogical process of 
commodification in which money assumes status as ultimate cause and, in turn, as a primary 
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object of faith. All the writers agree that modern commodification negatively affects Cuba 
and Cubans. In an effort ‘to fight fire with fire,’ “magical” interventions arise within the 
intellectual discourse as a powerful way to break the spell of what Ortiz clearly identifies as 
“the magic power of money.” Most immediately, the intellectuals’ magic entails the 
production of willful representations to enact specific material effects. Such representations 
often emerge as cubanismsos and other forms of ‘dialectical images.’
2.
I contend, once again, that the circuitous nature of my discussion reflects the 
inevitable nervousness of the Cuban intellectual discourse of displacing magic. Ortiz, 
Carpentier, Guillén, Lachatañeré and other participants in the discourse sense that they are 
caught up in what Michael Taussig more recently has called “the Nervous System” of
modernity. As part of this “system,” intellectuals try to reconstitute material conditions under 
which they and others live. It is a paradoxical endeavor that necessitates the displacement of 
“primitive magic” as well as “the magic power of money” through other “magical” practices. 
In the face of a perceived lack of control, these early-twentieth-century Cubans seek a 
measure of control through intellectual production. And, to some extent, they accomplish 
their objectives. Their efforts often produce real consequences that, on the writers’ own 
terms, are magical. The effects stem from actions deliberately pursued. Still, the intellectuals 
find that that their efforts do not necessarily produce intended results. Acting with a nervous 
system, the Cubans try to straighten out things that will never come out entirely straight.
From that standpoint, my account has revolved around two interrelated developments: 
the emergence of the Society for Afro-Cuban Studies around the beginning of 1937 and the 
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subsequent production of the term ‘santería’ out of that institutional context. I have outlined 
how both developments surfaced magically within the Cuban intellectual discourse of 
displacing magic. According to Ortiz’s own explanation, the Society emerged three decades 
after he rearticulated the little-known nineteenth-century word “Afro-Cuban.” He indicated 
that his willful act had turned into reality: by the early 1940s his linguistic revindication had 
“been incorporated into common parlance,” and the terminology finally had enabled an 
intellectual organization dedicated to “Afro-Cuban” history and culture. Similarly, around 
1941 Rómulo Lachatañeré offered his own linguistic revaluation as critique of the magical 
consequences of Ortiz’s foundational 1906 project. He offered an original use of the familiar 
term “santería” in order to displace the entrenched association—ostensibly established by 
Ortiz—between “Afro-Cuban” and the criminally inclined magical practice of “brujería.” 
“Santería” functioned as Lachatañeré’s own dialectical image, a composite representation 
that could magically bring to fruition his desire to displace “brujería.” Like Ortiz, 
Lachatañeré’s spell worked to a great extent, yet it played out differently than he expected. 
Just as “Afro-Cuban” and “brujería” did before it, “santería” has moved into the global 
vocabulary to designate an international reality that—against Lachatañeré’s best intentions—
often surfaces in popular images as a domain of criminally inclined magical practices. Such 




All of my examples of magic in and of early-twentieth-century Cuban intellectual 
discourse arise from considerations of and by Fernando Ortiz. I have focused especially on 
some of his work as well as on texts by Alejo Carpentier, Nicolás Guillén and Rómulo 
Lachatañeré that directly or indirectly engage Ortiz’s production. Since he stands as the 
central figure in the discourse of displacing magic, my discussion—even with all of its 
necessary nervousness—appropriately begins and ends with Ortiz. As means of conclusion, I 
will examine one more invocation of magic by Ortiz. The example serves as an epilogue in 
that it falls at the far end—or, really, just beyond—the chronological boundaries I marked off 
for my study. 
This case involves a slight essay entitled “Magia y religión” [Magic and Religion] 
that Ortiz completed in July of 1956. As the title of the piece indicates, Ortiz offers 
definitions of and distinctions between the two key terms. He carries out the task in two 
pages. In that narrow space, he delineates a relationship between religion and magic that 
effectively captures many of the theoretical conclusions he had reached over the course of 
five decades of engagement with the issue. The essay appears as a capstone to Ortiz’s 
ongoing theorization of religion and magic. And, in distilling a half-century of Ortiz’s 
intellectual labor, “Magic and Religion” also encapsulates the critical dynamics of the Cuban 
intellectual discourse on magic that has served as the subject of my discussion. Therefore, I 
look to the 1956 essay here as a useful summary of major points. Nevertheless, the essay also 
differs in significant ways from the other texts that I have discussed. Those sources lead into 
the very early 1950s, with Carpentier’s prologue from 1948 and Guillén’s 1951 eulogy of 
Lachatañeré as the latest examples. The peculiarities of Ortiz’s 1956 essay in relation to the 
other work I have discussed suggest that, by the mid-1950s, changes in the discourse of 
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displacing magic were becoming more palpable. The contrast throws into greater relief the 
contours of Cuban intellectual discourse during the 1930s and 1940s. 
An immediate and significant difference involves the process of reflection. Each of 
the earlier sources that I examined employs a common rhetorical move: the writers offer 
intellectual accounts in which they explicitly or implicitly place themselves. In all of the 
other texts by Ortiz, he gives a history of Afro-Cuban studies by way of personal reflection. 
He recounts his own histories in various ways to describe how the field developed. In a 
similar way, Carpentier addresses his own relationship to Surrealism, Guillén recollects his 
time with Lachatañeré as well as the unsettling discovery of the latter’s death, and 
Lachatañeré delineates the suspect history of the terms and methods of Afro-Cuban studies 
that he has inherited. 
To some extent, Ortiz’s 1956 essay makes the same reflexive move. “Magic and 
Religion” also reviews existing scholarship in order to argue for changes in theories and 
methods used in Afro-Cuban studies. But, unlike the earlier sources, Ortiz stands noticeably 
outside of the text. He does not reflect on his own history; rather, “Magic and Religion” is a 
short essay about reflection. More specifically, in the piece Ortiz tries to account for role that 
theoretical contemplation plays in magic and religion. Key to his argument is the claim that, 
contrary to established scholarly opinions, both magic and religion necessarily depend upon 
“theory.” This contention already hints that the essay differs from the earlier work not only 
on matters of style. The absence in the essay of personal details represents a decided shift 
toward “theory” as praxis. In his preceding work, Ortiz used various rhetorical devices to call 
his audience’s attention to theorization and its effects, but he never really offered an explicit 
theory of “theory.” He does so in “Magic and Religion,” setting forth a quick yet powerful 
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argument about theory as means to power. He implied as much before; in the 1956 essay he 
states it outright. 
In doing so, he revisits issues about the relationship between “theory” and “practice” 
that are familiar in the discourse of displacing magic. Such questions directly connect early-
twentieth-century Cuban intellectual endeavors with debates among Kant’s immediate 
intellectual successors. In a marked shift, Ortiz points in “Magic and Religion” toward a 
politics of culture that now leans toward Hegel’s Idealism and away from Schlegel’s 
Romanticism. He no longer suggests that radical change must come through an intoxicating 
loss of consciousness that creates social bonds. Rather, Ortiz gestures toward heightened 
consciousness—theoretical endeavors—as a profoundly transformative experience. In fact, 
he even implies the impossibility among moderns of the lack of consciousness that enables 
collective cohesion among “primitives.” As in the sources from the 1930s and 1940s, the 
dialectic, with its hope for redemption in synthesis, remains the operative model. However, 
“Magic and Religion” privileges Engel’s “subjective dialectics”—the confrontational 
dynamic of thought—over the “objective dialectics” in which the encounter of matter 
primarily determines the human world. As always, theorization of magic and religion assume 
strategic import in the discourse of displacing magic, but in Ortiz’s 1956 essay the theories 
appear as effective actions rather than as means to greater political ends. 
4.
The literal place of “Magic and Religion” makes more apparent Ortiz’s argument in 
the essay for theory as political. Unlike the other essays I have examined, the 1956 piece 
offers no explicit vision of strategic possibilities. Rather, the politics of “Magic and 
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Religion” are implicit in the text’s content as well as in its location. The essay belongs to a 
book and occupies a curious position there. According to Ortiz’s own postscript to “Magic 
and Religion,” he wrote the piece in Havana during July of 1956 and sent it off shortly 
thereafter for inclusion in a project released the following year by a Mexican publishing 
house. Thus, the piece only appears in a 1957 volume dedicated to the honor of Rafael 
Heliodoro Valle, one of Ortiz’s friends and intellectual companions (Romero de Valle 1957). 
Most of the contributors to the honorary volume submitted personal reflections about Valle 
or appreciations of his professional endeavors. Amidst the other pieces in the volume, Ortiz’s 
concise theoretical reflections stand out. That sense of peculiarity only heightens in light of 
the fact that Ortiz surely had plenty to say about Valle. In addition to time they had spent 
together as friends, the two men shared numerous affinities of interest and experience as 
widely admired comrades-in-arms in a half-century of struggle for Latin American economic, 
political, and cultural sovereignty. 
Valle had played many roles in different sites around the world over the first half of 
the twentieth century in a professed commitment to serve his nation and his region. Born in 
Honduras in 1891, Valle had settled in Mexico in 1907 to pursue university and graduate 
studies. After securing an academic appointment at Mexico City’s famous Universidad 
Autónoma Nacional, Valle maintained his primary residence there until his death in 1959. 
His intellectual endeavors varied widely, and he earned recognition throughout Latin 
America for historical studies of the region, frequent essays on culture, journalism, and 
innovative poetic explorations. Despite his deep roots in Mexico, Valle maintained his natal 
allegiances to Honduras. These loyalties carried him abroad in diplomatic roles, including an 
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extended turn in Washington, D.C. between 1949 and 1956 as Honduras’ ambassador to the 
United States. 
In the course of my discussion, I have touched on various details of Ortiz’s personal 
and public life. Clear parallels between Valle and Ortiz emerge on many levels. With so 
many obvious possibilities for prolonged reflection about Valle, why did Ortiz submit an 
unusually short essay that never mentions Valle by name and has no apparent links to him? 
Ortiz was renowned for outsized expressions of admiration toward and acts of support for his 
friends and intellectual companions. Rather, Ortiz clearly intended his peculiar contribution 
to stand on its own as a heartfelt homage to Valle. Thus, the essay’s position in a volume 
dedicated to a tireless social reformer illuminates Ortiz’s conception of the essay as an act of 
social intervention. Ortiz offers a theory as a profoundly political maneuver that circumvents, 
and possibly displaces, traditional politics. Ortiz clearly hoped to connect his theoretical 
piece with Valle’s own struggle for national and regional sovereignty. Both men had entered 
the political sphere, and both had faced challenges there that led to a certain measure of 
disillusionment and, eventually, to retreat from that domain. From that standpoint, Ortiz’s 
theory of theory belongs to an era of Latin American intellectual activity in which culture—
including theories of culture—served as a domain of intervention that replaced more 
traditional political pursuits.  
5.
Still, the cultural politics figured in Ortiz’s 1956 essay differed from earlier 
contributions to the discourse of displacing magic. The particular dialectical perspective of 
“Magic and Religion”—its drift away from a Romantic sensibility and toward Idealism—
272
becomes immediately apparent. Ortiz dedicates most of his short discussion to sharpening the 
distinctions between the two key terms of the title. However, as he does so, he makes a 
simultaneous move toward synthesis. He uses his sharper characterizations of magic and 
religion to collapse major differences between them. Ortiz reconciles these seemingly 
contradictory gestures by arguing that magic and religion are, in fact, “two expressions or 
attitudes” of the same fundamental impulses. In reinforcing a critical point repeated by 
Carpentier, Guillén, and Lachatañeré as well as in his own 1937 and 1939 pieces, Ortiz casts 
human action as fundamentally a quest for power. This pursuit necessarily entails a struggle 
to control external forces. According to Ortiz, religion and magic are distinct manifestations 
of that same will to power, and he suggests that religio—the etymological root of religion—
implies an act of lashing together that illuminates common foundations. From this standpoint, 
the predominant dynamic of “Magic and Religion” is one of unbinding in order to bind 
together again at a more profound level.167
Ortiz mimics his subject in a curious way: By centering his discussion on religio as a 
sign of the human compulsion toward binding, Ortiz separates magic and religion as 
historical phenomena so that he can tie them together again at the level of primordial 
impulses. Thus, his insistence on those binding human compulsions situates his essay 
squarely within the tradition of modern primitivist theory. The primitivism of “Magic and 
Religion” surfaces in the very first clause of the essay when Ortiz identifies the same human 
tendency in two different archaic locations, one chronological (“the most remote times”) and 
the other evolutionary (“the most primitive cultures”). He contends that by looking at those 
167Ortiz’s relative assurance about the etymological root of “religion” is interesting in light of the long-
running disagreements on the issue among scholars of religion. For a helpful review of and contribution to those 
debates, see Smith 1998.
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arches—or ‘openings’—the observer can recognize comparable motivations that arise from 
one undeniable fact: human understanding is inherently limited. Something in the world—in 
fact, most of it—remains mysterious. Accordingly, Ortiz links all human action back to the 
most basic human inclination of all: to confront the world dialectically, first and foremost 
though theoretical knowledge, in an ongoing struggle for control. That process plays out in 
different ways, through different “attitudes,” even as the production of always-tentative 
“knowledge” never fully dissolves the mystery. People are left to fabricate ideas about how 
the world really is and to act accordingly on those very real fictions. 
“Since the most remote times and in the most primitive cultures,” Ortiz begins
the human being, moved at the same time by fear and hope before the mystery 
of nature and its forces and by unavoidable contact, has operated by adopting 
offensive-defensive attitudes that have their own underlying similarities. He 
has tried to dominate and overcome with force or threat, or by enduring or 
adapting himself through submission or supplication. (Ortiz 1957: 249; ¶1)168
According to these terms, the actions of humans—or “man,” in Ortiz’s gendered language—
always correlate to “offensive-defensive attitudes.” This clarification makes the line between 
magic and religion much easier to delineate. Ortiz links magic to “offensive” postures—those 
attempts “to dominate and overcome with force or threat”—while he associates “religion” 
with man’s “defensive” stance of “enduring or adapting himself through submission or 
supplication.” He moves to metaphor to sharpen the contrast:
Magic is the belief in mysterious powers to which one wants to lay hold 
through domination, and in order to locate and propitiate them one has to use 
domineering, compelling, accursed, or conjuring methods. Magic is force and 
law. Religion is the belief in the mysterious supernatural powers to which one 
feels bound by subordination, and in order to propitiate and earn favor from 
them one has to supplicate them through obedient and submissive prayer. 
Religion is grace and justice. (249; ¶1; emphases in original)
168My translation of “Magic and Religion” appears as Appendix C. In citing the essay, I include the 
page reference of the original text followed by the paragraph number of the corresponding translation.
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Still, Ortiz’s initial description emphasizes that, with their common root in “fear and 
hope before the mystery of nature,” these distinct “offensive-defensive attitudes […] have 
their own underlying similarities.” He moves quickly toward that common ground by 
considering the etymological roots of religion. That move enables Ortiz to posit the crucial 
and inextricable connection between divergent “attitudes.” In magic and religion alike, 
people try to control the supernatural in a way that inverts the familiar human-divine 
relationship:
The Latin term religio seems to derive from religare, which signifies ‘to bind’ 
or ‘to tie.’ Generally, one interprets religion as the binding or tying of man as 
slave to supernatural or divine power, which is the Lord. But Westermarck is 
of the opinion that in that regard religio was not man bound to God but rather 
God bound to man. 169  Better is to think that the term religio signified a 
binding of man with superhuman mystery, capable of two expression or 
attitudes. (249; ¶2)
Ortiz reframes his definitions of magic and religion according to this idea that both of the 
“expressions or attitudes” seek to lash divine power to human endeavors instead of vice 
versa. According to his reformulation, magic remains “offensive,” while religion now 
appears as diplomatic rather than merely “defensive”:
If man ties the mysterious potency and dominates it, the binding is magic; if he 
is the bound one, then the binding is religion, more precisely said. That manner 
of conduct, social or political, that is war among people, with the mysterious, is 
magic; this other mode, which in interhuman relations is diplomacy, with the 
mysterious is religion. (249; ¶2)
169The original passage reads “Watermark is of the opinion […].” The reference certainly includes a 
typographical error or a misreading of Ortiz’s handwriting. He undoubtedly alludes to Edvard Alexander 
Westermarck (1862-1939), who was a pioneer in social anthropology. Westermarck was born and raised in 
Finland but spent much of his adult life in England, where he served as Professor of Sociology at the London 
School of Economics and Political Science (simultaneously with an appointment in pratical philosophy at the 
University of Helsinki. Westermarck’s comparative studies of marriage and sexuality functioned as the core of 
his research and the primary source of his fame. The topic also grounded Westermarck’s forays into moral 
philosophy. In his last work, Christianity and Morals (1939), Westermarck critiqued the popular idea that 
Christianity propelled progress with a theological drive toward ultimate truth. Here Ortiz gives his own 
rendering of Westermarck’s controversial argument that the idea of “God” derives from scientific inquiry and 
not vice versa. For more on Westermarck and his theoretical discussions of religion, see Strouop 1982.
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In either case, whether through the belligerency of magic or with the diplomacy of religion, 
people actively try to control “mysterious potency” as it plays in human worlds. 
His turn to etymology allows Ortiz to create the double bind in which religion and 
magic are bound together as acts of binding. He uses the remainder of his short essay to 
reinforce, from different angles, this sense of indissoluble ties. Ortiz switches from 
etymology to genealogy of predominant conceptions of magic and religion. He immediately 
dismisses two influential theories on account of their strict chronological evolutionism, 
which categorically misrecognizes the necessary simultaneity of magic and religion as 
different manifestations of the same struggle:
No longer does the opinion seem acceptable of the famous Frazer, for whom 
magic precedes religion in the development of culture.170 According to him, at 
the beginning there is no religion; it is only and everywhere magic. Nor has 
predominated the theory of P. Schmidt, who takes an inverse perspective; the 
monotheistic religion was first, through divine revelation, and magic was 
nothing but a degeneration [250] of the Adamic truth. (249-50; ¶3)171
Ortiz is more sympathetic to a third view that recognizes the inseparability of magic and 
religion, but he finds fault in the theory’s essentialized characterization of each phenomenon: 
“For Arnold Van Gennep, in his beautiful work Les Rytes de Passage (1909), magic and 
religion—the former as practice and the latter as theory—are indissoluble. It does not seem 
that this is acceptable on account of the distinction between one and the other” (250; ¶3). 
The engagement with Van Gennep’s work is a pivotal moment in Ortiz’s discussion. 
It allows him to rely on the Van Gennep’s authoritative notion that “magic and religion are 
170Ortiz alludes to James George Frazer (1854-1941), author of the monumental The Golden Bough. 
The comparative study of religion was first released in 1890 as two volumes. Frazer continually expanded the 
work until it reached twelve volumes by 1915. The critically acclaimed, one-volume abridgement appeared in 
1922. Refer above to my earlier discussion (pp. 15 and 100f.) of Frazer, including consideration of Jorge Luis 
Borges’s critical use of The Golden Bough.
171Ortiz here refers to P. Wilhelm Schmidt [1868-1954] and his study The Origin and Growth of 
Religion (first published in 1912 and regularly expanded through 1955).
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indissoluble” while turning that idea in another direction. In confronting Van Gennep’s 
objectionable separation of “theory” and “practice,” Ortiz comes to the points he especially 
wants to reinforce. First, he reverses Van Gennep’s move by asserting that conceptualization 
and actualization, like magic and religion, are also inextricably bound. He explains:
There is theory and practice in both; ideas and conceptual systems and also 
technical matters of doing. In magic, force or mana is in the power of the 
magician himself, who knows how to marshal and marshals other extrahuman 
powers compelled to serve; it is not a matter of simple practice. In religion, 
sacred power lies in another, superior power to which one supplicates, at times 
through intermediaries, so that it serves but without making it oblige the 
supplicant; it is not only theory. (250; ¶4)
With this clarification, Ortiz introduces a sense of complexity that he thinks the other 
theories lack. Neither magic nor religion is simple, nor is one simpler than the other. Rather, 
the field of social action is always a perplexing mix of attitudes comprised of different 
components, such as: particular “ideas”; their incorporation into broader “conceptual 
systems”; and, related “technical matters of doing.” Ortiz implies that by distinguishing these 
different modes and their components as if the various elements never interacted together, 
scholars like Frazer, Schmidt, and Van Gennep end up expounding more simplistic “theory” 
than the ostensibly simple-minded phenomena those modern theorists purport to study. 
 However, in his response to Van Gennep, Ortiz also suggests that theory precedes 
practice even if each component surfaces in both attitudes. Practitioners of magic and 
religion alike confront the confusing social field most immediately through ideas about it. 
“Conceptual systems” and “technical matters of doing” only develop in the wake of 
engagement through thought. In other words, “theory” has a structuring force in human 
affairs because it is the means by which people come to terms with the confusion of the 
world, including their own confusing endeavors in it. But Ortiz’s response to Van Gennep 
narrows even further. He suggests that it is not only “theory” that precedes practice in both 
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magic and religion. Rather, specific theories—namely, conceptions of power—take 
precedence before all and really distinguish human endeavors. Thus, he reduces the 
difference between magic and religion to the fundamental notion of where power resides: 
magic rests on the idea that humans have power over the world; religion depends on the idea 
that external forces rule human life. 
With his critical review of theories of religion, Ortiz has spiraled back in more 
focused terms to his initial characterizations of magic and religion. There too he had 
emphasized that both modes unfolded around theories of power that, in turn, enabled systems 
of practice (magic as “domineering, compelling, accursed, or conjuring methods” stemming 
from “the belief in mysterious powers to which one wants to lay hold through domination”; 
religion as “obedient and submissive prayer” inspired by “the belief in the mysterious 
supernatural powers to which one feels bound by subordination”). Now, only two paragraphs 
after presenting those opening characterizations, Ortiz reinforces them as a theoretical 
advance beyond the commonly recognized theories of magic and religion. 
And, as if to prove a point about how those other theories remain simplistic with their 
unwarranted separation of categories, Ortiz immediately begins to call his own critical 
distinctions into question. Theoretical categorization, he suggests, is a powerful yet tentative 
undertaking. Conceptions of power, he goes on to say, are never as clear cut as those that he 
circumscribed in preceding paragraphs. “In the religions with present validity,” he notes, 
“many times the originarily magical concepts coincide and combine with religious ones, 
particularly in the most archaic, transcendental, and sacramental liturgies” (250; ¶4). With 
this new primitivist appeal to “the most archaic, transcendental, and sacramental liturgies”—
which is to say, the ‘purest’ examples of magic and religion in practice—Ortiz once again 
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reiterates points made in his opening paragraph. In this case, he looks back even further, to 
his very first sentence, in which he had laid down the position that impulses—namely, “fear 
and hope before the mystery of nature”—precedes even theory. By his fourth paragraph, 
Ortiz has reduced “offensive-defensive attitudes” to a single “underlying similarity.” Both 
magic and religion are basically “offensive” after all: 
In general every religious act, including the purest prayer, tends to impregnate 
itself with magical sentiment by asserting itself as a consequential ‘certainty,’ 
as if the supernatural powers remain totally obligated to the submissive human 
act and to the repetition of its words, gestures, and rites. (250; ¶4)
Religion obfuscates its will to power through passive aggression while magic, associated 
with “force and law” and “war,” lays bare the assertiveness of its desire to bind non-human 
forces in the struggle for control. 
Ortiz has returned to the notion of “religiosity”—the “biotic desire to overcome”—
ferreted out in his January 1937 talk on “religion in poesía mulata.” He has also reached the 
climax of his short discussion and, accordingly, offers two summary sentences: “In history, 
magic and religion frequently appear almost entirely intertwined, simultaneously or 
alternating. Human progress goes about separating them” (250; ¶4). In other words, he 
underscores the foundational dialectic between impulse and theory. Across the entire course 
of the human enterprise, people operate according to an underlying drive for control in the 
world while they also go about creating categories through which to distinguish their 
fundamentally similar efforts. Ortiz punctuates this point by showing how analysis of magic 
and religion extends to the present-day activities that are pulled apart by theory when, in fact, 
they share with magic and religion—and with each other—a common root in the will to 
power:
Magic continues to transform into science, which is magic already converted 
into human, truthful, and effective power. Religion goes about converting into 
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philosophy, which is the result of the rationalization of the religious. Yesterday 
was magic and religion, tomorrow will be science and philosophy. (250; ¶4)
“Magic” versus religion”; “science” versus “philosophy”; one set of endeavors converting 
into new forms. Ortiz makes a familiar primitivist gesture by posing the trajectory of 
“history” as a move away from primordial unity in a compulsive drive toward differentiation, 
which inevitably produces change. Such is the apparent price of “human progress” as it “goes 
about separating” entities otherwise intimately and indissolubly bound at the level of 
impulse. 
In the fifth and last paragraph of his short essay, Ortiz tries to substantiate further the 
main points in his argument about the dialectic of impulse and theory. He offers a selection 
of cases that demonstrate the complexity of social endeavors. They resist categorization even 
as people seem compelled to that activity as part of the quest for control over the unknown: 
It has come to pass that way among blacks as among whites. For the black 
Congo that we observe in Cuba, nkanga signifies ‘threat’ and its relational 
functions with the supernatural are inextricably like those of magic as well of 
religion. In the rest of the Afroid cults of Cuba, those brought from the 
Sudanese villages of Guinea, the religious rites of propitiation through prayers, 
sacrifices, dances, possessions, and positive and negative observations are 
more differentiated from those that are magical, but they consistently combine 
with them, with rites that are sacramental, divinatory, fetishistic, etc. (250; ¶5)
Still, these “Afroid” traditions, in Cuba as elsewhere, are all examples of the universal human 
attempt to ‘bind up’ external forces and bend them to the will of the practitioner, whether his 
or her practices are called “magic,” “religion,” “science,” “philosophy,” or anything else. 
In that way Plato talked about people that tied up the gods in order to make 
them fulfill the capturer’s wishes. In the Middle Ages they used to celebrate 
certain masses called “Masses of the Saintly Spirit,” with profane and harmful 
objectives, which they believed tied up the will of God Almighty, who had no 
choice but to do what the celebrants asked of Him. And many who were 
incredulous of the gods preserved in their conscience a profound and invincible 
fear of witches. (250; ¶5)
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With these comparisons, Ortiz effectively achieves his goal. He pulls apart this 
propensity to binding—whether manifest as “religion,” as “magic,” or as a more typical 
combination of the two—so that he can tie all of the cases back together again with the 
primordial thread of impulse. Ortiz traces that filament as the invisible line that runs beneath 
the false supernaturalist order that sustains magic and religion and links it to science and 
philosophy and beyond. Accordingly, Ortiz can end his essay with an image of chaos that, in 
light of his identification of the new order organized around “fear and hope before the 
mystery of nature,” is not confusing at all. Ortiz concludes by reiterating the key point from 
his preceding paragraph: “Today, despite the progress of human culture, magic and religion 
still frequently surface intermingled in a confused magma of heteroclite ideas or in 
alternating situations or moments” (250-51). But by now we know that the jumble of ideas 
that appears at unpatterned times recurs according to another logic, one guided by the same 
will to make the forces of the world serve the practitioner regardless of the different means 
he might use and despite his divergent conceptions of the nature of those forces. From 
beginning to end, “Magic and Religion” puts the primitivism of theory on display.
6.
Still, Ortiz’s essay—even in its brevity and with its clear primitivism—is far from 
simple. In fact, Ortiz’s ostensible primitivity exposes “Magic and Religion” as a deliberate 
trick and places the article directly in the tradition of displacing magic. The essay turns back 
on itself and on its author and implicates both in an ongoing struggle for power. After all, 
“Magic and Religion” opens with and repeatedly reinforces the primitivist assertion that 
“since the most remote times and in the most primitive cultures, the human being, moved at 
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the same time by fear and hope before the mystery of nature and its forces and by 
unavoidable contact, has operated by adopting offensive-defensive attitudes.” Ortiz never 
disavows—and, in fact, openly situates his own efforts as consistent with—those timeless 
impulses and their resultant “attitudes.” He leaves no way to distance himself from his claim 
about animating motivations except by denying his own status as “human being.” Soon 
enough, “Magic and Religion” makes the self-reflexivity explicit by casting “science” and 
“philosophy” as contemporary manifestations of a basic quest for power. Ortiz makes the 
implications clear: his essay, as an engagement with and contribution to social scientific 
theory, should be taken as a form of science as well as philosophy; accordingly, “Magic and 
Religion” internalizes aspects of both of the key terms of its title. As science, the essay 
contains traces of “magic already converted into human, truthful, and effective power”; as 
theory, or a form of philosophy, the article also unfolds as a kind of “rationalization of the 
religious.” 
But, of course, those same sentences about the common roots of magic, religion, 
science and philosophy also reveal that Ortiz distances the latter two modes—and, by 
extension, his own scientific and philosophical endeavors—from the first two attitudes. Once 
again, he is engaged in displacing magic. Even if the expected undertakings of “tomorrow” 
mimic the familiar enterprises of “yesterday” as “offensive-defensive” means through which 
to bind superhuman mystery to man, that mimicry of “attitudes” necessarily alters the 
original forms. Ortiz emphasizes the changes that results from the propensity in “human 
progress” to differentiate, to “go about separating” fundamentally bound entities.” Magic 
continues to transform into science”; “religion goes about converting into philosophy.” 
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The passage also reveals Ortiz’s ambivalent view of the differentiating and 
transforming compulsion that leads magic and religion toward science and philosophy. In 
highlighting the mixtures between and transformations of magic and religion, Ortiz displays 
a palpably unsympathetic tone toward the sensibility that inhabits both expressions. By 
“impregnat[ing] itself with magical sentiment,” religion falls into magic’s fatal trap of self-
aggrandizement; in mimicking magical endeavors, “every religious act” overestimates its 
own power in fallaciously “asserting itself as a consequential ‘certainty,’ as if the 
supernatural powers remain totally obligated to the submissive human act and to the 
repetition of its words, gestures, and rites.” By adding a qualifying “as if,” Ortiz poses the 
magico-religious conception of “supernatural powers” as presumptuous and misguided. He 
extends his critique of magic and religion’s exaggerated sense of power to science and 
philosophy as well. As an assertion of “human, truthful, and effective power,” science also 
seems to take itself too seriously. Philosophy makes a similar mistake as it tries to re-enact 
religion’s false “submission” to external forces that it actually seeks to control by 
understanding and then propitiating them. 
Thus, in the space of a short paragraph on the jumbled but inextricable ties between 
magic, religion, science, and philosophy, Ortiz’s essay simultaneously aligns itself with and 
distances itself from each of those “expressions” of the primordial will to power. Just as 
magic and religion engage the world dialectically though theory and practice, Ortiz’s brand 
of scientific-philosophic theory mimics its subjects by working on magic and religion—and, 
in turn, on science and philosophy—in order to transcend them. The essay posits an archaic 
ground of unity that can never be fully recovered due to the relentless drive in “human 
progress” to differentiate. Nor would Ortiz want human culture to collapse back entirely into 
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that point of origin since the result would be blind fear and ambition or, in a word, anomie.172
Ortiz’s essay implies that awareness of and reflection on primordial impulses is necessary to 
direct them toward logical and productive ends. Without self-reflexivity, the underlying will 
to power drifts toward the self-aggrandizement—and even self-destruction—that, according 
to Ortiz, plagues even contemporary science and philosophy. 
Ortiz positions his own essay as an example of what the world needs now: a new
combination of science and philosophy, namely, a theory-based practical system that is aware 
of its own magical and religious sensibilities. “Magic and Religion” points to and poses itself 
as the beginning of a new order. And, in working on magic and religion (and science and 
philosophy) in order to internalize their rightly directed drive and overcome their myopia, 
Ortiz’s short piece situates itself most closely with magic. As an active attempt to intervene 
in the march of “human progress” and to direct its theoretical differentiations toward its own 
will, “Magic and Religion” pursues “force and law” more than “grace and justice.” With all 
of its simultaneous associations and disassociations, the essay asserts itself as displacing 
magic. Like the earlier examples from Cuban intellectual discourse of the preceding decades, 
the piece is an open trick: it calls attention to its own ambitions and its own devices. 
Nevertheless, the essay represents a different strain of displacing magic. With the 
reflexivity by which the essay affirms its practical impact as theory, “Magic and Religion” 
mimics the dynamics of Idealist dialectics. It gives epistemological primacy to the order of 
representation and then situates itself in that sphere as implicitly interventionist. As theory—
and especially as a primitivist theory of theory—Ortiz’s essay casts itself as an aesthetic 
172For more on the foundational importance of the notion of anomie to articulations of modernity, see 
Christopher Herbert’s (1991) enlightening genealogy of and readings around the formation of the culture 
concept.
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maneuver that engages the failings of contemporary society and offers another avenue for 
political action outside of traditional politics.
But whether Ortiz’s project in this case falls closer to Hegel than Schlegel, Ortiz’s 
return to the fundamental questions regarding the status of knowledge necessarily 
differentiates him from the German intellectuals who preceded him by one-and-a-half 
centuries. Mimicry never exactly reproduces what it copies, and the transformation of Ortiz’s 
objects of imitation—theories of religion, magic, Romanticism, Idealism, Marxism—is 
precisely what he seeks. Alterity is the objective of his openly mimetic trick. And, in that 
way, “Magic and Religion” encapsulates modern Latin American intellectual endeavors and 
especially the early-twentieth-century discourse of displacing magic. As a reflection on 
ambivalent bindings, Ortiz’s short 1956 essay reveals his own ambivalent ties with the 
cultural and political legacies that converge on and in Cuba and Latin America.
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APPENDIX A:
TRANSLATION OF ALEJO CARPENTIER’S “PROLOGUE” TO EL REINO DE ESTE MUNDO173
…What must be understood concerning this matter of being transformed into 
wolves is that there is an illness that the doctors call wolf madness.
-The Works of Persiles and Segismunda
¶1 At the end of 1943 I had the good fortune to visit the kingdom of Henri Christophe—
the ruins, so poetic, of Sans Souci; the imposing bulk of the Citadel of La Ferrière, 
intact in spite of thunderbolts and earthquakes—and to discover Ciudad del Cabo, 
still Norman to this day—the Cap Français of the former colony—where a street of 
very long balconies leads to a stone palace once occupied by Pauline Bonaparte. 
Having felt the indisputable charm of the Haitian landscape, having found magical 
portents in the red roads of the Central Plateau, and heard the drums of the Voodoo 
gods Petro and Rada, I was moved to compare the marvelous reality I had recently 
experienced with that exhausting attempt to invoke the marvelous which has 
characterized certain European literatures of the last thirty years. The marvelous, 
pursued in old prints of the forest of Brocelianda, of the knights of the Round Table, 
the wizard Merlin and the Arthurian cycle. The marvelous, pathetically evoked in the 
skills and deformities of fairground characters—will the young French poets never 
tire of the freaks and clowns of the circus, to which Rimbaud had already bade 
farewell in his Alchimie du verbe? The marvelous, produced by means of conjuring 
tricks, bringing together objects which would normally never meet: the old and 
fraudulent story of the chance encounter of the umbrella and the sewing machine on 
an operating table, which spawned the ermine spoons, snails in a rainy taxi, and the 
lion’s head in a widow’s pelvis of the Surrealist exhibitions. Or even the marvelous in 
literature: the kind of de Sade’s Juliette, Jarry’s supermale, Lewis’s monk, the blood-
curdling theatrical props of the English Gothic novel: ghosts, walled-up priests, 
werewolves, hands nailed to the doors of castles.
¶2 But, determined to invoke the marvelous at any cost, the miracle workers turn into 
bureaucrats. Calling on timeworn formulae which reduce certain painting to a 
predictable jumble of drooping timepieces, dressmakers’ dummies, and vague phallic 
monuments, the marvelous is consigned to the umbrella or lobster or sewing machine, 
or whatever it may be, on an operating table, in the interior of a desolate room, in a 
desert of rocks. Imaginative poverty, Unamuno said, consists in learning codes by 
heart. And today there exist codes of the fantastic—based on the principle of the 
donkey devoured by a fig, proposed by the Chants de Maldoror as the supreme 
173The following translation is based on the “Prólogo” included in Carpentier 1964. The text appeared 
in the original, 1949 edition of El reino de este mundo (Mexico City: E.D.I.A.P.S.A.). An earlier version of the 
Reino “Prologue” appeared in El Nacional (Caracas) on April 8, 1948. The translation here closely follows the 
English version by Heather Martin included in Carpentier 1990. I have revised Martin’s version in places.
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inversion of reality—to which we owe many “children threatened by nightingales,” or 
Andre Masson's “horses devouring birds.” But note that when Andre Masson wanted 
to draw the jungle of the island of Martinique, with its incredible tangle of plants and 
the obscene promiscuity of certain of its fruits, the prodigious truth of the subject
devoured the painter, leaving him all but impotent before the blank paper. And it was 
left to a painter from America, the Cuban Wilfredo Lam, to show us the magic of 
tropical vegetation, the unbridled Creation of Forms of our nature—with all its 
metamorphoses and symbioses—in monumental canvases of an expressiveness 
unique in contemporary painting.174 Confronted by the disconcerting imaginative 
poverty of a Tanguy, for example, who for twenty-five years has painted the same 
petrified larvae beneath the same grey sky, I am moved to repeat a dictum which 
filled the first crop of Surrealists with pride: “You who do not see, think of those who 
do.” There are still too many “adolescents who find pleasure in violating the corpses 
of beautiful women who have recently died,” (Lautreamont), without realizing that 
the truly remarkable thing would be to violate the living. But what many forget, in 
disguising themselves as cheap magicians, is that the marvelous becomes 
unequivocally marvelous when it arises from an unexpected alteration of reality (a 
miracle), a privileged revelation of reality, an unaccustomed or singularly favorable 
illumination of the previously unremarked riches of reality, an amplification of the 
measures and categories of reality, perceived with particular intensity due to an 
exaltation of the spirit which elevates it to a kind of ‘limit state.’ First of all, the sense 
of the marvelous presupposes a faith. Those who do not believe in saints will not be 
cured by the miracles of saints, nor will those who are not Don Quixotes be able to 
enter body and soul into the world of Amadís de Gaul or Tirant lo Blanc. Certain 
statements made by Rutilio in Los trabajos de Persiles y Segismunda about men 
being transformed into wolves are entirely trustworthy, because in Cervantes’ time it 
was believed that people could be afflicted with wolf madness. Likewise the journey 
of the character from Tuscany to Norway on a witch’s cloak. Marco Polo accepted 
that certain birds could fly carrying elephants in their claws, and Luther came face to 
face with the devil and threw an inkwell at his head. Victor Hugo, so exploited by the 
bookkeepers of the fantastic, believed in spirits, because he was convinced that he 
had spoken, in Guernsey, to the ghost of Lèopoldine. It was sufficient for Van Gogh 
to believe in the Sunflower to fix his revelation on canvas. Thus the marvelous born 
of disbelief—as in the long years of Surrealism—was never more than a literary ruse, 
as tedious, after a time as certain brand of ‘ordered’ oneiric literature, certain eulogies 
of madness, with which we are all too familiar. But this is not, of course, to concede 
the argument to those who advocate a return to the real—a term which acquires, 
then, a gregariously political meaning—who do nothing more than substitute for the 
magician’s tricks the commonplaces of the committed man of letters or the 
eschatological humor of certain existentialists. But it is undoubtedly true that there is 
scant defense for poets and artists who praise sadism without practicing it, who 
admire a miraculous virility on account of their own impotence, who invoke spirits 
174Note with what prestige the works of Wilfredo Lam stand out, in their profound originality, among 
those of other painters collected in the special issue–an overview of modern art–published in 1946 by Cahiers 
d’Art [author’s note in original].
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without believing in spells, and who found secret societies, literary sects, vaguely 
philosophical groups, with saints and signs and arcane objectives—never attained—
without being able to conceive of a valid mysticism or abandon their petty habits in 
order to gamble their souls on the fearful card of faith.
¶3 This became particularly clear to me during my stay in Haiti, where I found myself in 
daily contact with something which might be called the marvelous in the real. I was 
treading on land where thousands of men anxious for freedom had believed in the 
lycanthropic powers of Macandal, to the point where this collective faith produced a 
miracle on the day of his execution. I already knew the extraordinary tale of 
Bouckman, the Jamaican initiate. I had been in the Citadel of La Ferrière, a work 
without architectural antecedents, foreshadowed only in the Imaginary Prisons of 
Piranesi. I had breathed the atmosphere created by Henri Christophe, a monarch of 
incredible exploits, far more astonishing than all the cruel kings invented by the 
Surrealists, so fond of tyrannies of the imaginary variety, although they never had to 
endure them in reality. At every step I encountered the marvelous in the real. But I 
also thought that the presence and prevalence of this marvelous reality was not a 
privilege unique to Haiti, but the patrimony of the whole of America, where there has 
yet to be drawn up, for example, a complete list of cosmogonies. The fantastic is to be 
found at every stage in the lives of men who inscribed dates on the history of the 
Continent and who left names still borne to this day: from those who sought the 
Fountain of Eternal Youth, from the golden city of Manoa, to the first rebels or the 
modern heroes of our wars of independence of such mythological stamp as the 
colonel's wife, Juana de Azurduy. It has always seemed significant to me that, in 
1780, some Spanish wise men, setting sail from Angostura, should still embark on a 
quest for El Dorado, and that, at the time of the French Revolution—long live Reason 
and the Supreme Being!—Francisco Menendez from Compostela should wander 
through the lands of Patagonia in search of the Enchanted City of the Caesars. 
Considering another aspect of the question, it is clear that, whereas in Western 
Europe folk dance, for instance, has lost all magical or invocatory character, rare is 
the collective dance in America that does not incorporate a deep ritualistic meaning, 
becoming almost a ceremony of initiation: such as the dances of the Cuban santería, 
or the extraordinary negro version of the festival of Corpus Christi, which can still be 
seen in the town of San Francisco de Yare, in Venezuela.
¶4 There is a moment, in the sixth of the Chants de Maldoror, when the hero, pursued by 
all the police in the world, escapes from an “army of agents and spies” by adopting 
the form of different animals and making use of his gift of being able to transport 
himself in an instant to Peking, Madrid or Saint Petersburg. This is “fantastic 
literature” at its most uninhibited. But in America, where nothing similar has been 
written, there existed a Macandal endowed with these same powers by the faith of his 
contemporaries, and who inspired, with that magic, one of the strangest and most 
dramatic uprisings in History. Maldoror—Ducasse himself confesses it—was never 
anything more than a “poetic Rocambole.” His only legacy was a literary school of 
ephemeral duration. The American Macandal, on the other hand, left behind a whole 
mythology, along with magical hymns, preserved by an entire people, which are still 
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sung in Voodoo ceremonies.175 (There is, besides, a strange coincidence in the fact 
that Isidore Ducasse, a man who had an exceptional instinct for the fantastic and the 
poetic, should have been born in America and have boasted, so insistently, at the end 
of one of his songs, of being “the Montevidean.”) And the point is that, because of its 
virginal landscape, its formation, its ontology, the Faustian presence of both Indian 
and Negro, the Revelation represented by its recent discovery, and the fertile 
interbreeding it has fostered, America is far from having drained its well of 
mythologies.
¶5 Without any systematic intention on my part, the text that follows is concerned with 
this sort of preoccupation. In it is narrated a sequence of extraordinary happenings 
which took place on the island of Santo Domingo, in the space of a period which does 
not equal the span of a man's life, allowing the marvelous to flow freely from a reality 
precise in all its details. Because it must be stressed that the ensuing story is based on 
the most rigorous documentation, which not only respects the historical truth of 
events, the names of characters—including secondary ones—places and even streets, 
but which conceals, beneath its apparent intemporality, a meticulous collation of 
dates and chronologies. And yet, because of the dramatic singularity of the events, the 
fantastic elegance of the characters encountered at a given moment at the enchanted 
crossroads of the Ciudad del Cabo, everything seems fabulous in a story impossible to 
situate in Europe, and which is nonetheless just as real as any exemplary incident 
consigned, for the purposes of pedagogy, to scholarly textbooks. But what is the 
history of America if not a chronicle of the marvelous in the real?
175See Jacque Roumain, Le sacrifice du Tambour Assoto [author’s note in original].
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APPENDIX B: 
TRANSLATION OF FERNANDO ORTIZ’S “‘BRUJOS’ OR ‘SANTEROS”176
This work appears with special tribute to Dr. Fernando Ortiz, founder and president 
of the Society of Afro-Cuban Studies, who initiated in 1906 this research in Cuba. 
Since Mr. Rómulo Lachatañeré treats the original work of Fernando Ortiz, Los 
Negros Brujos, we have asked its author for some notes in relation to the commentary 
in [Lachatañeré's] present study, and he has put together for us [nos ha remitido]
some appended remarks [acotaciones] that we will publish at the end of 
[Lachatañeré’s] study with the title “‘Brujos’ or ‘Santeros’” (Director's note).
¶1 [193] Lachatañeré's thesis of not accepting the denomination of brujería to signify the 
religions of Afro-Cubans is really very laudable. As schools of anthropology 
essentially do not distinguish religion from magic and one and the other continue to 
be pretty much mixed, it seems unacceptable today that both concepts are confused in 
such a way.  And we have to make an effort to see that the term santería, which is a 
legitimate and well-formed cubanismo, be accepted to designate the religious systems 
of Afro-Cubans. But some clarifications seem advisable, above all from a personal 
point of view. Let us address these first. 
¶2 My book Los negros brujos was published in 1906, having been composed by me 
between 1902 and 1905.  Of these years, I spent three in Italy and only one in 
Havana, where I began my direct research.  It is true that, like Dr. Nina Rodrigues had 
done shortly before in Brazil, I arrived at the ethnographic study of Cuba from the 
camp of criminal anthropology, with which I had my most fervent attachments.
Perhaps some personal memories would not be inopportune.
¶3 In 1901 I finished in Madrid my university degree, which I had begun in 1895 in 
Havana, my natal city. During my stay of one year in Madrid and at the Sociological 
Institute organized by Sales y Ferré, we reviewed excitedly the recently published 
book, La mala vida en Madrid [Criminal Life in Madrid], by Constancio Bernardo de 
Quirós, the famous criminologist who subsequently, due to the silly vicissitudes of 
luck, had to leave Spain and can now be found as a professor nearby at the University 
of Santo Domingo [Dominican Republic]. I was then known in that group of young 
students for my criminological commitments. [194] My doctoral dissertation, which 
earned from the Tribunal the singular vote of three highest commendations against 
two failures, had been on a positivist thesis, and for these reasons obliged me to 
comment there on Bernardo de Quirós's book and to distinguish its contents from the 
'bad life' (la mala vida) in Havana. I felt worried because very little did I know of the 
tricky affair; but I acquitted myself gracefully by talking of something so exotic there 
as that which is published in Trujillo Monagas's work Los criminales de Cuba [The 
176This translation is my own. The original text appeared as Ortiz 1939. The translation is based on the 
reprint of the essay (Ortiz 1993a). Bracketed in-text numbers correspond to page breaks in the reprint.
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Criminals of Cuba] and that which I had seen in the Madrid museum, Ultramar, where 
some suits of diablitos, instruments, and the rest of the accessories were kept of the 
secret societies that had such theatrical fame during the colonial period. But in reality 
I knew nothing for sure of the ñáñigos, and from that point I proposed to myself to 
study them and to write a book that would be titled La mala vida en La Habana
[Criminal Life in Havana] and to include a chapter on ñáñiguismo as one of its most 
conspicuous chapters.
¶4 Upon my return to Cuba, I thought that my criminological work would be a thing of a 
few months; but I soon realized my error. Havana had very peculiar issues in its mala 
vida, derived from its singular history and from the cultural conglomeration of white, 
black, and yellow peoples at its base. Facing these difficulties, which would demand a 
very long time, I joined with two good friends and distinguished writers of those 
years to write, among the three of us, the projected book. Miguel de Carrón, the fine 
novelist, was charged with studying the aspects of Havana prostitution, and the 
acerbic journalist Mario Muñoz Bustamante took charge of the examination of 
mendicancy. But the book about La mala vida en La Habana, with it attractive title 
and its alluring content, is still to be written. I offer the theme to any young and 
daring writing. Those companions died soon thereafter, and through another turn of 
fortune, I went for a stop in the land of César Lombroso and Enrico Ferri, with some 
information but without having written a line.
¶5 I had not even initiated the study of the ñañigos when I came to understand that I 
would have to separate them from the brujos, as one commonly called them and calls 
them still. One and the other were confused, and both terms are still scrambled 
although they are expressive of very different things. And for that reason I continued 
to gather information for my study of the ñañigos, and I dedicated myself to 
substantiating my initial findings about the brujos. (Forty years of labor already have 
now gone by.)
¶6 In these kinds of religious affairs it is known that every priest believes himself 
repository of the only certain religion, of 'the true truth,' of the Truth with capital 'T,' 
and [considers] heterodox priesthoods wastebaskets of the worst ways, which for [the 
orthodox] are malicious, inspired by the spirits of evil, by demons, by the numens 
[númenes] of enemy tribes, etcetera. For that reason, in the [195] vernacular tongue of 
Cuba, the black who had any relation with the supernatural would commonly be 
called brujo, which was the term that was much in vogue in Spain and the Indies 
since the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, when in the Iberian peninsula there 
were more witches than those later counted in Afro-American groups. One only has 
to read the ecclesiastical writings of that period, the proceedings of the Inquisition, 
the treatises on moral theology, and the literary satires to see how full of brujería 
Spanish culture was with many of the essential attributes that one says are 
characteristic of Afro-American brujería, such as the magic, exorcisms, trances, 
possessions, ecstasies, spells, incantations, orations, amulets, charms, ‘evil eye,’ 
curses, psalmodies, and dances, up to the sporadic aberrations of cannibalism and 
necrophilia as well as with other fantastic or lubricious characteristics that never were 
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known among Negroids, such as flights on brooms, nocturnal Witches’ Sabbaths, 
Satanic orgies, the freakishness of incubus and succubus creatures, and the prodigious 
rest in Catholic theory. As non-believers, such white brujerías were piously burned at 
the stake. Upon being transplanted to the lands of the Americas, the religion of the 
whites of Castile deemed those who did not take communion as:  'infidels,’ if they 
had never been baptized (like the Indians, Moors, and Jews); 'heretics' or 'apostates' if, 
having become Christians, they renounced the papacy or accepted whichever other 
dogma (like the Protestants, Huguenots, Molinists, Jansenists, Illuminists, etc.); and, 
finally, 'magicians,’ divided into brujos and hechiceros, if they had a direct treaty 
with the demons to create supernatural miracles against the mandates of the Church.  
¶7 Given the general ignorance of the matter, the term 'brujería' prevailed to signify the 
magic of blacks, and the word 'hechicería' for the magic of whites. Since then, 
thousands of poor devils accused as brujos died in the dungeons and the autos de fe of 
the Santo Oficio because, in 1484 –a bit before the discovery of America– Pope 
Innocent VIII, with his bull Summis desiderantes afffectibus, fulminated on the most 
terrible canonical penalties and inquisitional persecutions against brujería. The 
Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries were precisely when all of Spain was at its 
fullest with brujos and with demons. Until a king died from a spell. Logically, then, 
when in the Antilles, before the Sixteenth Century ended, they began to discover 
certain mysterious rites among black slaves, with strange liturgies and exotic music, 
and with unintelligible sing-song, the same vocabulary was applied to them as was 
applied in Spain to those analogous rites persecuted by the Inquisition.
¶8 For the white Catholic, all of the black cults were brujería, an abominable thing 
inspired by demons for the ruin of human beings. In its expression was that same 
disdain that, in days gone by, was unanimous among the believers of one African cult 
against those of another. To the babalao, he who practiced mayombe or kimbisa was a 
brujo. It is curious to observe how [196] still, among Catholic priests as well as 
among santeros, those who are not believers in their religion are typically classified 
as Jews, a word that in those centuries when it was seeping into the language of Cuba 
was one of the most abominable words in religious matters in every ambit of the 
Hispanic domain. And the pejorative word continued –and continues– in common 
use. It does not pertain to a racial prejudice but rather to one of originally 
ecclesiastical character; but undoubtedly ethnophobias reinforce it and help to 
maintain it. Therefore, the evident syncretisms of the Catholic with the African cults 
and the frequent dichotomy that is customarily made in Cuba between certain 
clergymen and certain blacks of the so-called brujos, when they try to form rites and 
prayers from one of the popular figures: for example, we could take an oration with 
the name of Ochún as one dedicated to the Virgin of Charity, which for the mixed 
masses of Cuba is essentially the same supernatural entity with diverse names.
¶9 Actually, the best treatment that the black and his things will continue to receive, 
apart from the general cultural expansion making itself known in Cuba, would come 
from the substitution of the term santería for the word brujería; and this is very 
plausible because it tends to cast away inexcusable incomprehensions and indecent 
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diversions. In the end, the term santero is a very traditional word that appears in old 
dictionaries to signify someone devoted to the icons of a superstitious and indiscreet 
cult. Without a doubt, it was originally applied by those same Spanish clergy to the 
blacks that in their confraternities [cabildos] venerated Mersé, Caridá, or Saint 
Barbara with unorthodox rites. With the word santero one expressed also something 
ecclesiastically disdainful and indecent in relation to the proper ritual conduct ‘as God 
mandates’; but in its pejorative sense it did not arrive—not even closely—at the 
slanderous meaning of the word brujo. The santero is a mistaken one who adores 
celestial and good entities; the brujo is a pervert who adores infernal and evil entities.
¶10 Upon entering the study of the Afro-Cuban through the path of his typical relations 
with the supernatural, I adopted for my book the expression, technically and 
philosophically improper but vernacularly and socially precise; if then it is true that 
the word expressed confusion, this same confusion is already by itself a social 
phenomenon that was important to clear up. And later, in the course of my essay I try 
to go about separating, in the group of so-called brujos, the functions of the priest, 
those of the doctor, and those of the fortune teller, and, after that, the criminal aspects 
in which at times those activities can manifest; not only those activities strictly of 
brujería or of black magic but rather all of the tendencies of antisocials, such as the 
false miracle, the capricious bilongo, the fraudulent okpelé, and illicit healing 
practices. Realities such as these arise—one cannot deny—among whites and blacks 
alike because pigmentations have nothing to do with credulities and mischief. 
¶11 Today, there is no doubt that at times in the most marginalized sectors of the ancestral 
traditions there are skeptical or exceedingly gullible subjects, [197] who, by believing 
in everything or by not believing concretely in anything, sing to Babalú Ayé, light 
incense to Saint Lazarus, or prepare –for anyone who will pay– a spell to ‘lasso in’ a 
good catch that acts elusive [un embrujo para ‘amarrar’ a una Buena moza que se 
muestra esquiva]. This occurs in the peripheral zones of all social groups. In 
validating the example, I can assure that I knew a sacristan of a rural parish church 
who helped with mass, then ‘threw the shells’ in his house, and on holy occasions 
climbed to the bell tower to ring the two bells for the procession of the Virgin with 
the rhythmic sandungueo of the falaguera toque for the goddess Ochún.
¶12 Thus, all of the magico-religious phenomenology of the black was considered by the 
white as brujería, such that every black priesthood of Africa—whose magic, not 
being orthodox ‘as God mandates,’ conspires with the spirit of evil—qualifies as 
‘dangerous heretics’ to the priests of the subordinating and outsider, or rival, religion. 
In the same way that, for still more complex reasons but socially analogous, all of the 
mass of black African slaves, because of the exoticism of all of their customs and 
languages, was considered by dominating whites as included—ipso facto—in the 
social category of ‘the bad life.’ This is all to say, the life not accepted as good, which 
is—naturally!—that of the group that is socially predominant and politically and 
legally coercive. These things can be comprehended more easily today, after forty 
years of research on Africa and with numerous museums and journals of Afrology 
now covering the most diverse aspects of black populations. And, above all, the great 
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awakening of the dispossessed in this twentieth century has diffused greatly the 
elemental and basic criteria of the social evolution and of the determinism of their 
factors, which favors objective comprehension. Afro-Cuban Studies has to feel very 
satisfied that the figure of Rómulo Lachatañeré, already acclaimed for a book treating 
the folklore of Lucumí mythology in Cuba, would dedicate his efforts to these 
ethnographic aspects, as much or even more indispensable to the knowledge of the 
national soul of Cuba than the episodes of the Romencero del Cid or the picaresque 
life of Rinconete and Cortadillo.
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APPENDIX C: 
TRANSLATION OF FERNANDO ORTIZ’S “MAGIC AND RELIGION”177
¶1 [249] Since the most remote times and in the most primitive cultures, the human 
being, moved at the same time by fear and hope before the mystery of nature and its 
forces and by unavoidable contact, has operated by adopting offensive-defensive 
attitudes that have their own underlying similarities. He has tried to dominate and 
overcome with force or threat, or by enduring or adapting himself through submission 
or supplication. Magic is the belief in mysterious powers to which one wants to lay 
hold through domination, and in order to locate and propitiate them one has to use 
domineering, compelling, accursed, or conjuring methods. Magic is force and law. 
Religion is the belief in the mysterious supernatural powers to which one feels bound 
by subordination, and in order to propitiate and earn favor from them one has to 
supplicate them through obedient and submissive prayer. Religion is grace and 
justice.
¶2 The Latin term religio seems to derive from religare, which signifies ‘to bind’ or ‘to 
tie.’ Generally, one interprets religion as the binding or tying of man as slave to 
supernatural or divine power, which is the Lord. But Westermarck is of the opinion 
that in that regard religio was not man bound to God but rather God bound to man.178
Better is to think that the term religio signified a binding of man with superhuman 
mystery, capable of two expression or attitudes. If man ties the mysterious potency 
and dominates it, the binding is magic; if he is the bound one, then the binding is 
religion, more precisely said. That manner of conduct, social or political, that is war 
among people, with the mysterious, is magic; this other mode, which in interhuman 
relations is diplomacy, with the mysterious is religion.
¶3 No longer does the opinion seem acceptable of the famous Frazer, for whom magic 
precedes religion in the development of culture. According to him, at the beginning 
there is no religion; it is only and everywhere magic. Nor has predominated the 
theory of P. Schmidt, who takes an inverse perspective; the monotheistic religion was 
first, through divine revelation, and magic was nothing but a degeneration [250] of 
the Adamic truth. For Arnold Van Gennep, in his beautiful work Les Rytes de 
Passage (1909), magic and religion—the former as practice and the latter as theory—
are indissoluble. It does not seem that this is acceptable on account of the distinction 
between one and the other. There is theory and practice in both; ideas and conceptual 
systems and also technical matters of doing. In magic, force or mana is in the power 
of the magician himself, who knows how to marshal and marshals other extrahuman 
177Original source information: Ortiz 1957. All translations are my own. All italicized words appear in 
bold emphasis in the original text. Bracketed in-text numbers mark the beginning of pages in the original.
178The original text incorrectly reads “Watermark” instead of “Westermarck.” See n. 169 above for 
more on this error and on Westermarck.
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powers compelled to serve; it is not a matter of simple practice. In religion, sacred 
power lies in another, superior power to which one supplicates, at times through 
intermediaries, so that it serves but without making it oblige the supplicant; it is not 
only theory. 
¶4 Still in the religions with present validity, many times the originarily magical 
concepts coincide and combine with religious ones, particularly in the most archaic, 
transcendental, and sacramental liturgies; and in general every religious act, including 
the purest prayer, tends to impregnate itself with magical sentiment by asserting itself 
as a consequential ‘certainty,’ as if the supernatural powers remain totally obligated 
to the submissive human act and to the repetition of its words, gestures, and rites. In 
history, magic and religion frequently appear almost entirely intertwined, 
simultaneously or alternating. Human progress goes about separating them. Magic 
continues to transform into science, which is magic already converted into human, 
truthful, and effective power. Religion goes about converting into philosophy, which 
is the result of the rationalization of the religious. Yesterday was magic and religion, 
tomorrow will be science and philosophy. 
¶5 It has come to pass that way among blacks as among whites. For the black Congo that 
we observe in Cuba, nkanga signifies ‘threat’ and its relational functions with the 
supernatural are inextricably like those of magic as well of religion. In the rest of the 
Afroid cults of Cuba, those brought from the Sudanese villages of Guinea, the 
religious rites of propitiation through prayers, sacrifices, dances, possessions, and 
positive and negative observations are more differentiated from those that are 
magical, but they consistently combine with them, with rites that are sacramental, 
divinatory, fetishistic, etc. In that way Plato talked about people that tied up the gods 
in order to make them fulfill the capturer’s wishes. In the Middle Ages they used to 
celebrate certain masses called “Masses of the Saintly Spirit,” with profane and 
harmful objectives, which they believed tied up the will of God Almighty, who had 
no choice but to do what the celebrants asked of Him. And many who were 
incredulous of the gods preserved in their conscience a profound and invincible fear 
of witches. Today, despite the progress of human culture, [251] magic and religion 
still frequently surface intermingled in a confused magma of heteroclite ideas or in 
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